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FRENCH SERIES

VOLUME II

ANGLO-FRENCH
BOUNDARY DISPUTES
IN THE WEST
1749-1763

17^{me} Juin 1761.

Monsieur Le Duc De Choiseul propose a
Monsieur Stanley: il demande la restitution
de la Guadeloupe et de Marie Galante, ainsi
que celle de Gorée pour l'Isle de Minorque,
il propose la cession entière du Canada a
l'exception de l'Isle Royale ou il ne sera point
etablé de fortification, et pour cette cession la
France demande la conservation de la Pêche
de morue telle qu'elle est établie dans le
Traité d'Utrecht: et une fixation des limites
du Canada dans la partie de l'Ohio deter-
minée par les eaux pendantes, et fixée si
clairement par le Traité qu'il ne puisse plus
y avoir aucune contestation entre les deux
Nations par rapport aux dites limites. La
France rendra ce que ces armées ont conquises
en Allemagne sur les Alliés Britanniques.

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VOLUME XXVII

FRENCH SERIES, VOLUME II

ANGLO-FRENCH
BOUNDARY DISPUTES
IN THE WEST
1749-1763

EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES BY

THEODORE CALVIN PEASE

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

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PREFACE

This volume undertakes to assemble the documentary material essential to the illustration of the boundary controversies between Great Britain and France in the region of the Mississippi and the Great Lakes in the era of the Seven Years' War. Since diplomatic documents cover wide ranges of interests it has been necessary to extract from long documents the relatively small portions germane to the question in hand. To counteract the inevitable distortion and overemphasis on one phase of wide negotiations, the introduction is much more general in its outlook, and much longer than usual. In fact it is in a sense the story of the Franco-English diplomacy of the Seven Years' War.

The preparation of the volume was made possible by a grant-in-aid from the Social Science Research Council and a sabbatical leave February–September, 1933 from the University of Illinois which enabled me to do my editorial work in the selection of materials abroad. The funds of the Illinois Historical Survey, as a branch of the Graduate School of the University of Illinois, have enabled the procuring of photostats to supplement my personal efforts. For the expenditure of these funds to the best possible advantage grateful acknowledgments are due to M. Abel Doysié for his intelligent and efficient services in Paris and to Miss Ruth Anna Fisher in London for the patience, tact and supreme intelligence with which she swiftly and surely produced results.

To the following archive and manuscript repositories, arranged in the order in which I have used them, my sincere thanks are due: the Canadian Archives at Ottawa; the Library of Congress; the Archives Nationales, Archives des Affaires Étrangères, Archives de la Guerre, and the Bibliothèque du Senat; the Public Record Office and the British Museum; and the William L. Clements Library at Ann Arbor, where among many other valuable materials rests the last surviving original of the Viry-Solar Correspondence.

My colleagues, Professors L. M. Larson and J. W. Swain, have read the introduction offering valuable criticisms; so also has Dr. Solon J. Buck, Director of Publications in the National Archives. My wife, Marguerite Jenison Pease, has been ready

with suggestion and advice. Miss Edna Vosper, of the Clements Library, has assisted by checking various points. The members of my staff, Miss Mildred Eversole, Miss Marie Louese Ramser, Mrs. Leona Alexander, Mrs. Elizabeth Mood, and Miss Catherine Gregory, have worked assiduously on various tasks connected with the enterprise. Miss Ernestine Jenison, far outstepping the bounds of an assistant editor, has been a scholarly conscience intent on meticulous accuracy in every detail, and ready with sound advice at every turn. It is needless to bid the reader remember that the errors he may espy have crept in despite the persons to whom grateful acknowledgment is here paid.

Certain editorial privileges which it is hoped are not excessive have been taken. Thorns have been changed to th—. In the interests of printing economy superior abbreviations have been set down to the line. The notations in various hands, made at various dates on the first pages of documents from the *Affaires Étrangères*, are sometimes barren of import, sometimes positively confusing. I have taken the liberty to retain only those which afford information germane to the point at issue. Interlineations, passages crossed out or amended, and marginal notations have been included only where they seemed of special significance as indicating a state or change of mind, or the overruling of an inferior by a superior; the final form of drafts has been reproduced. The inconsistency with which Frenchmen capitalized in the eighteenth century, and the numerous cases in which a letter might be read as either upper or lower case, led to the adoption of the rule to lower case all capitals unless current English use authorized them; this rule was not applied to French written by Englishmen. The title of the Duc de Nivernois is spelled as all literate people of his day spelled it. Translations are free. Applied to materials great parts of which, such as memoirs and the Viry-Solar Correspondence, can be described only as contemporary copies, D.S., C., etc., become meaningless, and the practice of the American Historical Association Reports in omitting them has been followed.

March 25, 1936

THEODORE CALVIN PEASE

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DECEMBER, 1762-JANUARY, 1763.....	545
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Add. MSS.	=Additional Manuscripts, British Museum
A E Corr. Pol.: Angl.; Esp.	=Affaires Étrangères, Correspondance Politique: Angleterre; Espagne
A E Mém. et Doc.: Amér.; Angl.; Etats Unis	=Affaires Étrangères Mémoires et Documents: Amérique; Angleterre; Etats Unis
A G Simancas	=Archivo General de Simancas Seccion de Estado
A N Colonies	=Archives Nationales, Ministère des Colonies
I. H. C.	=Illinois Historical Collections
L. C.	=Library of Congress
N. Y. C. D.	=Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York
S P France; Spain	=State Papers: France; Spain

ANGLO-FRENCH
BOUNDARY DISPUTES
IN THE WEST

SPECIAL INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

PART I

TO THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, JULY, 1755

THE FRENCH POSITION

With all the minute attention that has been bestowed on the Seven Years' War in America and on the struggle between France and England for empire in the Mississippi Valley, little heed has been paid to the sequence of diplomatic negotiations by which the rivalry of the two powers achieved a solution. Taking as a *fait accompli* the boundary finally arrived at in 1763, we have almost completely ignored the long series of negotiations by which it came to pass. A study of those negotiations read in the light of happenings in the West and of European diplomats' opinions of their significance renders clear and logical a result that we were formerly content to accept without question as the fiat of the gods. Our search into causes most appropriately may begin fifteen years before the outcome.

In 1748 the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle had left France in the position, always coveted by its statesmen, of the central power of European diplomacy. Save in the field of North America the war had been a triumph. In India French soldier-statesmen had exposed in contemptuous fashion the nakedness of the English establishments. In Europe, after Fontenoy, French armies had swept triumphant through the Low Countries. France's ally, Prussia, had emerged with Silesia as the spoil of England's ally Austria; and Austria, compelled by England to make peace at such a price, nursed her resentment. Holland, England's other

traditional ally, had at last given up the rôle of a great power. French influence was dominant in Poland, in Saxony, in Sweden; Denmark might easily be drawn into the circle. Spain and Naples were ruled by Bourbon princes. With reason the Duke of Newcastle¹ might fear a French encircling policy that would weave its coils around an isolated and friendless England.² Whether the decay of France's finances and marine, or the pacifism of Louis XV had induced her to be content with the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, the position in which it had left her was a proud one.

In North America however, France had to face the reality of reverses. A crowd of amateur soldiers from New England, coöperating with the English navy, had taken her great fortress of Louisburg, England's one gage of vantage in the war; and the fleet freighted with France's punishment for the upstart Bostonnais had been scattered by storm. Moreover Colonel William Johnson's Mohawks had raided even the island of Montreal; and the peace had forestalled a general Iroquois and English invasion for the conquest of Canada. Further, the belts, messages, and presents of English governors and traders had penetrated into the depths of the Northwest and produced the widespread Indian revolt of 1747. The Ottawa and Huron of Detroit, the Saulteaux of Mackinac, the tribes of the Ohio Valley, even the Illinois were tainted with the infection; and the fall of the western posts, the communication of Canada with Louisiana, would entail the crash of France's far flung empire.

In saner moods France might indeed calculate the value of that empire. On a strict budgetary basis there could have been no doubt of the answer. Louisiana cost the king 800,000 *francs* a year;³ Canada was no less a liability. In 1754, the year the die was cast for her great game of empire with Great Britain, the colonial minister seriously warned the Marquis Duquesne, gov-

¹ See *post*, xxiii.

² Newcastle to Hardwicke, August 25, 1749. Add. MSS., 32,719:69. "France is, if she knew it, in a condition almost to dictate her own terms to all Europe." Henry Pelham to William Pitt, October 12, 1750. *Correspondence of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham*, 1:49.

³ Choiseul to Ossun, September 20, 1762. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 537:160.

ernor-general of Canada, that unless the excessive costs of the up-country were reduced, the king would abandon the colony altogether.¹ The older settled part of Canada, even for the fur trade, seemed so far exhausted, that in 1761 its surrender to England as a dry husk was a part of French policy.² With the exception of those who, like the Jesuits, had a heavy stake invested in North America, the run of enlightened opinion in France would have rated the whole of the North American Continent lower than a frontier canton with two or three scores of thousands of inhabitants.

There were of course other considerations than those of fiscal profit and loss. The furs of North America were the raw material of French hatteries that supplied all Europe. Sentiment cried aloud against the abandonment of a possession of the French monarchy consecrated by the labors and deaths of heroic warriors and martyred saints. From a practical point of view, Canada, though not intrinsically profitable, served as a mainland base for France's precious sugar islands in the West Indies: by drawing the attention of New Englanders to the protection of their own wilderness frontier, Canada prevented them from wandering to the attractions of Martinique and Guadeloupe.

This argument naturally suggested another. Ever since the founding of Louisiana the French possessions on the Continent had been represented as the barrier in the way of an English conquest of all America, in which the acquisition of Santa Fé would be the first step to the ruin of the whole empire of Spain. This argument had intermittently appeared in French memoirs thereafter, especially in those designed for Spanish consumption: in the decade 1750-1760 it was a diplomatic commonplace, finally perhaps believed by the French themselves.³ It was given renewed

¹ Minister to Duquesne, May 31, 1754. A N Colonies B99:199.

² "Memoire sur les limites à donner à la Louisiane du côté des Colonies Angloises et du côté du Canada, en cas de cession de ce dernier pays," August 10, 1761. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 444:150 *et seq.*

³ J. H. Schlarman, *From Quebec to New Orleans*, 116. Citation after citation could be given for the statement in each of the first six decades of the eighteenth century.

currency by the Comte de la Galissonnière,¹ governor of New France from 1747 to 1749, reputed among the ablest of French colonial and naval statesmen.

Not only did La Galissonnière sketch in the main outlines of this interpretation of English imperial aspirations: he traced the course they must pursue and the lines of defense against them. In possession of the Illinois, he averred, the English would stand on the threshold of New Mexico; and from the Illinois they could be barred only by French possession of the upper Ohio.² However well or ill-founded the theory of English avidity, if that theory were to be the rule of French action, French security imperatively dictated to her the securing of the Ohio (we would say the Allegheny) River as her eastern boundary, and as her first line of defense.

In a larger analysis of the situation, to the Ohio must be added as vulnerable points in the French position, Acadia and Oswego. The Acadia-Nova Scotia boundary controversy with Great Britain is outside the scope of this study; but as a breach in the French defensive wall it had less attention than the Ohio or Oswego. Through Oswego had gone the English belts, messages, and presents that had stirred half the north to revolt.³ Trade routes from the distant regions beyond the lakes led to its gates. It was under the protection and dispensed the influence of the redoubtable Iroquois. Since Governor Burnet of New York had founded it in 1726, the French had continually protested against

¹ Roland Michel, Comte and later Marquis de la Galissonnière, was born November 11, 1693 and died October 26, 1756. He returned to France in 1749 to be director of the depot of maps and plans of the marine, and one of the French commissaries. He was in command of the French fleet that covered the capture of Minorca in 1756.

² La Galissonnière's memoir exists in several versions in the French Colonial Archives. It has been reprinted in *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*. In justification for French alarm it might be noted that when Miami visited Lancaster, Pennsylvania, in 1748 and sketched the position of their country, the Pennsylvania commissioners noted with interest that this new alliance opened to the English the road to the Mississippi. *Pennsylvania Colonial Records*, 5:315, etc.

³ La Jonquière to the minister, November 12, 1749, enclosing "Words of the English at Oswego to the Huron Tahoké." Colonies C11A 93: 58, 61. La Jonquière to the minister, August 24, September 20, 1750. Colonies C11A 95:211, 237. Oswego gathered up all the Indian trade that came into Lake Ontario from the north and west. La Jonquière considered Sault Ste. Marie as a farther portal of English influence among the Indians.

it as an encroachment on the lands of France; but in time of peace they could hardly take it by the strong hand. They could sedulously foster by special bounties French settlement at Detroit as a western barrier to its influence:¹ they could establish the rival post of Toronto on the opposite side of the lake to intercept what they could of furs on the way to it: they could ordain that goods be sold at a loss to compete with it at Niagara, Toronto, and Fort Frontenac:² they could include as an ingredient in any proposed settlement with England, English evacuation of the shore of Lake Ontario; but in time of peace they could do no more. The problems of both Oswego and the Ohio resolved themselves into problems of the economics of the fur trade.

Other things being equal the French could not compete with the English for the Indian trade. On the French traders was the crushing load of French bureaucracy. The Beaver Company paid less for beaver by far than the market price at Albany. The French could not produce textiles of the quality demanded by the Indians: and the Beaver Company had actually to purchase for the Indian trade the produce of English looms. The French system of high priced licenses for trade, or of monopolies at distant posts was designed to produce a modicum of revenue for the government, and afforded huge profits to favored traders and officials. High prices for goods sold to the Indians were the rule till English competition broke in. "You know well, my father," complained a Wea chief to the French commandant at Miamis,³ "we pay for a wool blanket of 2½ points, 9 beavers; a yard and a half of cloth, 12 beavers; a linen trade shirt, 4 beavers; for one of cotton, 5 beavers; a pair of mitasses, 3 beavers; a pound of powder, 3 beavers; 2 pounds of lead, a beaver. That is what rebuffs all our young men, and we are no longer able to keep them from going to the English, who give them every thing very cheap. . . . You see yourself, my father, that the traders are hard on

¹ Bigot and La Jonquière to the minister. A N Colonies C11A 95:3.

² La Jonquière and Bigot to the minister, October 9, 1749; La Jonquière to the minister, October 31, 1749. A N Colonies C11A 93:42, 207. La Jonquière to the minister, August 20, 1750; La Jonquière and Bigot to the minister, October 24, 1750. A N Colonies C11A 95:205, 104. La Jonquière to the minister, October 6, 1751. A N Colonies C11A 97:110.

³ Near the present Fort Wayne, Indiana.

us. A man must hunt a year to clothe himself. With the English our young men for a buckskin have a yard and a half of cloth: and all things in proportion."¹

As a result of such inequalities Montreal merchants and Albany traders had long since surmounted international boundaries and mercantilist trade regulations in practical business relations for mutual profit in which the Iroquois tribes played the part of middlemen.² In this capacity the Montreal merchants used the Iroquois of the two Christian villages settled at the Lake of the Two Mountains and Sault St. Louis. To keep these Indians in good humor and to use them to win over more of their countrymen, the Canadian authorities accorded them the utmost freedom of trade. Allowed to carry their own beaver to the high cash market at Albany, they also carried quantities belonging to Montreal merchants. So much English cloth was smuggled in that two hundred pieces of it were seized at one time at Detroit. When Governor de la Jonquière³ issued an ordinance against this trade the Montreal merchants sulked and wrote home complaints against the governor: the Jesuit patrons of Sault St. Louis used their powerful influence against him.⁴

The interests of the Montreal traders suggested a clear cut Indian policy which would have vetoed the famous expedition dispatched by La Galissonière under Céloron de Blainville to reestablish French prestige in the valleys of the Allegheny and the Ohio, as calculated to affront and to alienate the Iroquois who claimed to be lords of the region. Leaving Lachine June 15, 1749, with

¹De Reymond to La Jonquière, May 22, 1750. A N Colonies C11A 95:397.

²According to Sir William Johnson, from the time of Queen Anne's War, the Albany traders had negotiated a practical neutrality for the Iroquois and the New York frontier; and had sold to the Canada Indians the guns used to raid Deerfield and other hapless New England villages. When in 1747 Johnson had induced the Iroquois to take up the tomahawk, the Albany traders used their influence in the Assembly to hold up his accounts and to harass his patron Governor Clinton.

³Pierre Jacques de Taffanel, Marquis de la Jonquière, naval officer, 1680 or 1685-1752. Governor of New France 1749-1752.

⁴Ordinance of May 29, 1750, in A N Colonies C11A 95:266. La Jonquière to the minister, September 29, 1750. A N Colonies C11A 95:260. La Jonquière to the minister, October 19, November 1, 1751. A N Colonies C11A 97:127, 173.

some 250 men, 30 of them Iroquois and Abnaki Indians,¹ Céloron passed from Lake Erie over the Chautauqua portage to the upper waters of the Allegheny, everywhere warning the swarming English traders to leave the region, sending letters to the English governors bidding them keep their traders off the lands of France, and burying lead plates in token of renewal of French possession. Despite the presence of Joncaire, the Frenchman supposed to have supreme influence over the Iroquois, Céloron encountered difficulties. The Indians of some villages took to the woods. At Logstown, below the Forks of the Ohio, he found English traders and Indians defiant and had to temporize. At Sonnioto, the great Shawnee town on the west side of the Scioto at its union with the Ohio, he encountered a similar situation. Thence he went to the village of Pickawillany on the Great Miami. Hither the chief called La Demoiselle had led a band of Miami who had left their former home at the Miamis post on the Maumee. Céloron vainly sought to induce them to leave their new village and its English traders and return to their old home. At last he withdrew by way of the Miamis post and Detroit to report to La Galissonière's successor, La Jonquière.

His expedition had called attention to the activity of such English traders as George Croghan through the whole middle Ohio region from Sandusky on Lake Erie to the Great Miami and the Kentucky; and to the alienation of at least a part of the Miami, the Shawnee, and Delaware, as well as to the waning of French influence over Wea, Piankashaw, and Illinois. Céloron had been strong enough to alarm the Indians but not strong enough to overawe them; the situation in the Ohio Valley was worse instead of better.²

Under these circumstances as the French government later came to believe—possibly under the prompting of Intendant

¹ Céloron's Journal is in *Wisconsin Historical Collections*, 18:36 *et seq.* Also in Pierre Margry, ed., *Découvertes et Établissements des Français dans l'Ouest et dans le Sud de L'Amérique Septentrionale, 1614-1754, Mémoires et Documents Originaux*, 6:666 *et seq.*

² La Jonquière to the minister, September 20, 1750. A N Colonies C11A 95:237.

François Bigot¹—La Jonquière's policy was subtly moulded to Canadian ends. In 1750, he dispatched Joncaire to the upper Ohio, with presents to soothe and reassure; under specious pretexts of trade he was to build a fort.² When reports from De Reymond at the Miamis fort indicated the increasing defection of the Miami and their cognate tribes, and the increasing influence of English traders,³ he replaced De Reymond with De Villiers, who was represented as being *persona grata* to the Miami; and sketched in his detailed instructions⁴ a plan of conciliation destined to prove completely abortive.⁵ A conciliation by presents, or a war in the wilderness, were both opportunities for traders to reap profits; barring English traders and Iroquois middlemen from French territory was less favorable to Canadian interests.

La Demoiselle's village grew to four hundred families. The chief hoisted the English flag on his house: traders assisted in constructing and arming a fort. In February, 1751, Christopher Gist, agent of the Ohio Company, and George Croghan negotiated there in the name of the English an alliance with Wea and Piankashaw, and saw the Ottawa emissaries of the French dismissed with contempt.⁶ To Céloron, now commandant at Detroit, the harassed La Jonquière entrusted in 1751 the conduct of a campaign to reduce La Demoiselle's village. The Indian auxiliaries failed to appear: Céloron acted with caution: and La Jonquière, facing his own imminent recall, grew almost incoherent as he rebuked and exhorted his lieutenant.⁷ Frenchmen

¹ Bigot to the minister, October 26, 1752. A N Colonies C11A 98:269. This is a clear exposition of the Canadian policy, and sounds much like the ministry's pronouncements on it. See *post*, 39.

² Joncaire's instructions of June 22, 1750, are in A N Colonies C11E 13:216. La Jonquière to the minister, February 27, 1750. A N Colonies C11A 95:129.

³ De Reymond to La Jonquière, September 4, 5, 1749, January 5, 1750. A N Colonies C11A 93:62, 64; 95:380.

⁴ Instructions to De Villiers, July 10, 1750. A N Colonies C11E 13:194.

⁵ Petition of De Reymond, October 1, 1751. A N Colonies C11A 97:389.

⁶ W. M. Darlington, ed., *Christopher Gist's Journals with Historical, Geographical and Ethnological Notes and Biographies of his Contemporaries*, 47 *et seq.* De Reymond to La Jonquière, April 9, May 14, 1750. A N Colonies C11A 95:383, 390. La Jonquière to the minister, August 26, 1751. A N Colonies C11A 97:60.

⁷ La Jonquière to the minister, October 20, 29, 1751; La Jonquière to Céloron, October 1, 1751. A N Colonies C11A 97:135, 162, 165.

were murdered on the Vermilion: the taking of two Miami scalps by the Nipissing was likely only further to infuriate that tribe.

Death forestalled the king in recalling La Jonquière. His successor pro tem., the Baron de Longueuil,¹ Canadian and adopted child of the Iroquois, pressed on with La Jonquière's policy. A force of four hundred was to winter in the Miamis, and be reënforced by five hundred or six hundred more for a spring campaign;² but this plan the king especially directed the new governor, the Marquis Duquesne, to countermand.

At length the French ministry had formulated a definite policy, to which the king's approval had been secured, and which was expanded into Duquesne's instructions in the spring of 1752.³ Taking definite note of the Canadian policy, of restraint towards Iroquois and English on the Ohio, and of indecisive campaigns against the rebel Indians of the interior—a policy characterized by Bigot⁴ as dictated by the traders' business alliances, and by the huge profits that accrued to them from military operations at distant posts—the ministry specifically condemned it. Duquesne was directed, whatever the Iroquois might say, to establish French authority by a strong French and Canadian force along the Allegheny, and to keep the English traders out of the region, confiscating their goods and sending them prisoners to France as had been done in the previous year. Were this once accomplished the rebellion of the interior tribes would die away for want of English goods and English influence. The right of the French to the Ohio in virtue of La Salle's discovery was expressly affirmed. Duquesne was directed to undo the mischief wrought by his predecessor in admitting even for a moment that the Iroquois had any title in the region, or were entitled to be consulted before a French reoccupation of it.⁵

¹ Charles le Moyne, second Baron de Longueuil, 1687-1755, acting governor of New France, 1752.

² Longueuil to minister, April 21, 1752. *Wisconsin Historical Collections*, 18:104.

³ "Canada. Approuvé par le Roy." September 28, 1751. A N Colonies C11A 97:258.

⁴ Bigot to the minister, October 26, 1752. A N Colonies C11A 98:269.

⁵ Duquesne's instructions, May 15, 1752; minister to Duquesne, and to Duquesne and Bigot, July 9, 1752. A N Colonies B95:204, 245, 246.

On these lines French policy unflinchingly proceeded. That in the summer of 1752, Charles Langlade had surprised La Demoiselle's fort and had broken up his village was an incidental, not an essential advantage.¹ In the fall of 1752, Bigot and Duquesne began preparations for the elaborate expeditions of 1753 and 1754 which resulted in the chain of French posts from Lake Erie to the Ohio, in the expulsion of the Ohio Company from the fort at the Forks, and in Washington's capitulation at Fort Necessity. Pennsylvania's neglect to establish a fort on the Ohio when the Indians asked it in 1751² was the beginning of a decline of English influence which by 1754 had driven the English traders out of the whole Ohio and Lake Erie region, and had forced most of the Indians into the arms of the French. On the ground, the commands of the French ministry had been obeyed. French officers had occupied in force the line that La Galissonière had designated as essential to French security. The demonstration of a French right to it: the extracting from Great Britain of an admission of that right, were to be the tasks of the diplomats of Versailles.

THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND

It was the French profession that France had ever been sincerely desirous of an exact delimitation of bounds in America on the basis of the strict rights of the respective nations involved. For such a delimitation she considered the ideal instrument was the joint commission created in pursuance of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, for the settlement of all points at issue between the two powers. To that commission she insisted on referring all territorial disputes in the St. Lawrence and Ohio valleys.

When in 1748 France and England had agreed to stop fighting each other, the hardest part of the task was to induce their allies, especially Austria, to stop also. Therefore, to leave their energies free to that end they had agreed on a mutual restoration of conquests. To settle points not decided by this formula, they

¹ Duquesne to the minister, October 25, 1752. *Wisconsin Historical Collections*, 18:128.

² A. T. Volwiler, *George Croghan and the Westward Movement, 1741-1782*, 75-76.

had agreed to the erection of a joint commission of two French and two English delegates to meet at Paris. Immediate questions to come before the commissaries would be the settlement of accounts for the keep of prisoners and adjudication of disputed prize cases. Other questions requiring adjustment in their turn would be the boundaries of the two powers in Nova Scotia and determination of rights in the Neutral Islands.¹ Pending arrangement by the commission the Neutral Islands were to be strictly evacuated by both powers: neither was anywhere to make any new settlements or commit any aggression on territory in dispute.

In the personnel of the commission the French had all the advantage. Since it met in Paris they could man it with their ablest colonial experts. One of their nominees was the Comte, later Marquis de la Galissonnière, an able naval commander, a nautical expert, intimately acquainted with the whole French colonial system. Their other choice was M. de Silhouette.² The mockery of Paris had not yet given Silhouette's name to a picture that is only a shadow of a real man; and he was supposed to have all colonial and fiscal detail at his finger tips.

The English commissaries were no match for such men in reputation or in ability. Walter Mildmay³ is simply a good old English name. Governor William Shirley of Massachusetts had acquired reputation from the taking of Louisburg, but both Newcastle and Bedford appear to have had reservations about him. When he demeaned himself by a marriage with the daughter of his Paris landlord, he lost caste. He was succeeded in 1752 by Ruvigny de Cosné, from his name presumably descended from a Huguenot refugee. The lot of the English commissaries was not a happy one. The secretaries of state read them severe lectures; De Cosné was scolded for using his own judgment as to the method of sending the English ambassador's body back to Eng-

¹ These were St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Dominica, and Tobago. To these neither nation had succeeded in making out a claim satisfactory to the other. Spain professed to have some rights there; and certain powers of government were still exercised by Carib chiefs.

² Etienne de Silhouette, 1709-1767. Controller-general, March 4-November 21, 1759.

³ Mildmay's correspondence is in the William L. Clements Library at Ann Arbor. It affords an interesting picture of Paris as it presented itself to an English gentleman of the mid-eighteenth century.

land in 1754! The board of trade¹ insisted on revising and re-writing the memorials they drew up in defense of the English case. In short the English government manifestly expected little of them, or little good of the commission. Intermittently down to 1754 it endeavored to get the French government to agree to abandon it.²

To repeated representations as to the impossibility of accomplishing anything by balancing memoirs against each other, and as to the desirability of abolishing the commission, the French ministry turned a deaf ear. Finally it grudgingly admitted "that the way of negotiation was open also."³ Under the circumstances, less acute diplomats than the French need not have been surprised that the English ministry took occasion to suspend the commission's activity. The French had taken exception to the phrasing of the French translation of an English memorial. Under orders the English commissaries thenceforth tendered their memorials in English. The French refused to receive them and the commission was deadlocked.⁴ The dispute was not made up until the English

¹ Albemarle to Bedford, $\frac{\text{November } 21}{\text{December } 2}$, 1750, December $\frac{12}{23}$, 1750. S P France, 237:176, 324.

² July 8, 1748, Hardwicke had cynically written Newcastle that the English commissaries would be subject to the orders of the ministry, and, as the commission must agree, it would in this as in other cases make reference to commissaries end in nothing. Add. MSS., 32,715:315. After the Pelhams had forced Bedford out of the secretary's office, Newcastle insinuated he could not deal confidentially with commissaries appointed by Bedford. Mirepoix to the minister, March 24, 1752. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 434:223. On another occasion he insinuated that the parsimonious George II would be glad to relieve his civil list of the commissaries' stipends. Mirepoix to the minister, January 28, 1752. *Op. cit.*, 87. More frankly he professed that the territorial questions at issue could never be settled by matching an extreme English claim against an extreme French one. They could only be settled in the give and take of a diplomatic negotiation where convenience as well as strict right could be allowed for on either side, and where English ministers responsible to Parliament could make concessions in exchange for concessions as they would never dare to do in black and white.

³ Albemarle to Newcastle, $\frac{\text{October } 30}{\text{November } 10}$, 1751; Albemarle to Holderness, $\frac{\text{November } 13}{\text{November } 24}$, 1751; Holderness to Albemarle, November 21, 1751. S P France, 241:188, 204; 242.

⁴ The quarrel spreads itself over S P France, 239 and A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 435, 436.

ministry had reached its decision to settle the difficulties on the Ohio by matching force with force.

Far more important therefore than the commissaries in attempts at adjustments in America were the ministries and their diplomatic representatives. The English minister principally charged with diplomacy in the period was the Duke of Newcastle, secretary of state for the northern department under his brother Henry Pelham, till Pelham's death in 1754, and thereafter prime minister and first lord of the treasury. Newcastle has been dealt with unjustly; masterly literary caricatures of him have been taken as portraits, and the mannerisms allowed to obscure the man. He was a typical politician and a good one—with an excessive geniality of manner the fruit of a kind heart and a real human interest. He was equally skeptical of eternal friendships or eternal enmities in politics, regarding them as constantly subject to effacement by new political alignments. He had fits of timorousness, suspicion, and procrastination; but they came and went; possibly sometimes they represented a pose. He was always in a hurry, but his voluminous correspondence with its multiplicity of interests explains why; explains why, also, with so many details constantly before him, he was sometimes careless about them. As a diplomat he had the experience of a quarter of a century and knew the personal foibles of most of the European statesmen of his generation.¹

Beside Newcastle the other secretaries of state of his day sink into unimportance. The Duke of Bedford² had been willing to perform such duties of the office as did not interfere with the life of an English country gentleman. He was inclined to be francophil, and in foreign affairs, pacific. As the potential center of a Whig group opposed to their own, Newcastle and Pelham distrusted him; on the ground of his neglect of business, they got rid of him in 1751. After him come two shadowy secretaries of

¹ Thomas Pelham Holles, Duke of Newcastle, July 1, 1693–November 17, 1768. The characterization is based on an impression gained from turning over some two hundred volumes of the Newcastle Papers.

² John Russell, Duke of Bedford, September 30, 1710–January 14, 1771. Secretary of state for the southern department, February 13, 1748–June 14, 1751.

state. The Earl of Holdernessee¹ originally succeeded Bedford in the southern department as a satellite of Newcastle: in later years he played an independent hand. After Newcastle on his brother's death had become first lord, and Holdernessee had taken the seals of the northern department, a still more shadowy man followed him, Sir Thomas Robinson.² His name lives in popular history from Pitt's impatient comparison of him to Newcastle's jack boot; and the comparison does him no great injustice.

One man served all these secretaries of state as ambassador at the Court of Versailles, William Anne Keppel, Earl of Albemarle.³ Descended from the male favorite of William III, it was natural that Albemarle should revert to the Whig party to be provided for. The "spendthrift earl," married to a Lennox, a family just short of royalty, spent his own and his wife's fortune, to say nothing of such pittances as his pay for condescending to be absentee governor of Virginia; when he died it was feared his French creditors would attach his body as security for his debts. Naturally his eight legitimate children expected and received especial consideration and patronage in army, navy, and church: his eight illegitimate children were less expensive to the public. The earl was indeed the ideal representative to the court of Louis XV; he was much closer to the popular conception of Louis than the real man. The robust and soldierly earl was never subject to the moral misgivings which occasionally swept over Louis' soul, making the courtiers who patterned after his whims consort with their wives till the royal attention was once more turned to the pleasures of this world: to Albemarle such misgivings were an irresistible provocative to his sense of humor. He was a spirited representative of his court, though sometimes inclined to

¹ Robert Darcy, Earl of Holdernessee, May 17, 1718-May 16, 1778. Secretary of state for the southern department from June 18, 1751; for the northern from March 23, 1754, and from June 29, 1757 to March 18, 1761.

² Sir Thomas Robinson, later Baron Grantham, April 24, 1695-September 30, 1770. Representative at Vienna, 1730-1748; secretary of state for the southern department, March 1754-November 1755.

³ Born June 5, 1702; died December 22, 1754. Married Lady Anne Lennox, daughter of Charles Lennox, first Duke of Richmond. Governor of Virginia from September 26, 1737; ambassador at Paris from March 14, 1749.

refrain from pushing an American question when he was anxious to clinch a European advantage.

Albemarle's counterpart at the court of London was the Duc de Mirepoix.¹ In view of his candidacy for the appointment of governor to the little Duke of Burgundy, one may suppose that his outward life was more correct than Albemarle's. By nature he was open and likeable, so that when the duty of temporizing or avoiding a person was imposed on him he did it awkwardly. He was inclined to agree with the person to whom he was talking, or even writing. Repeatedly he gave the English ministry assurances of French concessions that later proved to be unjustified. Repeatedly he gave the French ministry accounts of English intentions that to speak mildly showed he had been completely misled. Current opinion laid on him the responsibility for deceiving both French and English with vain hopes of an accommodation;² always reserving him the benefit of good intentions, current opinion was well founded.

Across the stage behind him pass the figures of successive French ministers of foreign affairs. Puysieux³ and St. Contest⁴ are little more than shadows. Rouillé,⁵ transferred to the foreign portfolio in July, 1754, was naturally aggressive on behalf of the policy he had adopted as minister for the colonies. Behind them was "The Lady," as Newcastle termed her, Mme de Pompadour,

¹ Gaston-Charles-François de Lévis, Duc de Mirepoix, Marshal of France, December 2, 1699-September 25, 1758. He served in the campaigns of 1733-1734, 1744-1747. Ambassador to Vienna, 1737-1739. Ambassador to London till the rupture of diplomatic relations, July, 1755. Horace Walpole says his whole time was given to two English card games, the names of which he could never pronounce correctly. *Memoirs of the Reign of King George the Second* (1847 ed.), 1:423.

² Hans Stanley to Pitt, August 6, 1761. S P France, 252. ". . . Monsr de Mirepoix who when he was Ambassadeur in England, either saw affairs in a very flattering light, or wrote his Court accounts more agreeable to their inclinations, than to reality, by which he engaged his Country in the present unfortunate war."

³ Louis Philogène, Marquis de Sillery et de Puysieux, ambassador to the Two Sicilies, 1735-1739; secretary for foreign affairs, 1747-1751.

⁴ François-Dominique Barberie de St. Contest, secretary for foreign affairs, September 11, 1751-July 24, 1754.

⁵ Antoine-Louis Rouillé, Comte de Jouy, June 7, 1689-September 20, 1761. Minister of marine, April 26, 1749-July 28, 1754; minister of foreign affairs, July 28, 1754-June 25, 1757. He was said in the latter capacity to be only the mouthpiece of the Duc de Noailles; it was also thought he was managed by his subordinate the Abbé de la Ville, a protégé of D'Argenson.

inclined to pacific courses, struggling for her sway over the king with the "little Irish Girl," Mlle Morphy, Boucher's model;¹ struggling also with hostile ministers like the warlike D'Argenson, who succeeded at least in making impossible concerted ministerial policy.

And behind them all was Louis XV—perhaps the greatest pacifist in his court; personally brave, but distressed beyond measure at human suffering on a battlefield; anxious to be liked, subject after Damiens' attempt on him to recurring fits of despondency in which he wished to abdicate; possibly conscious that he was in the grip of a world order too strong for one feeble man to break; in the hands of people so much more clever than himself that he could not be sure of fathoming their purposes; drifting on lines of least resistance, save when behind the back of an accredited minister of foreign affairs, he carried on a secret diplomatic correspondence.

Of the purposes of the French court after the peace Newcastle had been suspicious from the beginning. They had, he wrote Hardwicke,² his most trusted adviser, failed in the last war because their marine was no match for the English. "Their Trade, & consequently their great Ressources, fell a Sacrifice to us: and Their Possessions in America, very narrowly escaped us. What was then the Measure for them to take? To make Peace instantly: to get back Cape Breton, tho' with the Restitution of all the Low Countries, in the low & defenseless Condition They are now in. And what was to be the Scheme for the future? To preach up Peace, and really, for the present, to wish it. To secure all the Powers upon the Continent by Subsidies, (and They have gone a good way towards it,) to establish, at any rate, a Marine (and That is their present Point) to restore their Trade, and encroach upon ours: (which, your Son sees, They are

¹ A satiric account of her is in a letter of Walter Mildmay of May 2, 1753, in the Mildmay Papers in the William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

² Philip Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke, December 1, 1690-March 6, 1764. Lord Chancellor, February 21, 1737-November 19, 1756, and afterward in the cabinet without portfolio, July, 1757-May, 1762. He was Newcastle's confidant to whom the duke turned on all occasions.

attempting :) To extend their Limits in America, which They are actually endeavouring to do: and when we shall complain, They will give us very Civil Answers, but no Redress: & depend upon their great Superiority, That we must, at last, acquiesce under it; and in this manner, and This Manner only, with France maintain the Peace; and Thus, I Think, They are absolute masters of all Europe."¹

The events of the next five years, what with French aggressions in Acadia, French aggressions on the Ohio, French failures to evacuate the Neutral Islands, to say nothing of French Continental policy, to Newcastle fully bore out this forecast. It is not surprising that when the disgrace of Ensenada in Spain seemed to indicate that at one point the encircling coils had parted, that he seized the opportunity of doing what he considered a mere retaliation for French aggression, that as he put it, would put the laboring oar on them and give them in their turn cause to complain.

The Franco-Prussian entente was a perennial cause for alarm. George II was anxious that the son of Maria Theresa should be elected King of the Romans in order to reënforce his title to succeed to the Empire: France seemed behind the difficulties which the Elector Palatine and the King of Prussia cast in the way. Prussia's sending a Scottish Jacobite as her representative to Versailles added fuel to the fire. In 1753, Frederick II endeavored to do himself justice in the matter of English prizes on Prussian ships, by impounding the interest on the Silesian loan due English bondholders; France played the part of mediator to keep Prussia and England from flying at each other's throats. The conviction of the English diplomats that Versailles was under the sinister influence of Prussia reënforced their general distrust of French policy. In apportioning the responsibility of the two powers for failing to settle their American disputes till they had grown too great, the latent English distrust of French aims has always to be taken into account.

¹ August 25, 1749. Add. MSS., 32,719:69.

THE OHIO CONTROVERSY UP TO 1755

English complaints of aggressions in Nova Scotia contrived by La Jonquière: French assurances that the facts could not be as represented: English complaints that the Neutral Islands were not evacuated: French assurances, emanating even from His Most Christian Majesty that they were: such is the background of the first exchanges between the powers, in the winter of 1752, on their rival interests in the Ohio Valley. On February $\frac{13}{24}$, 1752, the Earl of Holdernessee transmitted to Albemarle the correspondence between La Jonquière and Governor Clinton of New York; Holdernessee was sure that La Jonquière's language as well as his interpretation of Article 15, of the Treaty of Utrecht, which recognized the Iroquois as English subjects, would be disavowed by the French ministers. Albemarle was further to demand the release of the traders captured in the Ohio Valley and sent prisoners to France, and the restitution of their goods; he was also to demand instructions to the governors to prevent such acts in future.¹

An ambassador in the eighteenth century frequently claimed and secured the release of prisoners, even when they were not the subjects of the court to which he was accredited.² Too much significance should not therefore be attached to the fact that Albemarle had, of his own accord on an appeal from the prisoners, demanded their release. He had heard nothing from his application till February $\frac{1}{12}$, when Rouillé indicated that he would willingly ask of the king the freedom of the prisoners; but there could be no restoration of their goods. So far the French had adroitly kept the matter on the basis of favor rather than right.³

Albemarle did not let the matter rest there. In an interview

¹ Holdernessee to Albemarle. S P France, 243:133.

² The English ambassador to the French court frequently asked the release of Huguenot prisoners from the galleys. Ordinarily such requests were accorded as special favors to George II or to his ambassador.

³ Albemarle to Holdernessee, $\frac{\text{February } 19}{\text{March } 1}$, 1752. S P France, 243:151,

with St. Contest he indicated that he had complaints to make of La Jonquière; but, as he knew they would be referred to Rouillé, he would transmit them to him in the first instance.¹ The memoir of $\frac{\text{February } 25}{\text{March } 7}$, 1752, is in the French foreign archives;² but it seemed to have won little notice from the French; well-informed persons like La Galissonnière, even French diplomats were later to make statements which implied their ignorance of its existence. In it, on the basis of Clinton's letters, Albemarle protested against a long series of La Jonquière's acts, including the capture of English traders at Sandusky, and at Miamis. He expressly claimed as belonging to the Five Nations, who by the Treaty of Utrecht were British subjects, the lands surrounding Lake Ontario, including Niagara and Frontenac, and the lands of the Ohio.³ Albemarle expressly claimed the restitution of the traders' goods and the punishment of those responsible for their mistreatment; but these parts of his memorial he did not push. However through him the British government had officially set forth a claim to the lands of Ontario and Ohio, basing it on treaty rights under the peace of Utrecht.

At the moment it seemed possible that France would consent to adjust all American differences by direct negotiation. Mirepoix, who always reflected the color of his surroundings, had been representing the English dislike of the Paris commission; and St. Contest on March $\frac{2}{13}$ had agreed that, while France must persist in leaving the affairs of America to commissaries, there was no hindrance to direct negotiations between court and court.⁴

¹ Albemarle to Holderness, $\frac{\text{February } 26}{\text{March } 8}$, 1752. S P France, 243:165.

² A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 434:196.

³ In drawing this up Albemarle undoubtedly had the assistance of two of the traders. One of them, John Patton, was a man of intelligence and ability. His account of his captivity is in *Wisconsin Historical Collections*, 18:113n. A declaration by him is in S P France, 243:192.

⁴ Mirepoix to St. Contest, $\frac{\text{February } 20}{\text{March } 2}$, 1752; St. Contest to Mirepoix, March $\frac{2}{13}$, 1752. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 434:187, 214.

The English ministers would have been glad of a more specific proposal;¹ but the reply impelled them in a cabinet meeting, March 27
April 7, 1752, to consider their demands in case a negotiation ensued. They specifically fixed on their terms for Acadia; they added a prescription that the country as far as the St. Lawrence should remain unsettled by either power; they proposed a perpetual neutrality for the islands.²

A week later Mirepoix agreed to represent the English views on his approaching visit to the French court: he was so sanguine of success that Holdernessee began to prepare Albemarle's instructions for the ensuing negotiation. Mirepoix agreed with the English in thinking the basis of the settlement must be mutual accommodation and concession, neither power retaining what might endanger the other.³ For the time his views seem to have carried the French ministry along with him. St. Contest in an interview with Albemarle said concessions must be made on both sides without going further into questions of abstract right, which only seemed to perplex the matter.⁴ He adopted the suggestions of Mirepoix and the English ministry as to a neutral zone. Albemarle said he expected instructions to negotiate on such a basis, and suggested that to save St. Contest's time, he and Mirepoix should treat on the matter. St. Contest assented, saying he would get Rouillé to draw up instructions for Mirepoix which he would show Albemarle week after next.

The interview was to be fruitful in misunderstanding. The English ministers decided to wait to see what Mirepoix showed Albemarle before drawing his instructions. Newcastle, then with the king in Hanover, was afraid the French ministry might regard this as chicane, and himself communicated to Albemarle the cabinet minute of March 27
April 7, as well as a dispatch to Holdernessee

¹ Holdernessee to Albemarle, March $\frac{12}{23}$, 1752. S P France, 243:213.

² Add. MSS., 32,994:300.

³ Holdernessee to Albemarle, April $\frac{2}{13}$, 1752. S P France, 243:251.

⁴ Albemarle to Holdernessee, April 22
May 3, 1752. S P France, 243:345.

of May $\frac{6}{17}$, which indicated the English would insist on a neutrality for the south bank of the St. Lawrence.¹ The ministers at home could only add their opinion that if France was to insist on St. Lucia as the price of all Nova Scotia, England should insist also on the demolition of Crown Point, which Anson and Halifax² represented as a menace to New York.³ Meanwhile Newcastle had confirmed to Albemarle that they preferred to wait and see what St. Contest had to offer, before giving him more formal instructions;⁴ a mutual communication of instructions he thought injudicious. As he read St. Contest's remarks they were to look not for a formal paper, but rather for general instructions to Mirepoix such as those that Albemarle already had. The first conference of the ambassadors on the basis of them would give both sides something to go on.⁵

By the end of May it was clear France was not going to be drawn into making the first statement.⁶ Mirepoix, perhaps owing to La Galissonnière's illness, perhaps due to other causes, on May 28,⁷ still had no instructions. In June the English ministry approved a map line submitted by Albemarle as a proper basis for negotiation. There the matter rested till December.

¹ Newcastle to Albemarle, $\frac{\text{April } 27}{\text{May } 8}$, 1752. Add. MSS., 32,835:291.

² George Montagu Dunk, Earl of Halifax, October 6, 1716-June 8, 1771. President of the board of trade and plantations, September 7, 1748-March 21, 1761; lord lieutenant of Ireland, March 20, 1761-April 20, 1763; first lord of the admiralty, June 17-October 13, 1762; secretary of state for the northern department, October 13, 1762-July 10, 1765, and again January 22, 1771.

³ Holdernessee to Newcastle, $\frac{\text{May } 15}{\text{May } 26}$, 1752 (two letters). Add. MSS., 32,727:184; 32,836:300.

⁴ Newcastle to Albemarle, $\frac{\text{May } 4}{\text{May } 15}$, 1752. S P France, 244:22.

⁵ Newcastle to Holdernessee, $\frac{\text{May } 6}{\text{May } 17}$, 1752. Add. MSS., 32,836:97.

Newcastle to Albemarle, $\frac{\text{May } 13}{\text{May } 24}$, 1752, $\frac{\text{May } 24}{\text{June } 4}$, 1752. Add. MSS., 32,836:94; S P France, 244:109.

⁶ Holdernessee to Albemarle, $\frac{\text{May } 28}{\text{June } 8}$, 1752. Add. MSS., 32,836:339.

⁷ Albemarle to Newcastle, $\frac{\text{May } 28}{\text{June } 8}$, 1752. S P France, 244:124.

Then Mirepoix, who had returned to his post, indicated to Newcastle that the failure of Albemarle to receive instructions had prevented a negotiation the previous summer. Now it seemed to Mirepoix the best method would be for each court to draw a memoir of its claims to be negotiated between Albemarle and St. Contest in Paris. Newcastle, assenting, said that he, Pelham, and Holdernessee would draw such instructions.¹ December 20, a minute made by Newcastle proposed that Newcastle and Mirepoix discuss the points in dispute and that instructions based on their findings be sent Albemarle for his negotiation with St. Contest.² The court of France approved, insisting however that the commissaries continue their discussion of the rights involved.³ Holdernessee, professing himself unable to see the need for this, on January 4⁴ indicated to Albemarle that the king had given orders to examine the whole American situation and decide what proposals had better be made; they were afraid, from some hints Mirepoix had dropped since his return from France, that there were points on which agreement was impossible. However, intermittently in January, Mirepoix reported to his court that Holdernessee was working on instructions for Albemarle.⁵

Nothing further ensued till October. Then Mirepoix communicated to his court a proposal of Newcastle's that he be instructed to negotiate at London on American differences. St. Contest acidly replied that in the previous January Holdernessee had professed to be working on instructions for Albemarle of which nothing had been heard. Meanwhile Mirepoix might consider himself authorized to listen to anything the English ministers cared to propose: Holdernessee set to work on a method of procedure.⁶

¹ Mirepoix to the minister, December 15, 1752. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 435:236.

² Holdernessee to Albemarle, December 21, 1752. Add. MSS., 32,841: 354.

³ Albemarle to Holdernessee, December 27, 1752. S P France, 245:261.

⁴ S P France, 246:51.

⁵ Mirepoix to the minister, January 18, 25, 1753. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 435:283, 298.

⁶ Mirepoix to the minister, October 12, 1753; minister to Mirepoix, October 29, 1753; Mirepoix to the minister, November 9, December 10, 1753. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 436:335, 358, 388, 422.

Disputes between the two powers were multiplying faster than they were being settled. On European issues they were more at odds than ever. The French were constructing works at Dunkirk which they represented as a sanitary drainage system, but which the English thought designed to scour the harbor and reconstitute the port in defiance of the treaties of Utrecht and Aix-la-Chapelle. The commissaries during most of the year had suspended conferences as a result of the language dispute. The English ministry was manifestly irritated that the French insisted on continuing the commission.

Newcastle poured forth his misgivings to Albemarle. French claims, French aggressions seemed elusively multiplying on every hand, just out of reach by diplomatic means. On their present conduct, the French could, as they wished, break off relations next day, or keep the peace for years. Who was the responsible head? Certainly not St. Contest. But whoever he or she was Albemarle should state the situation frankly, and appeal for a frank understanding. Partly agreeing, Albemarle could see no way out; he doubted if Pompadour directed; and if she did, court etiquette forbade a foreign minister to seek a private audience. He could only express his belief that the intention was, after all, pacific.¹

On his side too, there were forces hurrying the pacific Newcastle toward paths of aggression. In the Earl of Halifax as president of the board of trade the ministry had an adviser aggressive not only in his demands for authority, perquisites, and patronage² for himself, but also in his statements of British rights in America. He was a fit counter-balance to La Galissonière himself; if moderation were to prevail it must be supplied by the diplomats. In a paper of August 15, 1753, Halifax listed as French aggressions all their settlements on the Great Lakes from Frontenac to Mackinac; all in the Ohio and Mississippi valleys. He extended the title of the Six Nations to all the territory of

¹ Newcastle to Albemarle, May 24, 1753; Albemarle to Newcastle, June 6, 1753; Newcastle to Pelham, July 17, 1753. Add. MSS., 32,844:327; 32,845:18; 32,732:295.

² See for instance, Pelham to Newcastle, September 29, 1752. Add. MSS., 32,729:400.

the Great Lakes that they had ceded to the English in 1701.¹ The ministry followed, even though at a distance. On May 10, 1753, they ordered a present of £1000 to support the Miami against the French.² Dinwiddie's letter of June 10, detailing the march of the French to settle on the Ohio, reached Halifax August 12. August 21, a cabinet meeting that decided on a protest at the non-evacuation of the Neutral Islands, and joint representations with the Dutch on Dunkirk, decided that the English governors should prevent by force any French attempts on the Ohio.³

By the spring of 1754, Halifax was proposing⁴ as a check on French aggression a chain of forts that included posts at Crown Point, Niagara, the Ohio, the Cherokee country, and Mobile, all so placed as to cut the communications of the French posts they were designed to oppose. Linked with this was a scheme for an Indian department controlling Indian trade and diplomacy, and for a consolidation of colonial revenues by act of Parliament. Halifax represented this policy as bearing no marks of aggression and still a checkmate to the French; Newcastle for a time was inclined to adopt it.⁵ A cabinet on June 13 accepted the principle of colonial union.⁶ Two weeks later the news of the capture of the Ohio Company's fort reached London; and June 26, the lords decided that the most effectual means must be taken to oblige the French to retire. Tentatively Governor Sharpe of Maryland was named commander in chief.⁷ Then came news of a revolution in Spanish policy, calculated to stiffen the cabinet's resolution.

¹ Add. MSS., 33,029:96.

² Add. MSS., 32,731:430.

³ Add. MSS., 32,995:26.

⁴ "Two Papers delivered by Ld Halifax to Sir Thos Robinson in April 1754"; "Proposal for building Forts etc upon the Ohio, & other Rivers in North America April 30th, 1754." Add. MSS., 32,995:271; 33,029:109, 156.

⁵ Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, May 14, 1754. Add. MSS., 32,735:268. Horatio Walpole, First Baron Walpole of Wolterton, December 8, 1678-February 5, 1757, brother of Sir Robert Walpole, was one of Newcastle's trusted advisers on diplomacy. He had served long at The Hague in a diplomatic capacity.

⁶ Add. MSS., 32,995:266.

⁷ Add. MSS., 33,029:124. See also Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, June 29, 1754. Add. MSS., 32,735:597.

In Spain even more than in the other western European monarchies, policy turned on the personality of the king. Ferdinand VI was a pious and well-meaning ruler, painfully conscious of his small abilities and devoted to his queen. In their haste, French ambassadors sometimes averred that the queen was opposed to war because it involved the expenditure of money on other than her personal ends. At all events Ferdinand VI was devoted to peace and truly alarmed at the prospect of a French-English war into which he might be drawn despite himself. The French ambassador, the Duc de Duras,¹ with the support of a pro-French party headed by the Marquis of Ensenada, had been endeavoring to persuade the king that the aggressive designs of England were a menace to the peace of Europe in general and to the Spanish empire in particular.²

Opposed to Duras was Benjamin Keene,³ one of the ablest English diplomats of all time. George II affected to consider him not a gentleman. "The Order my son wears!" he shrilled, when Newcastle pressed him to reward Keene with the coveted ribbon of the Bath; and Newcastle found the courage to reply truthfully that Keene did the king more service than all his other diplomats together.⁴ In fighting his battle for control of the Spanish court, Keene, in the spring of 1754, was reënforced by the return to Spain of her ambassador to London, General Richard Wall, Irish by birth, the intimate friend of Newcastle, and pro-English.⁵ Keene and Wall engineered a diplomatic coup. They demonstrated to the king that Ensenada without his knowledge had given orders to the Spanish governors to fall upon the English establishments in Honduras. Ferdinand's reaction, when convinced the pro-French party had come near involving him in war

¹ Emmanuel-Félicité, Duc de Duras, December 19, 1715-September 6, 1789. Participated in all the wars of Louis XV; ambassador to Madrid, 1752.

² Holderness to Albemarle, February 7, 1754. S P France, 249.

³ Sir Benjamin Keene, 1697-December 15, 1757. Agent for the South Sea Company at Madrid; British consul at that place 1724; minister to Spain, 1727-1739; 1746-1748, envoy to Lisbon; from 1748 till his death, minister at Madrid.

⁴ Newcastle to Pelham, July 27, 1752. Add. MSS., 32,728:400.
August 7

⁵ Newcastle to Albemarle, August 1, 1754. Add. MSS., 32,850:6.

with England, was decisive. Ensenada was disgraced, arrested, and exiled; and Wall was given charge of foreign affairs.¹ The English tried to magnify this into a turning of Spanish policy into a pro-English channel, and here undoubtedly went too far. When George II's speech from the throne hinted at a close alliance with Spain, Spanish ambassadors took exception.²

But the effects of Ensenada's fall were sufficiently potent. Keene reported the discomfiture of Duras. Albemarle wrote that the French court was thunderstruck at the news.³ The death of St. Contest, July 24,⁴ resulted in a shift in the cabinet in which Machault⁵ took the marine, and Rouillé became minister of foreign affairs.⁶ Albemarle's impression was that Rouillé was more conciliatory than any French minister had been for some time.⁷ It may have been that having attained her objective on the Ohio, France could afford to be conciliatory; or it might have been alarm at the break of a link in the chain of alliances that had been weaving about England.

To the English, Ensenada's hostile orders may well have seemed of a piece with French aggressions on the Ohio and part and parcel of the policy of embroiling England in America at once with France and Spain. With her Spanish partner no longer to be counted on, it was to be expected that France would not only be conciliatory in Europe, but would be glad to extricate herself from the results of her aggressions in America.

¹ Keene to Robinson, July 31, 1754. Add. MSS., 32,849:441. Robinson to Albemarle, August 15, 1754. Add. MSS., 32,850:90.

² Albemarle to Robinson, November 27, 1754. Add. MSS., 33,027:284. Keene to Robinson, December 14, 1754. Add. MSS., 32,851:319. The volume of diplomatic correspondence with Albemarle for the last half of 1754, is not in the Public Record Office; it is among the Shelburne Papers in the William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Add. MSS., 33,027, which contains copies of Albemarle's dispatches, was used to supply the lacuna.

³ Albemarle to Robinson, August 21, 1754. Add. MSS., 33,027:272v.

⁴ Albemarle to Robinson, July 26, 1754. Add. MSS., 33,027:269v.

⁵ Machault d'Arnouville, Jean-Baptiste, December 13, 1701-July 12, 1794. Controller-general of finances, December 6, 1745-July 28, 1754; *garde des sceaux*, November 9, 1750. Gave up controller-generalship for marine, July 28, 1754, keeping the post of *garde des sceaux*. Disgraced February 1, 1757.

⁶ Albemarle to Robinson, July 30, 1754. Add. MSS., 33,027:269v.

⁷ Albemarle to Robinson, August 14, 1754. Add. MSS., 33,027:271.

Under the circumstances, when the news of Washington's capitulation at Fort Necessity reached England in the first days of September,¹ it stung the ministry into projects of retaliation. Possibly private interests had their influence; certainly public opinion did. Newcastle decided, to use his own phrase, that it was high time to put the laboring oar on the French, to give them aggressions to complain of in their turn. An English policy was quickly formulated. William Murray, the later Lord Mansfield, advocated immediate and unobtrusive action. He would send munitions, officers, and non-commissioned officers to train colonial levies.² By the king's direction the ministers applied to his son, the Duke of Cumberland, commander in chief, for advice.

Cumberland suggested Braddock as a fit officer to command, but preferred to colonial levies the sending two regular regiments on the Irish establishment to be recruited to full strength in America. He sketched as necessary parts of the operation, the capture of Crown Point, the recovery of the Ohio, and the expulsion of the French from Nova Scotia. All this he thought could justly be done, since the French had notoriously infringed the convention which forbade all encroachments during the negotiations of the commission. The king highly approved Cumberland's suggestions, expressing his surprise and pleasure that his son had so evident a mastery of the problem. He also approved the duke's insistence that the commander's instructions must be drawn to indicate in precise terms his objectives, and not to leave him with the responsibility of vindicating vague charter claims. As Robinson put it, an ultimatum must be fixed for both operation and negotiation for "solid, and not charter, limits."³ Halifax's extravagances were still considered extravagances.³

Newcastle had apparently hoped the ministry's resolution would remain an impenetrable secret; but early in October a

¹ Newcastle to Albemarle, September 5, 1754. Add. MSS., 32,850:218.

² Murray to Newcastle, September 7, 1754. Add. MSS., 32,736:438. Albemarle as a soldier and as titular governor of Virginia sent similar advice, pointing the moral with Washington's want of military knowledge and experience! His offer to go himself was rejected. Albemarle to Newcastle, September 11, 1754. Add. MSS., 32,850:289.

³ Robinson to Newcastle, September 22, 23, 1754; Newcastle to Murray, September 28, 1754. Add. MSS., 32,736:563, 569, 591.

war office newspaper notice pointed unmistakably¹ to the expedition and set all the foreign embassies buzzing. Newcastle was alarmed; what if the French refused to play the part he had expected of them and to expostulate and complain; what if they assumed that England was bent on war and acted accordingly? Was it fair for the French, after all they had done in America, stirring up Indians, and building forts despite the status quo enjoined pending the commission's decision, to take England's necessary defensive measures as the beginning of the war? Newcastle adjured Albemarle to hold him back from the edge of the precipice; to give such a turn to England's defensive measures, that the French would be ashamed to take such notice of them as might lead to war.²

This letter tapped the vein of Albemarle's cynical humor. In England, he reminded Newcastle, nothing could be kept secret. He had himself learned from private letters all the details which Newcastle had just confided to him. In France on the other hand, things were kept secret. The details of the English preparations were early known to the ministers,³ but not to the public. He had already with the greatest caution approached Rouillé; but it took a better head than his to distinguish what Newcastle was doing from hostile preparations. The result would soon be known; but it might be unpleasant. The Lady might still be depended on; but her mortal enemy D'Argenson was still minister, and at times had much influence.⁴

Rouillé's conduct since he took the foreign portfolio had been restrained and conciliatory. In August he had complained of Washington's alleged assassination of Jumonville.⁵ But when Albemarle had dismissed it as something that must have been the

¹ Newcastle had apparently thought of cutting down or postponing some of the colonial elements in the plan; Henry Fox in the war office acted to force his hand. Ilchester (Giles Stephen Holland Fox-Strangways), 6th Earl of, *Henry Fox, first Lord Holland, his family and relations*, 1:222. See also, S. M. Pargellis, *Lord Loudoun in North America*, 29.

² Newcastle to Albemarle, October 10, 1754. Add. MSS., 32,851:56.

³ Boutet, the French chargé at London, had reported the sending of the two regiments October 3. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 437:340.

⁴ Albemarle to Newcastle, October 23, 1754. Add. MSS., 32,851:82.

⁵ The French account was that Jumonville had been treacherously slain during a parley.

deed of an Indian, not of a British officer, and had taken it as the text of a sermon on the need of restraining orders for Duquesne, Rouillé had assured him Duquesne had orders to behave in the most conciliatory fashion.¹ A week later Rouillé was reiterating his pacific intentions, and his orders to all parts of the world to abstain from everything that might give Great Britain cause for dissatisfaction; he even offered to ask his king's permission to show Albemarle minutes of the orders!² In September he was professing gratification at George II's good opinion of him, and trying to appease Albemarle on Washington's capitulation, appealing to him to judge if it were so very outrageous.³ Once more he gave earnest assurance that France had at last completely evacuated the Neutral Islands; Albemarle even believed that his assurances, if mistaken, were made in good faith.⁴

If it be assumed that Rouillé's conciliatory language had been designed to keep England passive in the face of French aggression, it is important to note his attitude once he knew that England was preparing to retaliate. October 16, Albemarle reported that Rouillé had raised the question, saying he had seen an account of the expedition in a newspaper. Albemarle replied that his own information came from the same source, and he had no instructions. Rouillé responded that he had none either, but that Albemarle would hear from him when he had. On Albemarle's suggesting in his private capacity that such preparations seemed necessary in view of the late French aggressions, Rouillé merely remarked that time would tell what turn matters would take. On the whole he was less alarmed than Albemarle had expected.⁵

At their next interview, Rouillé took a higher tone. When Albemarle minimized the force sent, saying they might well do as much in view of the men and arms France had sent year after year, Rouillé retorted that it was true, and that if his advice had been taken, many more would have been sent. He indicated they would probably order a stronger force there immediately "as the

¹ Albemarle to Robinson, August 21, 1754. Add. MSS., 33,027:272.

² Albemarle to Robinson, August 28, 1754. Add. MSS., 33,027:274.

³ Albemarle to Robinson, September 18, 1754. Add. MSS., 33,027:276.

⁴ Albemarle to Robinson, October 9, 1754. Add. MSS., 33,027:277v.

⁵ Albemarle to Robinson, October 16, 1754. Add. MSS., 33,027:278v

most effectual way to prevent a war in those parts"; they only retook possession of their own on the Ohio, which, despite English encroachments, could never be looked upon as the English boundary. Albemarle added fuel to the fire, by asking how they assumed to prescribe England her limits in that region, when commissaries had been appointed for that purpose. Mutual recriminations on the mutual attempts of the two nations to blacken each other to the courts of Europe closed the interview.¹

While France lacked ice-free ports for Canada, Rouillé could scarcely carry out his threat. A month later he anxiously inquired if there was not some means of accommodating matters in a friendly manner. Albemarle, though uninstructed, suggested the withdrawal of French troops behind the Ohio: but this Rouillé dismissed as a sign of weakness and therefore impossible.² December 17, Albemarle had what was destined to be the last interview with Rouillé that he was to report. Rouillé talked to him as a friend, expatiating on the danger of dispatching to America a force manifestly intended not for defense, but for conquests. Albemarle assured him the expedition was intended only to prevent new encroachments and to vindicate those already made. Again Rouillé replied that the French had only prevented invasions of their territory, and had only obliged English troops to keep within their proper bounds. He wished things might be put back as at 1743 and 1748, conformably to the treaties of Utrecht and Aix-la-Chapelle. Albemarle encouraged the overture, but Rouillé would go no further except to suggest that possibly the governors of neither nation represented the real state of affairs.³

Returning to a past status that antedated the activities of

¹ Albemarle to Robinson, October 23, 1754. Add. MSS., 33,027:279v.

² Albemarle to Robinson, November 27, 1754. Add. MSS., 33,027:283v. Albemarle reported that Mirepoix avoided him in almost comic fashion. Albemarle to Robinson, November 13, 1754. Add. MSS., 33,027:282v. In London Boutet was haggling over the price quoted him of fifty guineas for a copy of the Ohio Company grant, to the possession of which the French minister attached importance. He was trying to procure by the same underhand means a copy of Braddock's instructions. Boutet to Rouillé, November 28, December 12, 1754, January 2, 1755. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 437:386, 406; 438:7. Rouillé to Boutet, December 6, 1754. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 437:397.

³ Albemarle to Robinson, December 18, 1754. Add. MSS., 33,027:287.

both English traders and French commandants was an understandable proposal: returning to a status conformable to the treaties of Utrecht and Aix-la-Chapelle was under existing circumstances impossible until the two powers could agree what that status was. The diplomacy of the next six months was to demonstrate that combining the two propositions in a settlement, temporary or definitive, was beyond the skill of the statesmen who attempted it. In it, the fates had destined the Earl of Albemarle no share. At about six o'clock of the evening of December 22, he died of apoplexy.¹ Ruvigny de Cosné, who thereafter acted as chargé, had not in the faintest degree the confidence of the English ministry. Henceforth the only view into each other's intentions for the two courts was the Duc de Mirepoix, now about to set out for London charged with Rouillé's instructions. The event was to prove that the facile duc was not so much a window as a double mirror in which men might see only the reflection of their own wish.

In the endeavor to justify their nations to European public opinion French and English diplomats were to try each to lay on the other the failure to settle amicably the American issues before they became acute. The French with truth alleged that they had three times indicated the English might negotiate, and that each time the English had failed to act. The English retorted that France's failure to halt her aggressions on disputed territory, her deceit as to the evacuation of the Neutral Islands, and as to Dunkirk, her insistence that the barren exchanges of the commissaries continue, above all the general trend of her European policy, had, whether from weakness or design, created an atmosphere of suspicion in which negotiation could have borne no fruit. The historian may be pardoned for refraining from the attempt to strike a moral balance between the nations.

THE NEGOTIATION OF 1755

The English-French negotiations of 1755 as to the Ohio, with each side anxiously watching the effect of its lines on neutral spectators like Spain and Austria, have a distinctly histrionic

¹ De Cosné to Newcastle, December 22, 1754. Add. MSS., 32,851:342.

flavor. Both sides repeatedly sent Madrid and Vienna long narratives, each emphasizing the ruthless rapaciousness of the other, and its own willingness to sacrifice its just rights for the sake of peace.¹ In general Rouillé was steadfast against yielding anything essential, while affecting to believe the English government would not go to extremities. Mirepoix, perhaps acting in part on secret instructions from Louis and Pompadour, pushed conciliatory proffers far beyond what Rouillé's authorized; they were never specifically backed up nor was Rouillé reversed by higher authority. At the same time Mirepoix drew for Rouillé the picture of a vacillating English ministry, afraid of war, afraid of public opinion, increasingly dominated by Fox and Granville—a picture completely refuted by facts.

Rouillé's instructions to Mirepoix of December 30, 31, 1754,² begin a new phase of the negotiation. It would perhaps be unfair to Rouillé to say that he deliberately took advantage of Albemarle's death to misrepresent the tenor of his exchanges with the deceased ambassador; but certainly his account of the relations and protests given Albemarle, of the demands made on him for satisfaction for Jumonville's "assassination," is far more imperative as recounted in his instructions to Mirepoix, than it is in Albemarle's correspondence: and so thought the English ministry.³

At all events Rouillé's instructions offered as a constructive suggestion for settling the American difficulty that both sides should order their governors to refrain strictly from all aggression until the commissaries could decide all boundary disputes. The commentary is interesting. There could be no question as to France's rights on the Ohio. The French had frequented it ever since its discovery by a Norman gentleman, *Sieur de la Salle*, in 1679; it had only been since the last war that the English governors had nefariously undertaken to break the communication between Canada and Louisiana by way of the Ohio. It was the English governors who had acted aggressively: the French gov-

¹ For instance, Robinson's and Holdernessee's letters to Keene and Keith of March 11, 1755. Add. MSS., 32,853:179, 185, 205. There are numbers of justificatory memoirs in the *Affaires Étrangères* of uncertain dates but manifestly for Spanish consumption.

² A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 437:431, 433, 437.

³ Mirepoix to Rouillé, January 16, 1755. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:15.

ernors had acted on the defensive, defending the lands of the king and repelling force by force. Finally it was much to be wished that the King of Great Britain should openly explain the purpose of Braddock's expedition.

Mirepoix expressed these ideas in interviews with the king, Newcastle, and Robinson.¹ The king said merely that he had to protect his subjects and that he did not seek more territory. Newcastle was vague on most points, but he and Robinson both offered the soothing suggestion that the armaments were not so much against the French as to restrain the English colonists: Robinson also minimized their size and importance. But Robinson was also quite specific as to the Ohio Valley. He insisted the routes from Canada to Louisiana used by the French had been three westwardly portages; he denied that they had any claim to the headwaters of the Ohio; those belonged to the Iroquois, who, recognized by the Treaty of Utrecht as English subjects, had also sold their lands to the English. Into the subject of right, Mirepoix, lacking instructions, refused to go; but he consented to reduce his position to writing in form of a memoir. This emphasized the need of restraining orders to the governors on both sides and restoration of affairs on the Ohio as they were before the last war, pending an examination of the dispute by commissaries; it ended with the inquiry as to the purpose of the English armaments.²

The English cabinet considered this memoir January 16. It decided that if it could be shown that most of the French encroachments were made since, or contrary to the Treaty of Utrecht, Mirepoix' proposals were inadmissible. Nevertheless, it would offer France a restoration of the status of that treaty as it was or should have been, especially as to the Ohio, Niagara, Crown Point, and Nova Scotia. It explained the armaments as designed to support the just rights of the crown and to protect its subjects, and not to give offense to any power or to disturb the general peace: it hoped an equally satisfactory explanation of current French armaments would be forthcoming. As there was no British force in commission capable of meeting what the

¹ Mirepoix to Rouillé, January 16, 1755. *A E Corr. Pol. Angl.*, 438:15.

² *A E Corr. Pol. Angl.*, 438:31.

French were reported to be fitting out, the lords ordered the guardships filled.¹

The cabinet's question as to French encroachments since the Treaty of Utrecht called the aggressive Halifax once more into action to supply the needed information. South Sea charters, the Iroquois cession of the Great Lakes region to the English in 1701, were sufficient arguments to libel as French aggressions prior to 1713, Fort Frontenac and Detroit; since the peace the list included Niagara, Toronto, Sandusky, Presqu'Isle, aux Boeufs, to say nothing of French settlements on the Mississippi and the Mobile; both these were within the limits of British colonies, and had been discovered by the English long before the French had any knowledge of them! In manufacturing historical proof the English board of trade quite outstripped its French counterpart!²

So fortified, M. le Chevalier Robinson, as the French dispatches named him, presented on January 22, a memoir embodying the cabinet decision of the sixteenth. It suggested, however, as the basis of the status quo, the Treaty of Utrecht's stipulations as renewed by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. It agreed to negotiate the instructions to the respective governors: but substituted for the reference to commissaries proposed by the French, an amicable negotiation from court to court.³

In the interval needed to receive the French reply distrust grew apace on both sides. Rouillé poured out on De Cosné his alarm at the sailing of Braddock's expedition which was supposed to have been delayed until spring.⁴ Mirepoix wrote on January 30 that active English preparations called for French counter

¹ Add. MSS., 32,996:5. It is characteristic of the accuracy of Mirepoix' impressions of cabinet opinions that he treated the last decision as a victory of Henry Fox over the pacific Newcastle; but Fox was not at the meeting, which included only Newcastle's own following. Mirepoix to Rouillé, January 23, 1755. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:40.

² Add. MSS., 33,029:332. This paper begins with the question excerpted from the cabinet minutes; it is quite in Halifax's style.

³ A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:38. Newcastle and Robinson told Mirepoix that it had been agreed in 1752 that commissaries could not settle the dispute, and that Albemarle had been sent instructions for negotiating on it. Literally this was of course true. Mirepoix to Rouillé, January 23, 1755. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:40.

⁴ De Cosné to Robinson, January 29, 1755. S P France, 250.

preparations; he did not trust the conciliatory language of Fox or Lord Granville.¹ Both Rouillé and Mirepoix noted that the English were not so well with Spain as they would have it thought they were; and frantic letters of Newcastle to Keene and Wall, expostulating with them for letting Spanish governors continue Ensenada's anti-English policy, indicate that French suspicions were well founded.²

On February 3, Rouillé announced to Mirepoix his king's decision. The commission was to continue; but he acceded to a court-to-court negotiation, and sent Mirepoix full powers to treat and conclude; Louis was further willing to say that his armaments were to protect his subjects and his colonies, and not to attack in America or elsewhere. The instructions that Mirepoix had asked as to the Ohio were unnecessary: all that could be said was that it belonged incontestably to France. The Treaty of Utrecht did not mention river or territory. England must advance the arguments for her new pretension; it would not be hard to refute them.³

The next phase of the negotiation is told in justificatory letters written by Robinson and Holdernessee to Keene at Madrid and Keith at Vienna on March 11.⁴ When Mirepoix saw that Rouillé's lines offered no chance of an agreement, he had on the basis of his full powers entered into discussions with Robinson which implied leaving the whole territory between the mountains and the Wabash as a neutral zone. In it all forts and settlements were to be abandoned: the traders of both nations might enter it freely. This proposal was essentially a return to the status of 1748, when Vincennes, Ouiatanon,⁵ and Miamis were the eastern limits of French occupation in the valley. Robinson sent Keene a minute taken down in Mirepoix' presence of such a basis of territorial settlement. These proposals, Robinson averred, Mirepoix

¹ A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:54. For Henry Fox, see *post*, cxxv, n.

² Newcastle to Wall, January 26, 1755; Newcastle to Keene, January 27, 1755. Add. MSS., 32,852:272, 277. Wall to Newcastle, March 5, 1755. Add. MSS., 32,853:115.

³ Rouillé to Mirepoix, February 3, 1755. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:81.

⁴ Add. MSS., 32,853:179, 185, 205.

⁵ Near the present Lafayette, Indiana.

had dispatched to his court, which had responded with the project of a preliminary convention dated February 19, 1755.¹

This proposal spaced the joint evacuation in the region between the Ohio and the mountains bordering Virginia: all access of traders to it during the two years' period of the convention was prohibited. There and in other contested regions all forts built since 1748 were to be razed. Robinson characterized the project as not a settlement, but a two years' cessation of hostilities. Rouillé's commentary, as communicated by Mirepoix, was even worse than his convention.² Rouillé depicted it as an extraordinary concession that France should suffer the evacuation of indisputably French territory between the Ohio and the mountains. He indicated, wrongly of course, that the English government had not thought it had the right to protest the seizure of English traders in the region, and had made its grant to the Ohio Company in underhand fashion. He remarked that there were French settlements on the Wabash, and that using it as a boundary would carry the neutral zone to the Mississippi. Worst of all he went out of his way to traverse the whole English interpretation of the Treaty of Utrecht. He alleged the uncertainty of Indian habitations, and the independence of white authority jealously maintained by all Indians and especially by the Iroquois. He pointed out the instability of all alliances between Indians and whites; and finally he dismissed the treaty as in this respect merely a monument to the ignorance of the diplomats who made it. Perceiving the hopelessness of this project, George II ordered the preparation of an English counter-project.

The evolution of this counter-project may now be traced. On February 7 a small cabinet of Newcastle, Hardwicke, and the two secretaries had outlined a project which included an evacuation from "the Back of His Majesty's Colonies" to the lakes and as far as the Wabash. It had also directed Robinson to ascertain if Mirepoix' full powers would authorize him to negotiate a settlement on the lines of the minute of March 27, 1752.³ Appar-

¹ A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:154.

² Rouillé to Mirepoix, February 19, 1755. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:163, 175.

³ Add. MSS., 32,996:25.

ently the answer seemed affirmative. On February 10, the same group, with Anson added, enlarged the scheme and made it more specific. The line was defined as extending from the mountains to Lake Ontario; it was to follow the Niagara River, Lake Erie, and the Wabash; all forts and settlements made since the Treaty of Utrecht were to be demolished, but traders on either side were to enjoy free access to, and free navigation of Lakes Ontario and Erie and the Niagara River. The forts at Niagara and Crown Point were to be demolished. The plan further outlined a settlement on the side of Nova Scotia.¹

This paper was submitted to Halifax, who criticized it severely for its vagueness and for its concessions. He pointed out that a line from the Allegheny Mountains to Lake Ontario might mean many different things: some would embrace sections already inhabited in New York and Pennsylvania; all would exclude the English from the rights they impliedly enjoyed under the fifteenth article of Utrecht of building forts on the lands of their Iroquois subjects. All would similarly allow the French to retain forts and trading houses on the lands of the Iroquois north of the Great Lakes, and render nugatory all English rights over them. French forts on the lower side of Niagara would not be affected; and merely stipulating the demolition of Crown Point would leave the French free to rebuild it farther down Lake Champlain.²

Robinson went over Halifax's criticisms with Hardwicke. Hardwicke could see their force when they were shown him on Mitchell's map: but the map itself alarmed him. Published with the patronage of the board of trade, it carried the boundaries of the colonies farther west than any other he had seen. Coming out at that moment, he feared it might imbue public opinion with a notion of British rights that would make accommodation impossible. The restless spirit of Halifax was pushing the ministry, in despite of itself, into strange channels.³

¹ Add. MSS., 32,996:27.

² "Lord Halifax's Observations on Sir Thos Robinson's Paper of Points," February [?] 1755. Add. MSS., 33,029:167.

³ Hardwicke to Newcastle, February 16, 1755. Add. MSS., 32,852:505.

On February 20, a cabinet at which Halifax was present adopted a revised basis of negotiation.¹ In deference to his objections the neutral zone was marked by a line beginning at Cuyahoga Bay, drawn due south to 40°, and thence southwest to 37°; the zone's western boundary began at the mouth of the Maumee, and ran south or southwest to the head of the Wabash, thence to its junction with the Ohio, and finally due south to 37°. Indian trade within this zone was to be free to both sides. All forts on Niagara River and Lake Champlain were to be demolished; the river and the lower lakes with the fur trade of the upper lakes were to be free to both parties. Halifax had thus stiffened the English demands to include a littoral on both Ontario and Erie, as well as a line much to the westward of the mountains.

This was not actually presented to Mirepoix till March 7,² after the king had decided that the French project of February 19, offered no possibility of an agreement. Even Mirepoix was afraid the English project would not do, though he thought the insuperable difficulties lay in what was proposed for Nova Scotia. On the side of the Ohio he seemed only anxious to know if the neutral zone included the east bank of the Wabash. He offered no objection to English trade on the Great Lakes "after it was proved to him that France had not the least pretence to claim those Countries & Lakes as their own. But as to the Forts he could say nothing."³

The French answer took a high tone. The English counter-project was absolutely inadmissible. The English should take it as a condescension that Mirepoix had even transmitted it. Henceforth he was to remain passive in a negotiation which the French considered as absolutely at an end. If the English ministers made further advances, he might listen to them. If their overtures,

¹ Add. MSS., 32,996:34.

² The formal project is in A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:253.

³ Minute of conversation. Add. MSS., 32,996:44. Mirepoix had prepared his court for this counter-project in a dispatch of February 28 (A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:232), retailing the changes that the English desired in the project of February 19. He stated the boundaries of the neutral zone as the Ohio (meaning of course the Allegheny) and the Wabash; the English, he said, claimed the mountains would not do, because they were irregular and not parallel to the Ohio, and because they were filled with ancient English settlements.

contrary to all reasonable expectation, appeared admissible he might transmit them; but he was to make no advances of himself. How far this was a gesture of disdain, how far a desperate effort to muzzle Mirepoix, is not clear. The ease with which he could be talked into concessions is manifest. There was no knowing when he might put France in the position of making surrenders from which she could not recede with grace.¹

Mirepoix represented the French reply as only increasing the terror of the English ministers. He depicted them trying frantically to get him to resume an active rôle in discussions. Newcastle said that all they really wanted on the Ohio was that the French should not occupy the region behind the English colonies.² Mirepoix' perceptions were probably here as elsewhere at fault. In the cabinet meeting of March 18,³ the ministry had faced the imminence of armed collisions at sea, and had decided that in case the French dispatched a squadron to America, a superior force should be sent from Torbay with orders to fall on the French and prevent their going to America or landing troops. The cabinet had also weighed the advisability of ordering Braddock to attack Montreal or Quebec, but had decided against it, partly because it was contrary to Great Britain's previous declarations of policy, but partly also because the proposed offensive might interfere with movements previously ordered! On the twenty-fourth⁴ a second meeting had determined to dispatch a squadron of seven ships of the line to cruise off Louisburg and attack any French fleet attempting to enter or to land troops! In both these cabinets all but Lord Granville were of Newcastle's own entourage save possibly Lord Anson, the son-in-law of Hardwicke. Mirepoix' delusion that warlike measures were forced by Fox and Granville on the vacillating Newcastle is merely a sign of how completely the ambassador was deceived by Newcastle's effusive cordiality.

¹ Rouillé to Mirepoix, March 5, 17, 1755. *A E Corr. Pol. Angl.*, 438:247, 280, 285. Earlier it had been proposed that Noailles or St. Severin be given Mirepoix as a colleague. La Galissonnière was also proposed, and Mirepoix much hurt at the implied slight on his abilities.

² Mirepoix to Rouillé, March 22, 1755. *A E Corr. Pol. Angl.*, 438:297.

³ Add. MSS., 32,996:50.

⁴ Add. MSS., 32,996:57.

Mirepoix, by his own account, had forgotten Rouillé's instructions in less than a week. March 22, he was once more discussing with Robinson the whole range of problems; Robinson had of course serious misgivings as to whether Mirepoix had any authority to make the proposals he did. He was stiffest on the lakes, insisting on a neutral zone twenty leagues wide following the south shore of the St. Lawrence and the lakes from Quebec to Presqu'Isle. He demanded a similar zone twenty leagues east of the Wabash, and an eastern boundary drawn from Venango to the mountains. He also required that traders be excluded from the neutral territory. While the English ministry could scarcely be content with this, it was far more than Mirepoix seemed authorized to offer. Mirepoix' own account of this conversation was similar, except that he thought Robinson had yielded the neutral zone on the lakes, with the exclusion of traders.¹

Robinson apparently recommended on March 26 an eastern line to the Ohio zone that ran from Cuyahoga Bay to the western ranges of the "mountains of Virginia," and thence to 39°. On the west he allowed the French both banks of the Wabash. He dodged the question of the lakes by proposing that they be put on the basis of the Treaty of Utrecht and that the Iroquois be reckoned British subjects. He stipulated the demolition of Niagara and Crown Point, and drew the boundary through the foot of Lake Champlain. Between his ideas and Mirepoix' there was

¹ Robinson to Newcastle, March 22, 1755. Add. MSS., 32,853:437. Mirepoix to Rouillé, March 24, 1755. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:307. April 21, 1755, Knyphausen wrote from Paris to Frederick II that Mirepoix had a secret correspondence with the king and Pompadour, who gave him instructions the tone of which, very different from those he received from the ministry, was all peace and sweetness. Richard Waddington, *Louis XV et le Renversement des Alliances*, 162. Robinson's and Newcastle's exchanges indicate they strongly suspected something of the sort. However the content of his secret instructions, and the reason they did not prevail are both a mystery.

Moreau in his memoirs avers that his patron the Marshal Noailles directed Rouillé, and dictated the policy of a passive refusal of concessions, and of European aggressions alike. Jacob-Nicolas Moreau, *Mes Souvenirs* (Paris 1898), 1:57. Pompadour a year later deemed Rouillé managed by one of his subordinates, the Abbé de la Ville, a partisan of her enemy D'Argenson. Waddington, *op. cit.*, 65. When the abbé took his post in the fall of 1754, Robinson, considering him a firebrand, was alarmed. Robinson to Albemarle, December 5, 1754.

still great variance: between his ideas, and those that, so far at least, Rouillé had expressed, the gap was impassable.¹

How far Robinson, according to Mirepoix' understanding or not, thereafter receded from this position in informal diplomatic give and take is a question. On April 6, Mirepoix thought he had conceded the western boundary of the neutral zone at twenty leagues east of the Wabash.² On the twenty-first Mirepoix thought he was allowing France full sovereignty on both banks of the St. Lawrence and the lakes as well as the full possession of the lands between the Ohio and the Wabash.³ On May 1 he found Robinson still clinging to the southern shores of the lakes for the English Indians: and while he would extend the neutral zone as far eastward as the mountains, he still insisted on neutrality for the Ohio as far down as the Wabash.⁴ On May 15 this was still the situation, with Robinson trying as before to avoid an issue on the lakes.

The formal exchanges for a time became vague and pointless. On March 27 Rouillé had sent a dispatch to Mirepoix;⁵ a part of it, stressing the desirability of a mutual communication of the orders of the two crowns to governors and naval commanders, was to be formally presented to the English ministry. On it Mirepoix based a communication which king and council decided to be merely the old proposal of refraining from hostilities, the advantage of which would be all on the side of France.⁶ About the third of April Mirepoix made another overture; the ministry, while treating it politely, appeared to doubt if he was so far authorized by his court.⁷ Rouillé on April 13, sent off another dispatch to Mirepoix couched in high terms.⁸ Distinguishing three English proposals, one for neutrality between the Wabash and the Ohio, another for limiting French sovereignty on the

¹ "Sir Thomas Robinson's Three Points of Recommendation." Add. MSS., 32,996:61.

² Mirepoix to Rouillé, April 6, 1755. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:362.

³ Mirepoix to Rouillé, April 21, 1755. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:418.

⁴ Mirepoix to Rouillé, May 1, 1755. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 439:4.

⁵ A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:332.

⁶ Robinson to Newcastle, March 31, 1755. Add. MSS., 32,853:511.

⁷ Robinson to Newcastle, April 5, 1755. Add. MSS., 32,854:55.

⁸ A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:392, 397.

south bank of the St. Lawrence and the lower lakes, and a third on Acadia, Rouillé announced that they endangered the safety of Canada, and that his master would never even discuss them.

This drew a formal English reply transmitted by Mirepoix April 25,¹ expressing regret that such a stand prevented England from negotiating freely to end all differences. Rouillé had to recede, claiming that France had refused, not to discuss the three points, but to allow England to make them the basis of the negotiation.² France, perfectly willing to discuss all disputed points, would press no claim not founded on right and on treaties. On this Newcastle told Mirepoix that if France had so declared herself in January, it might have had more effect; on May 9, the English court made a cold and vague reply.³

Between March and May the English ministry had taken stock of its position and the implications involved. In America they held the strategic advantage. Braddock had arrived safely with a force of regulars and artillery, which the French supposedly could not match, at least on the Ohio in the early summer. France had failed to send a force commensurate to Braddock's, which was probably the thing of which Newcastle had been most afraid in the fall of 1754. In a series of meetings⁴ the cabinet had planned dispatching Boscawen with a naval force superior to that which France was preparing, with orders to use force to prevent the French fleet from landing troops in North America. Boscawen had a hundred leagues' start of the French fleet dispatched with the regulars destined to defend Canada so well under Montcalm. Thus England could keep the upper hand in North America, and on the pretext of former French armed aggression in Acadia and on the Ohio, do what she would in the disputed regions, or even to Quebec and Montreal.⁵

Under such circumstances, with her game in North America irretrievably lost, what would France elect to do? With a weak

¹ A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:440.

² Rouillé to Mirepoix, May 2, 1755. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 439:14, 20.

³ Mirepoix to Rouillé. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 439:30.

⁴ March 18, April 10, 17, 21, 22, 1755. Add. MSS., 32,996:50, 73, 77, 87, 89.

⁵ This point of view develops in Newcastle's confidential correspondence. See his letters to Joseph Yorke, May 6, Holderness, May 9, Hartington, May 17, 1755. Add. MSS., 32,854:392, 459; 32,855:35.

marine, tottering finances, and recalcitrant *parlements*, would she listen to a settlement in North America based on a just regard to British rights, or would she stake her redress on a European war? English ministers through the medium of Mirepoix' facility had been looking for signs of such a willingness to hear reason on the part of Rouillé. So far they were not apparent. On the other hand while French ambassadors at Madrid and Vienna had labored to convince those courts that English rapacity had periled the peace of Europe, France had made little secret of plans to invade the Electorate of Hanover or the Low Countries.¹ The one would touch the sensibilities of George II, the other would menace English security at the point of five centuries' alarm.

Against Continental dangers, English ministers had their defense. Subsidies would bring Russian and Austrian armies to the field. The Dutch Republic might be armed against an invasion of Flanders. If Spain would make representations to France of sentiments such as Wall expressed in private, the danger would blow over.² At all events it was likely that with America definitely lost France would prefer to recover what she could by negotiation rather than by precipitating a European war.

Of all this Mirepoix seems to have understood but little. Only occasionally, as by a lightning flash was the true purpose of the British ministry revealed to him; and as Rouillé generally preferred to credit his optimistic estimates, his warnings had the fate of Cassandra's. Mirepoix could not fathom character; indeed one questions if he always fully understood the import of conversations in which he took part, and if he did not frequently miss altogether some of the more delicate nuances of expression. He persisted in reading character on simple lines. Newcastle is always timorous and afraid of public opinion; that Newcastle's mannerisms might serve to mask his real purpose did not occur to Mirepoix. He was apt to lay responsibility for warlike measures on Henry Fox or Lord Granville, though surviving cabinet minutes attest that warlike measures were usually adopted in cabinets

¹ For Vienna, Rouillé to Mirepoix, April 24, 1755. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:426. For Madrid, A E Mém. et Doc. Angl., 40:256.

² Newcastle to Keene, and to Wall, April 28, 1755. Add. MSS., 32,854: 299, 309.

in which Granville was the only minister outside Newcastle's circle of influence.

Mirepoix' lack of understanding is patent. An interview with Newcastle in early April led the Frenchman to report Newcastle more scared than ever, and Granville once more in the ascendancy; Robinson reported to the king that Mirepoix left it in mortification and despair.¹ Mirepoix was convinced George wished to avoid war, at the very times when Newcastle and Robinson's private exchanges indicate the very opposite. On April 21, after Boscawen's aggressive orders had been decided on for a month, Mirepoix was convinced that no such orders would be given.² In this he misled Rouillé, who in his dispatch of April 13 had forecast quite accurately the purposes of English military and naval enterprise in America.³ True, on April 28, Mirepoix had indicated that the ministry was yielding to the public's war-like mood; on May 5, he had a flash of intuition as to the realities of the situation. But on May 1, he was convinced the ministry was still anxious for peace, and on May 10, he accepted Granville's denials of the hostile orders with which Boscawen had sailed. His dispatches of May 15 convey the same impression. On the twenty-fourth Rouillé was still in his false security, and it was only in the course of June that he and Mirepoix came definitely to suspect the worst.⁴

Once again it has to be considered how far Rouillé himself was really misled as to the purposes of England. Albemarle's death had placed him at a disadvantage in fathoming her intentions. De Cosné manifestly knew nothing, and merely served as an occasional outlet for his impatience. Hertford, mentioned as Albemarle's successor, did not come. Rouillé could not very well replace Mirepoix without a scandal; he could hardly with good grace give him a colleague unless the negotiation became more active: yet, Mirepoix, pliable as he was, was likely at any moment

¹ Mirepoix to Rouillé, April 6, 1755. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:362. Robinson to Newcastle, April 5, 1755. Add. MSS., 32,854:55.

² Mirepoix to Rouillé, April 21, 1755. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:418.

³ Rouillé to Mirepoix, April 13, 1755. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:392.

⁴ Mirepoix to Rouillé, April 28, May 1, 5, 10, 15, June 7, 1755. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:450; 439:4, 24, 65, 76, 166. Rouillé to Mirepoix, May 24, June 29, 1755. *Op cit.*, 439:96, 209.

to make admissions calculated to prejudice seriously the French case. Rouillé must have known how little Mirepoix' estimates of English intentions were worth.

How far was he really misled by Mirepoix, and how far did he merely pretend to be?¹ France and England were both playing for effect in the courts of Europe. Some of Rouillé's statements accepting the pacific assurances of the English ministry have a theatrical ring. How far did he really believe, as he pretended to, that the purposes of Braddock's expedition were non-aggressive?² Did he accept the English assurances of the pacific character of their armaments because France had let slip the moment to anticipate or to match them? Or did he trust farther than he should to England's unwillingness to risk without sure allies a new European war with France? Or was he convinced by La Galissonnière's arguments that France could not yield a jot of the English demands without risking Canada, and do as he did because he could no other?

Straight into war the nations drifted. For the last three weeks in June the cabinet considered the sending of Admiral Hawke to sea, possibly with orders to fall upon the French fleet or the French merchant shipping.³ In mid-June arrived in London one of Jumonville's officers, taken prisoner by Washington, and with his comrades held prisoner by Dinwiddie in contravention of the terms of Washington's capitulation. The Sieur Druilon brought correct information of Braddock's march to the Ohio, and of Shirley's expedition against Niagara—which last

¹ Knyphausen was convinced of Rouillé's false security even at times when Rouillé's dispatches to Mirepoix indicate the contrary. Knyphausen to Frederick II, April 18, 21, 1755. Quoted in Waddington, *Louis XV.*, 162.

² Rouillé's self-deception may well have been assisted by a misleading copy of Braddock's instructions which Boutet had procured. They were couched in general terms, prescribing defensive measures, a good understanding with colonial governors, etc. The real instructions prescribing the movement to the Ohio were conveyed in a letter from Colonel Napier of Cumberland's staff. The copy is in A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:2.

³ The Duke of Cumberland approved doing this: Newcastle, Holderness, and the king opposed it. Cabinets of June 29, July 1, 1755. Add. MSS., 32,996:149, 160. Newcastle to Hardwicke, June 7, 28, 30, 1755. Add. MSS., 32,855:381; 32,856:329, 394. Newcastle to Holderness, June 13, 1755. Add. MSS., 32,855:479. Holderness to Robinson, June 22, 1755. Add. MSS., 32,856:93.

Robinson denied. In accordance with orders from France Mirepoix demanded the punishment of Dinwiddie: Robinson had the pleasure of returning the French answer of former days that Dinwiddie would be ordered to report.¹ With Rouillé and Mirepoix at last fully convinced that the English intentions were hostile, Rouillé on July 14 gave Mirepoix permission to return when he chose, leaving Boutet as chargé.² But on July 15 news reached London of Boscawen's attack on the *Alcide* and the *Lys*, and of the escape of the rest of the French squadron.³

Possibly, had Boscawen's attack been fully successful, the French course might have been different. But as it was they had got a strong force of regulars into Canada, and could afford a high tone. Mirepoix, until he had word from his court, refused to listen to Robinson.⁴ On July 18, Rouillé ordered Mirepoix and Bussy to quit London and Hanover, without taking leave.⁵ De Cosné was given a hint to stay away from the French court: on July 22, Robinson recalled him.⁶

THE FRENCH AND ENGLISH ARGUMENTS

A summary view of the French and English claims and of the arguments with which they were supported is most conveniently given in a summary of the last two extended documents of the negotiation. These are Rouillé's memoir of May 9, communicated to the English court on May 14, and Robinson's answer of June 7.⁷ It is simpler to discuss them in reverse order, beginning with Robinson's. The first and last of his four points which

¹ Mirepoix to Rouillé, June 18, July 3, 10, 1755. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 439:191, 223, 233.

² A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 439:239.

³ Newcastle to Holdernes, July 15, 1755. Add. MSS., 32,857:109.

⁴ Mirepoix to Rouillé, July 15, 1755, July 16, 1755. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 439:250, 252.

⁵ Rouillé to Mirepoix, July 18, 1755. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 439:255. Holdernes to Newcastle, July 23, 1755. Add. MSS., 32,857:308. For Bussy, see *post*, xciv-xcvi.

⁶ De Cosné to Holdernes, July 20, 1755; Robinson to De Cosné, July 22, 1755. S P France, 250.

⁷ A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 439:172; 437:465. Robinson's appears in several places in the *Affaires Étrangères*, sometimes under the title, "Sur les Quatre Points a discuter relatifs a L'Amerique," and with the incorrect date of 1754.

respectively concern Nova Scotia and the Neutral Islands, we do not need to consider.

On the second point, the boundaries of Canada, Robinson begins with a flat denial of French rights over Lakes Erie and Ontario, and the Niagara River: British, French, and Iroquois, without distinction had used them all. The boundaries of Canada to the south of the St. Lawrence the English were willing to discuss. Here Robinson expressly affirmed the English interpretation of Article 15 of the Treaty of Utrecht. Great Britain could never admit that that treaty referred merely to the persons of the Indians; on the other hand she was misrepresented as alleging that an Iroquois' passing residence in a territory gave her title to it. But, on grounds of Iroquois possession and Iroquois cession to Great Britain she rightfully owned the lands alleged to be dependencies of Canada on which France had encroached by her forts at Crown Point, Niagara, Presqu'Isle, and the Ohio.

As to the third article, which concerned the course and territory of the Ohio, France could there pretend possession neither before nor after the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle save by certain forts unjustly built on lands belonging to the Iroquois, or by them duly ceded to the king or to his subjects. France's title seemed to turn on her use of the river as a communication between Canada and Louisiana; but she had not so used it save secretly and occasionally. It was the Wabash and Maumee rivers, and those only of late years that served as her communication. The English court by the memorial of March 7, 1752, had specifically complained of La Jonquière's confiscating the goods and seizing the persons of English traders who had crossed the mountains of Virginia. Great Britain insisted that the territory had belonged by origin and conquest to the Iroquois, who had ceded it to the English: the English twenty years back had established settlements, notably at Pickawillany, midway between the Ohio and the Wabash.

The French memoir of May 9, 1755, deals with the same articles. As to the bounds of Canada, France must always reject the proposal that the south shore of the St. Lawrence and the lower lakes is to serve as boundary. Rather the negotiation must

treat the St. Lawrence as the center of Canada. France however would be willing to consider a settlement on terms of mutual convenience and concession. The sole English argument appeals to the Treaty of Utrecht; but its fifteenth article concerns not the territory but the persons of the Indians, who have no property in land save that of use, which a single day may alter. To posit the boundaries of the two crowns on the temporary residence of an Indian is absurd. Actually the Indians in question are jealous of their independence and subject to neither crown; no Englishman would risk his life by telling them they were English subjects; the Treaty of Utrecht could not change the nature of things. Indeed in the American wilderness such claims are as useless as they are incorrect. The essential interests of safety and trade, the court of France in due negotiation would ever be ready to concede.

As to the course and territory of the Ohio, it should belong to France on grounds of title, justice, convenience, and mutual safety. When British ministers professed that its headwaters were full of their ancient settlements, they were sadly misinformed. The French—a phrase that was to return to plague them in 1761—had always considered that river a dependence of Canada, and essential to its communication with Canada. The French had always frequented it, notably in 1739 when the Canadian detachment sent to the Chickasaw war had travelled by that route. Supposing the territory had then been full of British settlements, would there not have been complaints? It was true that in the past few years English traders had gone there; first warned off, they had on returning been seized with their goods without the court of London venturing to complain. It was a testimony indeed to France's love for peace that she should have consented to establish a neutral zone east of the river in her own undoubted territory.

As the historian endeavors to strike a balance between conflicting claims, he has first to sift the true from the false. Both on the Ohio and on the Great Lakes the English claim turned primarily on the phrase of the Treaty of Utrecht which characterized the Iroquois or Five Nations as English subjects.

From the point of view of diplomacy the claim was strong. For a quarter of a century the overlordship of the Iroquois had been a matter of diplomatic controversy between France and England; and if in the Treaty of Utrecht the French had quitclaimed their rights to the English they could scarcely allege that it was by fraud or surprise. Further there were in British archives authenticated treaties in which the Iroquois tribes had admitted British overlordship. That of 1701 had ceded to the British their hunting grounds, comprising all the country of the lower lakes. There might to say the least be doubt whether in all or any of these treaties there had been a meeting of minds; on certain occasions the Iroquois had expressly disclaimed British overlordship to both British and French: certainly no Englishman would dare to exercise his king's sway over them. But the letter of the record was against the French. If Indian titles were good the British could produce their set cessions: if Indian titles were bad, the crown of France had none the less quitclaimed its rights over their lands in article 15.

Further, a white man would no more dare tell an Indian that his tribe owned no lands than he would dare tell him that he was his lord. Indian tribes defined more or less exactly the area they claimed even as a bear claims a run in the mountains as his own. No Indian tribe in the area under dispute would have ventured to deny to the Iroquois their express claim to its overlordship. So much the Iroquois had said to the face of La Jonquière himself.

The counterclaims that the French could set up were discovery and conquest. Champlain first of recorded white men had been in the Ontario country. French invading forces with notary and *procès verbal* had taken possession of captured Iroquois castles. French explorers had captured English traders who had ventured, even under Iroquois protection, on the upper lakes.

As to the Ohio, those claims were not so valid. Silhouette had inquired of La Salle's heirs for papers that might demonstrate France's claim to the Ohio; he never produced any. The usually cited date of 1679 for La Salle's discovery is impossible. Formerly it was alleged that, slipping away from Dollier and

Galinée on Lake Erie, La Salle had discovered and explored the Ohio in 1669: but modern historical scholarship has overthrown the claim. On the other hand, that Thomas Batts and Robert Fallam found their way over the mountains to the headwaters of the New River in 1671 is authenticated fact. That within a decade English traders swarmed in the valleys of the Tennessee and the Cumberland, that by 1700 they had reached the mouths of the Tennessee and the Arkansas, is certain; but these facts Robinson never alleged. He stood content with his legalistic argument which was perhaps safest.

A strong unofficial argument for the French cause was afforded by the maps. Down to the publication of Mitchell's map in 1755, one English cartographer after another had followed the French originals of Bellin and Delisle. They had bounded the English colonies by a line which skirted south of Lakes Champlain, Ontario, and Erie and had kept carefully out of the Ohio basin. Such were the maps of Emanuel Bowen, published in atlases of 1747 and 1752. But while such maps might serve as an indication of public opinion, they could not seriously be urged as substitutes for more legal titles on a government that had never formally adopted them.

In drawing up its case, in deciding on what it must demand as essential to safety, the French court leaned heavily on its commissaries, especially on La Galissonnière. March 7 he was furnishing Rouillé with maps.¹ In response to a request of April 13, he produced a large body of materials justifying the French claim and annulling the English; these essentially were repeated in Rouillé's memoir of May 9.² Finally La Galissonnière is the probable author of a treaty drafted in June to indicate the point beyond which France in accommodation could not safely go. The neutral zone of course is between the Ohio and the moun-

¹ La Galissonnière to Rouillé [?], March 7, 1755. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:259.

² Rouillé to La Galissonnière and Silhouette, April 29; La Galissonnière to Rouillé, April 30, 1755. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:454, 455. The material is in A N Colonies C11E 7:2 *et seq.* "Note sur le Droit de la France au Territoire de la Belle Rivière." A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:457.

tains. The whole shore of Lake Ontario is surrendered to France. Only as a last resort can it be admitted that Oswego is merely to be razed, and not rebuilt by the French. All English establishments beyond the mountains or on the Mississippi or Mobile are to be surrendered. If there were English settlements beyond the mountains before 1743, the King of France will compensate their owners. In one form or another Article 15 of the Treaty of Utrecht must be abrogated. Neither French nor English may go to trade with Indians in the neutral zone. In last resort as a compensation for these concessions the English may be accorded full rights over the rivers flowing into Hudson Bay!

It is significant of La Galissonière's failure to grasp the realities of the situation that he should have thought such a treaty could be imposed on England save at the end of a disastrous war. Always his mind recurred to the necessity of French security, which he felt assured could be achieved only by such arrangements. Why La Galissonière should have been the trusted adviser of the French ministry is fully apparent in his draft objections to Robinson's four points.¹ The knowledge of America and its Indians there displayed is as astonishing as the keenness with which he penetrated Robinson's vagueness. But in one draft of the objections² he has indicated the additional reinforcements and fortifications necessary for security if the English claims in Acadia and on the St. Lawrence were admitted. New works at Quebec, La Presentation, Fort Frontenac, Fort Frederick, Niagara, Detroit, and Miamis; new forts on the Wabash; a walled city with a fort at the Illinois; garrisons at the mouth of the rivers of the Mississippi system that come from the English colonies; such are the needs for security. Security is the keynote of the policy that the Marquis de la Galissonière formulated and imposed on the French ministry. By the irony of fate France staked and lost her European position in a war for the security of a territory that in her cooler moments she listed as a colonial failure.

¹ A N Colonies C11E 7:80 *et seq.*

² A N Colonies C11E 7:181 *et seq.*

PART II

WAR AND DIPLOMACY, 1756-1761

TO THE CAPITULATION OF MONTREAL, 1760

Fear, mistrust and irresolution fanned the fire kindled in the North American forest until half Europe was in flames.¹ France, seeking a secret conciliation with England that the English reverses had made impossible, postponed the advice of her Prussian ally to strike at Hanover or the Netherlands.² England, failing to find a buttress for them in Austria or in Holland, concluded a subsidy treaty with the Empress Elizabeth of Russia. Frederick of Prussia, alarmed at a treaty which threatened his frontiers with the forces of his inveterate enemy, made advances to England. Swiftly was concluded the Treaty of Westminster by which Frederick guaranteed the Hanoverian possessions of his uncle George II. He excused himself on the ground that since his ally France declined to participate in a German war, it was necessary to his safety to insure the neutrality of Germany. But the treaty, concluded as the Duc de Nivernois arrived at Berlin on a long delayed mission to cement the union of Frederick and

¹ The classic on this period is Richard Waddington, *Louis XV et le Renversement des Alliances* (Paris, 1896), which serves as an introduction to his unfinished five volume treatise, *La Guerre de Sept Ans* (Paris, 1899 —). Hereafter these volumes will be cited as Waddington, 1, 2, etc. Waddington inclines to acquit Frederick of more than a normal amount of diplomatic duplicity. The Duc de Broglie, *L'Alliance Autrichienne*, makes Frederick at every point the *diabolus ex machina*. Sir Julian Corbett, *England in the Seven Years' War, a Study in Combined Strategy* (London, 1907), is the best work in English on the subject.

² During the last half of 1755 the French cabinet made several informal advances toward a reopening of negotiations with England. Early in 1756, they offered an ultimatum calling for the return of English prizes taken in the previous year as a preliminary to reopening the American question. Only when it was rejected did they seriously face the prospect of war.

Louis XV, caused a tremendous revulsion of French feeling against Prussia. France, deserted in her hour of need by her old ally, listened to the siren voice of her ancient enemy.

Almost since the end of the last war, Austria had been making overtures to a French alliance. They had been heard with politeness but no more. The ancient tradition of French diplomacy assigned to the House of Hapsburg the rôle of hereditary enemy of France. A newer school of diplomacy which taught that France had much to gain from the Austrian alliance, had scarcely won a hearing when Austria's latest advances had been made in the fall of 1755. Prussia's alleged defection made Austria's alliance seem necessary. The Austrian diplomats drove a harder bargain. Under the guidance of Abbé Bernis, Pompadour's protégé, the Franco-Austrian alliance of May 1, 1756, was concluded; and France in the end was committed to a war against Prussia in Germany.

Frederick, sensing an encircling ring of hostile powers, Russia, Austria, Saxony, and now France, elected to strike before his enemies were ready, and in the summer of 1756 overran Saxony. Russia could no longer be restrained by England from joining Austria to chastise the Hohenzollern, and France stood committed to the diversion of an important part of her resources in men and money to crush Prussia and leave Austria supreme in Germany.

At the outset the war took a disastrous turn for England. In 1755 Boscawen's failure to intercept the French fleet let into Canada the regulars whom Montcalm was to use so brilliantly. Braddock's disaster on the Monongahela, Dunbar's disgraceful retreat with the unbeaten echelon of the army, Shirley's failure on Lake Ontario, made William Johnson's negative exploit on Lake George shine in contrast with lustre which warranted him a baronetcy. The year 1756 was worse. Montcalm's capture of Oswego closed the second of the two openings through which the French had seen English influence seep into the interior to corrupt their Indians. Admiral Byng's failure in the Mediterranean resulted in the stinging disgrace for England of the loss of

Minorca. The successes of Frederick against Saxons and Austrians were humiliating by contrast.

In 1757 even that consolation was lost. French warships slipped past the English Channel squadrons until a fleet was constituted at Louisburg superior to that of Admiral Holborne, who agreed with General Loudoun that discretion was the better part of valor and postponed their projected attack to another season. Montcalm meanwhile pounced on Fort William Henry on the New York frontier. Tales of horror and disaster had come from India. The Duke of Cumberland, defeated by the French in the maneuver of Hastenbeck, retreated through Hanover, and on September 10 concluded the Convention of Klosterzeven, immobilizing the Hanoverian forces and leaving the French free to fasten on the hard-pressed Frederick. The King of Prussia, hastening too fast to come to Cumberland's assistance, had paid for his contempt of the Austrians in the disaster of Kolin; and George II, convinced his ally was lost, made haste to abandon him. He had sought the peace of Hanover at Vienna and directed Cumberland to negotiate. Shamed by the reproaches of his ministers and his mistress, he had changed his mind too late; and Cumberland was made the scapegoat for negotiating a convention for which Pitt dared to tell George he had ample powers.

Then came the reaction of events. Frederick pounced on a French army of twice his size, and cut it to pieces at Rossbach. The Hanoverian army, reconstituted under that master of military chess play Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, began a series of campaigns, prophetic of the Peninsular War in which English armies supported from forage magazines baffled far stronger French ones expected to live off the country and therefore limited to the season when a green forage and local fodder stores were available. A series of expeditions against the French coast devised by Pitt, most of them devoid of positive results, served the purpose of immobilizing superior French forces. And a vast superiority of British and colonial troops in North America, expeditions against French India, against Senegal and Goree in French Africa, against the French sugar islands in the West Indies, steadily chipped away the French colonial empire.

Moreover 1757 saw, after a year of ministerial instability, a cabinet arrangement devised that worked through four victorious years. It was Newcastle's lack of a competent leader in the House of Commons in November, 1756, that made Pitt first minister. It was a Pitt chastened by knowledge of his need of Newcastle's political machine and Newcastle's political experience, who, after an eleven weeks' interregnum took office with Newcastle in late June of 1757, a scant week after the evil tidings of Kolin reached London.¹

By what warrant William Pitt wears one of the great names of English history is an interesting question. To his contemporaries he was a man whose forceful personality had a wide and compelling magnetic field, and helped to make him an orator in the House of Commons whom few dared to encounter. A savage and dreaded critic of ministries in years past, he had shown he could not be silenced by the lucrative offices designed to quiet unruly politicians of his calibre. He had impressed himself on the popular imagination as the one incorruptible statesman, the one friend of the people, the one true-born Englishman on whom the blandishments of the Hanoverian court had no effect. Not without reason his associates suspected that he deliberately trimmed his sails, and framed his criticisms of government just or unjust to enhance the popularity which was so unique a political asset.

As secretary of state for the southern department, it was his province during the war to guide the diplomacy, the strategy, and the colonial relations of Great Britain. As a diplomat, his haughty and overbearing manner accentuated his uncompromising insistence on the extreme of his country's interests; but as a colonial statesman, he won an American following as blindly adoring as his English constituency; and as a strategist, he reaped a four years' series of successes to intoxicate Englishman and colonial alike with a heady wine of triumph untasted since the days of Queen Anne's War. It is probably as little possible for military historians as for any other group of students of the past

¹The news of Kolin reached London June 24. The ministry was finally constituted June 29. *Chatham Correspondence*, 1:233.

to reach agreement in their conclusions. But in the case of Pitt the best opinion appears that he was a supreme master of strategy, a supreme coördinator of military and naval effort to secure the most desirable results.

In 1758, luck definitely turned for Prussia and England. Frederick defeated the Russians at Zorndorf. Prince Ferdinand pushed the French southward across the Rhine and defeated them at Crefeld. In America Montcalm's regulars repulsed Abercromby from the trenches of Ticonderoga; but Louisburg, deprived of French naval support because the French ports were ravaged with pestilence that the fleet had brought back from America the year before, capitulated to Jeffrey Amherst; Bradstreet captured Fort Frontenac at the outlet of Ontario, imperiling Canada's communication with the west; and Forbes, obstinately pushing his way west across Pennsylvania, checked by the massacre of his vanguard, delayed his advance till Indians and Illinois militia had left Fort Duquesne for the winter. On November 25, 1758, through the smoke rising from the fort's ashes, the English saw the waters of the Ohio, beckoning them to the heart of Louisiana and to Santa Fé.

In England, the welcome news of Louisburg even though followed two days later by the story of the repulse at Ticonderoga,¹ turned men's minds to peace. Newcastle, Hardwicke, and their coterie took it for granted that France would never give up Louisburg and that it was to be used merely as a trading credit to retrieve their past losses, and to buy the claims in North America for which they had gone to war.² The king, as enthusiastic as the warmest of his subjects, as the Common Council of London itself, would hear of giving back nothing. He would have Cape Breton and Canada; he would drive the French out of North America; he would take Martinique and use it as an

¹ The news of Louisburg came August 18; of Ticonderoga, August 20. Newcastle to Hardwicke, August 18, 1758. Add. MSS., 32,882:413. Bute to Pitt, August 20, 1758. *Chatham Correspondence*, 1:335.

² Newcastle could not decide whether the demolition of Louisburg would lessen its value in diplomatic trade. Hardwicke to Newcastle, August 19, 29; Newcastle to Mansfield, August 20; Hardwicke to Newcastle, September 21, 1758. Add. MSS., 32,882:446, 472; 32,883:160; 32,884:98.

equivalent to get back Minorca.¹ The Whig lords suspected the influence of Pitt, determined to enhance his popularity by high demands, and by a continuance of the war and of conquests to make himself indispensable.² Pitt was himself more guarded in speech than the king; December 6, he said in the House of Commons it was yet too early to decide what to give up and what to keep.³

At the time English ministers were discussing terms of peace, a ministerial revolution in France brought to power a man set for the moment at least on a more vigorous prosecution of the war against England. The Abbé Bernis, aware too late of how fatally he had mortgaged France's resources to the pursuit of Austria's revenge against Prussia, had been frantically casting about for means of escape. He had appealed vainly to Spain to join France in the war, to loan France money, to mediate France's peace with England. In the fall he had summoned the Duc de Choiseul, ambassador to Vienna, to the portfolio of foreign affairs as the one man who might get France loose from the fatal Austrian subsidy treaty of May 1, 1757. December 13, a palace revolution exiled Bernis to one of his abbeys and made Choiseul in fact if not in name, first minister.

"The Minister is a Man of lively Parts, but no Education for Business; frank enough in Talk, meaning often what He says at the time, but fickle, very indiscreet; treats all affairs, & with the Highest as Matters of Jest: He has got a Credit with the King, quite independant of the Lady: He treats Her often slightly: sometimes roughly: tells Her, She is as handsome as an Angel when She talks of affairs; bid Her throw a Memoire, the other Day, into the Fire: did not make the Austrian Alliance, which was done by Bernis: has expressed His Dislike thereof to His Confidants: envious of That Court's generally hated Treaty, owing partly to Prussia's indiscreet Expressions about the Mistress, and Contempt of the Cardinal's verses."

¹ Newcastle to Hardwicke, August 26, September 17, 1758. Add. MSS., 32,883:114; 32,884:27.

² Newcastle to Hardwicke, September 18, October 19, 1758. Add. MSS., 32,884:79, 436.

³ Albert Von Ruville, *William Pitt, Earl of Chatham*, 2:219.

So Choiseul was summarized by an English minister possessed of an unconscious literary gift.¹ He had been a soldier: he had served as diplomatic representative to Vienna and to the Vatican. In fits of seeming frankness, a quick temper and sarcastic tongue ran away with him; in press of work thrown off headlong, he with seeming carelessness made mistake after mistake; but both outbursts and inaccuracies appeared by some strange coincidence almost always to work out to his advantage. Often enough to leave his antagonists in uncertainty as to his real intention, his frankness masked a deep duplicity. Pleasure loving by nature and compelled to bear his part in amusing the king, he had to do on the run the business of the portfolios he successively assumed. His carelessness in details was accentuated by his unrevised drafts in which a rapid pen tracing an all but illegible script lagged behind the swift thought of its master.

Choiseul's main purpose at the outset was to extricate France from the engagements to Austria to which Bernis had bound her. In the face of Kaunitz, a diplomat able as himself, he was unable fully to recover France's power to negotiate independently with England; he could only secure her liberation from the impossible subsidies promised in 1757; in return he surrendered empty conditional promises of territorial acquisitions in the Netherlands, and agreed to employ 100,000 men against Hanover. On this basis he devised a vigorous campaign in 1759, designed by a crushing blow at Hanover and a French invasion of England to make England agree to a reasonable peace.

In set statements not contradicted by his acts, Choiseul has indicated his further policy. Spain and Naples, ruled by scions of the House of France, are far more permanent and desirable allies than Austria, whose connection may change on the death of the ruler. For the same reason Prussia must be preserved as a German counterweight to Austria; and in a future peace congress Choiseul looks to a coöperation of Spain, France, and England to this end. A swift and honorable peace with England gained by the sword or by Spanish mediation is therefore his first

¹ This is on a loose sheet ciphered, in Hans Stanley's dispatch of June 12, 1761. S P France, 251.

objective; probably a permanent alliance with Spain was his secondary one.

Against the tide of English success, Choiseul's energy availed not. True, the fatal day of Kunersdorf brought England's ally to what seemed certain ruin; but in western Germany, English good fortune retrieved the balance. Prince Ferdinand's campaign began with a series of reverses in the face of overwhelming French numbers; he gave ground; the French predicted the conquest of all Hanover, and pressed jubilantly on. At Minden on August 1 they confronted the English 55,000 to 35,000. The astute Ferdinand slid his pieces on the board. Like a magician he hypnotized Contades into offering battle where he desired: and only Lord George Sackville's insubordination saved the French from utter ruin.

In America, Guadeloupe fell before an expedition repulsed from Martinique. Niagara surrendered to Sir William Johnson after the French militia from the Illinois, attempting to relieve the fort, had been lured into an English and Mohawk ambushade. The climax of the American drama however came at the Rock of Quebec. The French ministry had "admired but not adopted" the proposal to withdraw the troops from Canada to Louisiana; it had felt it useless to plan any large expedition of succor to New France and had rested content to supplement Montcalm's failing resources with supplies by private ships; it expected him only to do his best to save Canada for one campaign more. The English watched the death-struggle at Quebec as keenly as the French. October 14 arrived Wolfe's letter of September 9 which seemed to prepare men's minds for failure. Late on the sixteenth it was overtaken with the news of the Plains of Abraham and the capitulation of Quebec; and the most timorous gave way to exaltation. At the end of the year Hawke dashed among the rocks of Quiberon to achieve the destruction of Conflans' fleet and to scotch Choiseul's great project of invasion. France must now face in earnest the unpleasant price of peace; and Spain in her calculations gained enhanced importance.

Since the outbreak of the war Spain had increasingly been the pivot on which French and English diplomacy had turned;

but the pivot itself inclined to be unstable as Ferdinand VI himself, whose ministers of state worked independently and at variance with each other. An underlying sentiment and prejudice toward each power had much weight. England excited a certain fascinated interest as well as a warm dislike. That she persisted in maintaining fortified settlements in Honduras, where the Treaty of Utrecht permitted her subjects to cut logwood on uninhabited coasts, was a standing grievance, to which were soon added the outrageous violations of neutrality by her cruisers. France, regarded as a near relative, was regarded also with the latent distrust often the lot of such. Spain absorbed her never ending propaganda as to English greed and aggressions: her assertions, repeated for more than half a century, that Canada and Louisiana were the bulwark of New Mexico against English cupidity and avarice: these possibly Spain came to believe; but always she recollected that in Louisiana, France retained what was properly Spain's own.

Richard Wall, Spain's foreign minister throughout the period of our study, on principle inclined to a pro-English policy. It was perhaps partly a belief that a French alliance would mean Spanish subordination to the greater Bourbon monarchy, partly a conviction that war with England would destroy Spain's overseas empire. Wall had to meet the insinuation that his Irish birth and English friendships dictated his opinions: this made him continually subject to fits of bad temper at the high tone of English diplomacy and its stubborn evasions of righting Spain's wrongs; but, except when in 1757 he thought England on the verge of ruin, he clung to the very end to the policy of good relations with Britain.

In the summer of 1757, Pitt, anxious to find alliances in the south to counterbalance the seeming ruin of the English policy in the north,¹ had earnestly sought Spanish help. He carried through the cabinet a proposal to offer Spain Gibraltar for her

¹Newcastle to Hardwicke, August 9, 1757, reporting a conversation with Pitt that morning. Add. MSS., 32,872:492. A year before, Viry had told Newcastle that Fox had raised the question of giving Gibraltar to Spain and had even mentioned it to D'Abreu. Newcastle to Hardwicke, July 12, 1756. Add. MSS., 32,866:141.

help in recovering Minorca. Keene, his years heavy on his shoulders, wearily undertook the task, conscious it was foredoomed to failure. Wall's irritation at England's failure to support his policy was pointed by a conviction of her approaching ruin; to Keene's offers he was at best coldly polite, so much so that Keene thought it useless to pursue his first hint on Gibraltar.¹ When in October, Wall talked to Aubeterre of Spain's participation in the war on the side of France, the French ambassador considered it was prompted mainly by a desire to be on the winning side.² Previously he had discounted Spain's value as an ally, considering that she would be an easy prey to the English navy so that French conquests would in the end go to ransom lost Spanish colonies.³ His estimate of Spain's motive was justified when Ferdinand's face fell at the news of Rossbach, and Wall, sadly remarking that another campaign would be necessary, forebore to push his advances to France.⁴

For the next year, Spanish-English relations were stormy. D'Abreu returned a memoir of Pitt's as inadmissible, though Wall obstinately refused to explain why.⁵ Pitt on his side counseled moderation to the Earl of Bristol, who replaced Keene at Madrid; he apologized for the excesses of English privateers and multiplied instances of their punishment. But when on June 16, 1758, D'Abreu presented a claim, based on treaties of 1713 and 1721, to Spanish participation in the Newfoundland fishery, Pitt had to reject it as totally inadmissible.⁶ In September Wall's language to Bristol rose almost to menace; but in November he was once more cordial. The reason was that the death of Queen Barbara August 27, had been shortly followed by a melancholy on the part of the king that speedily became incurable insanity. In an autocratic monarchy where the personal order of the monarch

¹ Pitt to Keene, August 23, 1757; Keene to Pitt, September 26, 1757. *Chatham Correspondence*, 1:247, 263. Keene died December 15, 1757.

² Aubeterre to minister, October 31, 1757; minister to Aubeterre, November 15, 1757. *A E Corr. Pol. Esp.*, 522:381, 408.

³ Aubeterre to minister, July 6, 1757. *A E Corr. Pol. Esp.*, 522:3.

⁴ Aubeterre to minister, December 19, 1757. *A E Corr. Pol. Esp.*, 522:486.

⁵ Francis Thackeray, *A History of the Right Honorable William Pitt, Earl of Chatham*, 1:380.

⁶ Pitt to Bristol, August 1, 1758. Thackeray, *Pitt*, 1:380.

was required for a multitude of administrative details, the government was soon at a standstill.¹

This the French speedily found out to their cost. Bernis' appeals for Spanish help had grown more and more pressing in the late summer. Louis XV had reinforced them in his letter of condolence to his brother monarch with a remark that powers with American possessions had much to fear from the progress of English arms. September 5 Bernis had written Aubeterre that since Spain would apparently not assist France in arms or with money, she must at least offer her mediation to secure a reasonable peace; and two weeks later Aubeterre was assured that Fuentes, the new Spanish ambassador to St. James, would carry such instructions. Week by week Bernis preached his sermons on the danger in America from English rapacity and the need of union on the part of the other maritime powers. Wall agreed that it was important that the English should not become masters of America; but he could do no more, and Bernis turned his thoughts to Denmark as mediator.²

It was natural in view of Choiseul's policies that he should have redoubled efforts to induce Spain to play a decided part. December 25,³ before he had been two weeks in power, he was writing Aubeterre the familiar lecture on Spain's self-interest as far as America was concerned. His impatience vented itself on Aubeterre apparently in the hope that the rebound might affect the Spanish ministry. He demanded if it was possible that even with an insane king there was not some power in Spain capable of fulfilling her treaty obligations. Aubeterre blandly begged to be instructed as to what these were! Choiseul was reduced to citing some guaranty clauses, admitting that France had never fulfilled her obligations under them. Despite Aubeterre's arguments to the contrary he insisted that Wall was pro-English, and

¹ Instances occur *passim* in the French diplomatic correspondence for the next months. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 524, 525.

² Aubeterre to minister, September 18, 25, October 2, 1758; Louis XV to Ferdinand VI, September 16, 1758; minister to Aubeterre, September 5, 12, 19, October 9, 17, 31, 1758. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 524:40, 47, 68, 37, 11, 28, 43, 80, 90, 138.

³ Minister to Aubeterre, December 25, 1758. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 524: 226.

expressed his fears that he had poisoned Don Carlos' mind against France.¹

For months before the death of Ferdinand VI, on August 10, 1759, the attention of the European powers had turned to his half-brother and heir, Charles, King of the Two Sicilies. As men then estimated his character, he seemed as mighty a hunter as his half-brother, a man whose methodical ways descended to the ridiculous, of high moral character, a steady worker, an administrator who kept his subordinates in uncertainty and thoroughly trusted but few of them. Moreover, he was a man who never forgot, not even what was said to him. This characteristic caused anxious thought in European chancelleries. Did he most vividly remember the ultimatum forced on him in 1742 by Commodore Martin, watch in hand, or the French proposal to garrison the Neapolitan fortresses to secure the succession of Naples to Charles's younger brother, Don Philip, duke of a transitory appanage in Tuscany, and husband of Louis XV's daughter? Was he more impelled by his Bourbon blood or by jealousy of Austria? Was he more interested in dynastic acquisitions in Italy or in the security of the Spanish empire overseas?²

The influences upon him could at least be appraised. Tanucci, his Neapolitan minister of foreign affairs, he highly trusted; and Tanucci's councils were likely to be on the side of caution.³ His queen, Maria Amelia of Saxony, had much influence over him; but although she was a sister of the dauphiness she was by no means pro-French; and without advocating the cause of England, she threw her influence against France. Her motive was partly fear, produced by her father's misfortunes in the French cause, partly anger because by French court influence her daughter had been passed over for Don Philip's as a bride for Archduke Joseph, heir of Austria.

¹ Minister to Aubeterre, April 23, May 22, August 14, 1759; Aubeterre to minister, May 7, 1759. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 524:449; 525:28, 190, 4.

² His character is drawn *passim* from the dispatches of Ossun, who knew him intimately. There is an interesting description of him in a letter of Sir Stanier Porten to Pitt, April 28, 1760. *Chatham Correspondence*, 2:31.

³ This appears from Tanucci's correspondence with the king and queen after their departure as summarized in Manuel Danvila y Collado, *Reinado de Carlos III*, vol. 2 (*Historia General de España*, vol. 7), *passim*.

In spite of such influences, Choiseul, through the Marquis d'Ossun, French representative at Naples, who accompanied Charles to Spain, had been working, not without success, to interest Charles in the cause of France. April 3¹ Choiseul had ordered Ossun to urge Charles to send a Spanish fleet to America and to order the Spanish troops in San Domingo to join the French in case of an English attack. Charles had gone so far as to write Prince Sanseverino,² Neapolitan representative in London, that if the English attacked San Domingo, the Spanish forces must join the French. Pitt immediately assured Sanseverino and Wall that the English had no such intentions.³ He and Frederick were trying, though unsuccessfully, to tempt Charles into coöperation with Savoy to expel the Austrians from Italy and divide the peninsula between them. Naturally all of the great powers acquiesced when Charles, before leaving for Spain, installed a younger son as his successor in the Two Sicilies, and indicated that Don Philip should instead retain his duchy despite Austrian and Sardinian reversions on its territories.

Before quitting Naples for Spain Charles had pressed on England his services for mediating a peace with France to the point of embarrassment. Wall⁴ in renewed cordiality told Bristol that acceding to Charles's wish was one of two things that would perpetuate a good understanding with Spain. In the late summer of 1759, Sanseverino made two overtures of this sort to Pitt, the second the day after the news of Ferdinand's death reached England. Pitt replied it was necessary first to secure the assent

¹ François Rousseau, *Règne de Charles III d'Espagne*, 1:31. Ossun in January had urged Charles, as heir presumptive of Spain, to order Spanish and Neapolitan fleets to America; the queen vehemently opposed it and Charles professed that his hands were tied. *Op. cit.*, 1:30. Wall, acting on orders issued before his master's mind was permanently clouded, had got twenty-five sail of the line ready for sea; naturally he had rejected Aubeterre's suggestion that they sail in company with the French fleet as sure to bring on an armed collision; Aubeterre had next tried to get a Spanish fleet sent to the West Indies; but that Wall considered beyond his powers. Aubeterre to minister, January 7, April 2, 9, 1759. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 524:248, 414, 424.

² See *post*, 485n.

³ Pitt to Bristol, June 5, 1759, in Thackeray, *Pitt*, 1:393.

⁴ Bristol to Pitt, July 30, 1759. Waddington, 3:428-429.

of Frederick and bring the campaign to a close; further it was for France not England to make advances; the situation might change when Charles actually reached Madrid.¹

Choiseul of course eagerly accepted a parallel overture. On September 21, Ossun delivered to Charles a French memoir accepting his mediation, and suggesting that if soft words failed with England, Charles might well indicate that the mediation would be armed, and that Spain could not suffer the equilibrium in America established by the Treaty of Utrecht to be upset—a phrase which as we shall see Charles for a time adopted as his own. Choiseul specified a restitution of all American conquests, the demolition of Louisburg and the submission of the American questions outstanding in 1755 to Spanish arbitration.²

For a time it seemed as if Charles was about to fall in with Choiseul's wishes completely. In October both Tanucci and Sanseverino reëchoed Choiseul's phrase about the equilibrium. To the latter Pitt neatly retorted that England would look with pleasure on Charles's territorial aggrandizement in Italy and could not understand why he should not feel a similar friendly complaisance at her success in America.³ In November, Sanseverino again informally proffered mediation; when Pitt had parried it, suggesting a proffer of good offices instead, Sanseverino had once more repeated the phrase as to equilibrium. As a show of taking Spain into his confidence, Pitt privately instructed Bristol with the secret of England's and Prussia's design to call a peace congress.⁴

¹ Pitt to Bristol, September 14, 1759. Thackeray, *Pitt*, 1:419.

² Quoted in Waddington, 3:433. "Surtout si V. M. après avoir employé inutilement le langage de la douceur et de l'amitié, qu'Elle paraît préférer dans ce moment, fait signifier à la France et à l'Angleterre qu'elle se charge de la médiation; qu'Elle entend que cette médiation soit armée, et que vu le préjudice que le commerce de l'Espagne et les possessions espagnoles peuvent souffrir de la continuation de la guerre entre ces deux couronnes, et considérant aussi combien il est essentiel à L'Espagne que l'équilibre des possessions en Amérique établi par le traité d'Utrecht ne soit point altéré, S. M. se verra obligée de se déclarer contre la partie belligérante qui refuseroit de souscrire aux propositions raisonnables qu'elle aura suggérées pour le rétablissement de la paix."

³ Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 22, 1759. Add. MSS., 32,897:285.

⁴ Pitt to Bristol, November 20, 1759. Thackeray, *Pitt*, 1:458. Ossun to Choiseul, November 24, 1759. Quoted in Waddington, 3:434.

French influence seemed strong about Charles as he landed at Barcelona October 17 and by slow stages proceeded toward his capital. Ossun pressed on him a Franco-Spanish alliance only to be checkmated by the queen;¹ but from Saragossa Charles dispatched a letter to D'Abreu signed by the Marquis de Squillaci, emphasizing his desire for peace and once more reiterating Choiseul's phrase on equilibrium. When it was presented by D'Abreu, December 5, Pitt thought it necessary to inquire by Bristol why it was not signed by Wall and why its tone was different from the ordinary correspondence. Privately he sought of Bristol information as to whether the decline of Wall's influence was implied.²

In his anxiety for a separate peace with England Choiseul had not been content with Spain only as a mediator. In September he had asked that Denmark sound England. His terms were better than those he concurrently submitted through Charles; he would conform to England's demands on the Ohio and submit Acadia to the arbitration of a neutral power to be named by England. November 24, Count Bernstorff reported the English reply. England could not be explicit; but if France would make direct overtures, England would show her desire for peace.³ Not content with official overtures Choiseul repeatedly tried, through private persons, to open negotiations for peace.⁴

¹ Danvila, *Carlos III*, 2:105.

² Rousseau, *Charles III*, 1:37-38. Waddington, 3:437. Pitt to Bristol, December 14, 1759. Thackeray, *Pitt*, 1:461.

³ Choiseul to Bernstorff, September 23, 1759; Bernstorff to Choiseul, November 24, 1759. *Correspondance entre le Comte Johan Hartwig Ernst Bernstorff et le Duc de Choiseul, 1758-1766*, pp. 73, 96.

⁴ In the early fall a diplomatic flirtation had been going on between Sir Joseph Yorke, British envoy at The Hague, and a lady who vouched for Choiseul's anxiety for peace with England. Yorke communicated it to Newcastle, who showed it to the king, without Pitt's knowledge of it. When Holdernessee revealed it to him, Pitt affected to believe that Newcastle was trying to negotiate behind his back: a teapot tempest brewed, despite Newcastle's asseverations that he regarded it as but a jest. Newcastle to Pitt, October 23, 1759. *Chatham Correspondence*, 1:445. Lord Howe from Vannes reported overtures from the Duc d'Aiguillon, who

The French disasters in the autumn of 1759 made Choiseul moderate the terms he had previously quoted to Bernstorff. He consulted Silhouette as to fresh proposals to be the basis of Spanish mediation.¹ In reply Silhouette presented five different projects. The first called for mutual restoration of conquests and submission of North American boundaries to the arbitration of Spain, Denmark, and Holland, the Neutral Islands being divided, with France retaining Dominica and St. Lucia. The second project proposed in place of the arbitration a settlement in Nova Scotia, and the watershed as boundary elsewhere. The third offered a greater concession in Nova Scotia. The fourth was even more a complete surrender there, and gave Great Britain the left bank of the Ohio to within ten leagues of the Wabash, leaving other frontiers to be delimited by the watershed. The fifth added the concession of razing Louisburg and the forts on Lakes Champlain and George.²

It is significant to contrast these peace terms with those which Pitt was considering after the news of the fall of Quebec. About October 30, he indicated to Newcastle that he should keep Senegal and Goree on the African slave coast; as to Guadeloupe he was more indifferent. On the mainland he would have Niagara, Crown Point, the lakes, and a reasonable security for the English colonies. Quebec, Montreal, and Louisburg were to

¹ January 27, 1759, Choiseul had referred to Silhouette, apparently to have his own unfavorable opinion confirmed, two memoirs proposing the abandonment of Canada and the migration of its inhabitants to Louisiana. Silhouette had prepared two memoirs in reply, extracts of which are given below. Choiseul [?] to Silhouette, January 27, 1759. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 442:33. Silhouette to Choiseul [?], February 8, 1759. *N. Y. C. D.*, 10:940. In *Mém. et Doc. Angl.*, 41:256, is a memoir dated January, 1759 which proposes the exchange of Canada for Georgia, the migration of the Canadians, and a boundary line drawn from the source of the Savannah to the mouth of the Wabash and thence across Illinois and Wisconsin.

² Silhouette to Choiseul, December 30, 1759. A E *Mém. et Doc. Angl.*, 41:395 *et seq.*

showed him full power to negotiate, suggesting that with similar powers to Howe a treaty could be begun without the knowledge of France's allies. *Chatham Correspondence*, 1:463.

be treated on: certainly not given back for nothing.¹ These terms Newcastle and his friends, taking it for granted that Louisburg and Quebec were only trading points, considered reasonable. The king however, begging territorial gains for Hanover, was extravagant in his notions of proper terms in America. He was emphatic for retaining Canada even before it was taken!² and the common cry of his subjects, intoxicated with victory, vociferously echoed him.

The English ministry was not disposed to attempt an accommodation with France separately, least of all through the mediation of Spain. To parry that mediation as we have seen they put forth November 25, through Prince Louis of Brunswick, in accord with Prussia, a call on the part of the two kings for a peace congress. Frederick, perhaps because his ministers told him of Newcastle's complaints that England could not support the burden of the war another year, had on the basis of his own infirmity suggested such a measure June 20. The course of the

¹ Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 31, 1759. Add. MSS., 32,897:512. If Newcastle was not deceived Pitt at the time thought they would never be in a better condition to make peace. "Memds for the King," October 30, 1759. Add. MSS., 32,897:494. This idea of Pitt's reasonable attitude is reinforced by a letter of Kinnoull to Newcastle, October 30, Add. MSS., 32,897:500, saying that he sees from a confidential memorandum that Pitt is as moderate on America as could be wished. So far as he comments his details coincide with what Newcastle reported.

The point is important because in the Newcastle Papers [Add. MSS., 32,897:484, dated October 30 with a postscript of December 4, 1759] is a paper headed, "Considerations on a future Peace as it relates to Great Britain only," signed, "W. P." [?] which is far more extreme. It advocates keeping Cape Breton, St. Johns, Quebec, and other American conquests; a boundary from Montreal via the Ottawa, skirting the north shore of Lake Huron, passing down the middle of Lake Michigan, down the Illinois and Mississippi rivers to the gulf. It calls for reconsideration of French fishing rights in Newfoundland, taking Martinique and keeping all the sugar islands, or at least those now captured, Senegal and Goree. It breathes defiance at any resentment of neutral powers for the English trade monopolies thus assured, and advocates holding the interior of America in force by new settlements, roads, and garrisons. Waddington, 3:540, thinks this represents Pitt's ideas on peace. It is doubtful if ever he counted on being able to carry on war long enough to enforce such terms. Certainly he held very different language to his colleagues. The letter of Kinnoull which Waddington cites manifestly does not refer to this memoir. Neither Kinnoull nor Newcastle would ever have characterized such terms as reasonable.

² Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 19, 1758; Devonshire to Newcastle, July 10, 1759. Add. MSS., 32,884:436; 32,892:500.

year only increased his need of it. A declaration was concerted between his ministers in London and the British cabinet in September-October and published as we have seen. It fell on stony soil. Russia at once indicated that in her opinion the time for peace was not yet come. April 3, 1760, a joint reply was returned which was an acceptance in principle and a refusal in fact.¹

True to his principle of seeking a separate peace with England, Choiseul pushed private exchanges between the French and English envoys at The Hague, D'Affry and Joseph Yorke. Frederick's anxiety for peace led the English ministry to pursue these into the spring of 1760, when they finally broke down over a formula for stating Prussia's share in the negotiation. Prussia urged the continuance of them, Frederick probably sensing what Choiseul's policy of peace in Germany would really be.² Pitt, perhaps really, perhaps wilfully failing to sense the situation, expressed his fear that even if France were withdrawn from the war, Frederick could not make head against Austria and Russia.³ But so anxious was Choiseul for a separate negotiation, that two months later he was again making advances through a private channel, this time at Berne.⁴

Once again in 1760 the misgivings of the English ministers at the beginning of a campaign proved unfounded at the end of it. Frederick, never really recovered from the day of Kunersdorf, was ringed about with enemies. But whether from secret English and Prussian influences, from bribes, or from the influence of the Empress Elizabeth's presumptive successor, the Russian armies were backward, leaving the burden of the day to the Austrians. Frederick was defeated at Landshut on June 22; he

¹ Waddington, vol. 3, *passim*.

² Pitt to Prince Ferdinand, November 27, 1759; Newcastle to Pitt, March 13, 1760. *Chatham Correspondence*, 1:460; 2:26. Newcastle to Yorke, April 22, 1760. Add. MSS., 32,905:28.

³ Newcastle to Hardwicke, January 2, 1760; Hardwicke to Newcastle, January 3, 1760. Add. MSS., 32,901:42, 47.

⁴ Arthur Villettes to Pitt, Berne, June 29, 1760. *Chatham Correspondence*, 2:48. In the spring of 1760 advances were made to Yorke at The Hague by a certain Comte de St. Germain, who represented himself as speaking for Marshal Belleisle and the faction opposed to Choiseul. He made lavish promises. Choiseul vociferously disavowed him. Yorke to Newcastle, March 14, 1760; Newcastle to Yorke, April 1, 1760. Add. MSS., 32,902:252; 32,904:141.

made a last gambler's throw in besieging Dresden, and had to raise the siege July 21. His utter destruction seemed a matter of days: the chance of a quarter hour gave him on August 15, a victory at Liegnitz so miraculous that the English minister termed it an intervention of divine providence; Frederick dismissed it as merely luck.¹ In October his capital was occupied for a few days by the enemy. On November 3, he closed the campaign with the hard-won victory of Torgau. In western Germany French superiority in numbers secured no more decisive results against Prince Ferdinand. Another campaign in Germany had ended, and the destruction of the English and Prussian cause was postponed one year more.

In America, 1760 reaped the fruits of 1759. In early summer the report of Murray's defeat at Ste. Foy outside Quebec and its threatened loss was followed June 27² with the news that the English fleet had arrived to raise the siege and that the French forces were in full retreat. The campaign followed in which Sir Jeffrey Amherst, "the Cautious Commander," directed the convergence of overwhelming forces from three directions on Montreal. The operation was completely successful. Vaudreuil had delayed the gambler's throw of withdrawing his regulars to Louisiana until it was too late: September 8, 1760, he capitulated, surrendering to Amherst all Canada.

What he surrendered was to be an interesting question. He had avoided being explicit as to the boundaries of Canada and Louisiana. He had it was true, issued orders to the commanders of Mackinac and Detroit with their subordinate posts including St. Joseph and Ouiatanon to surrender to the English; but to requests for "cartes instructives" showing the boundaries of Canada, he replied only with complaints of the pillage of his papers at the surrender of Quebec. On the day of Vaudreuil's departure from Montreal, however, Major Frederick Haldimand, a Swiss officer in the Sixtieth Royal Americans, constrained the marquis to look over his shoulder and ejaculate assent while he traced on a map boundaries for Canada which began with Red

¹ *Chatham Correspondence*, 2:58.

² Add. MSS., 32,907:367.

Lake, descended the Mississippi to a point whence it crossed to the source of the Illinois, and thence east to the source of the Wabash, following the latter stream and the Ohio to the Mississippi. This map Amherst transmitted as having been marked by Vaudreuil: it was to play its part in the negotiations of 1761.¹

One immediate effect of the news of the capitulation of Montreal and of the not unfavorable ending of the German campaign was to turn men's minds to the materials England now had for making peace. Even among those formerly conservative in their views on acquisitions, the idea appeared that Canada might well be retained.² Newcastle early in December suggested to Hardwicke that he discuss the subject at length with Pitt considering which of England's conquests she should keep; for instance, Canada or Guadeloupe.³

Political squabbling immediately averted any balanced ministerial consideration of terms. Pitt and Newcastle, despite occasional suspicion of each other, had generally acted in harmony. But the death of George II, October 25, 1760, and the accession of George III and his favorite, the Earl of Bute, introduced an entirely new factor. Bute and George III came in with a well-organized party behind them generally unfriendly to Newcastle. Bute had been piqued at Pitt's failure to reveal state secrets to him; Bute had even shifted his own opinions in the past

¹ The story is told in Amherst to Haldimand, November 1, 1762; Haldimand to Amherst, December 10, 1762. Add. MSS., 21,661:244, 257. Vaudreuil to Duc de Choiseul [?], October 30, 1761; Article à mettre dans la Gazette de France. A E Mém. et Doc. Amér., 21:96-101. See *post*, 398 *et seq.*

² Newcastle to Egremont, October 5, 1760; Rose Fuller to Newcastle, October 6, 1760; Egremont to Newcastle, October 7, 1760; Hardwicke to Newcastle, October 12, 1760; Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 18, 1760; "Memds for The King," October 14, October 21, 1760. Add. MSS., 32,912:357, 411, 438; 32,913:67, 183, 128, 251.

³ Newcastle to Yorke, November 28, 1760; Newcastle to Hardwicke, December 3, 1760; Hardwicke to Newcastle, December 4, 1760. Add. MSS., 32,914:131; 32,915:268, 300. The Canada-Guadeloupe controversy was apparently much more vital to the pamphleteers and to the reading public than it was to the ministry. Pitt's preference for Canada was sometimes laid to the influence of his friend Beckford, whose West India interests made him oppose further acquisitions there. Be that as it may, none of the ministers in the 1761 negotiation showed any interest in keeping Guadeloupe. For the 1762 negotiation see *post*, cxxxi *et seq.* On this whole subject see L. B. Namier, *England in the Age of the American Revolution*, 317.

few months between peace and war in such fashion as best to embarrass Pitt. With the young king's accession began a triangular mutual jealousy, carefully fostered by Bute, which finally drove both Pitt and Newcastle from power, placing on Bute's shoulders the final responsibility for the peace of 1762.

DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERING FOR POSITION, 1760-1761

The diplomacy of England, France, and Spain from the end of 1759 to the French overtures to England in the spring of 1761, while in itself sterile, is of vital importance to an understanding of the peace negotiations of 1761 and of the *Pacte de Famille*.

The center of the problem is the Spanish court and the intentions of Charles III himself, which about the beginning of 1760 become obscure. From the time he left Naples October 7, 1759, to his arrival at Madrid December 9, he was clearly resolved to mediate a peace for France with the implied threat of force to maintain the equilibrium of Utrecht on the North American Continent. From the time he reached Madrid, and Wall's influence reënforced the Queen's, he became much less pliable to French uses.

Wall in his first interviews with Ossun¹ indicated that he was not impressed by the French representations of the peril to the Spanish empire from English conquests in America; certainly Spain had not enough at stake to seek to impose on England a mediation sure to be rejected; and while Charles wished to persist in his offer of mediation, Wall insisted the tone could not be too moderate. In the end he had his way. From his landing at Barcelona, Charles had been profoundly impressed with the inefficiency of the armed services. Repeatedly Wall and the other ministers at Naples and Madrid urged this on him as an argument for moderation: Ossun even thought Wall slack in carrying out Charles's orders to repair the neglect of his brother's reign.² Unpreparedness was the plea which Charles continually interposed thereafter to France's demands for action on her behalf.

¹ Ossun to Choiseul, December 15, 1759. Quoted in Waddington, 3:439.

² Ossun to Choiseul, February 14, 1761. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 531:232.

Intermittently at least Charles came to entertain suspicions of the purposes of the French. The queen, though holding no brief for the overbearing English, in her correspondence with Tanucci repeatedly scored the self-seeking inefficiency of the French.¹ Doubtless she did the same with the king, who indicated in at least one letter to Tanucci² his conviction that the French were endeavoring to use him to their own ends. With the full approval of that minister he resolved to maintain his independence of action—a lesson he might also have studied under Wall.

It is not unlikely that Wall suggested to the king the policy he followed in the first part of 1760, making his efforts for France purely formal and fishing in troubled waters for Spain's own advantage, alternately indicating to France his wish for Louisiana or the Neutral Islands, and to England his demands for a favorable settlement on logwood, fisheries, and prizes. In the latter part of the year he discovered that Choiseul and Pitt had both outwitted him, and that France was about to make her own peace with England; then, irritation at England's contemptuous treatment of his claims and fear lest after peace he should have to face England alone, made him seek an alliance with France to protect his American empire, even at the price of entrance into the war. Despite the professions of brotherhood with which it was cloaked, the Family Alliance was the fruit of fear on one side, and of calculated self-interest on both.

On the side of France Choiseul had probably outlined in a dispatch of December 24³ to Ossun his real policy. Regarding family alliances with Naples and Spain as more permanent and therefore more valuable than one with Austria, he immediately needed Spain's help to procure France a decent peace with England. Then, he hoped, France, Spain, and England might in a peace congress give law to Austria, and save Prussia as a counterweight in Germany. In this his fatal miscalculation was of English character, and of the possibility of making England hear

¹ Letters summarized in Danvila, *Carlos III*, 2:106.

² July 12, 1760. Danvila, *Carlos III*, 2:108.

³ Quoted in Waddington, 3:440. It is of course always difficult to know when a diplomat reveals his real purpose; however no other part of Choiseul's conduct or correspondence contradicts this statement of policy.

reason by threats of Spanish intervention. That intervention he sought to obtain by ringing the changes on the danger to Spain from the English conquest of French North America. Intermittently he begged for loans, receiving only grudging permission to import silver bullion from Spain. Ultimately his warnings that Spain's slackness on France's behalf would condemn France to sue for ignominious peace which would render her thereafter unable to protect Spain from England combined with Charles's conviction that the English were trifling with him to bear fruit in the Family Compact. But it is not surprising that Choiseul, half convinced in 1760 of Charles's self-seeking and duplicity, should have had his suspicions reawakened by a first draft in which the advantage was all on Spain's side, and should have retarded the Spanish negotiations to the same pace as those with England, in the hope that an honorable peace with the former would remove all immediate need for Spain's help.

The English ministers were singularly inept. They rightly decided in 1760 that Spain no longer attached real importance to her efforts on behalf of France, and thought her professions of friendship a tribute to England's growing power and prestige. The sincerity of those professions might be gaged by contrasting them with the menacing expressions of 1757 and 1758. But they dangled before her the dynastic profits of an anti-Austrian policy of expansion in Italy, in an endeavor to distract her from demands on England which were inadmissible, and must accordingly be evaded. Thus they irritated and alarmed Charles, finally winning Choiseul's game for him.

In the first days of 1760 Choiseul dispatched to the Spanish court a project for peace.¹ France would admit herself the loser in America and would accord England all she had gone to war for: all claimed for her on the American Continent in Sir Thomas Robinson's memoir of March 7, 1755. If she now desired more, Louis put himself absolutely in the hands of his good brother of Spain. Otherwise he expected the return of the rest of Canada and of Cape Breton; but it was left to Charles whether or not he

¹ Choiseul to Bernstorff, January 27, 1760. *Correspondance*, 119. Choiseul to Ossun, January 6, 1760. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 527:11. Articles are in Angl., 442:275.

should propose the demolition of Louisburg. Guadeloupe was to be returned, and the Neutral Islands divided, Dominica and St. Lucia falling to France. Charles indicated he would not offer the demolition of Louisburg, but would present the other articles as from himself.¹ Pitt replied that England could not give an answer till she had one to her own proposal for a congress. He commented on the seeming Spanish alarm at English success and on Spanish partiality to France.²

Meanwhile the Spanish tone toward England became increasingly cordial. True, Wall assured Ossun, Fuentes would be instructed to reiterate Spain's concern for the balance of power in America and the Spanish colonies. But to Bristol he detailed Charles's pain at England's seeming want of confidence in him and reiterated his assurances that nothing would ever move him from his own policy of friendship and close union with England in which he was convinced Spain's advantage lay.³ Choiseul sensed the changing tone. He commented in stinging terms on the little heed England paid to Spain's attempts at intervention, and on Spain's meek acquiescence in such treatment. Offer had followed offer at Naples and Madrid. "Mediation" had been toned down to "good offices." When France was crushed, Pitt would turn his attention to Spain: her true safety lay in telling Pitt that France had accepted Spain's mediation, and England must give a categorical answer.⁴

Previous remonstrances by Ossun had produced a most interesting interview with Charles III. Charles insisted he would not let France be crushed, but he needed time to remedy unpreparedness. Pitt's terms, as stated to Sanseverino, were reasonable; he would give back Guadeloupe and Quebec, and demand the destruction of all forts in Acadia or the Ohio country built since 1713, together with territory on the south bank of the St. Lawrence; he could not however make a separate peace with France. Fuentes would have orders to speak firmly but to wait till Spain was prepared before he raised his tone. Choiseul might rest

¹ Ossun to Choiseul, January 21, 1760. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 527:91.

² Ossun to Choiseul, February 4, 1760. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 527:140.

³ Bristol to Pitt, February 11, 1760. *Chatham Correspondence*, 2:22.

⁴ Choiseul to Ossun, February 19, 1760. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 527:232.

assured that Pitt would attack neither San Domingo or Louisiana that year. He had given his word on the first while Charles was still at Naples; an attack on the other would oblige Spain to act. Choiseul should therefore be forewarned to stand on his guard at Martinique.¹

Before Fuentes departed the language of Charles and Wall altered much for the worse. They indicated France might make a separate peace with England as best suited her, and could with difficulty be induced to present "good offices" once more pro forma.² Choiseul talked with Fuentes on his way through Paris but reaped little satisfaction. He answered, when pressed for what Spain would do to procure France's peace, "with phrases, such as M. d'Ossun forwards to me."³ At London Fuentes and George II were both anxious to make a good impression. Newcastle dangled before Fuentes Spain's Italian prospects to draw him away from American questions. He found the ambassador not inclined to insist on mediation or good offices and lavish in professions of Spain's friendship provided her demands were met. Those demands seemed to grow.⁴ Not merely the English settlements in Honduras but the right to cut logwood were now challenged.⁵ Pitt privately consulted Bute. Bute thought no English minister durst yield Spain a share in the Newfoundland fishery: the logwood might be accommodated in some fashion or other. With this Pitt was inclined to agree⁶ as a decision on which Spain might be brought to acquiesce. In September, Pitt and Newcastle

¹ Ossun to Choiseul, February 22, 1760. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 527:268.

² Ossun to Choiseul, March 5, 1760. Quoted in Rousseau, *Charles III*, 1:46.

³ Duc to Comte de Choiseul, May 10, 1760. Quoted in Waddington, 3:544. An illuminating phrase follows. "I care not at all that Spain enter our war, but at the same time I much desire that her preparations and her language be sufficiently impressive to get us peace."

⁴ Newcastle to Yorke, May 29, 1760. Add. MSS., 32,906:348. "An Account of My Conference with the Spanish Ambassador. Newcastle House July 3, 1760." Add. MSS., 32,908:34.

⁵ Pitt, despite Newcastle's denials, was inclined to treat the matter as a question of what Newcastle and Hardwicke had privately promised Wall in 1754. Add. MSS., 32,908:80.

⁶ "In the greatest Secrecy. Newcastle House July 18th 1760 C. V.;" "Secret Memds. Newcastle House July 25th 1760 (C. V.) Ld B. Spain." Add. MSS., 32,908:342; 32,909:46.

agreed to postpone any answer on logwood till the end of the campaign.¹

Ossun furnished recurring reports of Charles's reactions. Pitt at first seemed inclined to give satisfaction; then he vacillated. Charles was not to be trifled with; he would act with vigor. Ossun gathered that there was a secret correspondence between the king and Fuentes of which Wall knew nothing; but he gathered also that since the news of the raising of the siege of Quebec had reached London June 27, nothing more had been done about mediation.² Choiseul's misgivings ripened into suspicions. In July, Charles had instanced as a triumph of his underhand policy against Great Britain that his governors had broken up the Honduras settlements. The likelihood that such a step would embroil Spain and England made the news interesting; but was it true? It seemed to have no more official confirmation than a London newspaper item: Choiseul despite repeated asseverations on Charles's part remained unconvinced.³

Early in July, Charles had made a significant overture. He had reiterated former assertions that France and Spain were necessary and material allies. Then, the conversation turning on Louisiana, Charles had reminded Ossun that Spaniards still considered it rightfully theirs; he suddenly added, "After the peace I must arrange with France to have Louisiana on the basis of some exchange." Completely taken by surprise Ossun could only suggest of himself that San Domingo might be a fair exchange. Here the question dropped; but when Ossun reported it, Choiseul

¹ Newcastle to Hardwicke, September 17, 1760. Add. MSS., 32,911:361. Pitt on September 1, replied to a memoir of Fuentes of June 20, mainly concerned with prize cases. September 9, Fuentes presented two memorials on prizes, fisheries, and logwood. A statement that copies had been sent to the French court drew Pitt's fire. He sent Bristol a memoir in reply September 26, which on account of the queen's death was not read to Wall till November 6, and to which he did not reply till January 24, 1761. Waddington, 4:416.

² Ossun to Choiseul, July 21, July 28, August 4, 1760. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 529:85, 111, 123.

³ Ossun to Choiseul, July 17, August 18, September 15; Choiseul to Ossun, August 5, 12, 19. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 529:79, 173, 243, 137, 157, 180.

at once indicated the matter must be laid aside for a variety of reasons which he would later detail.¹

The incident is provocative. What led Choiseul to negative so decisively the proposed exchange? He had offered, and was to give away huge territories on the North American mainland with scarce a protest;² on Martinique, Guadeloupe, Mariegalante, and St. Lucia, his tenacity never relaxed. On principle he was quite likely to appraise San Domingo higher than Louisiana.

The immediacy of his reply gives the hint that the value he ascribed at the moment to Louisiana was a diplomatic one. Spain had already indicated her intention to restrain England from attacking it. If France, in advance of peace negotiations, agreed to exchange it with Spain, she could not cede it to England; and the danger on which Choiseul had played so long, of its falling into the hands of the English, would be averted. If that were the case, would not Spain's interest in France's plight become more and more tenuous? Was not Louisiana in the hands of France, and in them potentially a loss to England, the surest pledge France possessed of Spain's interest in her fate?³

Thenceforth Choiseul's distrust of Spain and especially of Wall was clearly marked. August 19, in one of his revelatory dispatches he announced his conviction that Spain under pretense of good will to France was merely playing her own game—making demands alternately on France and England, logwood, Neutral Islands, fisheries, Louisiana, in the hope of acquiring something from their embarrassments. Ossun echoed his superior's thought, indicating that Charles was pursuing Spain's own ends, and might pursue them to the point of war, without any particular desire to aid France.⁴

¹ Ossun to Choiseul, July 4, 1760; Choiseul to Ossun, July 15, 1760. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 529:22, 73.

² See *post*, cxxxvi.

³ This view is confirmed by a memoir of August, 1762, in A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 446:306. The author states that the danger to Spain from English possession of Louisiana was probably the sole cause why Spain entered the war; he states that on his trip to Spain in 1760 he saw this to be the one thing that could draw Spain from her lethargy, and that on his return he suggested alarming Madrid on the cession of Louisiana to England.

⁴ Choiseul to Ossun, August 19, 1760; Ossun to Choiseul, October 13, 1760. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 529:180; 530:50.

The influences upon the king were altering. Queen Maria Amelia died September 27; and Charles, unlike his brother, bearing his loss with more than Roman impassivity, had lost one of the strongest influences to inaction. As the autumn advanced, and it became increasingly apparent that no satisfactory reply on Spain's grievances would come from London, it seemed necessary to restrain Charles from plunging into war without pausing even to concert measures with France. Wall, Arriaga, and Tanucci made fresh exertions to convince him of Spain's unpreparedness.¹ As late as February 3,² Tanucci urged that even supposing Spain in a posture of defense, Italy and America were not.

Wall was giving up the struggle of years for Spanish-English friendship. The news of the capitulation of Montreal had led him to pronounce France so hopelessly beaten that Spain, Denmark, and Holland by interfering would only share her fate.³ But he had no answer for the persistent English failures to do Spain justice. January 26, Ossun reported that thereafter Wall would fall in with his master's policy.⁴ If Spain was to resent England's course she must do it in union with France; but France professing she must have peace on any terms at once indicated that Spain had made her decision too late.⁵ Was there still a chance of forestalling an English-French peace or at least paralleling it with a Franco-Spanish treaty to protect Spain's American interests?

Choiseul reiterated his determination to delay no longer to seek a peace for France. November 14, he announced that Spain must help, or France must make a peace with England that would

¹ Ossun to Choiseul, December 8, 1760. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 530:292. His correspondence with Tanucci is summarized in Danvila, *Carlos III*, 2:108-110.

² Tanucci to Losada, February 3, 1761, summarized in Danvila, *Carlos III*, 2:111.

³ Ossun to Choiseul, October 30, 1760. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 530:138.

⁴ Ossun to Choiseul, January 26, 1761. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 531:87. A day later Wall wrote Tanucci that things with England had reached a pass little suited to Spain's dignity. Danvila, *Carlos III*, 2:110. At the same time he told Bristol he had no desire to see Spain at war with England, but that England seemed to do all possible to bring it to pass. Bristol to Pitt, January 28, 1761. Quoted in Waddington, 4:419.

⁵ Fuentes wrote Wall January 30 that rather than redress Spain's grievances, England might give better terms to France. Waddington, 4:427.

incapacitate her thenceforth from coming to the aid of Spain. When the communication of his dispatch to Charles drew only a profession of inability to assist France for six months or a year, Choiseul indicated that he had given up hope; at last he was convinced that English influence had put Wall in power to neutralize and disarm Spain while England made ready her revenge for Aix-la-Chapelle; he dismissed with the year 1760 all calculation on Spain's assistance or all responsibility for her colonies. Charles in reply only recurred to Spanish unpreparedness. January 27¹ Choiseul launched a final philippic at Ossun. England's moderate tone for the time being did not mean she would do Spain justice once she had disposed of France. Spain would have a war with England in which France could not help. With Canada gone, Louisiana was no longer a barrier for New Mexico, and with a port on the gulf secured, England might cut the communication of all the Spanish colonies in that region. There is no doubt from other sources of Choiseul's real anxiety for peace with England; but much of this correspondence was manifestly designed to force Spain's coöperation with France, whether to secure a better peace or a renewed war.

Certainly it had the effect of leading Charles to the decision that if he was to break with England he must hasten to secure the coöperation of France. A draft of a defensive treaty sent by Choiseul in January impressed Charles favorably;² the communication of Choiseul's dispatch of January 27, led Charles to profess himself thoroughly alarmed at England's aggression and determined, if he could help it, not to allow her aggrandizement at France's expense or his own. Deliberate unpreparedness on the part of his ministers had caused his delay. Now it was in a fair way to be remedied, and in a few months Spain would be ready to assist France if she had not already made her peace; he seemed to incline toward a defensive treaty, but the great difficulty would be to keep him from a conciliation or a premature rupture.³

¹ Ossun to Choiseul, November 28, December 22, 1760; Choiseul to Ossun, November 14, December 16, 23, 1760, January 27, 1761. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 530:244, 345, 192, 340, 360; 531:96.

² Danvila, *Carlos III*, 2:114.

³ Ossun to Choiseul, February 9, 14, 1761. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 531:188, 232.

At Paris the negotiation of the *Pacte de Famille* had already begun. Of Masones, the former Spanish representative at Paris, Choiseul had complained that he was a worthy man who could neither speak intelligibly nor understand what was said to him on business; he therefore limited his communications to the Spanish ambassador to funny stories.¹ In February, 1761, Masones was replaced by the Marquis Grimaldi, a Genoese who had abandoned the church for diplomacy, anti-English despite the fact he was a protégé of Wall, ambitious, pushing, obstinate, possessed of an unpleasant personality.²

The first impression he made on Choiseul was distinctly unfavorable, as summarized for Ossun February 17. Spain, the duc averred, apparently had suspicions, despite the openness with which France had communicated all previous exchanges with England, that secret peace negotiations were already under way. Grimaldi did not even try to conceal that his mission was to find out how far they had gone. With this in view he had in the name of his king proposed an offensive treaty. Choiseul was polite; he had asked if Spain, in view of the proffer of peace France was about to make, would agree in case England refused reasonable terms to take the side of the power lending itself to peace. On this Grimaldi had to consult his court.³

An illuminating sidelight on Grimaldi's negotiation is offered by his correspondence with Fuentes at London; a large part of it was intercepted by the English government;⁴ but the ministry was strangely slow to sense its importance. Grimaldi indicated to

¹ Choiseul to Ossun, June 2, 1760, quoted in Waddington, 4:426: "à lui faire des plaisanteries, ce qui est plus son genre que la politique."

² Jeronimo, Marquis and later Duke of Grimaldi, ambassador to Versailles and later foreign minister of Spain. See Bristol to Pitt, March 5, 1759. Thackeray, *Pitt*, 1:389. It is significant of Bristol's complete lack of comprehension of what was going on about him that he took no alarm from Grimaldi's mission.

³ Choiseul to Ossun, February 17, 1761. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 531:266. The tone of this dispatch is an argument for supposing that Choiseul's last dispatches to Madrid had been expressions of his own real opinions as much at least as endeavors to work on Spain's fears. It would seem that at the moment he entertained no real hope of a Spanish alliance.

⁴ Part of it is printed in the *Chatham Correspondence*, *passim*.

Fuentes that the offer of an alliance came from himself, rather than from the king. He reported that France had forced the assent of Austria and Russia to the offer of astonishingly liberal terms to England and Prussia, nothing less than the *uti possidetis*. There could be no question of their acceptance, and he was afraid Spain was too late in her offers to France; he was told Spain had waited till France had been destroyed. Fuentes countered with conventional suggestions that it was important to close with France before she made her peace, as otherwise she might not be inclined to go to war anew on Spain's behalf: he assumed that Grimaldi would conceal the fact that Spain's necessity for settling her controversies with England prompted her overtures, and not sheer altruism, as if Choiseul were not perfectly aware of the fact; but Fuentes' perceptions were not very keen.¹

In time Choiseul came to believe that the offer of an alliance was bona fide at least. Ossun's report of February 14, that Charles was tending toward a defensive alliance came as corroboration. February 24, Choiseul instructed Ossun that Louis XV was much pleased with the idea of a union with his cousin. As Grimaldi demanded that the first advances come from France, Choiseul under date of March 3 prepared a memoir.² It specified a treaty of commerce and provided for the accession of the other Bourbon monarchies; in especial it called for an offensive and defensive alliance and a mutual guarantee of possessions, both present and post-bellum; it specified concrete assistance military and naval in the *casus foederis*, and indicated as the main purpose making England "reenter the bounds of equity and moderation."³ April 3, Ossun reported instructions sent to Grimaldi to conclude a defensive treaty: Wall said Charles thought this limitation necessary, as France was about to conclude peace and would require

¹ Grimaldi to Fuentes, February 15, 26, March 5, 1761; Fuentes to Grimaldi, March 10, 1761. *Chatham Correspondence*, 2:91, 92, 95, 96. March 20, Fuentes thought a civil war was about to break out between the partisans of Pitt, Bute, and Newcastle! *Chatham Correspondence*, 2:100.

² Choiseul to Ossun, February 24, March 3, 1761. *A E Corr. Pol. Esp.*, 531:295, 325.

³ In Rousseau, *Charles III*, 1:62.

some years' rest: since he was not ready to help in time, his grievances against England must wait.¹

It was then in a reasonable assurance of a Spanish alliance that Choiseul began peace negotiations with England. His victory over Austria's and Russia's unwillingness for peace had been less sweeping than he had indicated to Grimaldi. Not until March 26 did Choiseul finally agree with Starhemberg on the terms of a joint call for a peace congress at Augsburg, and on a separate proposal for a French peace with England. Having to meet allied approval, the terms of the latter had to be vague,² but they seemed to imply startling generosity on the part of France. The letter, addressed by Choiseul to Pitt under date of March 26, set forth that as the causes of war between England and France had been distinct, it was necessary, in order to hasten the general peace, to settle them separately before the congress. He suggested therefore the basis of *uti possidetis*: that each power retain what it was possessed of as of September 1, 1761, in the East Indies, July 1, 1761, in the West Indies and Africa, and May 1, 1761, in Europe.

THE NEGOTIATION OF STANLEY AND BUSSY

The proposal of Choiseul was received by a divided and discordant British ministry. Pitt was just recovering from a severe attack of gout. He was in a savage mood, thought Newcastle, because Bute had been brought into the ministry as secretary of state for the northern department in Holderness' place without his being consulted. Holding Newcastle responsible, he was disposed to retaliate by charges against the treasury of financial mis-

¹ A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 532:7. On March 16, Ossun had reported that Charles made no difficulty as to a defensive alliance; as to an offensive one he wished to know in advance to what he was committing himself, as to France's war on Germany and otherwise. Ossun to Choiseul, March 16, 1761. Quoted in Waddington, 4:430.

² Choiseul gave this explanation to Stanley, averring the proposal was intended only to blind Austria as to his real intentions. Stanley to Pitt, June 18, 1761. S P France, 251. A corroboration is suggested by the fact that toward the end of May Choiseul raised the question with Starhemberg as to whether France's conquests in Rhenish Prussia were hers to negotiate on. The Austrian thought not, while admitting France might do as she liked with Hanover. Waddington, 4:511-512. The chief point of vagueness in the proposals was the question as to whether German conquests were included in the proposed *uti possidetis*.

management of the commissariat in Hanover. Newcastle, grieved at Bute's indifference to his plight, thought the attack intended to scare him from opposing Pitt's extreme notions as to England's just dues in terms of peace. Otherwise Pitt was uneasy about Prince Ferdinand, and displeased with Frederick. Frederick the previous December, probably sensing Choiseul's policy, had urged England to make a separate peace with France. Pitt doubtless considered that France was not yet ready to yield all Canada and the Newfoundland fishery she enjoyed by the Treaty of Utrecht; but he could not under the circumstances avoid the negotiation Choiseul proffered.¹

To the Whig lords Choiseul's offer seemed almost too good to be true.² It would leave England with Canada, Guadeloupe, Mariegalante, Senegal, Goree and most of French India. It would leave France only with Minorca, which presumably she might see fit to exchange for Guadeloupe. Was it possible that France's conquests in the Electorate and Hesse were not to be taken into account? Would not an equivalent for them have to be found, even if Hanover was not strictly speaking a dependency of the British crown? Pitt was inclined to think France sincerely wished peace, but he wished to bargain. Just before Choiseul's offer had arrived he had diverted a British expedition to the attack of Belleisle off the French coast to provide himself with additional trading material. Meanwhile on April 8, he sent a formal reply accepting the French offer in principle; but suggesting that the dates for the *uti possidetis* should be determined by the date of the signature of the peace. Thus he might bring to market his expected conquest of Belleisle. He further assumed that exchange of conquests would be a matter of negotiation for which a French

¹ Hardwicke to Newcastle, March 17, 27, 1761; "My Conversation with Mr Pitt," April 10; Newcastle to Hardwicke, April 17, 1761; "Minutes of conversation with Bute," April 21, 1761. Add. MSS., 32,920:270; 32,921:101, 381; 32,922:15, 108. Pitt averred he would make war six or seven years for the fisheries and Canada. He would defend the Electorate in war, but he would not buy it back at a peace. Newcastle turned to Bute to fortify the mind of the king against this, but found him "unsatisfactory." He was mainly concerned to take the wind of popularity out of Pitt's sails, and he could not therefore be expected to favor an unpopular peace however necessary or reasonable.

² Newcastle to Devonshire, April 2, 1761; Devonshire to Newcastle, April 4. Add. MSS., 32,921:272, 311.

minister would be welcome at the court of London. In reply dated April 19, Choiseul agreed to send a French representative to London, and asked for an English envoy at Paris. To Pitt's proposed amendment of the epochs he took exception.¹

Very hastily Pitt selected his emissary to Versailles, announcing on April 28, the name of Hans Stanley. As the king later indicated, his appointment was not given more careful consideration because it was thought the main negotiation would be at London. Hans Stanley in a gentlemanly way professed political allegiance to Newcastle; he had an interest in a seat or two in the House of Commons and was a solicitor for lesser public offices.² For the rest he has written himself down in a most interesting and revelatory diplomatic correspondence. He was, one infers, physically awkward: he was learned and pedantic, knew ancient and modern Greek, and the law of nations, spoke French well, if slowly, had resided some time in Paris and had an entrée in French society of which he was quite vain. His vanity was his most obvious characteristic; and from every dispatch it flows in a torrent of naïveté. But he was transparently upright, honest, and honorable. In his negotiation he showed fair intelligence and penetration. General Mostyn wrote Newcastle that it was to be hoped Hans would succeed better in his proposals for the public than he had in those he had made on his own account. That he was not to do so was not his fault.³

François de Bussy,⁴ named French minister to St. James by Choiseul on April 19, was now sixty-two years of age. His whole career had been in diplomacy. He had been chargé at Vienna,

¹ Thackeray, *Pitt*, 2:515.

² In the spring of 1759 he had solicited from Newcastle a place on the treasury board. Stanley to Newcastle, May 13, June 26, 1759. Add. MSS., 32,891:113; 32,892:245.

³ Stanley's correspondence is mostly printed in Thackeray's *Pitt*, volume 2. The character here given is made from the correspondence above mentioned, from the *Dictionary of National Biography*, and from passing material in the Newcastle Papers. Mostyn's letter mentioned above is in Add. MSS., 32,923:253. In the *Chatham Correspondence*, 2:116, is a letter from Stanley to Pitt of April 18, 1761, rehearsing his qualifications for the appointment.

⁴ François de Bussy, January 27, 1699-January 16, 1780. He entered the department of foreign affairs in 1725. He was at Vienna, 1725-1733; was minister to London, 1740-1743; in charge of a division of the foreign office in 1745; and *premier commis*, April 1, 1749.

minister to London, 1740-1743, and to Hanover in 1755, and had since held several posts in the foreign office, finally rising to be *premier commis*. He had the general reputation of being anti-English which gave rise to all manner of gossip and speculation as to how Choiseul ever came to select him, supposing the duc really intent on peace; if he were otherwise, Bussy's reports of affairs and intentions in England could doubtless be relied on to retard the negotiation.¹ Actually Bussy had received money from English secret service funds for information supplied during his term as minister to London. When in 1755 he was designated special representative near George II in Hanover, George had decided not to resume financial relations with him. This neglect may have provoked his anti-English pose; but the pose may not impossibly have been assumed as a cloak to his former liaisons.² How far anyone in France or anyone in England except Newcastle and Holdernessee, knew the secret of his venality, we do not know.

Bussy's instructions³ indicated to him the pending negotiation between France and Spain, but also emphasized the fact that peace was the prime need for France, and that only if she could not have it on honorable terms would she accede to the Spanish proposals. Bussy was to deal with Fuentes with great confidence, not forgetting that he disapproved the French moves toward peace, and undoubtedly would try, by advice to Bussy, to frustrate them. He wrote daily to Madrid to influence his court against England and move it to war; naturally he would be of use whenever Bussy had to complain of English diplomatic tactics.⁴ As to the negotiation with Pitt, Minorca was to be the compensation for Guadeloupe, Goree, Senegal, St. Lucia, Tobago, and Mariegalante. Responsibility for quieting Spanish claims on the Neutral Islands

¹ This runs through Stanley's correspondence, and through the Cressener Intelligence in the Newcastle Papers, *passim*. The tone of this intelligence is always hostile to Choiseul.

² Newcastle to Holdernessee, May 16, 1755; Newcastle to the king, May 16, 1755; Holdernessee to Newcastle, May 25, 1755. Add. MSS., 32,854:546, 548.

³ Dated May 23, 1761. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 443:119.

⁴ Denmark by now was completely distrusted. Bussy with respect to her representative was only to try to find out how far the English thought they could rely on her.

was placed on England; of these St. Vincent and Dominica should remain to the Caribs under French protection. Acadia was to be left to England in its entirety. Canada, Isle Royale, and Louisbourg were to be restored to France in compensation for her conquests on Hanover and on England's German allies; but as Canada could only be ransomed by German conquests, it might in the end be necessary to cede all or a part of it. In any case restitution of prizes taken before the declaration of war was to be insisted upon. Generally, Bussy was to beware of being drawn into a futile negotiation that might give umbrage to France's allies; he was to avoid giving statements in writing; and as he discovered the opinions of the English ministry on various points, he was to expect further instructions. As Newcastle later remarked, after exchanges had revealed the vague quality of Bussy's instructions, they seemed to be, like Stanley's, only to listen and to report.¹

On May 13, the English council had decided on instructions of this tenor for Stanley, still assuming that his function would be purely formal. Pitt, in rather unpleasant language, had then demanded opinions as to whether in his exchanges with Bussy he should permit German conquests to be set off against maritime ones. He did not, he professed, care which line was followed: but he must be instructed himself on this point. The wilier of the Whigs saw the trap; public opinion was to be loosed on them for sacrificing colonial advantages to Hanover; but Devonshire, too great a nobleman to dissemble his opinion, answered Pitt in the affirmative.

"Well," said Pitt, "That is sufficient: That is all I want to know. I have no opinion of my own. I want an opinion. I don't care of which side of the question it is."²

Pitt's manner might well have given the impression that he was completely indifferent as to whether peace were made or not; probably his opinion was against it on any terms the French might conceivably yield. When Bussy missed his rendezvous with Stanley at Calais by a day or two, Pitt took as high and suspicious a tone as Stanley himself, instructing him not to present his cre-

¹ Newcastle to Devonshire, June 12, 1761. Add. MSS., 32,924:48.

² Newcastle to Hardwicke, May 14, 1761. Add. MSS., 32,923:63.

dentials until Choiseul had explained or disavowed the delay.¹ But fresh appeals came from Frederick to negotiate a separate peace speedily; the Whigs were alarmed at the situation of Prince Ferdinand, confronted in western Germany by the greatly superior forces of Soubise and Broglie, and urged a speedy cessation of hostilities; and the negotiation proceeded. At St. James's the immediate results were only squabbles as to whether the offer of March 26 still subsisted in view of England's failure to agree to the epochs, whether other epochs might be substituted, and whether Belleisle, captured while exchanges were pending, should be restored without compensation. On these points, before Pitt's overwhelming personality, Bussy gradually gave way. But from the other side of the channel Stanley was reporting a gracious and friendly reception, and an apparently genuine anxiety on Choiseul's part whether Pitt really wished peace, an anxiety seemingly removed by Stanley's reassurances. Choiseul was pliable on points whereon Bussy was stiff. He seemed, Stanley thought, quite anxious to learn the ministry's position on the Canada-Guadeloupe controversy, some of the pamphlets in which he had apparently read.²

Here it is necessary to appraise the progress of the French-Spanish negotiation. In accord with instructions Grimaldi had offered the project of a treaty.³ Its preamble specified the necessity of joint opposition to English designs to keep that nation in bounds. There was to be a mutual guaranty of all the possessions of the King of Spain and of those which France should possess at the end of the war. The powers agreed in case of war to treat only in concert and to communicate fully. Whatever stage France's negotiations had attained, Spain should concur in the negotiation thereafter, including in it her own grievances against England. The treaty was not to bind Spain as to the war in which France was at present engaged, inasmuch as France had

¹ Pitt to Stanley, May 31, 1761. S P France, 251.

² Pitt to Stanley, June 5, 1761; Stanley to Pitt, June 12, 1761. S P France, 251. Bute to Pitt, June 14, 1761. *Chatham Correspondence*, 2:128. Hardwicke to Newcastle, June 3, 1761. Add. MSS., 32,923:367. Bussy to Choiseul, June 11, 14, 1761. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 443:164, 195, 199.

³ Choiseul to Ossun, April 21, 1761. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 532:68. The draft with Choiseul's objections is in the same volume, 289.

proposed terms so liberal that it was impossible to suppose that they might be rejected. Portugal might be admitted to the pact; there was to be a treaty of commerce. A secret article provided that if the English learned of the treaty and attacked Spain or declared war on her, or even provoked her to war by refusing her just demands, France in recognition of the benefit thus accruing to her, should surrender Minorca to Spain, and continue the war.

On another occasion Choiseul averred he liked a man who sought his country's extreme advantage, provided he was intelligent in the way he did it;¹ but the clumsy evasion of reciprocity in Grimaldi's draft irritated him into caustic comment. Spain proposed to bind France to come to terms with England only in concert with her, and to include the points at issue between Madrid and London; thus after having refused all help to France during the war, Spain wished to be mistress of the conditions of peace. The draft accorded Spain a wider guaranty than France, and proposed to divest France of one of her few conquests for Spain's benefit; it prevented France from dealing, without Spain's concurrence, with any of her allies.²

Apparently the French council held two sessions on the matter in question. At the first, reported by Grimaldi April 28, the council was unanimous for a Spanish alliance as a matter which the king had much at heart; three of the ministers, however, were resolute for peace and believed the alliance should be postponed till after its conclusion. At the second council held May 6, the ministers considered the Spanish draft, and decided on an alliance to take effect after the peace. From it everything that might perplex the pending peace negotiation was to be excluded. A second treaty was to provide for the contingency that English negotiation might be broken off; it should in that event engage Spain to wage war jointly with France.³

Pursuant to this decision Choiseul undertook to prepare a counter-project in two parts.⁴ One was to be a *pacte de famille*

¹ Choiseul to Ossun, June 29, 1762. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 536:383.

² A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 532:289.

³ Grimaldi to Wall, April 28, May 8, 1761. Danvila, *Carlos III*, 2:120, 121.

⁴ Choiseul to Ossun, May 2, 1761. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 532:235.

to concern exclusively all the sovereigns of the House of France; the other was to be a treaty to which other kings and republics might be admitted. Choiseul did not complete his draft of the *pacte de famille* until the end of May.¹ It was moderate enough. It expressed no hostility to England; the mutual guaranty was to begin only when both powers were at peace. For the future it specified the precise military and naval assistance to be afforded; it provided for negotiation of peace in common, with gains and losses mutually balanced, and was limited to the House of France. In an accompanying memoir Choiseul indicated that he would agree to a joint negotiation of the pending peace if Spain would agree that in case Bussy's terms were not accepted, she would join in the war by May 1, 1762. Grimaldi thought his instructions warranted his assenting at once; but Choiseul considered no pressing need existed that precluded submitting the proposal to the court of Spain. Thus he gained three weeks more of freedom.

The Spanish draft must have reawakened Choiseul's suspicions of the unenlightened self-interest of Charles III. Apparently his rejection of it awakened corresponding misgivings at Madrid. Ossun reported that Charles and Wall were guarded as to a *pacte de famille*, affecting to believe it would arouse all Europe.² By curious coincidence about May 17-18 the foreign ministers at Madrid and Naples held most gracious language to the British envoys. Tanucci³ assured Sir James Gray of Charles's friendly disposition, his desire for an English alliance, and his grief that more attention was not paid his just demands; Tanucci was sure that by an hour's conversation with Pitt he could convince him of the king's good intentions. Wall⁴ insinuated to Bristol that if the point of honor were only saved as to Honduras, the king would be content with the abandonment of the English fortifications, and would allow the settlements to remain; he would pledge his royal word to find the English an expedient for their logwood. Bristol somewhat naïvely assured Wall that he

¹ Grimaldi to Wall, June 2, 1761, quoted in Danvila, *Carlos III*, 2:122. The draft was sent to Ossun June 2. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 532:316.

² Ossun to Choiseul, May 25, 1761. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 532:265.

³ Sir James Gray to Pitt, May 19, 1761. *Chatham Correspondence*, 2:119.

⁴ Bristol to Pitt, May 20, 1761. Thackeray, *Pitt*, 1:501.

would report how much more favorable his language was than it had been in January! If a momentary opportunity offered to separate Spain from France, the English ministry, as with previous ones, let it slip.

A month later Choiseul apparently thought the time had come to make his supreme effort for an understanding with England. Stanley, transparent, honest, caressed and flattered by Choiseul's sister, the clever Duchesse de Grammont, seemed his best chance. He feigned to lower his guard. In a long interview on June 17, he affected to be convinced by Stanley's repeated exhortations to be open. In seeming agitation he confided to the envoy as a great secret, to be revealed only to the most confidential of George's ministers, his real terms. They were to be concealed from Bussy, whom, instructed as he was to communicate freely with the envoys of Spain and Russia, he could not trust with such secrets. He professed the *uti possidetis* had been only a blind to puzzle France's allies and to enable him to determine if Pitt really wanted peace. He dictated to Stanley a little leaf of paper. Guadeloupe, Mariegalante, and Goree were set off against Minorca. All Canada was ceded, except Cape Breton, which was not to be refortified. France exacted in return the confirmation of her rights to the Newfoundland fishery under the Treaty of Utrecht and a fixation of the bounds of Canada by the watershed on the side of the Ohio. France would return all that her armies had conquered from the allies in Germany. In feverish haste Stanley dispatched the "little leaf" to London, dating his long dispatch at half-past one A. M. on the eighteenth. It reached London on the twenty-first.¹

Bute's first expressed reaction was that the French offer was not what it should be, but not far off. Hardwicke, as pleased as Newcastle with the overture, wisely opined it would be taken for granted that having gone so far, the French would go even far-

¹ Stanley to Pitt, June 18, 1761. S P France, 251. Waddington (4:599) admits Choiseul was at fault in agreeing to surrender the French conquests in Rhenish Prussia which were subject to treaty stipulations with Austria. He points out that Choiseul's necessary retreat from this offer later helped Pitt to discredit the French proffers. Somewhat naively he explains Choiseul's histrionics by saying extreme measures were necessary to impress "the impassive Stanley." Waddington, 4:534.

ther.¹ Bedford thought the offer much exceeded what he would have approved England's asking. Pitt attacked the proposal as obscure; he continued to insist that England should demand all Canada with Cape Breton, and the exclusion of the French from the Newfoundland fisheries. He rightly guessed that despite Choiseul's theatrical professions of secrecy Bussy had been fully informed of the offer;² on this point Newcastle's usually acute perceptions were at fault.³

When the council met June 24 to consider the French offer, the event turned on the part Bute should take between Pitt and the Whig lords. Granville told Pitt roundly that if Choiseul gave up the fishery he would be out in a fortnight, and England would have all the maritime powers of Europe upon her. Hardwicke, Bedford, Halifax, and Newcastle took the same side. Temple of course sided with Pitt; and Bute by proposing to try to gain the exclusive fishery, though not to the point of making it a *sine qua non*, laid himself open to Pitt's contemptuous sarcasm. It was generally agreed to couple the fisheries and the demolition of Dunkirk in a renewal of the Treaty of Utrecht, and the council adjourned to the twenty-sixth to consider Pitt's draft.

On the twenty-fifth Bute urged on Newcastle the danger of not at least trying to obtain the fisheries: he insinuated that Newcastle and his friends were walking into a snare Pitt had laid for them. Next day the king personally confirmed Bute's opinion to Newcastle. At the council Halifax and Henley sided with Bute's opinion of "making the trial"; the Whig lords honestly stood by their convictions.⁴

Newcastle insisted that Pitt's dispatch of June 26 as finally dispatched did not represent the true sense of the council. Certainly it was provoking rather than conciliatory.⁵ It announced

¹ Bute to Newcastle, June 22, 1761; Hardwicke to Newcastle, June 23, 1761. Add. MSS., 32,924:193, 221.

² Pitt to Stanley, June 26, 1761; Newcastle to Devonshire, June 28, 1761. S P France, 251; Add. MSS., 32,924:311.

³ Memorandum, June 25, 1761. Add. MSS., 32,924:241. " . . . My Conference This Day with Mor Bussy. In much better Humour but clearly out of the Secret. . . . "

⁴ There is a long account of the two councils in Newcastle to Devonshire, June 28, 1761. Add. MSS., 32,924:311.

⁵ S P France, 251.

as conditions *sine qua non* the total cession of Canada without assigning it new limits; the cession of Cape Breton and all other islands, with all fishing rights pertaining to them: the cession of Senegal and Goree: the establishment of Dunkirk on the basis of 1713. The Neutral Islands were to be neutralized or divided, and all German conquests evacuated in return for Guadeloupe and Mariegalante. The fishing rights under the Treaty of Utrecht were negotiable on the basis of compensation.

THE ACCORD OF FRANCE AND SPAIN

Choiseul's first reaction to Pitt's answer was probably expressed in his statement to Ossun June 30¹ that it was as yet too soon to decide what the outcome of the negotiation would be. His conversations with Stanley indicated that to his mind the serious differences were on the points of Dunkirk and of Cape Breton Island. As to Dunkirk, he regarded it as a point of his master's honor, to be freed from treaty restrictions on fortifying or otherwise doing what he liked with his own. Cape Breton involved the whole question of French participation in the American fisheries. Without an *abri*, a port of refuge and supply under their own flag, Choiseul thought the French fishermen would be driven from the banks: such a port, if not on Cape Breton, at least in an eligible situation elsewhere, was vital to the reconstitution of the French marine; and Pitt's refusal of it plainly hinted his intention to eliminate France from the sea powers of Europe.²

Before Choiseul had dispatched his answer to Pitt, he was measurably under obligations to Spain. Before June 21 Grimaldi had received Charles's assent to the conditional offer to link the two negotiations.³ By July he received Wall's instructions of June 23 to make a convention obligating Bussy to declare that France adopted the three Spanish grievances as her own so that peace could not be made unless Spain received satisfaction.⁴ Choiseul began to drop hints to Stanley of these obligations. July

¹ Choiseul to Ossun, June 30, 1761. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 532:488.

² Stanley to Pitt, June 29, July 1, 1761. S P France, 251.

³ Danvila, *Carlos III*, 2:124.

⁴ Danvila, *Carlos III*, 2:125.

8 he told the envoy that before the peace was thought of, France on Spain's request had taken certain engagements on her points of dispute with England. Choiseul affected to be embarrassed; Stanley emphatically insisted anything like mediation would come with an ill grace. On the eleventh Choiseul showed Stanley a rough draft of his reply with a paragraph on Spain's pretensions which he left out on Stanley's strong protest. Bussy, he said, would explain their engagements on Spain; Stanley considered that as Grimaldi would see the passage it would be fully as strong as Choiseul's intention.¹

Bearing the date of July 15, in the French archives is the project of a French-Spanish convention, the companion piece to the Family Compact. It recites the danger to maritime equilibrium from Britain's ambition, her war on France, and her refusal of Spain's just demands. To oppose her ambitious designs, France will continue the war, and Spain will join in it, provided the British court does not accept France's terms, and satisfy Spain. Spain in that case is to declare war before May 1, 1762; France is to unite the demands of Spain in her negotiation at London, not suspending hostilities until Spain is satisfied. In case of war, the two powers agree to pool their gains and losses. Spain cedes to France all her rights in the Neutral Islands. If the *casus foederis* exists May 1, 1762, France will surrender Minorca to Spain unless it is needed to compensate French losses. Portugal is to be either included or attacked. Other maritime powers may be admitted to the war: and if England attacks Spain before May 1, 1762, the treaty takes effect. In this document, unsigned as yet, was summed the alternative France had elected in case Choiseul's answer, dated July 14, met with no favorable response.²

Between the two courses Choiseul finessed with his customary skill in double dealing. Even as he had convinced Stanley that he earnestly desired peace, he had convinced Grimaldi that he was ardent to continue the war. Once Grimaldi had authority from his court to bind France to support Spain's claims to the

¹ Stanley to Pitt, July 12, 1761. S P France, 251.

² A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 533:102.

point of renewed war, Choiseul adroitly shifted his ground. Between July 5 and 7 he painted for the Spanish ambassador a picture of domestic distress calculated to make the council and the nation force his hand to have peace at any price; he urged that the convention pledging France to continue the war in case Spain's demands were not satisfied should not be signed immediately. Grimaldi thought it necessary to refer to his court for permission to sign Family Compact and Convention separately; he waited day by day for a week that he might include Choiseul's proffer to England of July 14, with the accompanying memoir on France's interest in the grievances of Spain, in order that his king might decide if it were a sufficient counterbalance to the postponement of signature of the convention.

Grimaldi himself, like Stanley under the magic of Choiseul's apparent disarming sincerity, thought that it was. He had expressed himself as sure that the very enunciation of Spain's wrongs by France would daunt the haughty English into hearing reason. Moreover the Louisiana herring had been dragged across the trail once more. Grimaldi had been given to understand that it had been seriously proposed to cede it to England. Taking alarm at once for Spain's position on the gulf, he had invoked the spirit of the future Family Compact against any such cession: and he actually regarded the assurance that no such proposal would be made as a first fruit of the projected treaties profoundly valuable to Spain!¹ A skeptical reception awaited his enthusiasms at Madrid.

In England, Choiseul's answer, delayed almost two weeks after the time it was promised, was awaited with increasing uneasiness. Stanley laid the delay to Louis' intermittent refusals to pay any attention to business. The English ministry feared it was to await news of a possible French victory in Hanover where Broglie and Soubise with superior forces were at last advancing. Choiseul himself explained it to Bussy as intended to gain time, in case of a not unlikely rupture, so that the English

¹ Grimaldi to Fuentes, July 7, 1761; Grimaldi to Wall, July 14, 1761. A G Simancas, Legajo 4543. The copy of the memoir on Spain's grievances given Grimaldi differs slightly in wording from that presented to England; no reason for the variation is apparent.

armaments would not be loosed before September. That, Choiseul designated as the time he would break off negotiations unless a satisfactory understanding had meantime been reached.

With the dispatch to Bussy were included memoirs on the demands of Austria regarding English neutrality, and the demands of Spain. The latter memoir suggested that Spain be invited to guarantee the treaty; it insinuated that Louis, fearing a new war in which he would have to take part if the Spanish grievances were not adjusted, thought their settlement essential to a sound peace.¹ These memoirs, which actually fell short of the wishes of the two powers,² were left to Bussy's and Fuentes' discretion as to the time of presentation; Choiseul himself thought it well to delay until after the English answer had been received. His proposal so to do hardly matched his suggestion to Bussy³ that a hint of Spain's union with France might make the Whig lords, if not Pitt, incline to reason in their demands on the latter power; but it is not unlikely that he may have thought such an effect possible. At any rate his dealings with Grimaldi indicated the memoir as the price for the postponement of signing the convention; if he could hoodwink Fuentes into consenting that the presentation be deferred, so much the better. Fuentes, however, repeatedly urged the immediate presentation of the memorial on Spain, and Bussy finally gave way.⁴

Meanwhile, Stanley's dispatch of July 14, including Choiseul's memoir, had arrived on the twentieth. With his reports of Choiseul's conversations respecting Spain, it was discussed in a cabinet meeting that had already been called for the twenty-first.

¹ The memoirs are in various places. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 533:51; S P France, 251; A G Simancas, Legajo 4543.

² Starhemberg presented six stipulations as essential in the Austrian memoir in place of the two Choiseul included. It is questionable if Choiseul could have stood by his offer without a break with Maria Theresa. Waddington, 4:557-560. Ossun announced Spain's dissatisfaction with the memoir as too mild. Ossun to Choiseul, July 31, 1761. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 533:179. Choiseul's suggestion that presentation be postponed till after the English reply raises the question as to whether his real motive was not satisfying Spain rather than scaring Pitt.

³ Choiseul to Bussy, July 15, 1761. Quoted in Waddington, 4:544. In quoting this dispatch M. Waddington incorrectly includes a paragraph from Choiseul's of August 10.

⁴ Choiseul to Bussy, July 15, 1761. Waddington, 4:544-545. Bussy to Choiseul, July 21, July 26, 1761. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 444:32, 59.

The ministers considered the French memoir unsatisfactory; earlier promises of evacuating Rhenish Prussia were modified; Cape Breton was insisted on. The cabinet was unanimous against allowing the affairs of Spain to be drawn into the negotiation especially on the basis of an alleged understanding prior to the French overture. It was decided that as soon as Pitt could see Bussy, presumably the morning of the twenty-second, he should inform him of the sense of the council. But the interview did not take place until the twenty-third. And by the afternoon of the twenty-second arrived the second piece of good news in three days.¹

The capitulation of Pondicherry, reported on July 20,² put an additional Indian advantage in Pitt's hands; on the twenty-second³ came the news from Hanover of the combat of Vellinghausen, fought July 15-16. Broglie and Soubise, concentrating superior armies on Ferdinand, were each as determined to monopolize the triumph as to achieve it. Broglie attacked before the concerted time: Soubise failed to coöperate: and the masterly Prince of Brunswick, successfully containing Soubise with a far inferior force, had been enabled to oppose nearly equal numbers to Broglie and had inflicted on him a decided reverse. The marshals and their factions at Versailles squabbled furiously; thenceforth their armies campaigned independently, and one more costly campaign achieved nothing for France against England in the Electorate except disgrace. If Choiseul had delayed his reply for such news, he might be sure Europe was laughing at him.

Pitt therefore on the twenty-third doubtless harangued Bussy in the tone of a Roman proconsul on the subject of Choiseul's reservations in favor of Spain as expressed in Stanley's dispatch. Bussy, possibly in the hope of palliating the offense, possibly so overwhelmed by Pitt's oratory that he chose to speak by the book, presented his memorials. Pitt's tone rose higher yet. If France thought Spain would make war on England, she was mistaken: Spain would get the fishery only at the point of the sword. Next day, after another council, Bussy's memorials were returned to

¹ Pitt to Stanley, July 25, 1761. S P France, 251.

² Newcastle to Bedford, July 20, 1761. Add. MSS., 32,925:202.

³ Hardwicke to Newcastle, July 22, 1761. Add. MSS., 32,925:260.

him as inadmissible, in a stinging letter.¹ To Choiseul's memoir of terms, Pitt wrote an English reply, directing Stanley to translate and present it; Stanley complained at having thrown on him the responsibility for selecting French equivalents for Pitt's undiplomatic vehemence.²

No less than Pitt's intransigence on terms, did his haughty tone sting the hot-spirited Choiseul, and even his languid master. There is no doubt that after receiving his ultimatum Choiseul made up his mind that a close alliance with Spain and a continuation of the war were essential unless the English ministry reversed itself in a fashion that was hardly possible.³ His insinuations as to Spain had, instead of completing the alienation of the Whig lords from Pitt, compelled them for the time being to acquiesce in his policy. Choiseul needed time to conclude negotiations with Spain, and for Spain to put herself on guard; he needed to re cement his alliances and strengthen his position at court by the turn he should give the closing stages of the negotiation. If at any moment the English unexpectedly showed signs of yielding to his demands, so much was at least gained. His summary of the negotiations for the council, dated September 6,⁴ states with apparent truth his policy up to this point of keeping the English and Spanish negotiations simultaneous; it further professes that if, after the signature of *Pacte de Famille* and Convention August 15, England had acceded to the French proposals, he counted on persuading either Spain or England to be moderate. But he averred elsewhere respecting his last offers that they would have been less liberal had he thought that there was any chance of their acceptance.⁵

For a time indeed it seemed possible that Choiseul had managed the negotiation with too much "art" and that in endeavoring

¹ Pitt to Bussy, July 24, 1761. S P France, 251.

² Stanley to Pitt, August 6, 1761. S P France, 251. It was presented July 29, 1761.

³ Choiseul to D'Havrincourt, July 30, 1761 (intercepted). Add. MSS., 32,926:67. Choiseul to Ossun, July 30, 1761. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 533:173. Choiseul to Starhemberg, July 29, 1761, quoted in Waddington, 4:569. "Je dissimulerai vis-à-vis du ministre anglois jusqu'à a que je sois parfaitement instruit des intentions de l'Espagne."

⁴ A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 444:255.

⁵ Choiseul to Bussy, September 9, 1761. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 444:264.

to conciliate England he had alienated Spain. By July 31 he had taken alarm lest Spain might not avow the memorial presented in her behalf, a default which would have put France in a position both dangerous and ridiculous; probably in the hope of impelling Spain to quick decision he proffered, in return for financial assistance, the cession of Louisiana.¹ On his side Ossun on July 27, reported the alarm of His Catholic Majesty at Choiseul's postponement of the signature of the convention until England had time to answer his last proposals: Charles was finally appeased by Ossun's reasoning on France's need of peace could she have it on honorable terms; His Catholic Majesty professed himself willing to empower Grimaldi to sign pact and convention separately. July 31, Ossun had worse news. Grimaldi was not authorized to sign until the council had considered the question of precedence between the two crowns; this Ossun considered a device of delay. He found that the Spanish considered Bussy's memorial an insufficient exposition of Spain's rights, calculated to indicate to England that in any event France would conclude with her; they complained that Spain's rights to the Neutral Islands had not been properly taken into account.² What was hardest of all to forgive was again Choiseul's delay in signing the convention.

The news of Spain's hesitation doubtless colored Choiseul's next dispatches to England; but the mood passed, Ossun warning him that on matters of procedure Charles must be humored. August 10, he could report that Charles was firm, that he would avow Bussy's memorial, and that he echoed Louis' sentiment, expressed in Choiseul's letter of July 30, that he regarded the alliance as already in effect.³ Actually Choiseul and Grimaldi signed *Pacte de Famille* and Convention on August 15.

England's maneuvers with Spain arising from Bussy's memorial had been correspondingly barren of success. Fuentes had avowed it when Pitt had tried to treat it as a piece of French

¹ Choiseul to Ossun, July 31 or August 1, 1761. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 533:210.

² Ossun to Choiseul, July 27, 31, 1761. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 533:145, 179.

³ Ossun to Choiseul, August 3, 10, 1761. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 533:223, 231.

presumption.¹ Pitt had then, July 28, dispatched it to Bristol, directing him to smooth Wall's way to disavow it if he seemed so disposed.² However, on August 6, before receiving Pitt's dispatch, Bristol reported Wall's announcement that since Spain had failed to get justice of England by her own advances, she had entrusted her interests to France. Bristol vainly protested.³ Before August 31,⁴ Wall had told him that Bussy's memorial had originally been dispatched from Madrid to Versailles. As he still wished to gain time for the arrival of the plate fleet he deprecatingly asked if Bristol could think a feeble power like Spain would dare assail England at the height of her power. Bristol's natural obtuseness prevented him from sensing the Irishman's sarcasm.

While still uncertain whether Spain had not been alienated, Choiseul dispatched on August 5⁵ his second formal proposal. In this he receded on Dunkirk, Senegal, and Goree and the Canada boundary; but he insisted on the *abri* and was still more difficult on German questions. In the accompanying letter to Bussy, Choiseul professed he would be embarrassed to say if it were better for France that England should accept or reject: he would have but a poor opinion of the English cabinet's intelligence if it did not close with terms so advantageous to England. If England accepted, he thought it unnecessary to depart from what was promised Spain and from the union agreed to with her, in order to adjust Spain's differences simultaneously with those of France. On this Bussy was to concert measures with Fuentes; he was to try to gain time before signature to hear from Versailles, and until France knew the intentions of Charles III. Manifestly Choiseul thought it not impossible that Spain might recede from or delay her engagements, leaving France at liberty to close immediately with her adversary.

¹ Bussy to Choiseul, July 31, 1761. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 444:100.

² Pitt to Bristol, July 28, 1761. Thackeray, *Pitt*, 1:570.

³ Bristol to Pitt, August 6, 1761. S P Spain, 164. Ossun thought Wall had made a similar statement to Bristol by July 23. Possibly he misunderstood. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 533:137.

⁴ Bristol to Pitt, August 31, 1761. S P Spain, 164.

⁵ Choiseul to Bussy, August 5, 1761. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 444:118, 114.

Five days later the die was cast. August 10, Choiseul informed Bussy of the Franco-Spanish convention, the first article of which he enclosed. If the English negotiated on the ultimatum and an accord seemed possible, Bussy was to insinuate the importance of settling the Spanish questions. If the English accepted it, he was to reveal the convention to Pitt, as to the minister of a friendly power, convey France's embarrassment and France's hope that England would settle on some basis with Spain. This dispatch was not to be shown to Fuentes!¹

In the light of Stanley's repeated asseverations of his faith in Choiseul's desire for peace,² the ministers during the intervals of an English country summer maturely reflected on the French ultimatum of August 5. The pacific Hardwicke considered it worse than the former one, but did not think it France's last word. Pitt and Bussy conferred on it August 17 and 19. The council considered it August 19. In view, as Pitt told Stanley, of his repeated assurances of Choiseul's good faith and of the *abri's* being all that stood in the way, he grudgingly allowed not Cape Breton or Canso, but the island of St. Pierre for that purpose. This Stanley communicated as part of an English reply by Sep-

¹ Choiseul to Bussy, August 10, 1761. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 444:145. Bussy had apparently scented his chief's uncertainty. In conversations with Newcastle July 29 and August 5, he had been highly pacific in tone, had blamed the memorial on Spain, and had insisted that some way or other Choiseul would get loose from her. He had thought the German situation capable of adjustment and had insisted that Dunkirk and the fisheries were the great point. Add. MSS., 32,926:47, 205.

² Stanley, made a confidant by Choiseul's sister, dramatized himself as contending over Choiseul with Grimaldi and Starhemberg. Probably he overemphasized the union between them. The Austrian knew nothing of the French negotiation with Spain until it was concluded. Waddington, 4:573-575. Stanley sensed correctly the final *rapprochement* with Spain about August 10, though he thought as late as August 16 that nothing had been signed. Stanley to Pitt, August 18, September 2. He knew that the answer to Pitt's letter on the memoirs had been much softened at his instances; in its original form he expected it to cause a rupture. Stanley to Pitt, September 1, 1761. S P France, 252. He insisted that he based his information of Choiseul's desire for peace on his enemies as well as his friends. Stanley to Pitt, September 1, 1761. When at the end of August, Choiseul assured him that he could still disengage himself from Spain, he was probably overoptimistic, but his outburst that no man in France had such cause as himself to wish France free of the Austrian alliance is a *cri du coeur*. Choiseul's exchanges with Starhemberg are the best arguments for the genuineness of his desire for peace with England.

tember 1; he debated it at length with Choiseul on the second and the fifth.¹

Stanley remarked apropos of Pitt's eleventh hour concession on the *abri*, that if it was to be made at all he wished it had been made a month earlier. As if under hypnotic suggestion phrases drop in his letters that portend failure. By September 2 he had seen the draft article of the convention that had been sent to Bussy August 10. He sensed a change in Choiseul's manner from late August. He remarked that if Choiseul broke off the negotiation he would do it on such grounds as to recover his lost standing with France's allies. He remarked with regret that France had in sight the money for her next campaign: he noted a report that a Spanish squadron had sailed to escort the plate fleet to safety. Instinctively he knew his negotiation had failed.²

September 10, Choiseul transmitted to him what he said they termed in Germany the ultimatum. To Bussy he pointed out that the French concessions on the side of Canada and Louisiana would never have been made had they expected them to be accepted. That England and Europe might see how they wished peace they had thought best to abound in compliance.³ Grimaldi commented to Fuentes that like faithful allies the French gave up everything of their own to assure the welfare of their confederates. Choiseul, he said, had consulted him whether he should once more assert the claims of Spain. Grimaldi had considered Bussy sufficiently bound by his instructions of August 10, from signing anything that did not secure Spain's interests; therefore he had decided it unnecessary to incur for her a share of the responsibility for the break.⁴

Even Newcastle had sorrowfully to admit that Choiseul had departed from so many of his former concessions that his last proposal must be rejected. There could be no division of opinion

¹ Bussy to Choiseul, August 18, 1761. Corr. Pol. Angl., 444:164. "Memds August 20:th 1761"; Hardwicke to Newcastle, August 22, 1761. Add. MSS., 32,927:131, 177. Pitt to Stanley, August 27, 1761; Stanley to Pitt, September 2, 1761. S P France, 252.

² Stanley to Pitt, September 2, 6, 8, 1761. S P France, 252.

³ A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 444:300, 264, 266.

⁴ Grimaldi to Fuentes, September 13, 1761. *Chatham Correspondence*, 2:141.

on Pitt's sending orders on September 15 that Stanley should demand his passports. Actually he did so on September 20. Bussy, by Choiseul's orders had planned to time his departure on the day the news would have the most disastrous effect on the British funds: but Pitt forestalled him, by indicating on the seventeenth a desire that he should take his leave. He told Bussy that though France found his terms too hard, the great mass of the English people found them too easy.¹

From another English point of view Newcastle wrote with remarkable intuition the negotiation's epitaph. "We lost *l'Heure de Bergier* And That I thought from the Beginning. We had, or pretended to have, such a Diffidence of M. Choiseul's Sincerity at first, as gave Him such Doubts of *Our Sincerity*, That He found Himself obliged, in Interest, to adopt another System by way of Resource.

"That new System with Spain, and perhaps some further Engagements with The Two Empresses, has Embarass'd Mor de Choiseul so much, That, when we grew more reasonable, and made Our *proper* Concessions, He was so engaged in His New Measures, That He Sent over The last Equivocal Memorial, To be presented by Bussy, as The *Ultimatissimum* of Their *Ultimatum*; And That Answer, receding even from many of Their former Concessions, *could not be accepted*."²

PROPOSED BOUNDARIES IN THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY, 1761

Running through the whole negotiation of both France and Spain is the thread of Louisiana, and of its boundaries on the side of the English colonies and of Canada; it may best be considered separately. At the outset a part at least of the English council were not in favor of large acquisitions from France. Bedford indicated that a French Canada was in his opinion the surest pledge of the dependency of the English colonies on the mother-country. Hardwicke thought it possible for England to

¹ Pitt to Stanley, September 15, 1761. Thackeray, *Pitt*, 2:624. Stanley to Choiseul, September 20, 1761. S P France, 252. Bussy to Choiseul, September 19, 1761. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 444:311.

² Newcastle to Yorke, September 18, 1761. Add. MSS., 32,928:211.

be overloaded with colonies. Keeping Canada, Guadeloupe, and part of Louisiana as some suggested, would require a large army to maintain them; England might find her colonial empire, like Spain's, so great as to enfeeble her.¹

On the French side, Bussy's instructions had pointed out that in the exchange of conquests, Canada could be compensated for only by German conquests, and that it might therefore become necessary to surrender it in whole or in part; on this, as on other points, Bussy would be instructed once he had learned the British views. As an old clerk in the *Affaires Étrangères*, Bussy was probably acquainted with the numerous memoirs enforcing France's vital need of the Ohio Valley; probably better than Choiseul himself.² June 11, Bussy suggested to his chief that in case the cession of Canada should prove necessary, the boundaries might be regulated on the side of Louisiana by the watershed.³ Possibly this suggested to Choiseul the proposal for bounding Canada by the watershed on the side of the Ohio, which he inserted in his sketch offer of June 17. June 19 Bussy enlarged on his former suggestion with a proviso that the boundary be located by names of places, to take from the English any pretext for encroaching toward the Ohio. June 26 he went a step farther. In view of the unfortunate French writings that referred to the Ohio as a dependency of Canada, it was absolutely necessary to specify that the Wabash and Ohio pertained to Louisiana, and to provide for the neutralization of everything between the Ohio and the mountains.⁴

Choiseul apparently was not impressed by La Galissonnière's old doctrine that the Ohio was the bulwark of Louisiana. Later in the negotiation he told Stanley that in 1755 he thought the French claims quite unjustified; and there was no reason that he should tell an untruth on that point.⁵ When Pitt in his answer

¹ Bedford to Newcastle, May 9, 1761; Hardwicke to Newcastle, May 16, 1761. Add. MSS., 32,922:449; 32,923:123.

² See *ante*, xcv-xcvi.

³ Bussy to Choiseul, June 11, 1761. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 443:164.

⁴ Bussy to Choiseul, June 19, 26, 1761. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 443:231, 274.

⁵ Stanley to Pitt, August 26, 1761. S P France, 252.

of June 26 announced that new boundaries for Canada toward the Ohio could not be admitted, Choiseul saw no difficulty in ceding all that actually had pertained to Canada. July 15, sending Bussy a memoir of the marine on Louisiana, he authorized him to overstep it and even to sacrifice what lay between the bounds of Canada and the English colonies. He further indicated that certain lands in Louisiana should remain unoccupied by either side.¹

The memoir in question was not very enlightening. It defined Mobile, Tombigbee, and the Alabama fort as garrisoned by Louisiana and therefore in its jurisdiction. It indicated the Tennessee as the boundary between Louisiana and the English colonies—certainly a surprising admission unless limited to the river's upper course. On the side of the Ohio, the memoir admitted the situation was doubtful. It claimed, on the basis of Fort Massac, the junction of the Ohio and the Mississippi; it claimed the territory between the Wabash and the Ohio as far as the Miami. It claimed Vincennes and Ouiatanon for Louisiana, and fixed Lakes Michigan and Superior as the boundary to the north.²

Pitt's reaction to the French reply, expressed to Bussy³ July 23, was that it was easy to arrange the boundaries of Louisiana provided France did not insist that they included everything that was not Canada. Bussy defined Louisiana as the lands from the Mississippi to the lakes, the Miamis, the outlet of the Ohio, and the lands of Shawnee and Cherokee as far as the mountains. Pitt retorted to this somewhat vague description, that the Ohio belonged to them, and they would not give it up; the boundaries might be arranged by commissaries. Bussy pointedly remarked that the abuse of commissions had been demonstrated long since; all that was needed was a map, with known places marked as

¹ Stanley to Pitt, June 29, 1761. *S P France*, 251. Choiseul to Bussy, July 15, 1761. *A E Corr. Pol. Angl.*, 443:351, 358. Grimaldi believed at about this time that the cession of Louisiana to England in full satisfaction of all claims had been seriously considered. Grimaldi to Wall, July 14, 1761. *A G Simancas, Legajo* 4543.

² *A E Corr. Pol. Angl.*, 443:358.

³ Bussy to Choiseul, July 26, 1761. *A E Corr. Pol. Angl.*, 444:59.

boundaries, leaving a neutral territory between the Ohio and the mountains. Pitt thereupon postponed the discussion.¹

Pitt in his masterful answer of the twenty-ninth reiterated his saying that it could never be admitted that all that was not Canada was Louisiana, or that the boundaries of Louisiana extended as far as Virginia, or to the British possessions on the Ohio. The intermediate tribes and countries, the true barrier between the nations, could never be given up to France by admitting them to be within the boundaries of Louisiana. So far Pitt was rather maintaining the British right to the Ohio, than seeking an extension of the boundaries with which it was proposed to cede Canada. The French reply was tart. Louis continued his offer to cede Canada in the most extended fashion; he had never maintained that all that was not Canada was Louisiana. If Pitt had condescended to listen to Bussy's instructions he would know that France, like England, insisted on leaving the tribes between Canada and Louisiana neutral and independent, to serve as a barrier. An instruction to Bussy approved his suggestion of a line marked on a map.²

By this time Choiseul was planning to dispose of Louisiana elsewhere. July 16 Ossun reported that Wall had approached him on the subject of its boundaries. He admitted that in view of the approaching union between the crowns, Spain must admit France's title to the colony; at the same time France should agree to such boundaries as would dissipate the old fear lest she one day penetrate into Mexico. Wall indicated that Grimaldi had several times been asked to take up the subject, but had never done so. Ossun suggested that the treaties should not be delayed by a provision such as this, likely to provoke discussion; Wall then proposed inserting a stipulation for regulating the boundaries by commissaries.³

¹ Bute about July 3 proposed this neutral zone to Bussy, linked with a French admission of the sovereignty of Virginia over the Ohio. The expedient was cumbrous as Bute himself; but Bussy here adopted at least part of the proposal. Bussy to Choiseul, July 3, 1761. *A E Corr. Pol. Angl.*, 443:318.

² *A E Corr. Pol. Angl.*, 444:87, 118.

³ Ossun to Choiseul, July 16, 1761. *A E Corr. Pol. Esp.*, 533:122.

Under the circumstances it is not surprising that Choiseul, alarmed lest Spanish support elude him at the moment that peace with Pitt seemed impossible, should fix on Louisiana as something to engage the fidelity of Spain to her engagements. About July 31 he directed Ossun to offer the province secretly to Squillaci in return for an extension of Spain's financial aid to France, reserving the definite offer until he learned the King of Spain's decision as to entering the war. In 1760 he had refused to consider the exchange of Louisiana, because Spain's anxiety over its fate was a pledge of her support; now, to buy Spain's participation in the war, he proffered it freely. August 17 Ossun reported the overture to Squillaci, who considered nothing could be done as to the French financial demands until Charles III should be in a liberal mood on the return of the plate fleet. Choiseul did not recur to the matter when on September 1, he wrote again of Laborde's financial needs. The return of the fleet with a disappointingly small lading September 12, postponed the whole affair.¹

Meanwhile on August 10 a second memoir² on Louisiana was sent to Bussy. It laid down the general principle that the cession of Canada was to be so arranged as to cede England the husk of a colony whose promise France had exhausted, while she retained with Louisiana the hinterlands that might afford her unexhaustible supplies of furs and of all else that Canada had furnished, as well as of the prized tropical products. The furs for the Montreal trade, the author affirmed, now came either from the Ottawa tribe, or were brought across Lake Michigan and the Chicago Portage by the *coureurs de bois*. Therefore, in ceding Canada France should retain the exclusive navigation of Michigan, Huron, and Superior so that the Indians of the Northwest might have easy access to the Illinois; further she should keep the English at a distance from the Mississippi, the navigation of which could alone make the interior useful to them; thus she would have parted with no essential advantages, and would have contributed not at all to upbuilding the commercial power of her rival. The

¹ Choiseul to Ossun, July 31 or August 1, September 1, 1761; Ossun to Choiseul, August 17, 1761. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 533:210, 355, 320.

² A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 444:150; also in A E Mém. et Doc. Etats Unis, Suppl., 6:104.

line suggested to this end ran from Rio Perdido by Fort Toulouse to the west end of Lake Erie, thence by the east shore of Huron to the Height of Land.

On August 17 Pitt and Bussy discussed the French ultimatum. Pitt insisted that England properly possessed the course of the Ohio and enjoyed the lands between it and the mountains by virtue of Indian cessions. Bussy did not have his memoir with him, and argued generally against Pitt. Next day he sent him the summary given in his memoir, although he felt dissatisfied with it since it jumped from Fort Toulouse to Lake Erie; he wrote home for a more detailed line.¹ On the nineteenth Pitt and Bussy conferred again. Pitt claimed that Bussy's proposed boundary violated the article on the cession of Canada, but said he could not speak with authority until a council was held. Later Bussy learned that the English case was being prepared by Sir Thomas Robinson, now Lord Grantham; it cited the French memoir of May 9, 1755, and a publication of Silhouette's, which included the lakes and the Ohio in Canada; it also referred to the claims and cessions of the Six Nations, arguments long since familiar.²

Pitt and Bussy conferred a third time August 26. Pitt again insisted that the Ohio was included in the cession of Canada: he adduced the memoir of 1755, Silhouette, and, now for the first time, the map on which Vaudreuil had supposedly traced the bounds of Canada a year before at the capitulation of Montreal. Bussy replied that the words of memoir and book were passing slips of expression on a point unimportant to their purpose. Vaudreuil's map he explained as best he could on the spur of the moment by saying Vaudreuil must have marked the limits of his authority rather than the legal boundary of his province! Such things could not upset the incontestible titles of France.

Pitt replied once more that England claimed the whole course of the Ohio. Bussy insisted that the claim was a great obstacle

¹ Bussy to Choiseul, August 18, 1761. *A E Corr. Pol. Angl.*, 444:164. Newcastle on the nineteenth thought Bussy was demanding "all the course of The Ohio. And from the East part of the Lakes." "Mem. relating To The French Negotiation August 19th 1761." *Add. MSS.*, 32,927:109.

² Bussy to Choiseul, August 25, 1761. *A E Corr. Pol. Angl.*, 444:202.

to peace, as the Ohio was an open road for the invasion of Louisiana. Pitt replied that they were not interested in it, as was proved by their failure to attack it. If the French retained the Ohio they would people it with the teeming Canadians, who in time would overwhelm the English by sheer numbers. Bussy pointed to the lakes and forts that defended Canada, and to the overwhelming numbers in the British colonies. Above all Choiseul's proposal for a neutral Indian zone between Canada and Louisiana would avert any such danger. To Choiseul, Bussy interpreted Pitt's policy as designed to make, not a peace, but an armed truce in which Louisiana, defenseless with restricted boundaries would fall a prey to the first English onset.¹

The English answer insisted anew on the cession of Canada with the line traced by Vaudreuil; it rejected Bussy's proposal of August 18 because on the side of the Carolinas it included lands and tribes long considered to be under the protection of the King of Great Britain; he would not abandon them to the neutrality Choiseul proposed. Sending this answer to Stanley, Pitt enclosed a tracing of Vaudreuil's map and animadverted on the effrontery of trying to evade its obligation.²

Once again Choiseul demonstrated how little he cared about the American wilderness. In his conference with Stanley September 2, he allowed Vaudreuil's map with little argument, and

¹ Bussy to Choiseul, August 30, 1761. *A E Corr. Pol. Angl.*, 444:216. At some time or other, probably in response to Bussy's request, two projects were drafted for a line drawn with greater detail. There is no evidence that either was ever presented. One of them from Fort Toulouse followed the Alabama River to its source, and thence went to the union of the three branches of the Tennessee. From there it went to the mouth of the Great Miami, ascended to its source, and followed the portage to the Maumee. From its mouth it followed Lake Erie to Detroit, thence followed the east shore of Lake Huron to the region of Lake Nipissing and the Ottawa, and struck over to Lake Abitibi and due west to Lake Superior and the "mountains bordering the Mississippi."

The other projected line went from the source of the Alabama to the Falls of the Tennessee, thence to the Cumberland, and down it to the Ohio. It ascended the Ohio as far as the Wabash, ascended the Wabash to its source, passed to the south shore of Lake Michigan and followed the shore of that lake and Superior to Superior's western end, whence it went to the Height of Land. *A E Etats Unis, Suppl.*, 6:117, 118. The first one is dated August 18, 1761, but this is no guide.

² *A E Corr. Pol. Angl.*, 444:233. Pitt to Stanley, August 27, 1761. *S P France*, 252.

consented that the Indian tribes under British protection be differentiated from those of the neutral zone.¹

In Choiseul's ultimatissimum the only demand on this point was that the English explain what they meant by the term "dependencies" as applied to Canada, and that the paragraph regarding the Indian tribes be redrawn so as to make those west of the boundary neutral and independent under French protection, and those east of it in similar status under English protection; traders to be prohibited from crossing the line. Privately Choiseul confided to Bussy that such concessions would never have been made, had it not been certain that the negotiation would fail; they served to blazon France's moderation and her devotion to her allies to England and to Europe.² However Choiseul would hardly have mortgaged the future in such fashion for himself or his successor in a future negotiation had he seriously cared about the matter.

¹ Stanley to Pitt, September 4, 1761. S P France, 252.

² Choiseul to Bussy, September 9, 1761. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 444: 264, 266.

PART III

THE MAKING OF THE PEACE OF PARIS

THE REOPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS

In the English cabinet meetings of mid-September, 1761, the members regretfully or otherwise agreed that the last French answer was inadmissible.¹ But on the question of England's course toward Spain, the cabinet split. In a memorial which they insisted on presenting to the king September 18,² Pitt and Temple reviewed the apparent union of French and Spanish interests and the Spanish avowal of Bussy's memoir, and concluded that Bristol should at once deliver a hostile declaration and return without taking leave. The other cabinet members orally gave advice to the contrary which the king approved.³ Accordingly on October 5, Pitt and Temple resigned. The seals of the southern department were taken by the Earl of Egremont,⁴ a Wyndham and the brother-in-law of George Grenville. Egremont was old in politics with little experience of statecraft, greedy, malicious, narrow-minded, ungracious, and cautious of his own safety. The last quality probably was responsible for the critical attitude he intermittently displayed in the future negotiations in opposition to Bute's easy acquiescences. His influence was essentially negative: Hardwicke applied to him the epithets of dryness and non-inventiveness: they fit to perfection.⁵

¹ Pitt to Stanley, September 15, 1761. S P France, 252. Newcastle to Joseph Yorke, September 18, 1761. Add. MSS., 32,928:211.

² Add. MSS., 32,928:225.

³ Newcastle to Hardwicke, September 20, 21, 1761. Add. MSS., 32,928:259, 303.

⁴ Charles Wyndham, Earl of Egremont, August 19, 1710-August 21, 1763.

⁵ Hardwicke to Newcastle, June 30, 1762. Add. MSS., 32,940:164.

The question as to whether the course advocated by Pitt and Temple was the wise one has been often debated. On the military ground Corbett¹ argues that beginning offensive operations when Pitt wished would have averted the sickness that decimated the Havana expedition. On the other hand as Corbett himself suggests it is a question if that might not have been avoided in any case by a more energetic commander in chief, more apt to push his advantages. Pitt would have been too late in any case to intercept the Spanish plate fleet; it had anchored September 12.² Beginning the war with a raid on an unprepared opponent who still vouched her wish for peace would have earned England the distrust and hostility of the other maritime powers. Doubtless the ill success of the expedient tried against France in 1755 was an overwhelming argument to the Whigs against repeating it with another Bourbon monarchy. As it was, no charge of aggression lay against England in the manner in which the break with Spain occurred.

However, Newcastle held that the rupture was the immediate fault of Egremont. Instead of prompting a friendly and informal query to Wall as to Spain's possible engagements to support France,³ he dispatched a note to the effect that Spain must reveal her treaties with France before England would negotiate further on the grievances of Spain.⁴ It crossed Bristol's dispatch of November 2, reporting with distress a complete change in Wall's tone; he had railed at England for refusing France's reasonable terms and for planning to crush Spain in her turn.⁵ November 19, Egremont dispatched a note in an even higher tone than the former one; he demanded a categorical answer to his first demand under pain of warlike measures were the answer ambiguous.⁶ This

¹ Corbett, *England in the Seven Years' War*, 2:282.

² Ossun to Choiseul, September 17, 1761. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 533:430.

³ "Observations on Ld Egremont's Letter to the Earl of Bristol," October 26, 1761. Add. MSS., 32,930:57. It might be noted that as late as October 8, Choiseul was alarmed lest Spain retract her decision as she had done in 1759. Waddington, 4:627-628.

⁴ Egremont to Bristol, October 28, 1761. S P Spain, 164.

⁵ Bristol to Egremont, November 2, 1761. S P Spain, 164. Received November 14.

⁶ Egremont to Bristol, November 19, 1761. S P Spain, 164.

crossed a note of Bristol's of November 23,¹ reporting Wall in a better temper; but the die was cast. Bristol made his demand December 8; Wall offered the excuse of a sore toe to gain a day or two for final preparations; then on the tenth, he sent Bristol a note which represented the final outpouring of seven years' pent up wrath, denouncing the insolence of his demand and telling him he could go when he pleased.²

The news reached England December 24.³ The event was to prove all to England's advantage; for Spain, protesting she could not be ready until May of 1762, had not underestimated her unpreparedness. But in England the first effect of the news alarmed people less easily frightened than Newcastle.⁴ Portugal's quixotic adherence to the English alliance irritated sensible statesmen; for it gave the inefficient Spanish army a theater of war that promised success unless England diverted men and money from quarters where they might keep the French in check. By January 2, Bute, despite Newcastle's protests, had avowed his opinion that England could not go on with the German war.⁵ It was echoed by persons as different in their points of view as Shelburne and Bedford. Already the issue was taking form which four months later was to drive out Newcastle and Hardwicke.

While England was blundering into a war with Spain her statesmen had not ceased to negotiate unofficially with France. Newcastle pinned his hopes to Stanley's reopening negotiations by letters to his friends in France;⁶ Bute, apparently without his knowledge, had been flirting with Choiseul as far back as November through another channel and a most remarkable one.

The Comte de Viry, Sardinian minister to the Court of St. James, far surpassed in his practice all those classic manuals of

¹ S P Spain, 164. Received December 14.

² Ossun to the minister, December 10, 1761. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 534: 269.

³ Bristol to Egremont, December 11, 1761. S P Spain, 164. Newcastle to Egremont, December 25, 1761. Add. MSS., 32,932:336. Wall put difficulties in the way of the prompt dispatch of the news.

⁴ Newcastle to Hardwicke, December 25, 1761; Hardwicke to Newcastle, December 26, 1761. Add. MSS., 32,932:345, 367.

⁵ "Conversation with Mor. Mello: Eca," January 2, 1762. Add. MSS., 32,933:33.

⁶ "Memds Decr 4th 1761 (Mr Stanley.); Newcastle to Devonshire, December 5, 1761. Add. MSS., 32,931:408, 425.

diplomacy that describe the perfect ambassador of theory. In English politics he occupied the astounding position of confidential adviser and go-between for the various factional leaders. He carried in the first person confidential explanations and reassurances from Bute to Pitt, from Pitt to Newcastle, from Newcastle to Bute. Delicately he proportioned his confidences to the degree of favor the recipient enjoyed at the moment; to ministers out of power his attentions insensibly cooled. In the days of Newcastle's power, the duke's papers are filled with memoranda of political conversations with "My Friend C. V.," sometimes merely "My Friend"; after his resignation they are fewer by far. Hardwicke inclined to a realistic view of Viry as an intriguer who intrigued for the sheer love of secrecy and mystery; but the man who held even a share in Pitt's confidence, to say nothing of Newcastle's, must have been underneath his mask, much more than that. The part Viry played with Bute in the final negotiations will be unfolded in the following pages. Apart from his natural delight in intrigue he had the practical motive that his court was anxious for peace lest it have to take part in the war. The trust reposed by an English prime minister in the restless representative of a foreign state was well nigh unbelievable.¹

The Earl of Bute himself, for better or worse the author of the future peace, may bear a moment's consideration. Intrinsically he was a pompous courtier, fit for ceremonial uses, parading strange lore which even Shelburne with his wide interests found pedantic.² The tutor and trusted friend of the young George III he had, however ill fitted for the task, been pushed into the paths of statecraft. His aim like that of his young master and of the Leicester House faction was to break the power of Newcastle's Whig aristocrats, and to bend all men, even the haughty William Pitt, to serve the king, if they served him at all, on the king's own

¹ For an interesting picture of Viry see Namier, *England in the Age of the American Revolution*, 91-93. A much needed detailed study of the man is being prepared by my colleague, Dr. Lucille Shay, of the University of Illinois.

² See Shelburne's characterization of him in Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice's *Life of William, Earl of Shelburne*, 1:139-141. Bute was really interested in natural science.

terms. This part of his task, Bute, probably with the advice of intriguers far more skilful than himself, accomplished with rare cunning. Pitt and Newcastle were led first to distrust each other: Newcastle was encouraged to approve Pitt's departure from office in October, 1761; then he himself was slighted and reversed until in May, 1762, resignation remained his only honorable course. Finally Henry Fox,¹ the most unscrupulous man in English public life, was summoned in to build the king a political machine based on the patronage, only to be unceremoniously cast aside when his work was done. In all this Bute, like other political amateurs, showed himself more ruthless than the professionals.

To insure Bute's success in the political task he had undertaken for the young king, it was necessary that he make a peace; his efforts to do it were to make him regret that he had ever given up the golden key of a court official for the portfolio of a minister. Peace was essential because, if war went on, an irresistible public outcry would necessitate taking back the imperious William Pitt on his own terms and not the king's. Peace therefore Bute set about to make; and here his mere capacity for political intrigue left him helpless, lacking the experience necessary to fathom a diplomatic situation or to imagine the weaknesses of an opponent's position. He was bewildered and dazzled by the unequal antagonist with whom fate had matched him, and finally overborne by the colleagues he had himself chosen. At the last, having run from timidity to the extreme of temerity in making secret engagements with France which put him in Egremont's power, he staked on the game the whole royal patronage and influence, and barely managed to make, not the peace England might have had, but a peace that fell short of absurdity.

¹ Henry Fox, Lord Holland, September 28, 1705-July 1, 1774. Member of the House of Commons, 1735-1763; secretary at war, 1746-1755; secretary of state for the southern department, October, 1755-November, 1756; paymaster of the forces, 1757-1765. In 1755, as a follower of the Duke of Cumberland he had advocated a warlike policy. He broke with Cumberland in October, 1762, when he undertook to put Bute's peace through the House of Commons. He was discarded by Bute and the king in 1763 after his work was done. Popular opinion credited him with amassing a fortune out of his perquisites as paymaster, and increasing it by speculating in the funds on inside information of the peace.

November 17, 1761,¹ Bute had taken advantage of the correspondence maintained by Viry with M. le Bailli Solar de Breille, Sardinian ambassador at Versailles and intimate friend of Choiseul, to convey to the duc the message that "a person of credit"—a cant phrase for a royal favorite—was sorry that Pitt's resignation had not occurred while Bussy and Stanley were still at their posts. Viry reiterated the message on December 13,² indicating further that while the ministry was bent on conducting war with intense vigor, it would be glad to conclude a peace on the last ultimatums especially if it could be done before news arrived of the fall of Martinique. December 15,³ answering a letter of Solar's now lost, Viry indicated that the English ministry was still obdurate on allowing France to negotiate a settlement of Spain's grievances; he suggested that the French send an envoy disguised as a merchant; Richard Wall in negotiating a former peace between England and Spain had maintained that character in London for months without any one's penetrating the mystery.

¹ Viry to Solar, November 17, 1761. Viry-Solar Correspondence (cited hereafter as Shelburne MSS.), 1:3-6. Corbett mistakes the date as October 17. *England in the Seven Years' War*, 2:285.

The Viry-Solar Correspondence, volumes 1, 2, and 3, are volumes 9, 10, and 11 of the Shelburne MSS. in the William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan. As nearly as can be judged, the papers which passed between Viry and Solar in the course of the peace negotiation of 1761-1763, and which were not destroyed or returned to the senders, were copied on loose folios which were grouped into three volumes. At some later date these folios were copied by several copyists, taking successive folios of twenty-four pages, and their transcript, bound in three volumes, was installed in the library of the Earl of Shelburne. If the original copy remained in the possession of Comte de Viry or in that of his son who was successively Sardinian minister at London and at Paris, the copy was probably made with the possessor's consent. The elder Viry left London in 1764; the younger one was minister there 1765-1769. One would guess the copy was made by copyists some of whom at least had not much knowledge of French; such repeated mistakes as "devant" for "devoit" suggest as much. The chances are it was copied for Shelburne when his régime as secretary of state for the southern department, 1766-1768, overlapped the younger Viry's as minister.

There is a transcript of the three volumes in the Canadian Archives at Ottawa, made while the correspondence was still in the possession of the Marquis of Lansdowne. The copyist undertook in places to correct obvious misreadings of the French.

² Viry to Solar, December 13, 1761. Shelburne MSS., 9:13-16.

³ Viry to Solar, December 15, 1761. Shelburne MSS., 9:18-25. The lost letter was dated December 4.

Perhaps Choiseul wished the same thing as Bute; during much of the negotiation of 1761 he had counted on his tone of moderation turning Pitt's colleagues against the great secretary. However in January, 1762, with Spanish coöperation assured, and Prussia seemingly at last on the edge of the precipice, he may have wished to try the chance of the next campaign. In either case it was matter of course to meet Bute's manifest anxiety for peace with indifference. December 13,¹ Solar transmitted a note written to him by his friend the Duc de Choiseul which merely said they would listen with pleasure to anything that came from the representatives of their good friend the King of Sardinia. Solar, writing through the ordinary mails, on January 5, adopted a hackneyed metaphor.² The merchants with whom he dealt thought it was the turn for those that Viry represented to make advances; while they themselves were not disposed to adhere to their last proffers, they would not much depart from them; they were anxious to know if the late event—the Spanish declaration of war—altered the desire of the English merchants to strike a bargain. Assurances on this last point from Viry crossed Solar's inquiry, and Solar once more laid the English offers before his friends.³

Naturally the Spanish rupture made Choiseul raise his tone; and on January 23⁴ he addressed to Solar a letter in answer to the overtures received through Viry at the beginning of the month. The letter, which was of course intended for transmission through Viry to Bute, was highly provoking. If the English wanted peace, let them state their terms as the French had done the year before. English overtures presumably were due either to a desire to separate France from her allies, to dissension in the English cabinet, or to a sense of England's inability to continue the war. If impelled by either of the latter motives, the English ministers

¹ Solar to Viry, December 13, 1761; Duc de Choiseul to Solar, December 8, 1761. Shelburne MSS., 9:7-12.

² Solar to Viry, January 5, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 9:29 *et seq.*

³ Viry to Solar, January 5, 12, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 9:36-37, 39.

⁴ Duc de Choiseul to Solar, January 23, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 9:46-49. Also in Add. MSS., 32,933:458.

would find France receptive; but they might as well know at the beginning that Choiseul had already written off the result of the English expedition against Martinique, and that it would have no influence on France's course.

This letter was accompanied by one from Solar to Viry which Viry and Newcastle thought must have been composed by the duc himself.¹ Solar purported to say that he had conferred with the Duc and Comte de Choiseul, who found Viry's offers too vague. Not again would they take the risk of the first advances: besides they now had Spain to consider. England might send a negotiator masquerading as a merchant, with a memorial of terms signed by the ministers. France would reply with a corresponding statement; by this method, if they wished, peace could be made in six weeks. France could no longer base the negotiation on the Bussy-Stanley ultimatums, but she would not travel far from them. If Viry's friends did not accept these proposals, the correspondence was too dangerous for France to continue, and must be dropped at once.

In seeking to appraise these letters, the astute Hardwicke was at once concerned to know whether they were written before or after Paris had heard of the death of the Empress Elizabeth of Russia. Elizabeth had been the steadiest opponent of Frederick of Prussia. Her successor the Czar Peter III was a military monomaniac, a slavish admirer of the Great Frederick as the soldier *par excellence*; during his brief lease of power he was actually to carry Russia over to be the active ally of Prussia. Hardwicke, by a careful study of intercepted letters from Paris, established the fact that the news had arrived between January 29 and February 1; certainly after Choiseul's letter was written

¹Solar to Viry, February 1, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 9:50-58. Also in Add. MSS., 32,934:121. The argument is hard to check, as it turns on a phrase in another letter of Solar's which does not appear in the surviving copy; added in Solar's own hand, it stated he had been obliged to make use of his secretary "de faire le copiste." "From whence, Count Viry observes, That This Letter, as well as The Two Others, was wrote by The Duc de Choiseul." "Substance of a *most secret* letter from M de Solar to Count Viry of the Same Date Feb 1, 1762." Add. MSS., 32,934:125.

and probably after Solar's dispatch had been drafted.¹ An added mystery was that the two letters, due to what Choiseul alleged was the stupidity of the French *piqueur*, Le Roux, who carried them, did not arrive till March 2. Within a few days they were followed by a second communication from Choiseul in a much different tone.²

The Comte d'Estaing, French naval officer, had, after violating his parole, been recaptured by the English. Through Viry his family had appealed to George III; Louis XV let his personal interest be known. February 22, Egremont, releasing D'Estaing to the judgment of his king and his fellow officers, had announced the fact in a letter to the Duc de Choiseul couched in general cordial terms.³ March 7, Choiseul replied, acknowledging with warmth the generosity of George III, and apologizing for a previous note regarding D'Estaing sent by Le Roux, as ill written in view of His Britannic Majesty's magnanimity; on his side he expressed Louis' anxiety for George III's friendship. This exchange was later represented to Spain as the beginning of the negotiation.⁴ D'Estaing lifted his voice in protest at having his reputation butchered by the attribution of magnanimity to the English ministry for what he considered an act of simple justice;⁵ but the situation demanded as a conciliatory gesture, that George III be assigned the rôle of a chivalrous and generous prince.

During the delay of Le Roux's dispatches, Viry and Solar continued to exchange letters, dropping, when they had to use the ordinary mails, into the language of mercantile transaction.

¹ Hardwicke to Newcastle, March 3, 9, 1762. Add. MSS., 32,935:160, 276. Possibly the reason for Le Roux's delay was that the French ministers could not well unsay what they had said with so much hauteur through Solar, before they learned of the change in Russia; and that they therefore postponed Le Roux's arrival until more conciliatory messages might follow hard to take off the effect of the first.

² Choiseul to Egremont, March 7, 1762. Add. MSS., 32,935:209.

³ Egremont to Duc de Choiseul, February 22, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 9:69-71.

⁴ A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 536:62, 70. The letter is not in the Viry-Solar Correspondence; but there is a copy in the Newcastle Papers, Add. MSS., 32,935:209, and another in A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 536:269.

⁵ D'Estaing to Solar [?], March 28, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 9:79-80.

Viry professed the impatience of his friends to know if the merchants of Lyons would come to a bargain;¹ Solar on February 11 reassured him.² It is quite possible from the recurring phrase in several of the letters, "you know this hand," that Bute and the Duc de Choiseul actually testified their sincerity by penning letters dispatched in the name of their intermediaries.³ When Le Roux finally arrived Viry went to the City to talk to his friends; but he was unable to match the samples Solar had sent him; he would send the nearest approach to them.⁴ Solar on his part, with reference to the Russian reversal indicated the misgiving of his associates that advices of new modes from foreign manufacturers had captured the taste of the English merchants; his friends however were not disposed to design new patterns in competition; delays naturally would not animate them.⁵

Both Bute and Newcastle were more optimistic in March than in January. Bute seemed approaching the belief that 70,000 men might be supported in the Electorate besides the succors to Portugal; Newcastle, ordinarily pessimistic, was weighing the chance that Ferdinand might actually recover the Electorate and Hesse in the approaching campaign.⁶ In spite of this, Bute's first notions as to terms of peace when confided to an approving Newcastle by Viry, March 8, were comparatively easy ones. They accepted the Canada-Louisiana boundary as proposed by the French; they added Miquelon to St. Pierre as an *abri*; they proffered either Senegal or Goree; they softened former asperities as to Dunkirk.⁷ Viry throughout was playing the rôle of the fair

¹ Viry to Solar, February 9, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 9:41-43.

² Solar to Viry, February 11, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 9:63-65.

³ The letter cited above concludes with the words: "You know this hand; you can rely on what I tell you by this letter, and on what I may write you in future, making use of the same hand." Acknowledging the letter February 22, Shelburne MSS., 9:67-68, Viry used the phrase, "as you know this hand your excellency may rely on what I have the honor to write you."

⁴ Viry to Solar, March 12, 23, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 9:81-82, 85-86.

⁵ Solar to Viry, April 1, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 9:83-84.

⁶ Newcastle to Hardwicke, February 22, 1762; Newcastle to Yorke, March 2, 1762. Add. MSS., 32,935:9, 145. Newcastle at this point was undecided as to the Prussian subsidy whether giving it might not make Frederick bellicose or withholding it have the same effect on Maria Theresa.

⁷ Newcastle to Hardwicke, March 8, 1762. Add. MSS., 32,935:249.

broker who knew Choiseul's mind; he would not go on if Belleisle were demolished; all would be to no avail if England refused to treat with Spain through France; the English ministerial chiefs listened submissively.¹

Egremont from the beginning showed greater asperity. However by March 12, he had completed a draft of terms; Bute, Newcastle, and Hardwicke approved; Mansfield suggested verbal alterations that threatened difficulties.² A second draft of this proposal, which is dated March 21,³ was practically as outlined above; it indicated a partition of the Neutral Islands which accorded France St. Lucia.

News of the capture of Martinique arrived near the end of March. It made Hardwicke seriously consider, whether it might not be wiser to demand all the sugar islands, and only enough of Canada to secure their colonies. He indicated that the former pamphlet war only began to acquire weight with him now that England's possession of all the French sugar islands offered a prize worth serious consideration. Newcastle was impressed, and promised to consult his City friends; but there the matter dropped. Actually considering the tenacity with which Choiseul contended for St. Lucia, his surrendering all the sugar islands was beyond the realm of possibilities.⁴

The delays so irritating to the merchants of Lyons were caused by the serious illness in March of the Earl of Egremont, without whom Bute was unwilling to proceed. But on March 27, Viry dispatched letters representing the English ministers as deeply hurt at the insinuations cast on their sincerity in Le Roux's

¹ Newcastle to Hardwicke, February 13, 1762; Bute to Newcastle, February 14, 1762. Add. MSS., 32,934:320, 331. Viry to Newcastle, March 10, 1762 (2 letters); Newcastle to Hardwicke, March 11, 1762. Add. MSS., 32,935:295, 297, 312.

² "Copy of Remarks on Lord Egremont's Drat.," March 12, 1762; Newcastle to Hardwicke, March 12, 1762; Newcastle to Bute, March 13, 1762; "Memds Ld Mansfield"; Hardwicke to Newcastle, March 15, 1762; Mansfield to Newcastle, March 15, 1762; Newcastle to Mansfield, March 15, 1762. Add. MSS., 32,935:320, 331, 354, 390, 394, 396, 398.

³ Draft, Egremont to Viry, March 21, 1762. Add. MSS., 32,936:1.

⁴ Hardwicke to Newcastle, April 2, 1762; Newcastle to Hardwicke, April 2, 1762. Add. MSS., 32,936:310. There is little or no trace of the Canada-Guadeloupe controversy in the papers of either Newcastle or Pitt. Both seemed to take mainland acquisitions for granted.

dispatches.¹ On April 8 a declaration was issued in George III's name suggesting an exchange of ministers with the old ultimatums as a basis. On receipt of it, Choiseul indoctrinated Grimaldi with the affair, beginning with the correspondence on D'Estaing, suggesting that in view of France's losses in the East and West Indies since 1761, she could scarcely expect better terms.² April 15 he wrote Solar a letter traversing the various points at issue indicating that on most of them he was not far from the English; this letter Viry received April 21.³

A cabinet meeting to formulate the English demands was held April 23;⁴ Egremont drew them into a memoir about April 24.⁵ In this the great points of divergence from Choiseul's proposals were the demand of either Guadeloupe or Louisiana as an equivalent for Martinique, with a division of the Neutral Islands. On the pretext that some of the lords had refrained from stating their opinions, a second meeting was summoned for April 30.⁶ At it, Bute suggested that the French would never accept the demand for the surrender of an equivalent for Martinique—a complete reversal of his own former position—and that it was necessary to fix on something to which the ministry could adhere. To

¹ Viry to Solar, March 16, 27 (two letters), 1762. Shelburne MSS., 9:82, 88-95, 96-99.

² The declaration is in Shelburne MSS., 9:105-107. Memoir to Grimaldi, April 17, 1762. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 536:62.

³ Duc de Choiseul to Solar, April 15, 1762; Viry to Solar, May 4, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 9:118-127, 154-158. At the outset the question arose as to whether the negotiations should be conducted by secret envoys or by the exchange of memoirs. The Duc de Choiseul decided for the latter method when he heard that Stanley was likely to be the English envoy in case secrecy was preserved; he professed respect for Stanley, but considered that in the last negotiation he had been too much under Pitt's influence. Viry to Solar, April 9, 1762; Solar to Viry, April 16, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 9:112-114, 141-143.

⁴ Newcastle to Hardwicke, April 25, 1762. Add. MSS., 32,937:349.

⁵ "Lord Egremonts Answer to the Duc de Choiseul's Points." Add. MSS., 32,937:341. See on this, Newcastle to Hardwicke, November 27, 1762; Hardwicke to Newcastle, November 28, 1762. Add. MSS., 32,945:159, 176. Newcastle with the lapse of time and the confusion of his papers had an exaggerated idea of how high demands had been while he was still in office. At the time he had misgivings about demanding Guadeloupe or Louisiana; they would get neither. That was the mistake made in 1761. He thought Bute was copying Pitt's haughty language in his insistence on an equivalent for Martinique. Newcastle favored demanding the Neutral Islands, finally insisting on St. Lucia and one other.

⁶ Egremont to Newcastle, April 29, 1762. Add. MSS., 32,937:423.

this end he proposed retaining the Neutral Islands and Grenada, and demanding the Mississippi River as boundary on the North American Continent.¹ "It appear'd," wrote Hardwicke, "by what Lord Egremont said, that His Lordship had had his difficulties & misgivings about the new proposition of the part of Louisiana on the left side of the Mississippi: & that the noble Lord, who made it, had not *Then* consider'd how it was mix'd & complicated with certain Spanish settlements."²

The decision of the cabinet was incorporated in a letter addressed by Egremont May 1 to the Comte de Viry for transmission to the Comte de Choiseul.³ It stated "that the course of the Mississippi River be for the future the boundary between the two nations." A farce began that was to have consequences of far-reaching tragedy. Egremont, with misgivings of his own on Bute's invention, had used the most general phrases possible in the draft he read the council: when Viry "quite naturally" asked an explanation Egremont grew prolix in his determination to avoid giving one on his own responsibility. Accordingly Viry decided to write confidentially to a person of credit for an explanation of the words. Apparently through Sir James Stuart Mackenzie he received from Bute the fateful reply:

"The line of the boundary of Canada to the west as traced by M. de Vaudreuil ended at the junction of the Ohio and the Mississippi. From this junction to the sea the course of the Mississippi shall serve as boundary between the two nations: but as the Mississippi has several mouths, that one is understood which is farthest east: namely that which passes by the little river Iberville,

¹ Bute to Bedford, May 1, 1762. *Correspondence of John, fourth duke of Bedford*, 3:75.

² Hardwicke to Newcastle, May 1, 1762. Add. MSS., 32,938:10.

³ October 15, 1761, the Duc de Choiseul had turned over the department of foreign affairs to his cousin, the Comte de Choiseul, himself retaining the Spanish correspondence. César-Gabriel de Choiseul, Comte de Choiseul, Duc de Praslin, November, 1762, was born in 1712. He served in the wars of the Polish and Austrian Successions, attaining the rank of lieutenant-general in 1748. In 1758 he succeeded his cousin at Vienna. Returning to France in 1760, he added in 1766 the portfolio of the marine to that of foreign affairs. He shared the Duc de Choiseul's disgrace in 1770; he died in 1785. He lacked his cousin's brilliance and audacity, replacing them with system and pomposity.

Lakes Maurepas, and Pontchartrain, and from there communicates itself to the sea."¹

Secretly, on his own responsibility Bute had taken it on himself to give an interpretation of the terms officially approved that assuredly was not the obvious one. A difficult situation developed when it became necessary to let Egremont and George Grenville, later secretary of state, into the secret of Bute's concession: it is quite possible that Egremont, clearing his own skirts, thereafter held over Bute's head proof of his secret understanding with enemy ministers as a threat. An interesting subject of speculation is whether Viry was at the bottom of the whole affair. The quotation from Hardwicke given above indicates that the suggestion of the Mississippi boundary was made in council by Bute, and that Egremont had received it with misgivings. Does Viry's communication to Bute indicate that he had suggested to him in first instance the river boundary with the special interpretation given in Bute's note? Does the phrase "quite naturally" in his letter to Solar indicate also an understanding of Viry with Solar, and through Solar with Choiseul?

At all events with Bute's connivance the concession was embedded in the treaty and could not be dislodged either in the preliminary articles or in the negotiation of the definitive document. Its effects were far-reaching: for forty years to come the ownership of the Great Valley was to be divided, with its outlet in hands alien to those who dwelt on its upper waters. The failure of British attempts to exploit the West, the Revolution in the western country, western separatism and unrest in the critical and constitutional periods all trace to this cause. Not until the Louisiana Purchase redeemed Bute's fateful error, did unity and order reign once more in the interior of the Continent.

Choiseul weighed the English proposal. Surely and finally under the mask of levity he reached his decision. "I sang all night," he wrote Solar May 12,² "the airs from *la petite Demoiselle*. I would much rather think of that than of boundaries

¹ Shelburne MSS., 9:181-183.

² Shelburne MSS., 9:307-310. The original has "Petotes Chamoiuelle." The emendation, made by the Ottawa copyist, is undoubtedly the right one. Points like this indicate that the copying was done by English secretaries.

on the Mississippi and the difficulty of the Neutral Islands. It is for my cousin as minister of foreign affairs to adjust these differences. I think we should allow the boundaries of Louisiana as England demands. I think we can cede the Grenadines: but St. Lucia is indispensably necessary for us."

This program however he could not hope to carry against a minister less facile than Bute. He was accordingly deeply alarmed at the news of Newcastle's resignation lest it portend the return of Pitt; and protested that rather than negotiate for peace with him again he would row in his master's galleys. Viry however had hastened to send the reassuring forecast, that Newcastle's departure portended not the return of Pitt but the supremacy of Bute.¹ For Bute, by deliberately crossing Newcastle in going over his head to negative a continuance of the Prussian subsidy, had forced out a political rival;² Newcastle's old friend Hardwicke also was no longer summoned to council.³ Bute succeeded Newcastle as first lord of the treasury; he himself as secretary of state for the northern department was succeeded by George Grenville, brother of Lord Temple, brother-in-law of Pitt and Egremont. Grenville was prosy and tedious, but upright, industrious, tenacious, and courageous. To the best of his ability he fought Bute's concessions and prodded Egremont to do likewise:⁴ but as yet he had neither the weight and influence, or the ripe experience and astuteness of Newcastle and Hardwicke. It was Choiseul's good fortune to have such opponents removed from his path.

The fall of Newcastle in another sense implied the deliberate rejection by the English ministry of an alternative path to peace. The acceptance of the proffer of Peter III for an alliance with England and Prussia would have created a northern bloc that

¹ Viry to Solar, May 22, 1762; Choiseul to Solar, May 23, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 9:239-245, 249-257.

² Bute's friends later admitted as much to Newcastle. See *post*, clvi.

³ Hardwicke to Newcastle, June 22, 1762. Add. MSS., 32,940:24. This was the king's deliberate act. Viry says that the king named to Egremont the persons to be summoned. Viry to Solar, June 27, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 10:82.

⁴ *The Grenville Papers: being the Correspondence of Richard Grenville Earl Temple, K. G., and the Right Hon: George Grenville, Their Friends and Contemporaries, passim.*

would inevitably have forced Austria and France to terms on the side of the Continent. When Newcastle resigned rather than abandon the Prussian subsidy, the suspicions of Prussia redoubled. Almost on the day of Newcastle's departure Bute decided not to reveal to Prussia the declaration addressed to Spain;¹ the Prussian representatives were now openly stirring up protests in the City against the ministry and the peace it was bent on making. Choiseul on his part fortified the sentiments of Bute and Egremont by political sermons on the text that the union of the northern powers was a threat to the diplomatic supremacy of France and England against which sound policy demanded that they stand shoulder to shoulder.² Bute and Bedford coveted a French alliance after the peace; Bute actually urged it on Choiseul, who accepted the opportunity it offered to raise his terms.

Choiseul's declaration of May 29 was a subtle attempt to feel out the full weakness of Bute and his advisers. The duc made demand after demand. He blithely abandoned concessions made in his ultimatum of 1761 by professing that they had been made to win the sympathy of Europe, with no thought that the English would accept them! He struggled once more for Cape Breton or at least for drying rights on it; he insisted on St. Lucia; he adroitly balanced Dominica against Grenada; he accorded England everything between the Ohio and Mississippi, retaining a league's distance from the east bank of the Mississippi below the Ohio, drawing the line between Maurepas and Pontchartrain and throwing in Mobile as a kind of semi-tropical compensation for France's necessary insistence on the West Indies. Quite appropriately Choiseul termed the confidence game into which he was entrapping Bute "an amicable negotiation resembling none of those of which we read in politic histories!"³

The dispatch of this proposal to England was followed by ominous silence. The letters received from Viry in June talked, if not about the weather, about the young king's illness which precluded any consideration of Choiseul's memoir.⁴ The Choiseuls

¹ Egremont to Viry, May 20, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 9:231-232.

² Duc de Choiseul to Solar, May 25, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 9:258-261.

³ Memoir, May 29, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 9:261-279.

⁴ Viry to Solar, June 4, 11, 15, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 10:1-12.

became increasingly impatient at Viry's laconic phrases.¹ Only on June 28 did Viry dispatch the English reply with the full story of what he had discreetly concealed, that for three weeks the dove of peace had vainly sought in the English ministry a place where her foot might rest.²

Even Bute had had misgivings about Choiseul's proposals; his advisers and friends were more outspoken. Viry only cut short the torrent of Egremont's indignation by the tactful hint that it was getting late! George Grenville, even more discontented, he thought would not depart till the morrow! The secretaries, Henley, Halifax, even Bute's intimate Lord Melcombe told Bute that the French offers were impossible. The secretaries protested it would be hard enough to defend the peace even on the basis of Egremont's offer of May 1. They seriously proposed that that offer should be withdrawn. Finally the council of June 21 agreed to leave it open. But Egremont drew a reply dated June 26 which insisted on every jot and tittle of the English demands of May. In it the Earl laid aside the tone of stately courtesy that had hitherto characterized the negotiation and shrilled, scolded, and threatened in his natural peevishness.

Viry however had not relaxed his pressure; day in and day out he had been placidly telling angry ministers he could not see what there was in the French memoir to vex them; day by day he had been lecturing on the theme that historically England's northern policy had best succeeded when it had French support; day by day politely but firmly he had reiterated that France would not make peace without St. Lucia. Finally by sheer weight of quiet persistence he overbore the resistance of ministers who realized they were now politically committed to obtaining peace from the French negotiation if at all. On June 22, the day after the council, Egremont told him that if France would acquiesce in

¹ Solar to Viry, June 24, 27, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 10:25-28, 29-30.

² Viry's account is in a long letter of June 27. Shelburne MSS., 10:61-92. Bute's note to Viry is in Shelburne MSS., 10:184-189; the note on St. Lucia is in Shelburne MSS., 10:192-194. Viry's account of the council's attitude is substantiated in some particulars by an account Mansfield gave Newcastle; Mansfield thought that there was not the least probability of peace. Newcastle to Hardwicke, June 28, 1762. Add. MSS., 32,940:112.

the remaining English demands, he and Bute would risk advising the king to give up St. Lucia. Viry insinuated that there were ways of sounding France without committing themselves. Finally a hybrid dispatch was sent off. It included Egremont's scolding reply insisting on all the English demands, a letter of Viry's indicating that Bute and Egremont would give up St. Lucia if they were sure of French acquiescence on other points, and a note of Bute's to Viry pleading for a permanent alliance with France.

LES LONGUEURS DE MADRID

The Family Compact had tremendously complicated the Duc de Choiseul's problem in negotiation with England. Viry's *expédition* of June 28 left him in possession of the terms on which he had professed himself willing to make peace. Next he had to extract from England acceptable terms of accommodation with Spain, and to deal with Spanish attempts to veto terms in the French-English preliminaries contrary to Spanish interests; and of these the greatest stumbling block was the concession of eastern Louisiana and Mobile. Having yielded it to buy the consolidation of France's West Indian position, Choiseul was occupied for the next four months in endeavoring to dress it or disguise it in such fashion as to render it palatable to Spain; or failing that, to cajole the English ministry into giving it up.

From the outset of the serious negotiation Choiseul had set himself to convince Solar and through him Bute of his ability to adjust matters with Spain to England's satisfaction if he were left to do it his own way. Solar was mentally slower than the agile-witted Viry and inclined to be pompous, patronizing, and vain of his intimacy with the Duc de Choiseul; but he was for a diplomat, honest, and on occasion could even be outspoken with his great friend. He was probably himself convinced of the duc's ability to deal with Spain before he backed the assurances of it to his English correspondents. He transmitted private notes the duc had written him to be shown to Bute and then burned. He gave assurances that if England closed with the French memoir

of May 29 France would "force Spain's hand."¹ Some of Choiseul's expressions about Grimaldi possibly were purposely indiscreet. "I only ask not to be obliged to listen to his insufferable chatter." The two Piedmontese diplomats, naturally disliking all Genoese, especially "Spaniolized ones," fanned Choiseul's irritation at the ambassador of Spain. "There is," Choiseul wrote Solar "no stupidity of which I do not think that babbler capable; but I beg you to dissimulate till the outcome: we need him and will lead him by his weakness to the very end and then we will laugh at him." Not without reason was Grimaldi obstinate and suspicious.

As has been said the exchange over D'Estaing was revealed to Grimaldi as the ostensible beginning of the negotiation. To complete his deception Choiseul had even to send to England for a copy of his letter on D'Estaing; characteristically he had neglected to keep a copy!² Viry's dispatches of May 4 were communicated to Grimaldi. What concerned the Mississippi boundary at least must have been withheld, for Grimaldi in general approved.³ However both he and his court took strong exception to the employment of the Sardinians as mediators especially as Spain had pending a territorial question with the court of Turin; but Solar, and especially Viry were of such supreme use to Choiseul that despite promises to the contrary he continued to employ them.⁴ Charles III required an English declaration to Spain paralleling that to France, which was forthcoming in satisfactory form on May 19.⁵ The King of Spain's general re-

¹ Solar to Viry, May 30, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 9:310-318. Three accompanying notes of the duc to Solar were shown Bute and then burned. Viry to Solar, June 28, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 10:175-176. There are three surviving notes of the duc to Solar: May 25, 27, 28, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 9:258-261, 282-284, 284 *et seq.*; two of them contain indiscreet remarks on Grimaldi. The two quotations are from the notes of May 25 and 27.

² Solar to Viry, May 12, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 9:203-207.

³ Choiseul to Ossun, May 16, 1762. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 536:205.

⁴ Ossun to Choiseul, April 26, 1762; Choiseul to Ossun, May 12, 1762. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 536:93, 167.

⁵ Solar to Viry, May 12, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 9:203-207. The declaration is in Shelburne MSS., 9:217-218.

action to the peace, as Ossun reported it, was patronizing;¹ he had entered the war to secure better terms for the king his brother, and would do his pleasure. England would, of course, have to compensate his conquests in Portugal; he really wished she would try to attack Havana for, as to the security of that or any other place of importance, he had no uneasiness whatever.

While Choiseul impatiently waited through June for the English reply to his memoir of May 29, his tortuous course necessarily involved him deeper in duplicity. As that memoir had been dispatched before he had Charles III's assent to the negotiation, he had carefully to conceal the fact it had been sent. The leaking out in Holland of information as to the Solar-Viry exchanges had compelled the duc to disclose their existence to Austria in May;² and Austria had in principle agreed to the negotiation. With Spain's assent secured, and a statement of the terms on which she would treat in hand, the duc could not well avoid dispatching some offers to London without arousing misgivings in his allies, and causing the Spaniolized Genoese to suspect that France was already deep in negotiation. Accordingly the memoir of May was dressed up in the form of articles, communicated to Grimaldi as if a fresh declaration, combined with the Spanish articles, and sent off to London.³

On one important point a change was made. As originally worded it provided that the course of the Mississippi, both banks belonging to France from the junction with the Ohio as far as the sea, should serve as boundary to Canada and Louisiana. Finally, for Grimaldi's consumption only it was worded, "France will accord the fixation of the bounds of Canada with the greatest extension: provided they do not cross the Mississippi, and do not encroach along the sea on the dependencies of Louisiana. These bounds will be marked on a map annexed to the Preliminaries."⁴

¹ Ossun to minister, May 31, 1762. *A E Corr. Pol. Esp.*, 536:274.

² Solar to Viry, May 5, 1762; Duc de Choiseul to Solar, May 10, 1762. *Shelburne MSS.*, 9:191-193, 197-200. The communication had its comic side. On May 11, the Comte de Choiseul insisted to Starhemberg that he had no offers from England direct or indirect; next day he revealed the correspondence! *Waddington*, 5:287.

³ Duc de Choiseul to Solar, June 29, 1762. *Shelburne MSS.*, 10:132-138.

⁴ Choiseul to Ossun, June 29, 30, 1762. *A E Corr. Pol. Esp.*, 536:380, 385.

Meanwhile Choiseul on June 29 privately assured Solar that France stood to her original engagement with England.¹ Egremont could take what comfort he could from the fact that France was conniving with England to deceive Spain;² the French *expédition* arrived at London July 2.

Near midnight that same night Viry's dispatch of June 28 reached Paris. Solar sat down to read it at once, his despair increasing until finally he came to the notes announcing the cession of St. Lucia, and Bute's desire for a French alliance. As Solar believed, it was the latter that determined Choiseul to the fresh sacrifices demanded. With the news of Prince Ferdinand's victory of June 24 at hand, and with the English cabinet manifestly provoked at Choiseul's shiftiness, it became necessary to give way at all points for the sake of St. Lucia. The Choiseuls and Solar decided that the courier should be sent back the night of the fifth, bearing a French commentary on the articles sent June 28 which would meet Egremont's objections; there was a private plea to Viry to endeavor to wheedle Bute out of Dominica as well as St. Lucia.³ There was also a letter from the Comte de Choiseul on St. Lucia so inculpatory that to soothe Egremont he received it back and burned it.

On the Mississippi article the French ministers enlarged. They protested that Egremont's demand, still made in ignorance of Bute's concession, of a Mississippi boundary throughout the stream would deprive France of New Orleans. The Duc de Choiseul added a long letter and several notes on the subject; the letter and probably all but one of the notes have disappeared. There was also a marked map; but on this—an omission later laid at the door of the draftsman—the line indicating English possessions did not reach the sea.⁴

¹ Choiseul to Solar, June 29, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 10:132-138.

² Egremont to Grenville, July 3, 1762. *Grenville Papers*, 1:462.

³ Observations on the memoir of propositions sent to London June 28. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 446:149. Solar to Viry, July 5, 1762 (two letters); Comte de Choiseul to Solar, July 4, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 10:210-212, 216-224, 458-461.

⁴ Solar to Viry, July 4, 1762; Solar to Viry, July 5, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 10:204-210, 216-224.

Before Viry could make use of this *expédition*, the ministers had met July 6 to consider the French dispatch of June 28. The result was an uncompromising set of articles dated by Egremont July 10, reiterating the former demands. But those articles were supplemented and denatured by a secret letter of Viry's of July 12, which indicated that he had finally broken to Egremont the secret of Bute's concession of May 4 on the Mississippi boundary, and which was in effect the English ultimatum.¹

Viry had dealt on the whole matter with Bute on July 8. He began by trying to wheedle him out of Dominica as well as St. Lucia, but finding him obdurate, communicated the whole packet of July 4-5. Bute was surprised at the Mississippi article; Choiseul on May 29 had admitted that the boundary began at its source. On the map, he noted with distress that the English line was not drawn to reach the sea;² he said that on that point for the safety of the peace he dared make no concession.

Next Bute and Viry considered how to reveal to Egremont the former concession of New Orleans. The method adopted was naturally a tortuous one. Viry was to read the secretary three of the Duc de Choiseul's notes of July 4³ and also two substitute passages for passages in the Duc de Choiseul's long letter, and in the observations on the French memoir of June 28. It is hard to arrive at their precise significance, but they were intended "insensibly to lead My Lord Egremont to what is implied by my note regarding the Mississippi; on which I cannot too often repeat to Your Excellency that Bute only of the English ministers is acquainted with it, and that it would ruin him if it came out, as my letter on St. Lucia would ruin him and Egremont."⁴

Overwhelmed at this revelation, Egremont told Viry that hitherto he had believed the peace as good as made, but that now

¹ Viry to Solar, July 6, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 10:236-240. The articles are in Shelburne MSS., 10:259-271. For Viry's letter of July 12, see *post*, 455. It is in Shelburne MSS., 10:302-320.

² The French explained this as an error of the draftsman and promised to have it corrected; of course the reason behind the omission is perfectly obvious. Solar to Viry, July 21, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 10:336 *et seq.*; see *post*, 483.

³ At least two of these have disappeared altogether. Viry was pledged to return them after reading them.

⁴ Viry to Solar, July 12, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 10:307.

he saw with regret that there was much to arrange. His mind turned at once to his own safety and to covering up his own tracks. He asked that the Comte de Choiseul take back and destroy a certain note, probably incriminating him on St. Lucia.

Viry in summary told the French from Bute that they must insist on St. Lucia and the Iberville boundary in terms which concealed the secret understandings and could therefore be shown to the council. So far as England and France were concerned, Viry's letter of July 12 (it reached Paris late July 14) constituted the meeting of minds.¹ True, there remained unsettled the temporary disposition of Rhenish Prussia, held by French armies, and governed in the name of the empress queen; but as Viry wrote on the twenty-eighth of June, the English would never explain themselves clearly on that head until preliminaries were signed.² The Choiseuls were suspicious; but Solar impressed it on them that all that was needed was a set of articles that could be shown to the English council. That he counted on having by July 18. But meanwhile Grimaldi received a courier authorizing him to draw the Spanish proposals for England; and a delay was provided till he could prepare his draft.³

But July 19, 20, 21 the Spaniolized Genoese babbler fought the Choiseuls tooth and nail. He demanded that the negotiation be turned over to Prince Sanseverino, the Neapolitan envoy at London; he protested vehemently against the proposal that ministers be nominated.⁴ His articles on Spanish affairs were from the English point of view impossible. They maintained the Spanish right to the fisheries and provided for an unconditional evacuation of Honduras.⁵ The duc sent his advice to the English

¹ Solar to Viry, July 21, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 10:330. The following January the Duc de Nivernois thought that Bute was afraid of Egremont's accusing him of improper conduct in the negotiation, and that Egremont had letters to prove it. Nivernois to Praslin. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 449:39. See *post*, 559. Was it coincidence only that Bute had to retire in March, resigning his power to the three other men who had acted as secretaries of state during the negotiation and that his political activity did not again begin till the death of Egremont in the succeeding August?

² Viry to Solar, June 28, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 10:176-179.

³ Solar to Viry, July 21, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 10:330-336.

⁴ Solar to Viry, July 20, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 10:326-330.

⁵ Shelburne MSS., 10:344-350.

ministers to sign them with a declaration.¹ Finally Grimaldi wore the patience of the Choiseuls so thin that Solar induced them to say that if ministers were named at once they would sign a peace without Spain, leaving England, relieved of the German war, to work her will on her. "In spite of the verbiages of M. the Ambassador of Spain which they had to bear for two days," the Choiseuls had taken this attitude on the twentieth; and flushed with his triumph, which he realized might be a passing one, Solar on that day departed to Paris.

On the third day Grimaldi's persistence won him a success on the Mississippi article. In an exchange of notes of July 20, 21, he announced that his master would never consent to a peace which gave England a foothold on the Gulf of Mexico; he pinned Choiseul to an interpretation of the boundary article which would bar the English from all communication with the gulf even by the rivers. Choiseul in reply interpreted the boundary as ending at the Iberville and the lakes, leaving these in the possession of the French, and the English by consequence, no outlet to the sea.² That Grimaldi no more than represented the wishes of his court was evidenced by a dispatch from Ossun of August 2, stating that the King of Spain as an interested party demanded to intervene in fixing the limits of the French cession lest the English be given a foothold on the gulf and increased facilities for contraband trade. The Spanish king proposed a line drawn from "the western end of Georgia" to the Mississippi with a neutral Indian buffer state south of it. On this basis he would condescend finally to recognize the position of English and French in Georgia and Louisiana.³

Under the circumstances, Choiseul, strong in the sense that after all the King of France could do as he liked with his own, such as Louisiana and Mobile, requested the English court to assist him once more in hoodwinking his Spanish ally. He so far gave way to Grimaldi as to include in his draft of preliminaries of July 21 a boundary article stating that the left bank of

¹ Duc de Choiseul to Solar, July 21, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 10:356-361.

² Grimaldi to Choiseul, July 20, 1762; Choiseul to Grimaldi, July 21, 1762; Choiseul to Ossun, n.d. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 536:521,522,497 *et seq.*

³ Ossun to Choiseul, August 2, 1762. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 537:4.

the Mississippi belonged to Great Britain up to the river Iberville and Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain. At the same time he sent the English court another version authenticated by the signature of the Comte de Choiseul, which prolonged the boundary to the sea: both versions referred to marked maps to be annexed to the preliminaries. The word of the King of France was pledged that the second version should be substituted for the first when the negotiation with plenipotentiaries took place.¹ The English were asked to connive at the deception by agreeing to the first version of the article without comment.

If the advice of Viry and Solar had been taken, England would have indicated the day she would name her plenipotentiary to France, thereby making it necessary for France to name hers. If she did so, Solar was honestly convinced that at the moment the Duc de Choiseul was prepared to give up the Spanish alliance for the sake of peace with England on the terms agreed.² Whether on this as in other things Solar saw to the depth of his great friend is questionable.³ In any case, however much Solar and Viry might overpersuade Bute, it revolted the solid sense of the English cabinet even to consider the idea.

With Spain there was still so much at issue that agreement seemed impossible. Not only were the two powers still poles apart on the demands that had originally brought them into hostility; not only did Spain interpose her veto on the cession to England of eastern Louisiana. Again and again the English ministers reverted to the fact that in case Havana were taken by

¹ Duc de Choiseul to Solar, July 21, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 10:361-365. "Arte 6. . . . Done at Versailles July 21, 1762"; "Observations," July 21, 1762. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 446:239, 221.

² Solar to Viry, July 20, 21 (two letters), 1762. Shelburne MSS., 10:326-330, 423-428, 428-433.

³ In apparent honesty he had in the preceding April especially warned the English through Viry to rush troops to Portugal, as they could rely on it that the French would not take the offensive in Hanover. This played straight into Choiseul's hands. Pitt's strategy had been to keep troops where they could be quickly shifted from Prince Ferdinand's line of communications by the Weser to England for defense, or for expeditionary threats against the French coast. Shipping troops to Portugal would carry them out of the way of the projected French invasion of England. Solar to Viry, April 16, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 9:144-145; Corbett, *England in the Seven Years' War*, 2:300-307.

the expedition dispatched against it, they could not and would not give it back without equivalent; again and again Spain persisted in envisaging her conquests in Portugal great or small as either to be retained or used as trading material for possible losses by France or by herself. English opinion refused to contemplate anything but an unconditional restoration.¹

On the English side, despite expectations of success against Spain at Havana or Manila, despite the fact that the Spaniards had been checked in Portugal, and that the fear of a French invasion had blown over, the situation was at the beginning of August more dubious. A French surprise attack had captured Newfoundland. The deposition of Czar Peter III had certainly carried Russia back from alliance with Prussia to neutrality and might carry her farther still. Worse than that unskilful diplomacy had fanned suspicion high between the English ministry and Frederick the Great. So far England had not specifically abandoned to France Prussia's interests in the Rhineland. She had taken the position that if France could not be disloyal to Austria, England must not be disloyal to Prussia. But Frederick, ill-informed, outraged by the informal designation as English plenipotentiary of the Duke of Bedford, notoriously against the German war, was egging on his envoys to fan the rising flames of popular indignation at the peace, and was penning crackling commentaries on the English ministers, which their agents duly intercepted and deciphered.

The choice of Bedford as English plenipotentiary had been made as early as June 4;² by the end of July it was common knowledge among the well informed. What his course would be no one could say. Wiser men than Bute were at a loss whether his natural pugnaciousness would in actual negotiation offset his

¹ Hardwicke with great shrewdness made an almost perfect guess at the situation in a letter to Newcastle of August 21. Add. MSS., 32,941:325. He based it on a critical analysis of information Newcastle had received from Walpole and from Viry. "*Most Secret Heads of what pass'd with C. V. &c.*," August 18, 1762. Add. MSS., 32,941:270. Newcastle to Hardwicke, August 11, 1762. Add. MSS., 32,941:203.

² Bedford had indicated his willingness for such a post the year before. Bute privately proposed it to him, at Viry's prompting at dinner June 4; Bedford eagerly accepted. Viry to Solar, June 27, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 10:61-92.

pacifism. Naturally sanguine, Bedford undertook the task and with the coöperation of Bute and Viry set about keeping Newcastle and Pitt at odds, and bringing the Old Whigs back to the support of the ministry; but Newcastle did not yield to the solicitations of Viry, or to the ardor of his fellow-duke.¹

Solar's *expédition* of July 21 arrived at London July 24 at 4 P. M. Egremont and Bute, professing themselves content with the French terms, were naturally dissatisfied with those of Spain. A council was held the twenty-seventh; but as Bute had not had time to buttonhole the chancellor and Bedford between the time of their arrival and the meeting of the council, Granville and George Grenville, carrying Egremont along with them, nearly stampeded the council to insist on New Orleans and St. Lucia. Bute saved the day only by adjourning the council and bringing his own and the king's influence to bear on the members in a series of private interviews.² Discipline was restored and Egremont sent off a dispatch, definitely yielding on New Orleans and St. Lucia with some vague generalizations on Rhenish Prussia. To the Spanish articles there was no specific answer, but round assertions that Portugal must be admitted without prejudice to a participation in the peace. The whole, dispatched August 1, reached Solar late on the night of the third.³

Choiseul, waiting with impatience had irritably characterized the English ministry as well intentioned, but feeble and unused to great affairs, predicting that their feebleness would not save their places. But on receiving Viry's packets Solar had frankly to tell him that his estimate of Bute was too low. The ministers could not be blamed for refusing to leave Spanish affairs unsettled while they concluded with France.⁴ Spain seemed the difficulty; and Choiseul resolved to dispatch his satellite Jacob O'Dun to Madrid

¹ "Mems C. V.," July 22, 1762; Newcastle to Hardwicke, July 27, 1762; "At Lord B's House Wednes.:" July 28, 1762 (in Hardwicke's hand); Hardwicke to Newcastle, July 28, 1762; Newcastle to Hardwicke, July 29, 1762. Add. MSS., 32,941:18, 70, 84, 82, 108.

² Viry to Solar, August 1, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 11:52-69.

³ Egremont to Comte de Choiseul, July 31, 1762; Egremont to Viry, July 31, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 11:8-16, 32-52.

⁴ Duc de Choiseul to Solar, August 1, 1762; Solar to Duc de Choiseul, August 4, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 11:85-87, 88-92.

to bear a letter from the Most Christian to the Most Catholic King to urge him to lend himself to the peace needed by France. It had formerly been designed to send him about July 21, but Grimaldi's objections had prevented. O'Dun left the seventh, a reply being calculated on for the twenty-second or twenty-third.¹ On the eighth there came a dispatch from Ossun, followed by one for Grimaldi indicating an increasing complacency on the part of Charles III. To its suggestions on the points between England and Spain the English could scarcely take exception.

The French professed that if the English dispatch of August 1 had announced the day the English court would name its plenipotentiary they would have been compelled to follow suit. Since however the English merely sent passports for the French minister they decided to wait for their Spanish ally's concurrence. They were afraid that Charles III or at any rate Grimaldi might be sensitive at the English failure to reply to their proposals; to manufacture some sort of an answer they turned Egremont's letter into a memoir, omitting what it was unfit Grimaldi should know, as about the Mississippi boundary, and communicated it as an English reply. Meanwhile they urged on the English court to make some satisfactory answer to Spain; for the Spanish news that arrived was so favorable that they would have gone ahead but for the fact that O'Dun had left to urge Charles's acquiescence.²

Not very deep below the surface, other negotiations were proceeding. Laborde, Choiseul's pet financier, had been buying English stocks heavily through his London agents, doubtless on information from above. Newcastle, who had ways of being well informed of what went on in financial circles, knew that by July his purchases amounted to £100,000. His letters carried assurances that France would grant all that England insisted on; but that Havana must if taken be returned without compensation.³

¹ Solar to Viry, August 12 (three letters), 1762. Shelburne MSS., 11:99-103, 114-133, 136-143.

² Solar to Viry, August 12, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 11:114-133.

³ Newcastle to Cumberland, July 11, 1762. Add. MSS., 32,940:326-327v. "Mems C. V.," July 22, 1762. Add. MSS., 32,941:18-27v. Newcastle was intimate with Sir Joshua Vaneck and especially with his partner, Thomas Walpole, who was his informant.

Laborde transmitted to Sir Joshua Vanneck the exact accounts of the arrival at Paris of Viry's dispatch of August 1, of the Choiseuls' reaction to it, and of O'Dun's departure; he thought the peace uncertain and directed that his agents should sell.¹ Solar regarded the traffic with disgust; August 22 he warned Viry that if O'Dun failed of results at Madrid he feared Choiseul would not hold to his promise to Bute to sign separately.²

The official dispatches arrived at London on August 16. Viry thought Egremont sorry he had not named plenipotentiaries on August 1;³ the difficulty of not having answered Spain Egremont neatly evaded by saying they would have had to traverse Grimaldi's proposals so completely that hard feeling would have resulted, and that those proposals, made on his own responsibility, had been regarded only as the praiseworthy effort of a minister perhaps not fully empowered by his court, and scarcely a fitting reply to proposals, made like Egremont's in the name of the king. With such an answer Spanish punctilio was silenced.⁴ Egremont's answer reached Paris on August 26 at half past two in the morning; as O'Dun had sent favorable advices some days before the whole was pronounced *en règle*; and the weary courier was sent back the same night with news that the French court would on September 1 name the Duc de Nivernois⁵ as its representative to London. The news arrived at London on the twenty-ninth; and on September 1 also the Duke of Bedford was named the English plenipotentiary. The two emissaries were to cross each other at Calais on September 6.⁶

A grand nephew of Mazarin, the Duc de Nivernois by birth, title, and wealth was one of the greatest men in France. Membership in the Academy recognized his standing as a *littérateur*. He had fulfilled important diplomatic missions such as that to Frederick in 1756, with acclaim if not with success. Yet withal

¹ Solar to Viry, August 12, 22; Viry to Solar, August 13, 23, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 11:93-94, 171-173, 164-166, 237-238.

² Solar to Viry, August 22, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 11: 173-177.

³ Viry to Solar, August 23, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 11:210-214.

⁴ Egremont to Comte de Choiseul, August 21, 1762; Egremont to Viry, August 21, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 11:183-188, 202-209.

⁵ Louis-Jules-Barbon-Mancini-Mazarini, Duc de Nivernois, 1716-1798.

⁶ Solar to Viry, August 26, 1762 (two letters); Viry to Solar, September 1, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 11:254-255, 258-265, 309-310.

one suspects in him certain feminine qualities of charm that in one of their own sex are irritating to masculine men. The dilettante in him would win Frederick; but he manifestly irritated the Duc de Choiseul.¹ There is a suggestion of irony in Choiseul's remarks on the time required for him to prepare for his mission to London at a moment when Viry and Solar reiterated that hours were precious. The anxieties about a proper house in London properly to set him off contrast with Bedford's strong impatience to set about his task at Paris.² Appropriately enough *le petit d'Eon* just at the beginning of his notorious career was one of Nivernois' secretaries.

Nivernois' first impression on English opinion was however favorable. On his first landing in England the landlord of his inn vented his anti-Gallican spirit by presenting a ridiculously high bill; Nivernois paid it with the gesture of a grand seignior and won at least the respect of the English gentry.³

Nivernois' instructions, dated September 2,⁴ probably offer the key to the opportunist policy that Choiseul had been following on the Mississippi article of the treaty. He was to endeavor to secure a neutral Indian buffer state in the region between the Great Lakes and the Mississippi; he was, while admitting the English right to a navigation by the Iberville and Maurepas and Pontchartrain, or even by another outlet if that one were impossible, to emphasize that this was merely a navigation downward. Since Spain claimed the gulf as her own the English could have no right to approach the Mississippi or Mobile from that direction! Such a quibble was manifestly pitched to the level of Bute's intelligence and Bute's anxiety. The gist of the matter follows: "but it is to be hoped that the event at Havana, whatever it may be may furnish a solution to that article. The court of Madrid should become much more pliable if it has the misfortune to lose

¹ Solar to Viry, September 12, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 11:361-366.

² Duc de Choiseul to Solar, August 12, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 11:103-113. The anxious search for a proper house runs through Viry's August correspondence.

³ Copies of the bill were printed in the newspapers; and Nivernois' intercession was necessary to save the landlord from a boycott of the neighboring gentlemen.

⁴ A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 447:13.

so important a colony and the English should be less masterful if they fail in the enterprize." If Choiseul's later professions can be believed, he calculated on Spanish assurances that Havana was safe and played the opening moves of the game accordingly.¹

Bedford's instructions as drawn by Egremont under date of September 4,² took as the basis of the negotiation Choiseul's draft of July 21, with alterations. The Mississippi boundary line must unmistakably divide Mississippi, Iberville and the lakes, and reach the sea; navigation by the main channel must be secured in the event of navigation by the other being difficult or impracticable. Egremont followed these up with a letter of September 7,³ which reached Bedford at Paris about the twelfth. It was manifestly intended to take precautions against Bedford's desire for peace running away with him. Under color of interpreting his instructions, it directed him to insist on signing with France and Spain at the same time; if a separate peace was made with France he was to insist on a binding clause of neutrality. The king's subjects were to decide the point as to the navigability of the Iberville, and it was not to be left to commissaries. Finally he was to send over the preliminary articles for inspection before the final signature.

The blood of the Russells boiled in the duke's veins. With heavy sarcasm he thanked Egremont for explaining his instructions to him: he would insist, though he feared without effect on the question of the navigation being "left to the sole Decision of our own Traders and Sailors."⁴ What especially hurt Bedford was having to admit to the French ministers the diminution of his powers to conclude, especially as Egremont had already communicated the change to Nivernois.⁵ The French ministers and

¹ Ossun to Choiseul, September 13, 1762; Choiseul to Ossun, September 14, 1762, October 9, 1762. *A E Corr. Pol. Esp.*, 537:145, 148, 223. This last dispatch indicates that on this point Choiseul had encountered opposition in the council. Solar's letters give the impression that throughout the negotiation all decisions were made by the Choiseuls with references to Pompadour and to the king.

² *S P France*, 253.

³ *S P France*, 253.

⁴ Bedford to Egremont, September 12, 1762. *S P France*, 253.

⁵ Rigby to Bedford, September 29, 1762. *Bedford Correspondence*, 3:125.

the Sardinian envoy, expressing their sympathy with the flouted duke, were soon able to make some impression on him.¹ Since Spain was still confident on the point of Havana, the Solar-Viry combination had been once more used to feel out Bute as to a relaxation on Mobile, only to draw a protest of impossibility.² Choiseul on September 14 had instructed Nivernois not to treat on that subject. He hoped to get Bedford to accept some variation on it.³

With trepidation the French ministers approached the moment when the haughty Bedford and the acrid Grimaldi should meet in negotiation face to face. They admitted Grimaldi's ignorance of all their concessions to England on the gulf: they asked that England, so far as was consistent with her interests should coöperate with them to keep Grimaldi from breaking off the negotiation. There was need to hasten; for Bedford indicated that if the news of the fall of Havana reached London before the signed preliminaries, compensations must be exacted: and the latest news was disquieting. But on both sides of the channel the French were still playing their cards on the supposition that England, not Spain, was the power to make concessions on the boundary. Discussion of the article at Paris, in view of the offense Grimaldi had previously taken at it, was postponed till the Duc de Choiseul could be present.⁴ At London Nivernois' suggestion that Spain would object to English possession of Mobile had alarmed Egremont, especially in view of France's repeated professions to the contrary.⁵ Bute, facile as he was, gave Nivernois to understand that the boundary article, the only one that had not been popularly attacked, was his buckler against the opposition; he added the warning that if peace were not made fifteen days before the opening of Parliament, the negotiation must be considered at an end; he wished to conclude while the

¹ Viry had sent over an elaborate character sketch of Bedford indicating the points at which he and his duchess were vulnerable. Viry to Solar, September 4, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 11:349-358.

² Viry to Solar, September 20, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 11:372-377.

³ Minister to Nivernois, September 14, 1762. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 447:73.

⁴ Bedford to Egremont, September 15, 1762. S P France, 253.

⁵ Egremont to Bedford, September 16, 1762. S P France, 253.

event at Havana was still uncertain.¹ Nivernois could only hope that Bedford at Paris would take something on himself.

At Paris the crucial conferences began September 16. The quibble of the Duc de Choiseul on one-way navigation of the Mississippi was earnestly pressed on Bedford, who finally actually yielded so far as to propose that the limitation be common to the French and English; but the French ministers protested that this would exclude them from any access to Louisiana. Finally the Choiseuls "courageously"—their own word—discussed the matter in Grimaldi's presence, who at once declared his hands were tied by instructions, and he could not consent. He rejected a proposed compromise on that point, on Portugal, and on the renewal of commercial treaties desired by England. He declared that if England proposed to have an equivalent for the potential conquest of Havana, Spain would have one for her Portuguese conquests. Bedford's natural haughtiness quite got the better of his pacific tendencies; he told Grimaldi that unless Spain cared to play for very deep stakes, Grimaldi had better sign with him at once. The Genoese, who did not even trouble to conceal his hostility to England, remained defiant.²

The Choiseuls, The Lady, and Solar now all exerted their blandishments on Bedford to accept a meaningless article on the renewal of England's commercial treaties with Spain. They represented that Spain had given Louis XV authority to order Grimaldi to sign on all articles that related jointly to the two crowns, and they promised that Louis would exert it. On the Spanish articles, they could do nothing, and Bedford must make concessions. Bedford remained obstinate; he would do no more than refer the treaty article to his court.

They turned next to the Mississippi boundary article. They could not yet break to Grimaldi the news of the secret version authenticated by the Comte de Choiseul's signature; and they suggested that England be content with the ostensible article, and another secret note of explanation while Spain was brought round.

¹ Nivernois to the minister, September 16, 18, 1762. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 447:83, 79.

² Minister to Nivernois, September 19, 20, 1762. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 447:92, 100. Bedford to Egremont, September 19, 1762. S P France, 253.

If this would not answer they proposed a third version which might satisfy both England and Spain: "France agrees to extend the limits of Canada to the Mississippi which shall serve as a barrier, and be common to the two crowns; but it is stipulated that the possession of New Orleans remain to France"¹ with provision ensuing for a map. On such a situation Bedford once again pleaded to be allowed to sign preliminaries on his own responsibility!

The Duc de Choiseul meanwhile turned to Madrid and at last indulged in some plain speaking. He sent Ossun a draft of preliminaries to which the assent of the King of Spain must be secured, as neither Bedford nor Grimaldi would give way. He complained that the latter's instructions were quite different from what they had been led to expect; finally, he averred, the decision of peace or war rested with Spain. On the boundary article he clung to the subterfuge that it did not allow incoming English navigation of the gulf. He did not know if Bedford would accept the compromise version: but Louis was not going to miss his peace for want of power to do what he would with his own, especially when it was a province that yearly cost the king 800,000 *francs*, without a port that would admit a ship of twelve guns. He would cede the colony or evacuate it as he saw fit.²

The draft of preliminaries Choiseul had sent to Spain was reported to his court by Bedford, September 21.³ Sanguine by nature as he was, and witness to the incredible sloppiness of the Duc de Choiseul's diplomatic methods, he could not bring himself to believe it accident and not design that so many concessions wrung from the French in the last few days' negotiation were omitted. He set himself for a renewed struggle and by the twenty-fourth thought he had brought back the preliminaries nearly to their former status. He admitted the new version of the Mississippi article, adding a phrase in favor of navigation of the river in all its extent, while the Comte de Choiseul inserted a specific reservation of the island of New Orleans; all of which

¹ A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 447:112v.

² Choiseul to Ossun, September 20, 1762 (two letters). A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 537:160, 184.

³ Bedford to Egremont, September 21, 22, 1762. S P France, 253.

the comte thought should satisfy England as well as the secret note. The version of the articles specifically provided for the return of Havana without compensation in case it were taken, and left on a very uncertain basis the renewal of the prized commercial treaties with Spain.¹ Bedford transmitted the articles on the twenty-fifth, solemnly declaring that he felt sure they were France's last word, and adding the cheering suggestion that it would doubtless alienate France from Spain if London agreed to sign and Madrid did not! His dispatches of the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth reached London Tuesday the twenty-eighth of September.²

There Bute's power tottered on the edge of a fall. Egremont's negotiations with Nivernois had been irritating. Nivernois on the twenty-fourth had offered a draft of article 6 inserting the provision of 1761³ for the neutrality of the Indian tribes between the lakes and the Mississippi. It made an ill impression on the ministers who suspected him of finesse, and on September 27 he withdrew it. Receiving in course the Duc de Choiseul's revised preliminaries, he labored vainly with Egremont on them as might have been expected.⁴ Even the concessions announced in Bedford's dispatch of the nineteenth had led Egremont to term him a "headstrong silly wretch";⁵ and on the twenty-sixth and the twenty-seventh he had obstinately fought both Bute and the king on giving way, or allowing Bedford to sign without referring back the preliminaries. On the receipt of Bedford's revised preliminaries, Bute wished to summon a council to return to Bedford his full powers. But George Grenville, who had consistently opposed so easy a peace with France, was alarming Egremont as to the consequences to himself of making a peace like Harley's;

¹ Egremont to Grenville, October, 1762. *Grenville Papers*, 1:476. This is misdated. The contents automatically date it September 25.

² Bedford to Egremont, September 24, 25, 1762; Egremont to Bedford, September 30, 1762. S P France, 253.

³ A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 447:137. Viry to Solar, September 27, 28, 1762. Shelburne MSS., 11:394-404, 405-409. Viry was manifestly irritated at Nivernois' neglect of him; but after making allowances for that, it is apparent that even Bute had come to distrust the French envoy.

⁴ Nivernois to the minister, September 28, 1762. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 447:178.

⁵ Egremont to Grenville, September 26, 1762. *Grenville Papers*, 1:475.

and the two secretaries were again in open rebellion.¹ Mansfield was quietly opposed to the peace.² Devonshire refused to attend council. Repeated approaches to Newcastle and Hardwicke, and abject professions of Bute's penitence for having driven them out, met with no response.³ No terms could be suggested on which they would accept Bute's leadership.

Against Bute and the treaty the anger of the crowd, artfully aroused, rose to a roar. Though first lord of the treasury, Bute had so little knowledge of finance and so little of the City's confidence that it seemed impossible for him to raise the funds needed for a prolongation of the war. He talked of resigning;⁴ but the king sat in mute despair for hours, his head on his arm at the thought of parting from his friend. To gratify the boyish whims of a repressed youth in his early twenties who so little understood what was going on that he confused the Mississippi with the Ganges,⁵ a far-reaching decision as to the future of the British empire was to be forced into the hands of well-nigh the most incompetent man in public life to make it, and one committed to a decision reprobated by the vast majority of the kingdom.

THE NEWS OF HAVANA AND ITS RESULTS

On the twenty-ninth of September the politics of England and western Europe seemed on dead center. Then came the external impetus. On that day the English ministers and the French envoy were at dinner at Bute's when Captain Hervey arrived with the news of the fall of Havana.⁶

Lord Anson had planned the expedition with all the ripe cunning of his old age. He had staked success on sending it

¹ Rigby to Bedford, September 29, 30, 1762. *Bedford Correspondence*, 3:125, 131. "Most Secret Substance of a very Material Conversation," October 3, 1762. Add. MSS., 32,943:28.

² Newcastle to Rockingham, September 20, 1762. Add. MSS., 32,942:307.

³ Notes of Interview with Lyttelton, August 24, 1762. Add. MSS., 32,941:370.

⁴ Mr. Grenville's narrative. *Grenville Papers*, 1:482-485.

⁵ He had done this in an interview with Newcastle. "Most Secret," September 4, 1762. Add. MSS., 32,942:145.

⁶ Nivernois to the minister, September 29, 1762. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 447:182.

along the northern coast of Cuba through the Old Bahama Channel long believed by Spanish pilots to be impossible for a fleet. Thus it had evaded Spanish and French fleets operating to intercept it, and had effected a landing. The military commander imposed on the expedition by Cumberland's insistence, the Earl of Albemarle, was unenterprising. But Pocock, the naval commander, was an able officer, and there were military and naval subordinates on edge to emulate the perfect coöperation of army and fleet that had achieved victory at Quebec. The Morro fell on July 30, and August 14, Havana was surrendered.¹

It was not merely the loss of the key of Spain's position in the Antilles. A fifth of the Spanish navy was lost when three sail of the line were sunk and eleven captured. The booty in silver bullion was so huge as to be an appreciable per cent of the English war budget; and though it was to be divided as prize money, its very presence in England would of course facilitate the loans needed for next year's service. Such booty beckoned to further lucrative conquests on the supine empire of Spain in the West Indies and Mexico at the moment when the destruction of her naval power left her helpless to resist. The renewed project of Choiseul for a Franco-Spanish descent on England had come to nothing. Frederick with Russia neutral was holding on in Germany. Ferdinand was driving the French out of Hesse. Everything pointed to an easy and complete triumph over the Bourbon monarchies in the next campaign. The popular cry was for a continuation of the war; the most conservative were in favor of the exaction of strict terms at least from Spain. Bute even on the morrow of the news of Havana would have let it go back without compensation; but finding himself absolutely alone in that opinion, he forebore to press it.²

If the king were to retain Bute as his chief minister, peace was essential. The popular demand for Pitt could not be resisted once Parliament should meet without preliminaries being signed.

¹ Corbett, *England in the Seven Years' War*, 2:254-284.

² Nivernois to the minister, October 9, 1762. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 447:257. Bute to Bedford, October 14, 1762. *Bedford Correspondence*, 3:135.

Yet Bute's ministry was far from pacific. Grenville openly advocated referring the preliminaries to Parliament before signature,¹ which would overwhelm them and Bute in a general onslaught of the followers of Pitt and Newcastle alike. Bute was fairly cornered, and he struck out. He authorized Halifax to make advances once more to Newcastle and Hardwicke.² Then he transferred George Grenville from secretary of state for the northern department to head of the admiralty board, and took from him the leadership of the Commons.³ He gave the northern department to Halifax, at that moment his most submissive follower, thereby substituting a pacific influence over Egremont for Grenville's. He gave the leadership of the House of Commons and a cabinet place without portfolio to Henry Fox.

The apt comparison to Henry Fox is Aaron Burr; if the comparison does an injustice to Fox's personal morals, it does an equal injustice to Burr's political morals. Fox merited the condemnation of men who made no pretense of being purists; the strait-laced young king naïvely justified him to Grenville by saying it was necessary to use bad men to govern bad men.⁴ But Fox's political skill and astuteness were as well known as his unscrupulousness and his unpopularity. It was taken for granted that by the threat of removals from office and by bribery, he would force through the House of Commons an approbation of a peace that was not too bad. Removals began with that of the Duke of Devonshire, one of the most highly regarded men in the kingdom, the king being induced to perform it in the most insulting manner possible.

There remained the question as to what the peace was to be. There could be no doubt that all chicanery and double dealing on the Mississippi article must end; that Spain must expressly renounce the demands on which she had entered the war, and give

¹ Bute to Bedford, October 14, 1762. *Bedford Correspondence*, 3:135. Bute frankly assigned this opinion of Grenville's as the reason for his changes. *Grenville Papers*, 1:482.

² H. V. Jones to Newcastle, October 16, 1762. Add. MSS., 32,943:234.

³ *Grenville Papers*, 1:450-452.

⁴ *Ibid.*

an equivalent for the return of Havana—Porto Rico, Florida, or possibly Yucatan. Bute would have to decide, and to trust to the king's cajolery or to fears for their places to induce the cabinet to acquiesce. Meanwhile the fall of Havana found Choiseul with a set of French preliminaries far better at every point than the current situation warranted. To preserve France's advantage he prepared to bring all possible pressure on Spain to submit to the English demands. He exhorted Nivernois to urge Bute to be moderate, but at all events to get him to say as promptly as possible what he would demand of Spain.¹ October 11, Viry the irrepressible secretly showed Nivernois a statement in Bute's handwriting of the terms on which he would insist, allowed the French envoy to copy them, and dictated certain minor modifications which he thought Bute might admit. The crucial point was the demand of Porto Rico or Florida as an equivalent for Havana. The whole was promptly dispatched to Paris and thence to Madrid.²

It is now necessary to follow the story on the side of France and Spain. On September 29,³ Ossun reported the results of his action under the Duc de Choiseul's instructions of September 20. He had begun by tactfully persuading Arriaga of the impossibility of continuing the military and naval struggle in America; and had discreetly hinted that in the past the venality of Spanish officials had given far better facilities to English contraband trade than an official license to navigate the gulf could do. He had labored with Squillaci on the renewal of the English commercial treaties; and finally had tried Wall on the whole and found him noncommittal. On the twenty-seventh he had made his suit to Charles III, telling him that he knew too well France's situation and her need of peace, and had too tender an affection for his royal cousin to require a word more from Ossun.

Charles reserved his answer till he had examined all the

¹ Minister to Nivernois, October 3, 1762. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 447: 221.

² Nivernois to minister, October 11, 1762. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 447: 278.

³ Ossun to Choiseul, September 29, 1762. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 537: 201.

papers. On the twenty-eighth he told Ossun that for his personal interests he would not let the peace fail: he put himself absolutely in Louis' hands: and while he trusted Louis would do all in his power to secure Spain's demands, he left him master of ending for Spain as well as himself. Ossun well knew that his principal object in entering the war had been to relieve and oblige the king his cousin; he would learn the rest from Wall.

How well Ossun knew the motive stated to be the real one for Spain's entrance in the war may be doubtful; but diplomatic etiquette directed that he be moved to tears by Charles's magnanimity. Wall was more practical and specific. Spain wished the one-way navigation of the Mississippi distinctly stated in the treaty; she wished it expressly to preclude the English from establishing any new ports on the gulf; she wished a neutral Indian zone in the gulf region; she had various ideas on Portugal and the treaties of commerce. But while it was expected that France would struggle for these things up to the point of a rupture, rather than see her miss the peace Charles would be content with less, and would give his brother monarch full powers to conclude even on the English terms. The Spanish court assumed the attitude of patronage to its ally, secure in its own unshaken might, not yet rudely disturbed by the news of Havana.

As that news first reached Paris from London on October 3, so from Paris it reached Madrid October 9. As sometimes happened the Duc de Choiseul had to blame himself for letting his temper get the best of him in the dispatch which announced the news to Ossun: and very characteristically he blamed Ossun for communicating it so fully as he did to Wall. The consequences Choiseul traced in the first reaction of the Spanish court to the news. For Choiseul had not only blamed Spain's false security which had imposed on him and led him to think the news from Havana would be such that England, not Spain would be the one to recede; he had also, while emphasizing the need of sending Grimaldi powers to conclude at any price, ended by saying that if Spain did not want peace, France would do her utmost to continue the war. Choiseul believed that the Spanish court had taken the last phrase as a summons from a fellow knight-

errant and had assumed the vein of the Ingenious Gentleman of La Mancha.¹

Ossun first saw Wall on the tenth.² Wall said he had told the king the Indies were not safe, but the king had been determined to enter the war to extricate France. The result had been the loss of Havana, but the king was not moved. He had considerable means to continue the war, and he was resolved if necessary to lose all his possessions in America. Ossun vainly endeavored to persuade Wall of the certain ruin this course entailed. Wall merely replied, the king was resolved to continue the war if the English would not abide by Bedford's last proposals; he had no new instructions to give Grimaldi. Wall would not have been human if he had not taken a sardonic pleasure in hearing his past warnings at length reëchoed in the mouth of the ambassador of the power that had reversed his policy.

The report of Wall was confirmed to Ossun out of the king's own mouth. "You know the news," said Charles, "the courier announced it yesterday morning; and I do not know why the last details I received gave me hope. I have made my decision without difficulty. When one makes war, good and ill success must be expected. My troops fought well; that consoles me. And I never slept more tranquilly than last night." To Ossun's report of Choiseul's letter he only replied, "If the English act in good faith, they will hold to the preliminaries they have offered me, in which the restitution of conquests made in America is specified; if they have acted in bad faith, I have great means to use against them; and when one has resources and courage, one does not yield or bend easily. I am, thank God, in this case, and far from ever thinking of making a separate peace from France,"³ I charge you, Monsieur the Ambassador, to assure the King my cousin,

¹ Choiseul to Ossun, October 3, 20, 1762; Ossun to Choiseul, October 29, 1762. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 537:208, 256, 279.

² Ossun to Choiseul, October 10, 1762. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 537:227.

³ Nivernois reported from London that on the arrival of the news from Havana, the minister of Naples, Prince Sanseverino, began to insinuate that England, by giving back Havana without compensation, could easily induce Spain to abandon France. In former days Sanseverino had been Charles's spokesman at London. Was Wall or Tanucci responsible for such overtures? Soulange-Bodin, *La Diplomatie de Louis XV et le Pacte de Famille*, 206-207. Nivernois to Choiseul, October 29, 1762.

that I may lose all, even my Indies, but I will never abandon him. Thank him, however, from me for the generous and obliging offers he has made me."

Charles had no further instructions for Grimaldi. Ossun in vain expatiated on the terrible consequences that might follow. Charles was unmoved. Finally Ossun advanced instructions from Choiseul detailing the great military and naval requirements if fresh exertions were to be made. The king merely said he had given orders the day before; what, he did not say. Ossun, knowing his character from long experience, despairingly thought nothing would now change his determination. On the fourteenth¹ he had once more to report that the king was tranquil and unmoved; but the ministers were trying to hide their utter consternation. Nothing could have been more maddening to a cynical realist like Choiseul, brave as he was, than thus to run in the face of certain ruin. He blamed Ossun; he blamed the king; and he reiterated the need of impossible military and naval preparations on Spain's part if the war was to go on.

Already he and his master had devised an approach to Charles that promised better success. October 9² Louis had written a personal letter to his brother monarch. In it he expressed his gratitude for the full powers Charles had at last sent him. He spoke his grief at learning of the fall of Havana, and hoped from his heart that Spain should not suffer from a war she had generously undertaken because of Charles's personal tenderness for him. If New Orleans and Louisiana could serve to buy back Havana for Spain, Louis would be happy to give them as a token of his gratitude and his desire for the union of the two crowns whether in the war if that should be inevitable, or in peace in joint military and naval preparations to insure their future position.

Choiseul wrote covering letters in quite characteristic vein.³ Just nineteen days before he had declared that the King of France would abandon Louisiana if he wished, like the careless trifle it

¹ A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 537:246.

² A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 537:221.

³ Choiseul to Ossun, October 9, 1762. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 537:215, 223, 225.

was; now he expatiated on the rich and prized jewel which Louis' affection transferred, without any compensation, to his cousin's crown. He expressly bade Ossun not to press the court for either peace or war, but merely to urge a prompt decision. Privately he indicated to Ossun that he regarded an immediate peace as essential; but only as a stepping stone to a fuller revenge five years thence when Spain and France had reconstituted their forces. The motive he most feared might induce Spain to defiance was her mistaken belief that England cared in the faintest degree what happened to Portugal. October 15 Choiseul received Nivernois' secret information of the terms England would exact of Spain and hastened to forward them, indicating that his own opinion would be for the cession of Florida in view of Spain's acquisition of Louisiana. This reached Madrid October 21, five days later than the proffer of Louisiana.

Ossun had hastened to present Louis' letter to Charles when he returned from hunting on the sixteenth.¹ Next day Charles expressed himself as penetrated by his cousin's goodness; he would not accept the sacrifice and trusted things would arrange themselves. His attitude on peace would depend on whether England's terms were reasonable. On the twenty-second Ossun gave Wall Nivernois' information as to the English demands. Charles said new instructions would be sent Grimaldi; and he hoped peace could be made. Ossun tactfully told him the King of France looked to him for the decision: if he wished peace Louisiana might serve him to buy back Havana. Charles protested once more he would not take it. France had already lost enough. Later Wall assured Ossun that Grimaldi's new instructions would leave Louis the arbiter as to the terms to be arranged with England.

The final arrangement of the situation had been an adroit one, in which the hapless French of Louisiana had been sacrificed to save Spain's face. The sober thought of the morning after the news of Havana had convinced the Spanish ministry, and possibly the Spanish king that Spain needed peace worse than France.² But Spain could be most swiftly brought to the necessary action

¹ Ossun to Choiseul, October 22, 1762. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 537:266.

² Ossun to Choiseul, October 22, 1762. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 537: 266.

by a representation that peace was a favor to France; and that Spain had accomplished her double mission of extricating France and securing her own colonies from encroachment. The proffer of Louisiana as a proof of French disinterestedness had silenced the critics of France in the court and the nation.¹ It could be represented as a possession exchanged for Florida in the give and take of negotiation, as a first fruit of the Family Compact, putting an end to an old aggression of which Spain had always complained. True, Wall had hinted at an equivalent; but Ossun sensed the situation too well to take him up, and Choiseul cordially approved.² Between November 3 and 23³ the cession was completed, Louis in consequence of Charles's *carte blanche* to him, having ordered Grimaldi to sign his master's acceptance.⁴ To such an act of high courtesy, the Spanish court bowed in acquiescence.

That Choiseul's dispatch of September 20 set his real valuation on Louisiana no doubt exists. Useless to France with Canada gone, he had in 1760 regarded it as only a latent threat to Spain, so long as there was any danger of its falling into English hands, which might determine her to take part in the war. He had in 1761 freely proffered it to her in return for immediate assistance in money or armed force. In May of 1762, he had tossed away the eastern half of it to ransom St. Lucia and France's Caribbean situation; he freely gave the remainder to assure the permanence of the Family Compact, and to unite France and Spain in pursuit of their future revenge.

The last moves of the game of peace had now to be played out between Choiseul and an unstable English ministry. The English decision was delayed through the greater part of October. September 30 and October 4, Egremont announced to Bedford the postponement of England's last word to a final

¹ Ossun to Choiseul, October 22, November 15, 1762. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 537:266, 326.

² Ossun to Choiseul, November 12, 1762; Choiseul to Ossun, November 28, 1762. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 537:315, 355.

³ The final act is in A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 537:351.

⁴ Louis XV to Charles III, November 3, 1762. A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 537:292. Wall had on October 23 authorized Grimaldi to accept. In spite of this he signed *sub sperati*.

cabinet meeting.¹ October 10, he wrote that the duke might expect entirely new instructions which would enforce France's final decision.² Meanwhile he grew more gracious to Nivernois: October 12, he engaged in a long fencing match with him on the compensation for Havana, all the more futile from his ignorance of Bute's secret communication of the day before.³ The strategy of Fox and Bute undoubtedly was to postpone a cabinet meeting until the first popular enthusiasm subsided, and until the doubtful ministers and politicians could be convinced that they were trifling with their places in opposing the king's will. But the French ministers, unable to understand the delay in view of the avowed need for a decision two weeks before Parliament met, grew impatient. They got Bedford's opinion of the constitutionality of a prorogation and pressed it on Nivernois.⁴ As late as the twenty-fourth, Fox thought it could not be done. Finally, about October 29, the decision to prorogue from November 9 to November 25 was announced.⁵

The cabinet met at last October 22.⁶ Mansfield strenuously opposed, but to no purpose. A second cabinet was held on the twenty-fifth to approve the articles as finally drawn. Through the inevitable Viry Bute at once communicated them to Nivernois. Through Bute the king personally expressed his regret at the harshness of the terms he had been forced to adopt and gave private assurance he would not put some of them into execution.⁷ However he wrote Bedford that they were his last word and that

¹ S P France, 253.

² S P France, 253.

³ Nivernois to the minister, October 12, 1762. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 447:288. Egremont to Bedford, October 14, 1762. S P France, 253. Nivernois' account of the interview which was a comical one finds indirect confirmation and a heightening of the humor in Egremont's dispatch.

⁴ Minister to Nivernois, October 16, 1762. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 447:308.

⁵ Nivernois to the minister, October 24, 29, 1762. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 447:361, 377.

⁶ Minutes of the councils of October 22, 25, 1762, were sent to Bedford and are in S P France, 253.

⁷ Nivernois to minister, October 24 (two letters), 29, 1762. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 447:351, 355, 361, 377. Bute to Bedford, October 24, 1762; Fox to Bedford, October 26, 1762. *Bedford Correspondence*, 3:137, 140.

without them he would continue the war.¹ With Egremont's formal dispatch of his instructions it was dated October 26.² Bedford received it October 31.

Already the Choiseuls had all the cards on the table before them. Louis XV had been successively authorized by Charles III to order Grimaldi to sign all articles that concerned the crowns jointly, to approve the English demand as to the Mississippi boundary if necessary, and to accept the terms of Bute's secret communication of the Spanish articles. Viry's secret communication to Nivernois gave the duc and comte not only advance notice of the English ultimatum but also the guesses of Bute's confidant as to the points where it might possibly be relaxed. Bedford's instructions actually left him little power of variation from a set of elaborately drawn preliminary articles.³

On the Mississippi article the Comte de Choiseul expressly complained of the additional rights of navigation to which England had helped herself. The boundary was stated as a line drawn through the middle of the Mississippi from its source to the Iberville, thence through the middle of that river and Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain to the sea. To that end the King of France ceded all that he possessed, or should of right possess on the left side of the Mississippi River except "the city of New Orleans and the Island on which it is situated." The navigation of the Mississippi River was to be equally free to both powers in its full extent from the source to the sea and especially between the Island of New Orleans and the right bank, both coming and going. Ships were to be subject to no dues whatever.⁴

Through the whole day of November 2 the negotiation went

¹ George III to Bedford, October 26, 1762. *Bedford Correspondence*, 3:139.

² Egremont to Bedford, October 26, 1762. S P France, 253. Grenville retained his regrets on St. Lucia and Guadeloupe to the last; but as Egremont said, the king had long before abandoned those points. Grenville to Egremont, October 24, 1762; Egremont to Grenville, October 25, 1762. *Grenville Papers*, 1:492, 493.

³ Nivernois to minister, October 24, 25, 1762; minister to Nivernois, October 31, 1762. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 447:351, 365, 391.

⁴ S P France, 253.

on. Bedford on one or two points exceeded his instructions, as accepting the royal word of the King of France not to fortify St. Pierre rather than the right of an English commissary to inspect. As Bute had previously insinuated to Nivernois that such inspection would not take place during George's reign, Bedford doubtless carried out the king's wishes. Finally Louis expressly ordered Grimaldi to sign, and early on the morning of November 3, the articles were approved.¹ The signed preliminaries were received in London November 8, and approved by the council November 10.

Parliamentary endorsement of the treaty had yet to be obtained, but success could now reasonably be counted on. The thing after all was done and could not be undone without sullyng the young king's honor at the beginning of his reign. Newcastle's and Pitt's followers could not come to an agreement on grounds of criticism; Newcastle in April and May had agreed to terms, except for St. Lucia, not very different; to allege that the situation had changed since then for the better, while true, was a difficult argument to follow. Pitt could scarcely criticize the peace without criticizing Newcastle: aspiring as he did to future public service under the young king, he had no reason to antagonize him needlessly. Newcastle vacillated; and Fox stood ready to strike at the patronage of those who defied the court. There was a minority of martyrs, but in numbers an insignificant one.

It remained to put the preliminary articles in the form of a final treaty. Late in November Bedford received a French draft; in it he made in the Mississippi article only slight verbal changes of little moment.² On his side Egremont produced a draft dated December 6, but which, if Nivernois was right, he sent off to Bedford only on the eleventh.³ It contained a startling change in the Mississippi article, omitting the words which carried the line through the Iberville and the lakes. The pretext was that "the

¹ S P France, 254.

² A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 448:124, 181.

³ Egremont to Bedford, December 6, 1762. S P France, 255. Nivernois to the minister, December 12, 1762. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 448:303.

island on which New Orleans was situated" did not extend down the left bank as far as the sea, and that the territory on the left bank at the main outlet should therefore belong to England. Egremont commented that France could have no use for the left bank at the outlet unless she wished to hamper English commerce: the navigation by Iberville and lakes was doubtless worth little, but he was willing to insert a phrase securing a share in it to French subjects.

Bedford began negotiation on the basis of these articles December 21: he found the French very obstinate on the Mississippi boundary: that Grimaldi seemed keenly interested added to his suspicions of the French cession of Louisiana to Spain. December 26 the Comte de Choiseul wrote to Nivernois, solemnly protesting and appealing to Bute's secret note of May 4, and to the map annexed to the secret article. No one, he wrote, could pretend that the island on which New Orleans was situated was anything else than the land between the Iberville, the lakes, and the sea. He demanded also provisions respecting the right to remove artillery such as had been accorded Spain for Florida.¹

Nivernois replying on the thirtieth said the ministers would not leave their estates were the safety of England at stake. No council could be held till the twentieth of January, and nothing would be done till then. A week later he could report conferences with Egremont and Bute that had cleared the situation a little. The point involved was really the fear lest the French might use their hold on both banks to hinder English navigation; if the French agreed not to fortify the outlet the territorial point would not be pressed. His explanation of the incident was that Egremont had damaging letters which demonstrated that Bute had usurped the secretary's office, and that with Parliament in session Bute dared not cross Egremont, even when he as at present, persisted in taking his own course.² The compromise suggested

¹ Bedford to Egremont, December 24, 1762. S P France, 255. Comte de Choiseul to Nivernois, December 26, 1762. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 448:425.

² Nivernois to Praslin, December 30, 1762, January 5, 1763. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 448:443; 449:39.

above was included in the further instructions sent Bedford in the middle of January.¹

Adequately to appraise the peace of Paris it is necessary to consider what the results might have been under other leadership. Had Newcastle and the supporters of the German war been in power the negotiation would probably have dragged out until the fall of Havana caught Choiseul without preliminaries agreed as to their essence to be a moral obligation on the English cabinet; probably he would have had to make the additional concession of New Orleans or St. Lucia. Had Pitt returned to power in October of 1762 Choiseul would have had to face the alternative of surrendering Guadeloupe and the fisheries or undertaking a campaign from which nothing but disaster could have been prognosticated. In either case the "splendid isolation" of England that was to be the cornerstone of Choiseul's *revanche* would have been averted.

For while the articles of the peace were in substance better than France could have expected, they were mildly humiliating in essence, and more humiliating as to the form and the manner in which Egremont had choked them down Choiseul's throat. All

¹ As a minor move in the game Nivernois learned secretly the contents of Egremont's last instructions to Bedford. Wood, the undersecretary of state, had been communicating to Nivernois—possibly for a consideration—the contents of his superior's dispatches. January 12 Nivernois wrote that he had on the previous evening been allowed to read the dispatch to Bedford and that he sent notes that he had taken from memory. The dispatch itself had been sent to Egremont's estate for signature, and presumably would return to London to be sent off the twelfth or thirteenth. Nivernois added in cipher that the extract could be relied on as it was not solely from memory. D'Eon had abstracted it from Wood's papers which he had brought to communicate to Nivernois, while he was dining with the ambassador in the next room. The copying was done by Le Boucher, one of Nivernois' secretaries who knew English well and was intelligent. The notorious Chevalier d'Eon in his recollections gives a more colorful account of the affair in which D'Eon shares the glory with Nivernois. *Memoires du Chevalier d'Eon Publiés pour la Première Fois. . . par Frédéric Gaillardet* (2 vols., Paris, 1836), 1:249.

Actually the courier delayed setting off with Egremont's dispatches; Nivernois got his back and sent it by a special courier who arrived the seventeenth.

Nivernois to Praslin, January 10, 12, 14. A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 449: 76, 91, 99.

combined to dictate a policy of revenge. The peace Pitt would have exacted, in ruining the French marine would have ruined with it all chance of a return match; that it would have provoked a jealous coalition of lesser maritime powers was another question; but at all events the peace left the Bourbon monarchies with both the will and power to revenge.

And so at length George III ended the war his grandfather had begun, and made his peace with his brothers the Very Christian and Catholic Kings. Through the whirling maze of terms and conditions his young mind probably caught and clung firmly to one fact. His beloved tutor the Earl of Bute might continue to serve him as prime minister and need not leave him to the mercy of Pitt or the Whig lords. But in statecraft he had done too much or too little. He had angered and humiliated the two great Bourbon monarchies, and had left them with resources to pursue a future revenge. That was the price the British empire had to pay for the retention of Bute. To have exacted so much more that Choiseul would have preferred the gambler's chance of one more campaign, to have exacted so much less that France and Spain would have acquiesced with good grace—either would have meant the fall of Bute.

Especially thick were sown the seeds of future turmoil in what concerned the Mississippi Valley. By the irony of fate that article was preambled with professions of desire to remove for the future all causes of dissension. So long as men send their wares to market by water, so long as a tree felled by a Wisconsin lumberman, a drain dug by an Illinois farmer may flood the fields of a Louisiana planter, the Mississippi Valley must be a political unit. With all the anxiety with which British ministers had grasped after terms so broad as to defeat the chicaneries of France, so long as the outlet of the Mississippi rested in alien hands, they had but achieved "*une navigation illusoire.*" At the outset of the struggle La Galissonnière had clearly foretold that if France were to retain any part of the Great Valley, she must possess the whole of it. To Choiseul, determined that the peace should be but a cessation of arms, it mattered not at all that divided political authority in the interior of North America was

to usher in a generation of strife; but for forty years the failure of English colonial policy in the Northwest, the American Revolution, the separatist plots and disorders of the Critical Period successively bore their testimony to the equilibrium disturbed in the Peace of 1763.

Not till the Louisiana Purchase of 1803 once more reunited the valley, did political quiet return in the wake of political order and economic unity, or the essential oneness of the Great Valley establish itself to decree the doom of the Southern Confederacy, under a leader born and bred amid the tributaries of the Mississippi, who in his youth had witnessed the inevitable gathering of its waters by "the Island on which New Orleans is situated."

DOCUMENTS

CHAPTER I

THE BACKGROUND OF DISTRUST, 1750-1752

MEMOIR ON ENGLISH AGGRESSION¹

[A E Mém. et Doc. Angl., 69:128]

Octobre 1750.

Amere Septale

Memoire.

dessein des Anglois dans la nouvelle carte des etabliss.
des Anglois ds la Nouvelle Angre la Georgie &c par
Bolbon lad. carte faitte d aprez celle de M danville avec
ce qu'on appelle des corrections.

Le retablissement de la paix n'a point detourné les Angs du
dessein constant de s'emparer de tout le commerce de l'Amerique,
Il n'est besoin que de considerer leur conduite actuelle pour être
persuadé de cette verité.

[*Translation*]

October, 1750

North America

Memoir

Schemes of the English in the new map by Bowen [?]
of the English colonies from New England to Georgia.
The map follows that of M. d'Anville with what are
termed corrections.

The restoration of peace has in no wise diverted the English
from their constant design to get possession of all the commerce
of America. It is only necessary to consider their actual conduct
to be convinced of this truth.

¹ An illustration of French suspicion of England which may serve as a companion piece to the letter of Newcastle to Hardwicke, quoted *ante*, xxvi. The only map with which this can be identified is that of Emanuel Bowen, either in an atlas published by him in 1752 or in *A Complete System of Geography*, published in 1747. P. L. Phillips, *List of Geographical Atlases*, 1:353, 347.

On ne doute pas que l'Espe n'en ait de bonnes preuves de son coté; et la france n'en a que de trop certaines, tant par les projets qu'annoncent les Angs; que par les difficultés que leurs commissaires aportent chaque jour au reglement des differens des deux nations pour l'Amerique.

L'Angre non contente d'avoir deja empieté sur les terres de france du coté de la Baye d'HUDSON, et de pousser ses etablissemens de l'Acadie jusques sur le continent de la nouvelle france sur les bords de la Baye françoise, malgré les limites que le Tté d'Utrecht a données a ce pays, forme encore le dessein d'envahir la floride et la Louisiane.

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Il est bien vrai que les Angs ont deja empieté cy devant sur ces 2. provinces, mais ils n'avoient pas encore poussé leurs pretentions a un point aussy exorbitant que le demontre la carte qls viennent de faire imprimer a Londres, ou sous pretexte d'en perfectionner une d'un de nos geographes modernes, ils etendent leurs limites dans la floride Espole, de maniere qls s'établissent

[*Translation*]

No doubt Spain has good proof on its side. France's is but too certain, both from the publicly professed plans of the English and from the difficulties their commissaries are daily making in the settlement of the disputes of the two nations in America.

England, not content with having already encroached on the lands of France on the side of Hudson Bay, and with pushing its settlements in Acadia on the mainland of New France at the Bay of Fundy, despite the boundaries assigned that country by the Treaty of Utrecht, now plans the invasion of Florida and Louisiana.

It is true the English have already encroached on those provinces, but they have not hitherto pushed their claims to the extravagant extent revealed by the map just published at London, on which, under pretence of correcting one of our recent geographers, they extend their boundaries into Spanish Florida in such fashion as to seat themselves on waters flowing into the Gulf

sur les eaux pendantes du Golfe du Mexique

Quant a la Louisiane, ils pretendent faire passer leurs etablissemens sur toutes les terres des sauvages amis de la France et même jusqu' aux Alibamous, et faire retrouver a l'Espe sur la Louisiane une partie de ce qu'ils leur ôtent de la Floride.

Quoique cette carte ne soit pas faite par ordre exprès du gouvernement, on sait qu'il l'autorise.

Il n'est pas douteux cependant que les Anglois n'aient aucun droit pour ces entreprises quant a leur vue elle est de celée depuis longtems; Ils veulent se mettre a portée d'envahir la Floride, et au

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moien de cette conquête et de l'Isle de la Providence qu'ils possèdent parmi celles de Bahama se rendre maîtres du débouquement du canal de ce nom et par consequent du tresor de l'Europe.

Pour executer cette vue plus facilement, ils cherchent a mettre les François de la Louisiane hors d'état de fournir aux Espagnols les secours qu'ils leur ont donnés par le passé et qu'ils ne manqueront jamais de leur donner dans toutes les entreprises que

[*Translation*]

of Mexico.

As to Louisiana, they claim to extend their boundaries over all the lands of the Indians friendly to France as far as the Alabamas; they partially recompense Spain for what they took from Florida at the expense of Louisiana. Although this map is not made by express order of the government, it is well known to be by authority.

However there is no doubt that the English have no justification for such enterprises which have long been no secret. They wish to be in a position to invade Florida, and by that conquest, along with their possession of the Isle of Providence in the Bahamas, to make themselves masters of the outlet of the Bahama Channel, and as a result of the treasure of Europe.

To carry out this plan more easily they seek to put it out of the power of the French of Louisiana to give aid to the Spanish as formerly, and as they will never fail to do in all attempts of

les Angs voudront faire a leur prejudice, et ils ne peuvent mieux y reussir qu'en tachant de couper la communication des françois de la Louisiane avec la nouvelle france et la floride: mais le danger commun qui resulte de là pour la france et l'Espe n'est-il pas un conseil a ces 2. puissances de se concerter au plutôt pour faire echoüer ce pernicieux dessein. Le roi est prêt de son côté a entrer dans toutes les mesures que S. M. C. croira les plus convenables pour se mettre a couvert des projets ambitieux d'une nation qui n'a d'autre but que de subjuguer les autres en s'emparant de leurs etablissemens et de leur commerce et qui appelle cela l'équilibre de l'Europe.

[*Translation*]

the English to work their hurt. In this they can best succeed by seeking to cut the communication of the French of Louisiana with New France and Florida; but is not the common danger resulting to France and Spain a warning to the two powers to concert measures as soon as possible that will insure the failure of this pernicious design? The king on his side is ready to enter into all the measures His Catholic Majesty may think most proper to protect himself from the ambitious projects of a nation with no other aim than to subjugate all the others by seizing on their colonies and their commerce, and which terms that the "balance of Europe."

MEMOIR OF LA GALISSONIERE, 1751¹

[A E Mém. et Doc. Amér., 24:110]

1751.

Mémoire

Sur les colonies de la France, dans l'Amerique-septentrionale.

Par M. le Marquis de la Galissonniere.

Les prétentions qu'ont annoncées les commissaires de Sa Majesté Britannique sur l'étendue de l'Acadie, et les mesures que l'Angleterre poursuit pour s'établir dans cette partie du continent de l'Amerique, sont de nature à exiger de la part du gouvernement l'attention la plus sérieuse.

Tandis que la paix paroît avoir comme assoupi la jalousie des Anglois en Europe, elle éclate dans toute sa force en Amerique; et si on n'y oppose dès à présent des barrières capables d'en

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arrêter les effets, cette nation se mettra en état d'envahir entièrement les colonies francoises au commencement de la première guerre.

[Translation]

1751

Memoir

On the colonies of France in North America

By M. le Marquis de la Galissonniere

The claims set forth by the commissaries of His Britannic Majesty as to the extent of Acadia, and the measures pursued by England to establish herself in that part of the American Continent are of a nature to require the most serious attention of the government.

Just when the peace appeared to have lulled the jealousy of the English in Europe, it breaks forth in full force in America; and if barriers are not immediately opposed to it capable of checking its results, England will have prepared herself to invade the French colonies throughout at the beginning of the first war.

¹This is the most famous of several memoirs and drafts produced by La Galissonniere. In translation it is in *N. Y. C. D.*, 10:220 *et seq.*, but as the key to French policy in 1754-1755, it seemed necessary to reproduce a part of it here. For the esteem in which it was held see, *post*, 249. For La Galissonniere, see *ante*, xiv.

C'est dans cette vue qu'ils voudroient s'assurer de toutes les avenues du Canada. On sera obligé, pour faire sentir combien cette matière est importante, d'entrer dans quelque détail sur cette colonie, et sur les païs qui l'avoisinent.

On établira d'abord, mais brièvement, l'utilité des colonies en général. On ne dissimulera pas ce que l'on peut objecter contre le Canada en particulier; mais on fera voir qu'il est des raisons essentielles et capitales, pour veiller avec soin à sa conservation, et pour le fortifier et l'augmenter.

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On commencera sa description par la partie du nord et la Baie d'Hudson qui la termine de ce côté là; on parcourera ensuite et successivement, les établissemens qui sont dans le Golfe St Laurent, l'île Royale et l'Acadie; de là on se portera vers le centre de la colonie le long du fleuve Saint Laurent; on examinera l'importance des postes de Chouaguen, de Niagara, du détroit et des Illinois. On montrera combien il est nécessaire d'entretenir la communication par la belle rivière avec la Louisiane. Et de

[Translation]

It is with that view that they seek to make sure of all the approaches to Canada. To demonstrate how important the matter is, it will be necessary to go into detail on that colony and on the neighboring regions.

First, though briefly, the usefulness of the colonies in general will be demonstrated. What can in particular be alleged against Canada will not be concealed; but it will be shown that there are essential and capital reasons for looking to its preservation, and for fortifying and enlarging it.

The description will begin with the north and Hudson Bay, which bounds it on that side; then the settlements of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, Isle Royale, and Acadia will be successively reviewed; next will be considered the heart of the colony along the river St. Lawrence; the importance of the posts of Oswego, Niagara, Detroit, and the Illinois will be examined. It will be demonstrated how necessary it is to maintain the communication by the Ohio River with Louisiana. And from this various in-

ces diferentes connoissances, on déduira les moyens que l'on croit indispensables de mettre en usage, pour faire échouer les projets ambitieux de l'Angleterre, et conserver à la France, des païs qui sont devenus une portion des plus interessantes du domaine de la

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couronne. Tous ces diférents objèts seront traités par autant d'articles séparés.

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Article 2d

De l'importance et de la nécessité de conserver le Canada et la Louisiane

On peut objecter qu'il faut conserver avec soin celles des

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colonies qui produisent un revenu à l'état et des richesses au royaume, comme St Domingue, la Martinique, et les autres îles du tropique; mais que l'on doit abandonner à elles mêmes les colonies qui loin de produire ni revenus ni richesses, sont a charge comme le Canada et la Louisiane; que d'ailleurs leur étendue immense empêche qu'elles ne puissent s'entreprêter des secours

[*Translation*]

formation will be deduced the means that are indispensable to bring to pass the failure of the ambitious designs of England, and to save to France, countries which have become one of the most important portions of the domain of the crown. All these different subjects will be treated by as many separate articles.

Article 2

Of the importance and the necessity of preserving Canada and Louisiana:

It may be objected that colonies like San Domingo, Martinique, and the other tropical islands which produce a revenue to the state and wealth to the realm may well be preserved; but that colonies which, far from producing revenue or wealth, are an expense, like Canada and Louisiana, should be abandoned to their own resources; that, otherwise, their vast extent prevents their

mutuels; qu'on ne peut y communiquer que par l'embouchure de deux rivières éloignées de plus de neuf cents lieues l'une de l'autre; que la longueur et la difficulté de la navigation, en rendent toujours les marchandises plus cheres que celles qui viennent de la Nouvelle Angleterre; qu'étant au surplus facile aux ennemis, supérieurs en forces maritimes, d'en interrompre la communication

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avec l'Europe, il est nécessaire d'y avoir en tout tems l'aprovisionnement d'une année d'avance; enfin que les dépenses de ces colonies surpasseront longtems leur produit. Non obstant tous ces desavantages les seuls motifs d'honneur, de gloire et de religion, ne permettent point d'abandonner une colonie établie, de livrer à eux mêmes (ou plustôt à une nation, ennemie par gout, par éducation, et par principe de religion) les François qui y ont passé à la persuasion du gouvernement sous l'esperance de sa protection, et qui la méritent singulièrement par leur fidélité et leur attachement; enfin de renoncer à un ouvrage aussi salutaire que celui de la conversion des infidèles qui habitent ce vaste continent.

[*Translation*]

affording mutual assistance; that they can be communicated with only by the mouths of two rivers more than nine hundred leagues apart; that the length and difficulty of navigation always makes their goods dearer than those coming from New England; that moreover since it is easy for enemies superior in naval strength to interrupt their communication with Europe, it is always necessary to keep them provisioned a year in advance; finally that the expenses of those colonies far exceed their produce. Despite all these disadvantages the motives of honor, glory, and religion do not permit the abandonment of an established colony; or giving up to themselves (or rather to a nation hostile by taste, education, and religious principle) the Frenchmen who have gone thither at the solicitation of the government in the hope of its protection, and who peculiarly merit it by their fidelity and devotion; or, finally, abandoning so salutary a task as the conversion of the heathen who dwell in this vast continent.

On n'insistera cependant pas sur ces motifs, et quelques
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grands que soient les inconveniens auxquels ces colonies sont exposées, on ne leur opposera pas non plus les produits futurs et incertains tant du Canada que de la Louisiane; quoiqu'au reste ces produits soient extrêmement vraisemblables, puisqu'ils ont pour fondement un país immense, un grand-peuple, des terres fertiles, des forêts, des muriers, des mines déjà découvertes, &c.

On se bornera ici à regarder le Canada comme une frontière infructueuse, comme les Alpes sont au Piemont, comme Luxembourg seroit à la France, et comme il est peut être à la Reine de Hongrie.

On demande si l'on peut abandonner un país, quelque mauvais qu'il soit et quelque soit la dépense nécessaire pour le soutenir,
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lorsque par sa position, il donneroit un grand avantage sur ses voisins.

C'est précisément le cas du Canada; on ne peut nier que cette colonie n'ait toujours été à charge à la France, et il y a apparence qu'elle sera très longtems sur le même pied; mais elle est en même

[*Translation*]

These motives however will not be urged. However great the disadvantages of these colonies the uncertain future products both of Canada and Louisiana will not be adduced as arguments, although the expectation of them is based on an immense country, a great people, fertile lands, forests, quarries, and mines already discovered. Here Canada will be regarded only as a barren frontier, such as the Alps are to Piedmont, or as Luxemburg would be to France, and as it is perhaps to the Queen of Hungary.

The question is if it is possible to abandon a country, however ill-favored, and however great the expense of maintaining it, when by its position it affords great advantages against its neighbors.

This is precisely the case of Canada; it cannot be denied that this colony has always been an expense to France, and that there is every appearance that it will long remain on the same footing; but it is at the same time the strongest bulwark that can be

tems la plus forte digue que l'on puisse opposer à l'ambition des Anglois.

.....
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On ne doit pas se flater de pouvoir de longtems, soutenir la dépense d'une marine égale à la leur; il ne reste donc que la ressource de les attaquer dans leurs possessions, cela ne peut se faire par des forces envoyées d'Europe, qu'avec peu d'espérance

117v

de réussir, et avec beaucoup de dépense. Au lieu qu'en se fortifiant en Amerique et en se ménageant des moïens dans les colonies mêmes, on peut se conserver les avantages dont on est en possession, et on peut même les augmenter avec une dépense très médiocre en comparaison de celle que couteroient des armemens faits en Europe.

L'utilité du Canada ne se borne pas à l'objet de conserver les colonies Francoises et de faire craindre les Anglois pour les leurs: cette colonie n'est pas moins essentielle pour la conservation des possessions des Espagnols dans l'Amerique et surtout du Mexique.

[*Translation*]

opposed to the ambition of the English.

.....
We should not flatter ourselves that we shall long be able to maintain the expense of a navy equal to theirs [the English]; there remains then only the expedient of attacking them in their possessions; that cannot be done by forces sent from Europe save with little hope of success and with great expense. On the contrary, by fortifying ourselves in America and husbanding the resources of our colonies, we can retain the advantages we now have and even increase them at an expense very moderate in comparison with the cost of armaments equipped in Europe.

The utility of Canada does not end with preserving the French colonies and making the English fear for their own. That colony is not less essential for the preservation of the Spanish possessions in America, and above all of Mexico.

Tant que l on gardera bien cette barrière, que les Anglois n'y
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pourront pénétrer, que l'on s'appliquera à la fortifier de plus en plus, elle servira de boulevard à la Louisiane, qui jusques ici ne se soutient qu'à l'ombre des forces du Canada, et par la liaison des Canadiens avec les sauvages.

.....
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Tout ce que l'on vient d'exposer démontre suffisamment, qu'il est de la dernière importance et d'une nécessité absolue de n'omettre aucun moyen et de n'épargner aucune dépense pour assurer la conservation du Canada; puisque ce n'est que par la
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qu'on peut parvenir à soustraire l'Amerique à l'ambition des Anglois, et que le progrès de leur empire dans cette partie du monde, est ce qu'il y a de plus capable de leur donner la supériorité en Europe.

.....
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On n'entrera pas ici dans une plus longue discussion sur le point de droit, mais on ne doit pas obmettre d'observer que ce

[*Translation*]

As long as that barrier is so well guarded that the English cannot penetrate it, as long as care is taken to fortify it more and more, it will serve as the outwork of Louisiana, which up to now has only maintained itself under the protection of Canada, and by the alliance of the Canadians with the Indians.

.....
All that has been set forth sufficiently proves that it is of the last importance and an absolute necessity to omit no means, and to spare no expense, to assure the preservation of Canada, since only through it can America be enslaved to English ambition; and the progress of their empire in that part of the world is what is most likely to give them the upper hand in Europe.

.....
Here the point of right will not be further discussed, but it

poste, [Chouaguen] qui a été presque toujours regardé comme un objet de peu d'importance, est capable de causer la ruine entière du Canada et lui a déjà porté les plus rudes coups.

C'est là que les François font souvent un commerce frauduleux qui fait passer à l'Angleterre les profits les plus clairs que le Canada devrait donner à la France

C'est là que les Anglois prodiguent aux sauvages l'eau de vie
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dont l'usage leur avoit été interdit par les ordonnances de nos rois, parcequ'elle les rend furieux.

Enfin c'est là que les Anglois attirent toutes les nations sauvages, et qu'ils tachent à force de présents, non seulement de les gagner mais encore de les engager à assassiner les traiteurs françois repandus dans la vaste étendue des forêts de la nouvelle France.

Tant que les Anglois posséderont Chouaguen, on ne pourra être que dans une défiance perpétuelle des sauvages qui ont été jusqu'ici les plus affidés aux françois; on sera obligé d'entretenir dans la plus profonde paix deux fois plus de troupes que l'état de la colonie ne l'exige ou ne le comporte, d'établir et de garder des

[Translation]

must be observed that this post [Oswego], which has always been regarded as an object of small importance, is capable of causing the complete ruin of Canada and has already dealt the colony some rude blows. It is there that the French often carry on an illicit trade which transfers to England clear profits that Canada should afford to France. It is there that the English lavish brandy on the Indians, the use of which had been forbidden them by the ordinances of our kings, because it makes them madmen. Finally it is thither that the English draw all the Indian tribes, and try by means of presents, not only to win them over, but even to induce them to assassinate the French traders scattered throughout the vast extent of the forests of New France.

So long as the English retain Oswego, we can only be in perpetual distrust of those Indians who till now have been the most faithful to the French; in the most profound peace we shall have to maintain twice the troops the state of the colony requires or

forts en une infinité d'endroits, et d'envoyer presque tous les ans
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des détachemens très nombreux et très dispendieux pour contenir les différentes nations sauvages.

La navigation des lacs sera toujours en risque d'être troublée; la culture des terres ne s'avancera qu'à demi et ne pourra se faire que dans le centre de la colonie. Enfin on sera toujours dans une situation qui aura tous les inconveniens de la guerre sans en avoir les avantages.

Il ne faut donc rien épargner pour détruire ce dangereux poste, à la première occasion de represailles que les anglois en fourniront par quelque-une de ces hostilités qu'ils ne sont que trop accoutumés de commettre en tems de paix, supposé qu'on ne
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puisse se le faire ceder gré à gré moyennant quelque equivalent

Ce que l'on a déjà dit dans le cours de ce mémoire en parlant de l'utilité du Canada, relativement à la conservation du Mexique, fait sentir que la communication libre et sure du Canada au Mississippi, est absolument nécessaire. Cette chaine rompue, laisseroit

[Translation]

permits, to build and guard forts in numberless places, and to send nearly every year numerous and expensive detachments to control the various Indian tribes.

The navigation of the lakes will always be in danger of being disturbed; the cultivation of the soil will progress only by halves and can be carried on only in the center of the colony. Finally we shall always be in a situation that has all the inconveniences and none of the advantages of a state of war. Nothing therefore must be omitted for the destruction of this dangerous post, on the first occasion for reprisals that the English afford us from the hostilities they are only too used to committing in time of peace; always supposing that it is not possible to get them to give it up of good will for some equivalent.

What has already been said in the course of this memoir of the utility of Canada with respect to the preservation of Mexico, makes it evident that the free and sure communication of Canada with the Mississippi is absolutely necessary. That chain broken,

un vuide dont les Anglois proffiteroient sans doute, pour s'approcher de la source de l'argent. Beaucoup de leurs écrits sont pleins de ce projet qui ne sera jamais, si la France se maintient dans ses possessions du Canada.

La plus interessante relativement à cet objet est celle de la rivière Oyo, autrement ditte la Belle rivière: elle prend sa source proche du païs occupé aujourd'hui en partie par les Iroquois, dirige

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son cours vers le midi, tombe dans le Ouabache et avec lui dans le Mississipi.

Cette rivière a été découverte par le Sr de La salle qui en prit possession au nom du roi et elle seroit peut être remplie aujourd'hui d'établissements François si la crainte que cela ne fit lier entre les Anglois et les traiteurs François un commerce de contrebande, n'eût empêché les gouverneurs du Canada d'y établir des postes solides.

Les Anglois n'y en ont point non plus et n'y sont venus traiter que clandestinem jusqu'à cette dernière guerre, que la revolte de

[*Translation*]

would leave a gap by which the English would doubtless profit to reach the silver mines. Many of their books enlarge on this project, which will never be carried out if France maintains its possession of Canada.

What is most important to this end is the Ohio River, sometimes called the Beautiful River. It rises near the country occupied in part by the Iroquois, flows to the south, empties into the Wabash, and goes with it to the Mississippi. The Ohio was discovered by the Sieur de la Salle, who took possession of it in the name of the king. The region might today be filled with French settlements if the governors of Canada had not been deterred from establishing strong posts there by the fear that they might be the scene of a contraband trade between the English and French traders.

The English have no posts there, and only came secretly to trade until the last war, when the revolt of some neighboring

quelques nations voisines contre les françois les a encouragés à y venir plus hardiment.

Depuis la paix, ils ont été sommés de s'en retirer, et s'ils ne
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le font pas on ne doit pas douter que le gouverneur du Canada ne les y contraigne par la force: autrement il en arriveroit comme à Chouaguen, et ce malheur seroit encore plus facheux: car un établissement sur la belle rivière les mettroit bien plus a portée de nuire que ne fait Chouaguen seul

1. Ils y auroient encore plus qu'à Chouaguen la commodité de débaucher les nations sauvages.

2. Ils auroient plus de facilité d'interrompre la communication du Canada à la Louisiane, puisque c'est presque uniquement par la Belle riviere que lon peut porter du Canada dans le fleuve du Mississipi des détachemens capables de rassurer cette colonie

131v

encore foible, contre les entreprises des sauvages voisins de la Caroline que les Anglois excitent sans cesse contre les françois.

3. Si jamais les Anglois deviennent assés forts en Amerique

[*Translation*]

tribes against the French encouraged them to come more boldly. Since the peace they have been summoned to withdraw, and if they do not, no doubt the governor of Canada will force them to do so. Otherwise it would be the same as at Oswego, and the evil would be even worse; for a settlement on the Ohio River would put the English in a much better position to do harm than at Oswego.

1. They would have even more than at Oswego the opportunity of seducing the Indians.

2. They could with greater ease interrupt the communication of Canada and Louisiana since it is almost solely by the Ohio River that detachments from Canada can be carried to the Mississippi, that are of sufficient size to secure that colony, still feeble, against the enterprises of the Indians bordering on Carolina whom the English ceaselessly incite against the French.

3. If ever the English became strong enough in America to

pour ozer tenter la conquête du Mexique, ce sera par cette belle Rivière qu'il faudra nécessairement qu'ils descendent.

4. C'est aussi uniquement par elle qu'ils peuvent attaquer avec des forces un peu considerables, et avec esperance de succès, les postes des Illinois et tous ceux qui sont ou qui seront établis le long du fleuve St Louis autrement Mississipi.

5. C'est encore par là qu'ils peuvent attaquer le poste des

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Miamis, ce qui ôteroit encore une de nos meilleures communications avec le Fleuve de Mississipi, et ce qui entraineroit la perte du détroit: poste important dont il sera parlé ci après.

On pense donc qu'une des dépenses des plus pressées est l'établissement de quelques postes sur la belle Rivière, mais l'on croit en même tems que ces postes n'acquerront de solidité, qu'autant qu'on augmentera les forces tant de Niagara que du détroit.

C'est à ce dernier endroit qu'il faut aujourd'hui le plus s'attacher. S'il y avoit une fois dans ce canton mille habitans cultivateurs, il nourriroit et défendroit tous les autres. C'est de

[*Translation*]

venture on the conquest of Mexico, they must necessarily descend upon it by the Ohio River.

4. Only by that river can they attack in considerable force, and with prospects of success, the posts of the Illinois and those which are or may be established along the St. Louis River, otherwise called the Mississipi.

5. By this river also they can attack the post of Miamis, which would destroy one of our best communications with the Mississipi River, and would entail the loss of Detroit, an important post which will be dealt with later.

It is thought therefore that one of the outlays most urgently needed is for the establishment of posts on the Ohio River; but it also appears that those posts will not acquire solidity until the strength of both Niagara and Detroit has been increased.

It is to this last post especially that we must cling today. If there were once a thousand farmer inhabitants in that region, it

tout l'intérieur du Canada l'endroit le plus propre à établir une
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ville ou se reuniroit tout le commerce des lacs, et qui munie d'une bonne garnison et entourée d'un bon nombre d'habitations seroit a portée d'en imposer à presque tous les sauvages du continent. Il suffit d'en voir la position sur la carte pour en sentir l'utilité: elle seroit située sur le fleuve St Laurent à portée de l'oyo, des Illinois, du fleuve Mississipi et en situation de protéger tous ces différents endroits et même les postes du nord des lacs.

En suivant a peu près la même route, ainsi que les memes vues, le poste qui mérite le plus d'attention après le détroit, ou concurremment avec lui, est celui des Illinois

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Ici, le climat est presque'entierement changé; on n'est plus exposé aux rigueurs d'un hiver de sept mois; on n'a point, comme aux environs de Quebec à faire de défrichemens ruineux pour mettre en valeur des terres assez médiocres. hors les bords des rivières, tout le pais est decouvert et n'attend que la charue. Il y

[Translation]

would feed and defend all the others. In the whole interior of Canada, it is the fittest site for a city where all the commerce of the lakes would center, and which, furnished with a good garrison and surrounded with a good number of inhabitants, would overawe all the Indians of the continent. To see its position on the map is enough to perceive its usefulness. Situated on the St. Lawrence River, close to the Ohio, the Illinois, and the Mississippi River, it is in a position to protect all these places, and even the posts north of the lakes.

Following nearly the same route, as well as the same line of reasoning, the post meriting most attention after Detroit, or perhaps concurrently with it, is that of the Illinois.

There the climate is almost completely different: no longer is one exposed to the hardship of a seven months' winter; not as in the neighborhood of Quebec is one forced to clearing the forest at ruinous expense to put to use land that is of quite indifferent quality: away from the banks of the rivers all the country is

a déjà quelques habitans fournis d'un assez bon nombre de bestiaux, mais ce n'est rien en comparaison de ce qu'on y pourroit placer.

De plus, ces vastes plaines qui par différents détours s'étendent jusqu'à plusieurs centaines de lieues au delà du Lac Supérieur, sont couvertes d'une multitude innombrable—de boeufs: espece qui vraisemblablement ne se détruira pas d'ici à plusieurs siècles,

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tant parce que le pais n'est pas assez peuplé d'hommes pour que la consommation qu'ils en pourroient faire soit sensible, que parceque les cuirs n'en étant pas propres aux mêmes usages que ceux de la race Europeene, il n'arrivera pas comme chez les Espagnols de la Rivière de la Plata, de tuer les boeufs uniquement pour en avoir la peau.

Si les boeufs Illinois ne fournissent pas beaucoup par la suite aux tanneries on a lieu d'en attendre des avantages au moins equivalens et sur lesquels on ne peut s'empêcher de s'arrêter un moment.

1. Ils sont couverts d'une espece de laine assez fine pour

[*Translation*]

open, and only awaits the plow. There are already some inhabitants who possess a good number of cattle, but nothing in comparison with what could be done there.

Furthermore these vast plains that by different extents reach for several hundred leagues beyond Lake Superior are covered with an innumerable multitude of cattle of a species that presumably will not be destroyed for some centuries, both because the country is not sufficiently peopled for their consumption to be noticeable, and because, the leather being unfit for the same uses as that from the European species, it will never happen as in the case of the Spaniards on the La Plata, that the cattle will be killed solely for their hides.

If the Illinois cattle cannot supply much in the future for the tanneries, advantages at least equivalent may be expected from them over which we may pause a moment.

1. They are covered with a kind of wool fine enough to be

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être employée à beaucoup d'ouvrages on en a fait des épreuves

2. On ne peut guère douter qu'en les prenant jeunes et en les coupant, ils ne fussent propres au labourage, peut être même auroient ils sur les boeufs domestiques le même avantage que les chevaux qui est d'être beaucoup plus vites. Ils paroissent aussi plus vigoureux, mais peut être est ce leur éducation sauvage qui y contribue ; au reste il n'y a pas d'apparence qu'ils soient difficiles à apprivoiser : On en a vu de quatre à cinq ans, taureau et femelle, qui étoient extrêmement doux.

3. Si on établissoit assez bien le país des Illinois pour que

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les habitans pussent enfermer dans des parcs un grand nombre de ces animaux, ils en pourroient faire des salaisons : ce qui est susceptible d'être poussé très loin sans que pour cela il y ait aux Illinois un grand peuple. Ce commerce mettroit peut être en état de se passer des boeufs d'Irlande pour la Martinique, et même d'en fournir aux colonies Espagnoles en concurrence avec les Anglois et a meilleur compte qu'eux.

[*Translation*]

used for various purposes: trials have been made of it.

2. It cannot be doubted that by catching them young and splaying them, they would be fit for draft; perhaps they would have the same advantages over domestic oxen as horses, being much quicker. They also appear more vigorous, but perhaps it is their wild upbringing which contributes to that: it does not appear that they would be hard to tame. Bulls and cows that were very gentle have been noticed at four to five years of age.

3. If the Illinois country were sufficiently settled so that the inhabitants could enclose a large number of the cattle in parks, the beef could be salted. This could be carried very far without a large population in the Illinois. This trade might enable one to do without Irish beef for Martinique and even to furnish the Spanish colonies in competition with the English and at a lower price.

On objectera sans doute que ces profits sont bien éloignés, et que peut être s'y trouvera t il des obstacles imprevis; mais qu'on éloigne tant qu'on voudra ce point de vue, il reste toujours une question: non si l'on doit abandonner ce poste, mais si l'on doit

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le livrer à l'Angleterre, qui en feroit un entrepôt solide pour entreprendre la conquête du Mexique.

On ne parle point des mines qu'on prétend avoir découvertes dans ce canton independamment de ce qu'on n'en est pas suffisamment informé, on estime qu'on ne doit y penser qu'après qu'on se sera fortifié principalement en hommes en bled et en bestiaux.

Article 6e

De la Louisiane

On ne s'étendra pas sur ce qui concerne la Louisiane qui dans l'état de foiblesse où elle est aujourd'hui, ne peut se soutenir qu'à l'ombre des forces du Canada.

La Louisiane est un païs très susceptible de culture utile, et

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auquel il ne manque que des habitans. On peut le peupler

[Translation]

It will without doubt be objected that these profits are very remote, and that there may be unforeseen obstacles; but postpone them as long as you will, one question always remains; not if the post should be abandoned, but if it should be given up to England, who would make it a solidly established depot for undertaking the conquest of Mexico.

Nothing is said of the mines that it is claimed have been discovered in this district. Independently of the fact that we are not sufficiently informed, we should not think of them until the district has been sufficiently developed in men, wheat, and cattle.

Article 6

Of Louisiana:

We will not enlarge on what regards Louisiana, which, weak as it is today, can only sustain itself under the shadow of the strength of Canada.

Louisiana is a country very susceptible to useful cultivation, in which inhabitants are not lacking. It can be peopled on the

par le bas et par le haut du fleuve et aucune des deux voies n'est à négliger. Les progrès du commerce seront plus rapides en peuplant la partie à portée de la mer. on peut néanmoins douter que ce soit de ce côté qui doive se porter la principale attention du gouvernement: indépendamment que c'est ce qui est le plus capable d'exciter l'envie et les clameurs des colonies voisines; c'est aussi la partie qui se remplira le mieux d'habitans sans que le gouvernement s'en mêle.

Si l'on ne considère que la force et la solidité des établissemens, on doit alors se déterminer à peupler la Louisiane par le

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haut du fleuve, elle doit tirer sa principale force et ses principales ressources du poste des Illinois dont on a parlé dans l'article précédent.

Ce poste, comme l'on vient de le faire pressentir, n'est pas à beaucoup près aussi attirant que le bas du fleuve; c'est en quelque façon un pays perdu, ou de longtems le commerce ne sera brillant ni les fortunes rapides; mais en recompense elles y seront peut être plus solides que dans aucun autre endroit des colonies.

[*Translation*]

lower or upper course of the river; neither should be neglected. The progress of commerce would be more rapid if the portion close to the sea were settled: it may none the less be doubted if it is this side that should receive the chief attention of the government. Independent of the fact that it is the portion most capable of exciting the envy and clamor of neighboring colonies, it is also the portion which will best fill itself with inhabitants without the government's interfering.

If only the strength and solidity of settlements are considered, the decision should be to people Louisiana on the upper river. It should draw its chief strength and its principal resources from the post of the Illinois, mentioned in the preceding article. This post, as was just indicated, is not nearly so attractive as the lower river. In some sort it is a lost land where for a long time to come commerce will not be lucrative, nor fortunes quickly made; but on the other hand they may be more permanent than in

On doit considerer aussi que les difficults de remonter le fleuve sont telles que le bas de la colonie ne peut jamais nourrir les Illinois. Le poste des Illinois au contraire semble tre plac

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exprs pour assurer la subsistance de la nouvelle Orleans, ou il pourra en tout tems et malgr toutes les forces maritimes du monde, envoyer des grains et des viandes.

Il y auroit quelques observations faire sur les postes voisins de la Georgie et de la Caroline, mais comme ils dependent immediatement du gouvernement de la Louisiane, et que nous n'en avons qu'une connoissance imparfaite nous nous abstiendrons d'en parler, d'autant que ce mmoire est deja long et qu'on peut appliquer ces postes ce qui a t dit de la belle Riviere et de Chouaguen.

.....

[*Translation*]

any other place in the colonies. It should further be considered that the difficulties of ascending the river are such that the lower part of the colony can never feed the Illinois. The post of the Illinois on the contrary seems placed where it can always, despite all the navies of the world, export grain and meat.

There are some things to say of the posts near Georgia and Carolina, but since they are immediately subordinate to the government of Louisiana, and since we have but an imperfect knowledge of them, we will refrain from speaking of them, the more since this memoir is already long, and since to these posts may be applied what has already been said of the Ohio River and of Oswego.

.....

MINUTE ON FRENCH POLICY¹

[A N Colonies C11A 97:258]

28 7bre 1751.

approuvé par le roy

23 Sepr 1751

des essais etablissement des Anglois à la Belle Rivière
Canada

Les Anglois toujours occupés des moyens d'étendre leurs possessions dans l'Amerique Septentrionale et de resserrer celles de Sa Majesté, ont entrepris depuis la derniere guerre de porter leur commerce du côté de la Belle Riviere qui est dans la profondeur des terres entre le Canada et la Louïisianne, et qui fait la principale communication de ces deux colonies; de corrompre les nations sauvages de ces cantons; et même d'y faire des établissements.

Le Mis de la Jonquiere² ayant été informé de ces entreprises, il prit l'année derniere des mesures pour en arrêter le succès. Il

[*Translation*]

September 28, 1751

Approved by the king

September 23, 1751

English attempts to settle on the Ohio River
Canada

The English, always intent on ways of extending their possessions in North America and of trenching on those of His Majesty, have since the last war undertaken to carry their trade toward the Ohio River, which is in the heart of the country between Canada and Louisiana, and which is the principal communication of the two colonies; they also seek to seduce the Indian tribes of these districts, and even to make settlements.

The Marquis de la Jonquière² having been informed of these enterprises, took measures last year to check their success. He

¹ Several statements of French policy of this type occur in Duquesne's instructions of the next spring. The endorsement on this indicates its official adoption. See *ante*, xix.

² For La Jonquière, see *ante*, xvi, n.

forma divers detachements de françois et de sauvages; et par les dispositions qu'il fit, ces detachements devoient se reünir ce printemps pour se porter tout d'un coup sur la Belle-Riviere, en chasser les Anglois et ramener les sauvages qui auroient pû se laisser seduire par les insinuations de cette nation.

On attendoit à la fin de cette année la nouvelle de cequi se
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seroit passé à cet egard. Mais il est venu des lettres particulieres de Canada qui disent que le Mis de la Jonquiere a abandonné ce projet, et qui insinüent que l'interest particulier a porté quelqu'un à qui il a donné sa confiance, à l'en detourner, en lui faisant craindre d'engager par là une guerre sauvage.

Ce motif seroit bon, s'il étoit fondé. Il convient toujours d'eviter, autant qu'il est possible, les guerres avec les sauvages; mais il paroît que dans cette occasion, il ne doit pas être difficile de s'en garantir.

Ce n'est point contre les sauvages qu'il est question d'agir. C'est le commerce d'interlope que les Anglois font dans un pays

[*Translation*]

formed various parties of French and Indians. By his plans, these parties should have united this spring to move suddenly on the Ohio River, drive out the English, and win back the Indians who had let themselves be seduced by the artifices of that nation.

News was expected by the end of this year of what had happened on this occasion. But private letters from Canada say that the Marquis de la Jonquière has abandoned this plan; the letters hint that private interest has induced some one in his confidence to divert him from it, by making him afraid of being thus involved in an Indian war.

The motive, if well founded, would be good. It is always advisable to avoid so far as possible, wars with the Indians; but it appears that on this occasion it should not have been difficult to insure against their occurrence.

It is not a question of acting against the Indians. It is a question of checking illicit trade carried on by the English in a

qui nous appartient, et qu'avant la dernière guerre ils ne se seroient pas avisés de nous disputer, qu'il s'agit d'empêcher, en arrêtant en même temps les vûes qu'ils ont d'y faire des établissemens. Ainsy il est aisé de desintéresser à cet égard les sauvages, et même de leur faire envisager que pour leur propre tranquillité et pour la liberté de leur traite dans laquelle nous ne les avons jamais gênés, ils doivent desirer que nous arrêtions le cours des

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entreprises des Anglois. Il seroit donc fâcheux que le Mis de la Jonquière eut abandonné le projet qu'il avoit formé pour cela; et quoique les avis particuliers qui annoncent ce changement de sa part pussent n'être pas fondés, il paroît convenir de ne pas les lui laisser ignorer; de lui marquer en même temps que Sa Majesté attend toujours l'exécution de ce projet, qu'il n'y a point en effet d'autre party à prendre que de chasser de la Belle rivière les étrangers. Européens qui s'y trouveront, de manière à leur faire perdre l'envie d'y retourner, en observant neantmoins les ménagemens praticables dans ces sortes d'affaires.

[*Translation*]

country that belongs to us, and which they had not ventured to dispute with us before the last war, and of discouraging at the same time any notions they may have of making settlements there. It should accordingly be easy to render the Indians indifferent, and even to make them perceive that for their own peace, and for the freedom of their trade in which we have never hindered them, they should be willing for us to check the progress of the English enterprises. It would therefore be regrettable if on that account the Marquis de la Jonquière had abandoned the plan he had formed. And although the private letters which tell of this change on his part may be without foundation, it would seem proper not to let him be unaware of them; to indicate to him at the same time that His Majesty still awaits the execution of the plan; that there is in truth no other course save to drive from the Ohio River the European foreigners who are there, in such fashion that they may have no wish to return, observing nevertheless the discretion practicable in such matters.

Au surplus, on n'a point à craindre de plaintes fondées de la part de la cour d'Angleterre. Ce sont les françois qui ont decouvert la Belle riviere. Elle a toujours servi de communication, comme on vient de le dire, entre le Canada et la Louïsianne. Nous y avons toujours fait le commerce sans trouble; et nous y avons envoyé des detachements considerables en differentes occasions.

ROUILLÉ¹ TO ST. CONTEST, February 1 [?], 1752

[S P France, 243:159]

Sur le Memoire remis par M. l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, en faveur des trois Anglais arrêtés a Canada, pour avoir fait Commerce avec les Indiens de la Riviere d'Ohiho.

Mons. Rouillé a répondu que par Consideration pour M. le Comte d'Albemarle Il se porterait volontiers à leur procurer la liberté, et qu'il en feroit la proposition au Roy. mais que pour la restitution des Effets, qu'ils reclament, il ne peut en etre question

[*Translation*]

Moreover there is no reason to fear complaints with any foundation from the court of England. It was the French who discovered the Ohio River. It has always served as a communication, as was just said, between Canada and Louisiana. We have always traded there without molestation; and on various occasions we have sent considerable detachments there.

On the memoir communicated by the English ambassador on behalf of three Englishmen arrested in Canada for having traded with the Indians of the Ohio River:

M. Rouillé replied that out of regard for M. le Comte d'Albemarle he would willingly lend himself to procuring them their liberty, and that he would propose it to the king; but that as to the restitution of their goods which they claimed, there could

¹ See *ante*, xxv, n.

puisqu'aient été surpris en Commerce frauduleux, la Confiscation des Effets est de Droit

[*Endorsed:*] Note de M d. Rouillé a Mr St Contest remis a Milord Albemarle le 1er de Fevrier 1752

in H. E the Earl of Albemarle's of the $\frac{19 \text{ Feby}}{1 \text{ March}}$ 1752.

[*Translation*]

be no question of it since, as they were caught engaged in contraband trade, confiscation of their goods was only just.

[*Endorsed:*] Note of M. Rouillé to M. St. Contest, communicated to My Lord Albemarle, February 1, 1752.

In H. E. the Earl of Albemarle's of $\frac{\text{February } 19}{\text{March } 1}$, 1752.

HOLDERNESSE¹ TO ALBEMARLE,² February 13, 1752

[S P France, 243:133]

.....

I am persuaded the groundless Pretension the French Governor sets up (in direct Opposition to the 15th Article of the Treaty of Utrecht,) as well as the Stile He makes use of, will be equally disavowed by the French Court: it is therefore his Majesty's Pleasure that your Excellency should speak to the French Minister upon this Subject, & desire, that Monsr de la Jonquiere may have positive Orders, to desist from such unjustifiable Proceedings; & that, He may be particularly directed, to

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release those of His Majesty's Subjects, whom He has detained in Prison in so unwarrantable a Manner, & also to make ample Restitution of their Goods & Effects, according to the Desire contained in Governor Clinton's Letter: I am persuaded Your Excellency will lay hold of this opportunity, of shewing the French Ministers the absolute Necessity of sending Instructions

¹ Holdernessee enclosed with this dispatch copies of letters that passed between Governor Clinton of New York and the Marquis de la Jonquiere. The letters in question are printed *passim* in *N. Y. C. D.*, vol. 6, especially pp. 711, 730, 731. See also *Sir William Johnson Papers*, vol. 1. For Holdernessee, see *ante*, xxiv, n.

² William Anne Keppel, Earl of Albemarle. See *ante*, xxiv.

to their several Governors in the West Indies, not to attempt for the Future, any such Inroachments on His Majesty's Dominions there; which might prove fatal to the good Understanding, The King is desirous of maintaining, with The Most Christian King.

.....

MEMOIR PRESENTED BY ALBEMARLE TO ROUILLÉ, March 7, 1752¹

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 434:196]

Memoire présenté par le Comte d'Albemarle a M Rouillé
le 7. mars 1752.

Milord albemarle a ordre de sa cour de représenter a celle de France combien la conduite de M de la Jonquiere est opposée au traité de paix d'Utrecht, et la cour de Londres est persuadée que les prétentions mal fondées du gouverneur de Canada seront desavouées de sa cour

M Clinton gouverneur de la nouvelle Yorke, a eu des informations reiterées que des personnes se disant autorisées d'une commission de Mr de la Jonquière construisoient une forteresse sur la rivière Oniagara entre le Lac Erie et celui de Cadarackui

[Translation]

Memoir presented by the Comte d'Albemarle to M. Rouillé,
March 7, 1752

My Lord Albemarle has orders from his court to represent to the court of France how far contrary to the Treaty of Utrecht is the conduct of M. de la Jonquière. The court of London is sure that the ill-founded claims of the governor of Canada will be disavowed by his court.

M. Clinton, governor of New York, has had repeated advices that persons representing themselves as authorized by a commission of M. de la Jonquière were constructing a fort on the Niagara River, between Lakes Erie and Ontario near the center

¹This memoir is very awkwardly drawn, but it constituted nevertheless a clear English claim to the Ohio. In 1755 the French several times professed no such claim had been made. Some of the ignorance on the subject may be due to the fact that Albemarle transmitted the memoir directly to Rouillé as minister for the colonies instead of through the foreign office. Albemarle to Holderness, ^{February 26} March 8, 1752. S P France, 243:165.

vers le centre du territoire des cinq nations indiennes (appelées les Iroquois par les françois) qui est depuis longtemps soumis à la couronne de la grande Bretagne, et lesquelles par le Tté d'Utrecht sont reconnues par Sa Mté tres Chretienne, estre sujèts de la gde Bretagne.

Il a aussy appris que six anglois qui faisoient paisiblement un commerce legitime avec les Indiens qui sont en amitié avec les sujets du roy, avoient été arretés, et mis dans les fers dans les prisons au fort d'oniagara, traités avec des severités qu'on met rarement en usage, meme en temps de guerre, entre des nations civilisées, et que leurs effets avoient été saisis par des personnes

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se disant aussy munies d'une pare [*MS. illegible*] commission

M. Clinton en porta ses plaintes à M de la Jonquière par une lettre qu'il luy ecrivit le 12. Juin de l'année dre avec tous les menagemens possibles luy demandant de vouloir faire prendre les informations necessaires sur la verité des faits, et en faire rendre justice, en doutant nullement que ce qui venoit de se passer étoit sans sa connoissance, et a plus forte raison sans son approbation

[*Translation*]

of the territory of the Five Nations (called Iroquois by the French) which has long been subject to the British crown; and who [*sic*] by the Treaty of Utrecht were recognized by His Most Christian Majesty to be British subjects.

He has also learned that six Englishmen who were peaceably engaged in licit trade with Indians living in friendship with the king's subjects have been arrested and put in irons in the prison at the fort of Niagara, and accorded hard usage rarely practiced even in war among civilized nations; and that their goods had been seized by persons also claiming the authority of such a commission as aforesaid.

M. Clinton complained to M. de la Jonquière in a letter of June 12 of last year, with all possible politeness, asking him to make the necessary inquiries into the truth of the facts, and to do justice accordingly, since what had happened had doubtless occurred without his knowledge, and even more so without his approbation.

Mais il fut surpris de la reponse que M. de la Jonquiere fit a ses plaintes le 10. Aoust, en avouant positivement l'établissement qui en faisoient le sujet, et semblant vouloir les renverser toutes d'un seul trait, en luy mandant sans autre difficulté, que luy Mr Clinton qualifioit mala propos et contre ses propres lumières, les cinq nations de sujets du Roy de la grande Bretagne, lesquelles dit il, ne l'ont jamais été.

C'est vouloir fermer les yeux de propos deliberé, sur le Traité de Paix d'Utrecht et nommement sur le 15. artl. par lequel la domination de la grande Bretagne sur les cinq nations Indiennes, est expressement reconnue, ce qui detruit tous les raisonnemens de M. de la Jonquiere

Quant aux six prisonniers et leurs effets M. de la Jonquiere dit qu'ils ont été pris faisant commerce avec les Indiens d'Ohio, contraire a l'ordonnance qu'il avoit rendue portant defense aux Anglois d'y commercer, et que leurs effets ont été reclamés par les sauvages a titre de pillage.

Il est a observer que ce pays appartient aux cinq nations et que les *Twigtwees* et les autres Indiens qui l'habitent quoy qu'ils

[Translation]

But he was astonished at M. de la Jonquière's reply to his complaints, made August 10, in which he positively avowed the settlement in question; he seemed to wish to reverse everything at one sweep, by replying, without specifying other objections to M. Clinton, that he was ill-advised, and knew better when he described the Five Nations as British subjects, which, so M. de la Jonquière said, they never were.

To affirm this is to close one's eyes deliberately on the Treaty of Utrecht and in particular on the fifteenth article, by which the domination of Great Britain over the Five Nations is expressly recognized, thereby destroying all M. de la Jonquière's reasonings.

As to the six prisoners and their effects, M. de la Jonquière said they had been taken trading with the Ohio Indians contrary to his ordinance forbidding the English to trade there, and that the Indians had claimed their goods as plunder.

It is to be observed that this country belongs to the Five Nations, and that the Miami and the other Indians who dwell

ne soient pas natifs des cinq nations, ont été receus depuis long-temps par le gouverneur de la nouvelle Yorcke dans le même convention d'alliance avec les cinq nations. Et par consequent on ne reconnoit pas le droit que M de la Jonquiere eleve de rendre une telle ordonnance, et la capture de ces six anglois devient une violence d'autant plus injuste et condamnable. 197

Les françois de cette partie du monde, ne s'en sont pas tenus aux useès dont on vient de se plaindre. Un corps d'environ 1200 françois et 200. Orondagues &ca. ayant passé près d'Oswego a dessein de couper des nations Indiennes qui sont du costé de l'ouest, et fort attachées aux anglois, et d'empescher les habitans de Philadelphie de batir a Ohio, ou dans son voisinage ce que le Colonel Johnson mande au gouverneur Clinton par sa lettre du 17 Juillet der luy avoit été confirmé par un deserteur françois, qu'il avoit actuellement dans sa maison, qui vu ce corps d'hommes partir de Cadarghqui, dont il avertit les cinq nations pour qu'elles se tintent sur leurs gardes, et elles luy en ont temoigné toute la reconnoissance possible.

[*Translation*]

there, while not belonging to the Five Nations, have long since been included in the same alliance with them by the governor of New York. And by consequence, M. de la Jonquière's pretended right to make such an ordinance and to seize these six Englishmen is not recognized and becomes a violence all the more unjust and blamable.

The French in this part of the world have not confined themselves to the practices complained of. A body of about twelve hundred French and two hundred Adirondacks and other Indians have passed by Oswego, intending to cut off the Indian tribes to the westward who are much attached to the English and to prevent the inhabitants of Philadelphia from building at Ohio, or in its neighborhood. Of this Colonel Johnson informed Governor Clinton by his letter of July 17 last, as confirmed to him by a French deserter then actually in his house, who had seen this force set out from Fort Frontenac; Colonel Johnson warned the Five Nations of this, that they might be on their guard, and they

Le Lieutenant Lindesay posté a Oswego ecrivoit le 10. Juillet 1751. au Colonel Johnson, qu'un envoyé qui revenoit de chez les Mississagas, nation avec laquelle il avoit été negocier une alliance avoit raporté que tous les anciens sachims étoient morts, et avoient été remplacés par de jeunes sachims lesquels avoient confirmé leur ancienne alliance, et promis de l'observer et de la
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maintenir, quoy qu'ils avoient été sollicités par les françois de ne point avoir de correspondce avec les cinq nations.

Le meme envoyé raporta aussy qu'il avoit été a Cadarghqui, ou les françois construisoient un gros vaisseau qui devoit avoir trois mats, et qu'on luy dit etre destiné a venir prendre Oswego, qu'il vu six canons qui devoient servir a cet usage qui avoient neuf pied de long, et etoient percés a gros calibre.

M. Stoddert aussy posté a Oswego, confirme par la lettre qu'il ecrivoit au Colonel Johnson le 19 Juillet, la marche de ce corps de françois et d'orondacques laquelles il apprit par quelques canots commerçans et ajoute que ce corps etoit sous les ordres du Sr Belletre et du Chevalier de Longueville, et que leurs opera-

[*Translation*]

expressed all possible gratitude.

Lieutenant Lindsay, stationed at Oswego, wrote July 10, 1751, to Colonel Johnson that an envoy returning from the Missisauga, a tribe to which he had been to negotiate an alliance, had reported that all the old chiefs were dead, and had been replaced by young ones who had confirmed the old alliance, and promised to observe and maintain it although they had been solicited by the French to have no dealings with the Five Nations.

The same envoy also reported that he had been at Frontenac, where the French were building a large three-masted ship, intended to capture Oswego, and that he had seen six cannon intended for that service, nine feet long and bored to large caliber.

M. Stoddert, also stationed at Oswego, confirms by his letter of July 19 to Colonel Johnson, the march of this body of French and Adirondacks, of which he learned by trading canoes. He adds that the corps was commanded by the Sieur Bellestre and the

tions devoient etre contre un village des Twigtwees, ou les anglois batissoient une maison de pierre pour leur commerce lesquels ils devoient avertir de se retirer paisiblement, ou que sur leur refus, ils les y obligeroient de force, ce qu'ils estoient dans l'intention d'y construire un fort et d'y plaiser une garnison de 300. hommes; que le fils du gouverneur de Montreal estoit attendu a toute heure de passer près d'oswego avec quatorze canots remplis de soldats pour former cette garnison, et que les Indiens de ce village,

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etoient fort attaches aux anglois, et c'etoit pour cela que les francois les appelloient rebelles et alloient disoient ils pour les mettre a la raison deux de leurs chefs devoit n éprouver aucune misericorde, et les autres etre pardonnés s'ils se soumettent.

Et l'on a appris de toute part les tentatives que les francois font continuellement pour alier les esprits des Indiens qui sont sujets de la grande Bretagne, ou en alliance et en amitié avec eux.

Tant d'injustices et de violences reiterées, prouvent trop bien la necessité indispensable que la cour de france envoie des ins-

[*Translation*]

Chevalier de Longueuil and that their operations were directed against a Miami village where the English were building a stone house for trade: they were to warn the English to leave peaceably, and on their refusal would force them to it; they intended to build a fort there and establish a garrison of three hundred men; the son of the governor of Montreal was expected at any time to pass by Oswego with fourteen canoes filled with soldiers for that garrison; Indians of the village were much attached to the English, and it was for that that the French called them rebels and were going as they said to make them hear reason; two of their chiefs could expect no mercy; the others would be pardoned if they submitted.

Finally on every side we hear of the continual attempts of the French to alienate the minds of the Indians who are subjects of Great Britain, or are in alliance and amity.

So many repeated acts of injustice and violence prove too well the absolute necessity for the court of France's sending as

tructions positives au plustost a tous ses gouverneurs dans les Indes Occidentales de se desister de pareils procedes, de ne point entreprendre a l'avenir de telles usurpations sur les terres de la domination de sa Mte n'y d'exercer aucunes violences contre ses sujets, lesquels pouroient dans la suite devenir fatales a la bonne intelligence que Sa Mté desire d'entretenir avec Sa Mté Tres Chrestienne. Et quant a la forteresse que les francois ont entrepris de construire sur la riviere Oniagara, et aux six anglois qui ont été arrêtés, milord albemarle est chargé par sa cour de demander que des ordres les plus exprès soient envoyes a M. de la

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Jonquiere de se desister des procedes aussy injustes, et particulièrement de faire raser immediatement la forteresse dont il est question, et de faire retirer les francois ou autres peuples qui leur sont allies, qui s'y trouveroient, comme aussy de faire rendre aux six anglois et leur liberté et une ample reparation des torts et des pertes qu'on leur a fait souffrir et enfin que les personnes qui ont commis ces excès soient punies d'une maniere a

[*Translation*]

soon as possible positive orders to all its governors in the West Indies to desist from such proceedings, and in the future to undertake no more such usurpations on the king's dominions, and to commit no more acts of violence against his subjects, which may finally frustrate the good understanding that His Majesty wishes to maintain with His Most Christian Majesty. And for the fort which the French have ventured to build on the Niagara River, and for the six Englishmen who have been arrested, My Lord Albemarle is instructed by his court to demand that the most express orders be sent to M. de la Jonquière to desist from such unjust proceedings; and in particular to raze the fortress in question immediately, and to withdraw the French or tribes in alliance with them who are there; and also to restore their liberty to the six Englishmen with an ample reparation for the wrongs and losses inflicted on them; and finally that the persons who have committed these excesses be punished in a way that may serve as

servir d'exemple a ceux qui auroient envie a l'avenir de faire une pareille tentative

[*Translation*]

an example to any who may wish in the future to make similar attempts.

ALBEMARLE TO HOLDERNESSE, $\frac{\text{February } 26}{\text{March } 8}$, 1752¹

[S P France, 243:173]

PARIS $\frac{26 \text{ Feb.}}{8 \text{ Mar.}}$ 1752.

.....
 Your Lordship will observe, that tho', according to Mr Clinton's notes in Md de la Jonquière's Letter to him, he is of opinion, as to the Prisoners taken by the French, that it would seem that the Governor of Pensilvania is the most proper Person to make remarks on that part of the Letter, as the prisoners belonged to that Government, (which remarks have not been sent me, if made) Yet as he has said a little before, that the Country, in which the Prisoners were taken, belonged to the five nations, and that great part of the River Ohio was actually within the Grant to the Proprietors of Pensilvania, I have chose not to wait till an Answer from the Governor of Pensilvania can be had (which we could always have recourse to) but to lay hold of that, not to lose time to deny the Power the French Governor pretends
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to have, of giving Ordinances forbidding the English to trade in those parts, the Infraction of which occasioned the seizing of those People whom Governor Clinton demands of him, with a Satisfaction for the Seizure and Confiscation of their Effects (and which I have repeated as your Lordship directs) As I thought this argument sufficient for the present to overturn those of the French Governor's, which turn upon that Principle, and to condemn his Conduct, in which I hope I shall not be disapproved.

¹For a previous note of Albemarle to Holderness on the subject, see *N. Y. C. D.*, 10:241.

CABINET MINUTE, March 27, 1752

[Add. MSS., 32,994:300]

NEWCASTLE HOUSE March 27th: 1752.

Lord Chancellor ¹	Lord Anson
Lord President	Mr Pelham
Earl of Holderness	Duke of Newcastle
Earl of Halifax	

The Lords took under Consideration, the State of the present Disputes with France with Relation to the Limits of Nova Scotia, or Acadia, and the Right to the Islands of Sta Lucia, St. Vincent, Dominica & Tobago. And their Lordships are humbly of Opinion, that, in order to come to an amicable Accommodation of these Disputes, whereby the Rights, & Interests of His Majesty's Crown may be secured; It may be advisable to endeavour to induce the Court of France, to enter forthwith into Negociation between Court & Court, for settling these Points in Dispute; and that Mor de Mirepoix² should be acquainted with it.

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Their Lordships are, also, humbly of Opinion, that, if the Court of France shall consent to it, an Accommodation may be accepted, which would secure the quiet Possession of the Peninsula, with the Bay of Fundy; and of such a Part of the Continent, as shall secure the Possession of the Bay of Fundy, & His Majesty's other Northern Colonies; and that the rest of the Country, up to the Banks of the River St Laurence, shall remain unsettled, & unoccupied, by either Power. & And such an Agreement being made, for the Security of His Majesty's Northern Colonies: Their Lordships are humbly of Opinion, that a perpetual Neutrality for the Islands, in Dispute, may also be accepted. [Endorsed:] NEWCASTLE HOUSE March 27th 1752. Minute.

¹The persons noted as present are: the Earl of Hardwicke, lord chancellor, see *ante*, xxvi, n.; the Earl of Halifax, president of the board of trade, *ante*, xxxi, n.; Henry Pelham, prime minister; and his brother the Duke of Newcastle; Lord Anson, first lord of the admiralty, 1697-1762, son-in-law of Hardwicke. The lord president is John Carteret, Earl of Granville, 1690-January 2, 1763, secretary of state for the southern department, 1721-1724, northern department, 1742-1744. He held office for five days in 1746 in George II's futile attempt to shake off the Whig control. He had been lord president since June 17, 1751.

²For Mirepoix, see *ante*, xxv.

HARDWICKE TO NEWCASTLE, May 15, 1752

[Add. MSS., 32,727:180]

Private POWIS HOUSE, May 15th, 1752

.....
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Your Grace will be inform'd by my Lord Holdernessee of the Result of the Meeting on our American Disputes with France.

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It was the general opinion not to bring that affair, for the present, before the Lords Justices, as You had left that matter at large. There was no difference of opinion amongst the Lords, that met, tho' I think some seemed inclined to go rather faster than I was. My Notion is that, after Mr St Contest has communicated the Paper he has promis'd, the original Instructions to my Lord Albemarle should be formed exactly upon the Minute taken at Newcastle-House. That will be a proper Counter-project, even tho' France should (as Your Grace suspects & I think is very probable) demand a Tract, or Lisiere of Land on the Southern Bank of the River St Lawrence, to be left to them. That Point may create some difficulty, because it will be ceding to France, in possession, part of what is now understood here to be the Right of the Crown of Great Britain. But possibly it may not be worth the while, on that account, to break off the Negotiation, if This should be finally insisted on by France; and may it not then be time enough to instruct my Lord Albemarle to tack to it the Demand of the demolition of the Fort at Crown-Point, by way of Equivalent or Condition? If your Grace casts your Eye on the Map, You will see that Fortress seems very dangerous & threatning to New York, & may one day enable France from thence to push thro' our Northern Colonies to the Sea. If this Demolition can be attain'd, my Lord Halifax & Lord Anson think it will be a great Point gained; but doubt much whether France will come into it, unless they can get the possession of Ste Lucia thrown into the Bargain, of which You know my Lord Granville makes no account. I write this only as to the progress of your Instructions, & the Time when You would produce your Ultimatum, of which Your Grace is the best Judge.

The chief reason why a Draught of Instructions was not now prepar'd is that it was thought they might be drawn upon fuller & clearer Lights, after Mor St Contest's Paper is seen. But, if then

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Your Grace shall thing proper that the Instructions should be prepared here, it will readily be done, and I think it is fit that Your Grace, who has so great a load, should be eased as much as possible.

.....

CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEM OF THE OHIO, 1752-1754

BIGOT¹ TO THE MINISTER, October 26, 1752

[A N Colonies C11A 98:269]

Canada.

26. Oct. 1752.

MONSEIGNEUR

.....
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Je vois, Monseigneur, que vous n'approuviez point le parti que Mr de Longueuil² avoit pris de faire passer pendant l'été un
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détachement de 400: hommes aux miamis pour y hyverner en attendant un renfort de 5. ou 600: qui auroient esté les y joindre par la Belle riviere au printemps, Le défaut de vivres pour la route de ce détachement l'a empesché de partir en juillet, mais j'avois fait parvenir en may et juin au Detroit tout ce qui luy

[*Translation*]

Canada

October 26, 1752

MY LORD:

.....
I see, My Lord, that you in no wise approved the course taken by M. de Longueuil² of sending during the summer a detachment of four hundred men to the Miamis to winter there while awaiting a reënforcement of five hundred or six hundred who were to have joined them by the Ohio River in the spring. Lack of provisions for the march prevented their setting off in July, but I had had sent to Detroit in May and June all that was

¹ François Bigot, born in 1703, the able but corrupt intendant, 1748-1760. The extract emphasizes the fact that French aggressive action on the upper Ohio was the point of divergence of the policy enforced by the French ministry from the so-called Canadian policy. See *ante*, xviii.

² See *ante*, xix, n.

estoit nécessaire, ce qui a coûté des sommes, tant pour les vivres achettés a un prix excessif, que pour le transport.

Le sistême, en effet, de Mrs de Longueuil estoit de soumettre par nous mêmes les rebelles miamis et de laisser tranquille la belle

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Riviere, ayant une vénération et une consideration particuliere pour les Iroquois qui y président. Lorsque ces Messrs cependant eurent lû dans les papiers du gouvernement a la mort de M. le Mis de la Jonquiere, une lettre un peu vive que vous ecrivies a ce général, par laquelle il paroissoit que vous souhaittiés fort qu'on en chassa les anglois, ils dirent qu'on pourroit y aller par la suite, mais qu'il faloit pour le present tranquiliser les pays d'enhaut. Je leur avois représenté bien souvent et toujours inutilement, avant qu'ils eussent lû cette lettre, que la belle riviere estoit la source de

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tous les desordres qui régnoient parmi les sauvages, que les Anglois traittoient et dominoient sur une terre qui appartenoit a la france et dont la possession nous estoit nécessaire pour nôtre communication avec le mississipi; le gouverneur me répondit tres

[*Translation*]

necessary, which has cost considerable sums, both for provisions bought at an excessive rate, and for transport.

The policy, in effect, of M. de Longueuil was to subjugate by our own means the rebel Miamis and to leave the Ohio River in peace, since he had veneration and special consideration for the Iroquois who preside there. However when these gentlemen had read in the official papers on the death of M. le Marquis de la Jonquière a somewhat sharp letter you had written to the general, from which it appeared you much desired the English to be driven off, they said it could be done in due course, but it was first necessary to pacify the upcountry. I had often and uselessly represented to them, before they had read that letter, that the Ohio River was the source of all the disorder that reigned among the Indians; that the English traded as masters over a land which belonged to France, the possession of which was necessary to us for our communication with the Mississippi. The governor replied to

nettement que les anglois y traittoient avant nous, qu'il n'estoit pas juste de les en chasser, qu'au surplus cette riviere appartenoit aux Iroquois et que nous n'avions qu'a leur fournir tous leurs besoins, comme les anglois faisoient, ces derniers se retireroient d'eux mêmes quand ils veroient ne pouvoir y gagner leur vie. Je fus, je vous l'avouë, Monseigneur, surpris et piqué de cette

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réponse, et je l'assuray fort que je reconnoissois la belle Riviere pour appartenir a la france et que le roy y avoit renouvelé sa prise de possession il y a trois ans.

Vous avez heureusement envoyé un général, car si le gouvernement eût esté encor un an entre les mains de ces messieurs, le système Canadien auroit bien prévalû et personne ne se seroit oublié. Les guerres sauvages auroit eû lieu tant qu'on auroit pû ; c'est pour lors qu'il y auroit eû des dépenses immenses dans les pays d'enhaut et que chacun auroit produit des mémoires,

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outre ceux que les partis auroient occasionnés légitimement.

[*Translation*]

me very curtly that the English had traded there before we did, and that it was not just to drive them away; moreover that river belonged to the Iroquois, and that we had only to supply their wants as the English did, and the English would go of themselves when they saw they could no longer make a living. I was, I avow to you, My Lord, surprised and piqued at this answer, and I assured him strongly that I regarded the Ohio River as belonging to France, and that the king three years ago had renewed his act of possession.

Fortunately you have sent out a general, for if the government had been another year in the hands of these gentlemen, the Canadian policy would have indeed prevailed and no one would have forgotten it. The Indian war would have taken place so far as possible; for there would have been huge expenditures in the upcountry and each officer would have presented accounts in addition to those for which there was legitimate occasion.

ALBEMARLE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, December 27, 1752
[S P France, 245:261]

PARIS Dec 27, 1752.

.....
There are five of His Majesty's subjects from Philadelphia in
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the prisons of La Rochelle, that were taken by some French and Indians of Canada, and plundered of their Merchandizes I have claimed the Philadelphians as His Majesty's subjects, demanding that they may be set at liberty, and indemnified for their Losses. The former I have obtained, and shall send them to England as soon as possible, but to the latter part of my demand, I have been answered that those people were taken in carrying on a counterband trade with the French Indians, in consequence of which all their goods had been seized and confiscated. I have the honour to be with the greatest respect

.....
HALIFAX ON FRENCH ENCROACHMENTS, August 15, 1753
[Add. MSS., 33,029:96]

The Proceedings of the French in America, of which Great Britain has Cause of Complaint, are of two kinds,

1. Contraventions or Evasions of the Agreements entred into by both Crowns with respect to such points as are in dispute and the subject of the present Negotiation.
2. Encroachments and Hostilities, made and carried on within the Territories which indisputably belong to Great Britain, and the Right to which can not be drawn into question.

.....
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With respect to the Encroachments of the French upon Territories indisputably belonging to Great Britain, it must be premised, that the great Object of the French has for many Years been to unite their Settlements upon the River St Lawrence with those upon the Mississippi, so as at all times to have a free, safe and convenient Chanel of Communication, and whereby they might secure to themselves all the valuable and extensive Lands

upon these two Rivers and the lesser ones which fall into them, and confine the English to as narrow Limits as possible. They

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found themselves however greatly obstructed in the Execution of such a Plan as this, during the War between the two Crowns in the Reigns of King William and Queen Anne, as the six Nations of Indians who were possessed of all the Country lying upon the Heads of these Rivers and upon the great Lakes were firmly established in the English Interest and at Enmity with the French; but no sooner was Peace reestablished between the two Crowns, than the French began to put their favourite Scheme in execution by advancing their Settlements up the Mississippi, and by building Forts and making new Settlements upon and adjacent to the Great Lakes, altho' by the Treaty of Utrecht the six Nations of Indians, within whose Country these Forts have been built and Settlements made, were acknowledged to be the Subjects of Great Britain. The principal Forts built and Settlements made by the French upon Lands indisputably belonging to Great Britain by every kind of Right which the Law of Nations has established, are as follows, viz.

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1. Fort St Joseph upon the River of that name.
2. St Ignace, a small Fort opposite to Missillimackinac.
3. Le Detroit.
4. Fort Toronto on the Borders of Lake Ontario opposite to Oswego, to awe the Indians of the six nations on that side the Lake, and to intercept the Northern Indians as they go to Oswego.
5. Cadaracqui Fort upon the North side of Lake Ontario.
6. Chamblie Fort.
7. Fort Sorell.
8. Fort at Niagara.
9. Crown Point.

It will appear upon an Inspection of the Map, that all these Places are clearly not only within the Territory of the Six Nations, but also within some one or other of the British Provinces; and it will also appear, what a great Extent of Territory France

has secured to herself by building them, and how effectually she has answered the great Object of joining the two Provinces of Canada and Louisiana, and confining the English to their present Settlements: But the Forts, by which the British Interest is most affected and her Rights injured, are those of Crown Point and Niagara, the fatal Consequences of which are sufficiently pointed out by their Situation.

The Province of Louisiana, being of a much later Establishment than that of Canada, did not make so great a Progress in pushing her Settlements; nor does it appear, that before the last War the French had any considerable Settlements on the eastern side of the Mississippi; but as that Province has of late Years greatly increased in Number of Inhabitants and in military Strength, so her Endeavour to extend her Dominion has increased in proportion; and no sooner was the War at an end than the French turned their Thoughts to compleating that Scheme, in

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which they had before made so considerable a Progress; and in order to give some Colour to their Proceedings, they begun by setting up a Claim to all the Lands lying upon any Rivers or Waters terminating in the Rivers St Lawrence and Mississippi.

.....

And should the French establish themselves here [on the Ohio], which no doubt but that they will, unless soon and vigorously opposed, they will have compleated their favourite Plan, and will be in possession of near two-thirds of the very best unsettled Land on this Side the Mississippi and St Lawrence, while Great Britain will not only lose near one half of the Territory, to which it is indisputably entitled, but in case of a future Rupture, will find it extremely difficult to keep the other half.

[*Endorsed:*] R. August 15th 1753 (from Lord Halifax).

CABINET MINUTE, August 21, 1753

[Add. MSS., 32,995:26]

NEWCASTLE HOUSE August 21st 1753.

Lord Chancellor	Mr Pelham
Lord President	Sir John Ligonier
Lord Anson	Duke of Newcastle

Sir Piercy Brett	} attending
Mr Desmarests	

.....
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Their Lordships are likewise of opinion, that The strongest Representations should be made, by My Lord Albemarle, upon The Accounts, sent by Captain Pye, of the non Execution of The Treaties: And upon The French King's own Promise, That the Neutral Islands should be evacuated.

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And That, with regard to The Settlement said to be intended to be made by the French, on the River-*Ohio*; General Orders should be sent to The Several Governors in North America, To do their Utmost, To prevent, by Force, These, and any such Attempts, That may be made, by the French, or by the Indians, in The French Interest.

PAPERS DELIVERED BY HALIFAX TO ROBINSON, April, 1754

[Add. MSS., 32,995:271v]

Two Papers delivered by Ld Halifax to Sir Thos Robinson in April 1754.

The one, relating to the Proceedings of the French in America with regard to the Contraventions, or Evasions of the Agreements entered into, with respect to the Points in Dispute,

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viz the Right to the Islands of St Lucia, St Vincent, Dominica, & the limits of Nova Scotia. And to Encroachments, & Hostilities made, and carried on, within the Territories, which indisputably belong to Great Britain, particularly on the Back of the English Settlements in No. America, on the River Ohio, & Lake Erie.

The other Paper contains a Proposal for building Forts &c on the Ohio, & other Rivers in No. America, in order to check & stop the Encroachments of the French.

HALIFAX ON FRENCH ENCROACHMENTS¹

[Add. MSS., 33,029:102]

Since the Treaty of Utrecht, the French have made the following Encroachments in America, Vizt.

Two Forts at Niagara erected in the Year 1720.

One at Toronto, on the North West side of Lake Ontario.

Three on the South Side of the Lake Erie, built in the Years 1749. 1750. & 1752. Vizt. One at Sandoski in 1749 or 1750. One at Presqu' Isle, and One at the head of Riviere des Boeufs in 1752.

They have forcibly taken a Fort, built by the King's Order on the Ohio.

All these Forts are in that Part of the Territory, which
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the Five Nations yielded to Great Britain in 1701.

They have erected several Forts, & made Settlements on the Rivers Mississippi, & Mowille, which are within the Limits of some one or other of the King's Colonies, according to their original Charters, which extend their Boundaries from the Atlantick Ocean to the South Sea.

A Fort at the River St. John in Acadie.

Another at Beaubassin on the Isthmus of the Peninsula; and a Third at Baye Verte.

These three last Forts have been built since the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle.

They also erected a Fort in the year 1726. on Lake Cham-
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plain in the Province of New York, and on Lands granted by the Governor of that Province to His Majesty's Subjects.

N.B. Particularly, the Territory on the Side of the Ohio, or Belle Riviere.

¹ One of several papers of the Earl of Halifax, setting forth the extreme British claims.

The Forts at Niagara & Crown Point.

The Forts on the River St John & in the Isthmus of the Peninsula of Nova Scotia.

[*Endorsed:*] Encroachments made by the French in America since the Treaty of Utrecht.

NEWCASTLE TO HORATIO WALPOLE,¹ May 14, 1754

[Add. MSS., 32,735:268]

NEWCASTLE HOUSE May 14, 1754.

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As to The First, I have no Fear about it, Except from The Encroachments of The French in America; The Non-Evacuation of The Neutral Islands; And The Infraction of The Treaty of Utrecht, by the late Works at Dunkirk; Tho' I hope, & Think, That The present disposition of The French Court is so pacifick,

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That, if. We take Care of Our Rights, and Possessions, in North America, by either building Forts on our Boundaries To render Their's useless; Or even by demolishing Such, as may have been *clearly*, & *notoriously* built upon our Ground: *That* will not produce any Disturbance, but be matter of Debate, & Negotiation, wherein They will be The Complainants, as We unfortunately have hitherto been. As to Dunkirk, We must complain & remonstrate; But I doubt, We shall get no Redress; And There, I am afraid, we must leave it, for the present. The Evacuation of The Neutral Islands, I should hope, might be brought about:—But The Behaviour of The French upon That, is abominable.

.....
¹See *ante*, xxxiv, n.

CABINET MINUTE, June 26, 1754

[Add. MSS., 33,029:124]

NEWCASTLE HOUSE June 26th 1754

Present

Lord Chancellor	Earl of Halifax
Duke of Newcastle	Lord Anson
Marquess of Hartington ¹	Sir Thos Robinson ²
Earl of Holderness	

Their Lordships having taken into farther Consideration the present State of Affairs in North America: and It appearing by the latest Accounts from thence, That the French had actually destroyed the Fort, built on the River Ohio, and had invaded His Majesty's Dominions there with a considerable Force of Regular Troops, amounting to 1000 Men at least, and that there were other large Bodies of Men proceeding to join the said French Forces: whereby all Intercourse with the Indians would be cut off, and such advantage be gained by the French, as would

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endanger all the Northern Colonies, and tend to the total Destruction thereof and of their Trade: Their Lordships were humbly of Opinion, That the most effectual Measures should be forthwith taken for the Defence of the said Frontiers, and for obliging the French to retire from thence;

.....

NEWCASTLE TO HORATIO WALPOLE, June 29, 1754

[Add. MSS., 32,735:597]

CLAREMONT June 29, 1754.

.....

I am very glad to be able to tell you, That the Principles upon which we have proceeded, and The Resolutions which we have taken are entirely agreeable to your Letter. The first point we have laid down, is, That the Colonies must not be abandon'd. That

¹ William Cavendish, Marquis of Hartington, 1720-October 2, 1764. Duke of Devonshire, December 5, 1755. One of the great Whig lords whose transparent uprightness set off ability that was but average.

² For Sir Thomas Robinson, see *ante*, xxiv, n.

our Rights and Possessions in North America must be maintain'd, and, The French obliged to desist from their Hostile Attempts to dispossess us. They have by our last accounts drove us from a Fort we had built upon the River Ohio, had got above 1000 regular Troops, & were proceeding to make themselves Masters of that River, & by that Means cut off all our Communication with the Indians our Friends; & in time get a Communication from Canada by the River Ohio to the Sea. . . .

ALBEMARLE TO ROBINSON, August 21, 1754¹

[Add. MSS., 33,027:272]

PARIS Wednesday 21st August 1754

SIR,

Mor Machault² in his Character of Minr of the Marine who has the Colonies in his Department sent a Compl't to Mor Roüillé of the treacherous manner in wch one of their Officers had been kill'd by a party of English near the borders of the Ohio—He read me the *Ler* Mor du Quesne the Govr of Canada had wrote to the Bureau of the Marine on the Occasion wch was reced last Week: the Officers name is Jumenville, his rank is that of Ensign, who had been sent by Mor du Quesne to read some kind of declara from that Govr to the party of English, & a summons to retire from those parts & that while he was in the Executn of his Duty our Soldiers fired at him & shot him dead.—Mor du Quesne's *Ler* goes on & says that they were preparing themselves to revenge this perfidious Action.

I cod make no other Answer to Mor de Machault than that I was totally unaqtd with the Affair, That indeed I knew by private Lers that some time in May last a party of forty french having been sent out to reconnoitre the position & strength of the English Col Washington had met them with a detachmt of equal force upon wch a Skirmish ensued wherein the french had

¹ The diplomatic correspondence with France for the last half of 1754 is missing from the Public Record Office, but is in the Shelburne Papers in the William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan. This and the following dispatches of Albemarle have been taken from a contemporary copy in the Newcastle Papers.

² See *ante*, xxxvi, n.

been worsted—That I cod not but imagine if any such thing had been done as wt Mor Du Quesne complain'd of, that the Circumstances had been greatly aggravated & that if it had really pass'd in the manner it was there related I was confident that it co'd have been done but by some of the Savages in our Service on whose Sense of honor it was true there co'd not always be the firmest Reliance, as an Instance of it I put him in mind of the like Compl't we had made sometime ago of one of our Officers having been kill'd in a most barbarous manner by one of their parties to whom (wch was worse than the present case) he had been carrying some pacifick propositions—That I hoped Mor Du Quesne wod be prudent enough not to give occasion by committing of continual Hostilities on the occasion to wch Mor Roüillé replied that Mor Machault had wrote to him to behave in the most moderate manner & to Act wth H. Ms Subjects as wth a Nation wth whom France lives in Peace & friendship & not to use any violent means unless he shod be obliged to repell Force by Force—Mor Roüillé then Acqted me that Mor de Vaudreuil who was Govr of Louïsi-ana & is his particular friend had had orders sent him to return to France to receive his Instructions on his being appointed to releive Mor du Quesne in the Governmt of Canada for wch he was to set out sometime abt the next Spring That my Court might depend on that Gent's prudence & his receiving the strictest Orders to entertain a good Correspondce & Neighbourhood wth the English as long as They shod be inclined to Act wth them in the same friendly Manner. My answer was such as naturally offerd on a Conversan of this Nature.

.....

NEWCASTLE TO ALBEMARLE, September 5, 1754

[Add. MSS., 32,850:218]

Private NEWCASTLE HOUSE Sept 5th 1754

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I don't know, Whether You will hear of it in Form; But I may tell You in Confidence, That Our Troops upon The Frontiers of Virginia, amounting to 300 men Independent Companies &ca, have been defeated by a Superior Number of French, & oblig'd to

retire—I am afraid, They have left several Pieces of Cannon behind Them. The Insults, and Encroachments of the French have alarm'd The Inhabitants of Our Colonies to That Degree That Many of Them have left Their Habitations, with Crops upon Their Lands. All North America will be lost, If These Practices are tolerated: and no War can be worse to This Country,

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Than The Suffering such Insults, as These. The Truth is, The French claim almost all North America, Except a Lisiere to The Sea, To which They would confine all Our Colonies, & from whence They may drive us whenever They please, or as soon as There shall be a Declar'd War. But That is What We must not, We will not suffer: And I hope, We shall forthwith take such Measures (and Some are already taken) as will for the future, put the labouring Oar, & The Complaint, upon Them. Mirepoix has always talk'd reasonably upon This Subject: And I told Him, upon His going away, That He should take an Opportunity to insinuate, That, as The French King was really for

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Peace, They should take Care, That Their Officers in The West India, & in remote Parts, did not act so, as might make it impossible for The French King to obtain His View of Peace, and To have His own Intentions take Effect. Mirepoix writes me Word, That *He has made good Use* of What Thus pass'd between Him & Me.

During These Hostilities in The Indies, Mor Rouillé presses The Renewal of The Negotiation with The Commissaries: And assures You, That The strongest Orders are sent to Their Governors, & Officers, To give no Cause of Complaint. Suppose it is so—Those Govrs, & Officers will say, That They act, in Consequence of standing Orders To defend, and maintain, The Rights,

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belonging to the Crown of France: Tho' in Reality, There is not The least Pretence for saying, That These Countries belong to Them—And Then They get into Possession by Force; And afterwards, or at the same Time, To shew Their pacifick Disposition, They offer to refer The Discussion of Those Rights to Com-

missaries. I own, I am quite sick of Commissaries, Tho' I don't well know how to get rid of Them. I am sure, They will do no Good; And Therefore hope, We shall not be so far amus'd by Their Conferences, as To suspend, or delay, taking The proper Measures To defend Ourselves, or recover our lost Possessions.

I could not avoid flinging out my Thoughts to you, upon This Serious Subject. Ensenada¹ was sent to Granada, for sending Orders, That might have drawn The King of Spain into a War malgré Lui.

I am My Dear Lord,
Ever Yours

HOLLES NEWCASTLE

ALBEMARLE TO ROBINSON, September 18, 1754

[Add. MSS., 33,027:276]

PARIS Wednesday 18th September 1754.

SIR,

I have been hond wth both your dispatches of the 12th Inst & Mor Roüillé havg given me an Opportunity, I touch'd in General on the State of Affairs in America, so as to make him Comprehend, they were by no Means in such a Condition, as was proper to encourage a reciprocal Confidce; at the same time, I wod not let him be Ignorant, of the gracious regard H. M. had been pleas'd to express, of his prsonal Character, & good Intentions; at which, he shew'd the greatest Sensibility: telling me, that his Ambition was, to have Opportunities of giving Proofs of the Sincerity of them: As to the other Points, he insisted, that if my Court had been well informed, they wod have known, that the Neutral Islands had been strictly evacuated; And with respect to what was passing on the Continent of America, He was sorry to find things on the footing they now were, particularly, for the late Action between the French & English Troops: that he perceiv'd these Matters were exagarated, as there was no Intention whatever, in the Court of France, to make Invasions or Usurpations; but that the cause of this last Skirmish, had been to take

¹ For Ensenada, see *ante*, xxxv-xxxvi.

revenge of the Assassination as he call'd it, of Mor de Jumainville, (wch I mention'd in one of my late Letters). Upon this, he shew'd me the Capitulation their Officer had given to the Eng-
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lish Troops, asking me, whether there had been such very great Outrages committed.—I told him the Act itself was a Violence, ill becoming a Nation with whom we thought ourselves in Peace & Friendship & wch the Conditions of the Capitulation, had they been ever so moderate, cod never palliate; that I cod not help observg even in these, that much more cod not have been done, had there been Open War: in particular, the keeping of the Artillery, & obliging the English Colours to be struck: I concluded by telling him, that as I had not reced any Instructions on all these Points, what I had said, was only Historically & from myself.—He replied, that he wod then receive it as such, but that he hoped, means wod soon be found, to put an end to these Jealousies & misunderstandings.

.....
P. S. The Capitulation Mor Roüillé shew'd me, was to the best of my Recollection, to the same purport, as that Printed in Our daily Advertizer of the 12th of this Month.

ROBINSON TO NEWCASTLE, September 23, 1754

[Add. MSS., 32,736:569]

WHITEHALL September 23. 1754.

MY LORD

Since seeing Lord Halifax, who I know is gone to Your Grace extremely satisfyed with all that has passed with respect to North America, I have been at Kensington. I had no occasion to make the King a report of what happened yesterday. Whether his Royal Highness had spoken to the King both *before* and *after* I had waited upon his Highness, His Majesty recapitulated to me allmost all that the Duke¹ had said to me, applauding in the

¹ The Duke of Cumberland, the king's younger son, in his capacity as commander-in-chief had outlined the plans for Braddock's expedition. See *ante*, xxxvii.

highest manner his Son's great scheme, assuring himself, upon his Royal Highness's words, of the success of it, and shewing his surprise, not without the greatest satisfaction, how his Royal Highness could have made himself so entirely master of the Sub-

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ject. In a Word, My Lord, I never saw his Majesty so entirely pleased, and I could I think discern no less satisfaction below stairs. I humbly hope that all doubts, if there are any, will be removed at or, rather, before the meeting. There would, I should humbly presume, be no difficulty in fixing secretly and in one's own breast, an ultimatum for both *operation* and *negotiation*, for *Political* not *imaginary* Boundaries, for *Solid*, and not *Charter* Limits. Such a principle once resolved upon and adhered to will surmount everything.

The King has ordered me to express his Majesty's approbation of the Earl of Albemarle's zeal. His Majesty has a good opinion of Mr. Braddock's Sense and Bravery, and has heard he is become very *stayed*. His Majesty has likewise a good opinion of Colonel Dunbar, who has been thought of, as proper to go with his regiment in order to supply Mr Braddock's place in case of accident. His Majesty is for sparing all sorts of arms furniture ammunition, artillery and engineers. He looks upon the whole as the Highest national Service, and only hopes that

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means will be found to complete the remaining Corps in Ireland to their full number of 12000 men.

By your Grace's question *where are we to meet?* I should suppose Your Grace's intention was not to be at Newcastle house, if so, mine, if convenient, is at Your Grace's service. Fancying that this short account might not be disagreeable I have presumed to send another Messenger, and shall only beg leave to add that true respect with which I have the honour to be

My Lord

Your Grace's

Most obedient

and most humble Servant

T. ROBINSON

ALBEMARLE TO ROBINSON, October 23, 1754

[Add. MSS., 33,027 :279v]

FONTAINEBLEAU Wednesday 23d
October 1754

Separate.

SIR, I am now to Acqt you wth the Conversatn I have had
wth Mor Rouillé, since writing my other Lettr of the date

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..... And when we had settled the Point,
as much to my Satisfactn as I co for the present expect, he open'd
himself to me, on our pretended Expedition for Virginia, by
Complimentg me, on my Sons being appointed, to Commd the ships
designed for that Coast; & on his asking, wth some Eagerness wt
number that Squadron was to consist of; I answd him (wth truth)
that I did not positively know, havg only heard, that it wod be
composed but of few, to escort some Troops, we were said to be
sendg to Virginia, at the Instance of our Merchts; to prevent the
Progress of the french Arms, in that part of the World; & this,
I said, we might do, in imitatn of their own Example, who had
been for so many years sending Ships, Men, Arms & Ammun
to their American Settlemts;—Mor Rouillé owned they had done
this, Adding, that if his Advice had been followed, even more had
been sent, & that very probably, they wo'd at this time, order
a stronger Force to go, as being (said he) the most effectual way,
to prevent a War in those parts. (a Phrase he did not choose to
explain).—His manner of speaking, gave me room to lay some
stress on my Complts (wch I made him understand, were from
myself only) of their Hostile unjustifiable Proceedings on the
Ohio; to wch he replied, that they only retook possession of their
own, & endeavd to confine us to our Limits, since we had en-
croached upon theirs so far as the above ment: river; wch cod
never be look'd upon, as the boundary of the Brittish possessions.
—But upon my asking him, in virtue of wt Principle they took
upon them, to prescribe our Limits to Us, when I understood that
both Crowns had named Commissaries to settle those Points, &
that during their Negocians, nothing was to be attempted on
either side; I found the Reproach stung him, not knowing how

to answer or evade the Question, otherwise than by dropping that part of the Conversan.—He then turn'd it, to the general professions made by all Powers in Europe, of their desire for Peace: I assur'd him, that such was H. M.'s Sincere disposition, but that (to speak my own private thoughts) I did not Conceive, that the Court follow'd so laudable an Example, since I found by my Correspondce wth some of my Brethren, that the french Minrs were misrepresenting & blackening the King's measures & designs, & those of his Allies, in all the Courts Connected with France, and endeavouring to prejudice them agt Us.—It little becomes you, interrupted he, to accuse Us, when your News Papers are every day loading us, & appealing to the World for Justice; This *Saillie* of his, drew from me, that I was the farthest from taking the part, for the dark disavow'd writers, of uncredited news Papers, who shelter'd themselves, behind the Claim of the Liberty of the Press, wch he very well knew, was carried beyond the Bounds of Decency in England, nor cod be ignorant, of the difficulty of restraining it: But still (I added) I wod much rather choose that open Method, than any underhand dealings: That it was a misfortune for us, that those News Papers he was so very fond of blaming, were the means of making all our Actions & Resolutions Publick, wch France reced an advantage from, while she had that of keeping everything concealed from the knowledge of her Neighbours.

.....

ALBEMARLE TO ROBINSON, November 27, 1754

[Add. MSS., 33,027:283v]

PARIS Wednesday 27th November 1754

SIR,

Mor Roüillé who attended yesterday in Town opend the Conversao wth me on the Affairs of America by asking me whether H. M.'s Ships had yet set sail for that part of the World, & upon telling him I had not reced any Accots of it, he shook his head as from a Motion of Anxiety & ask'd me whether I thought there was no means of Accommodating these things in a friendly manner, I answer'd that he might be sure the king wod

at all times be ready to listen to anything reasonable & since he (Mor Rouillé had put the Question to me I woud take upon me to propose to him (tho' uninstructed) as a Preliminary Step to open the way to the Accommodan he had mention'd that H. M. C. M. shod order his Troops who had made such rapid Encroachmts to return behind the Ohio & leave everything on the English side of that River in the State it was in before, after wch if France had any Complots to make or proposals to offer they woud be reced wth the just Attention that woud be due to them.—To this Mor Rouillé replied that he thot it impossible to consent as it woud be shewing too much Weakness on their part to recede from Measures that were founded on their undoubted Right to the Territory they had enter'd, but at the same time profess'd he shod be extremely glad to find some method to prevent any Violent Measures the Conseqnes of which (he added) cod not but be fatal to the Publick Tranquility—You will believe Sir, I did not leave unanswer'd the pretended right he said they were vindicating & tho I endeavour'd to draw from him in what manner he thought this point cod be terminated to the Satisfacn of the King my Mar I found that what he had advanced proceeded entirely from himself rather than from any directions he had reced, since instead of returning me a direct Answer he only said in gen that *"Je suis fâché de tout ceci car je prévois que nous serons obligé d'envoyer aussi du monde en Amerique"*¹ And he then shifted the Conversan to talk of the Proceedings of the Commries wch he hoped wd now be expeditious, And upon this enter'd into all the Common-place reasoning of the Expediency of their coming to a Conclusion on the Affairs referr'd to them for the Interest of both Crowns: this gave me the Opporrtty to ask him when Mor de la Galissonniere woud be ready to attend that Business, He told me that he had return'd into Port wth his Squadron some time ago & was now on his way to Paris but had desired leave to spend a few days wth a friend whose House he was to pass by & that he woud be in Paris in a very short time.

Mor Rouillé having taken no notice at all of H. M's Speech

¹ I am vexed at all this, for I foresee that we shall have to send more men to America.

in opening the Parliament I did not think it necessary to say anything to him upon it.

.....

ALBEMARLE TO ROBINSON, December 18, 1754

[Add. MSS., 33,027:287]

PARIS Wednesday 18th December 1754

SIR, What Mor Rouillé said to me yesterday, being deliver'd, as he was pleas'd to tell me, *comme Ami à Ami*, I can only have the honor to Acqt you with it, in that Light—He said he spoke to me, as a well wisher & Lover of Peace, & that as such, he cod not help expressing his uneasiness, at the Sailing of our Fleet to America wth so considerable a Force as was on board, the Consequences of which he dreaded, as it seem'd fully sufficient to Attempt Conquests, rather than design'd as a mere defensive, which wod not require any such preparations; and upon Assuring him that there was no such Intention in England, of making new Conquests, but only to defend ourselves against future Encroachments, & to vindicate those, that may have already been made; he replied, that they (the french) had not gone further, than preventing our Invasions upon their Territories, & obliging our Troops, to keep within their proper Boundaries, & that they had no design, whatever, to do more; He then added, that he wish'd, that these things cod be put in the State they were in, before & at the End of the War, conformable to the Treaties of Utrecht & Aix La Chapelle, as a means of preventing, any unfriendly Actions between the two Nations, in that part of the world; I encouraged these sentiments in him, as a Justice to be done Us on their part, but as he spoke to me, as from himself only, we cod go no further at present.

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He then shew'd me, an Extract of a lettr from Mor Du Quesne, their Govr at Quebec, wch he permitted me to Copy, & is here inclosed, from which he drew this Conclusion, that the Contrariety of Informations from the respective Govrs argued, that neither of them represented the exact State of the Case; but this Lettr (he said) might serve as a Proof, that no Orders had

been sent from the Court, to commit any Violences, much less any Hostilities, & that there was no Intentions, of invading the Rights & Possessions belonging to the English Nation.—He then told me, that Mor Du Quesne's Governmt of three years, being near expiring, he wou'd be reliev'd by Mor De Vaudreuil.

From the W. Indies, he touch'd on the Affairs of the E. Indies, & shew'd diffidence, of our protracting the Conclusion of the Treaty between the two Compies till we shou'd hear w^t Effect the arrival of our Fleet in these last Countries w^d have;—that at least, if we had meant to deal freely & openly wth France, the Instructions given to Adml Watson, might have been Communicated to this Court: I condemn'd his unjust & groundless Suspicions, by setting before him, how different an opinion, H. M. great & noble Conduct on all occasions, ought to have given Them: And as to the Second Point, I repeated to him, w^t he might recollect I had formerly told him,—that in sending the Squadron to the E. Indies, w^{ch} the King had thot necessary & adviseable to do, H.M. had proceeded wth that Delicacy towards the Court, that the strictest Orders were given, to the Commanders, both of the Land & Sea Forces, cautiously to avoid, whatever cod even be construed as an Hostility ag^t the french comp unless their Proceedings shou'd oblige them to it.—Upon this, Mor Rouillé, who now appear'd better satisfied, said that he was sure, that if these Matters were referr'd to two Psons only, such as the E. of Holderness & the Duc de Mirepoix, they might finish the whole Affair, *d'un seul Coup de Plume*; upon which I told him, I hoped Mor de Mirepoix's Instructions wou'd be fram'd agreeable to this way of thinking of his.

.....

INSTRUCTIONS FOR MIREPOIX, December 30, 1754

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 437:433]

Lu et approuvé au conseil d'état le 23. xbre 1754

Joint a la depeche du 31. xbre 1754.

M de Bussi¹ étoit accoutumé a se 30. xbre 1754. A VERSAILLES
servir du terme Le Sieur un tel

Il falloit mettre Mons le Duc de &c

Instructions pour le Sr Duc de Mirepoix retournant &c.

La presence du Sr Duc de Mirepoix a la cour de Londres
étant devenue absolument necessaire par la situation critique des
affaires, l'intention du roy est qu'il s'y rendre le plus promptement
qu'il lui sera possible.

Son premier soin a son arrivée sera de représenter au Roy
d'Angre et a ses ministres "que le roy n'a pu voir qu'avec sur-
prise les armemens qui se sont tant en Angre que dans les colonies

[Translation]

Read and approved at the
state council, December 23, 1754

Annexed to the dispatch of

December 31, 1754

VERSAILLES, December 30, 1754

M. de Bussy¹ was accustomed to use the
term, the Sieur such a one. You should
say, M. le Duc de, etc.

Instructions for the Sieur Duc de Mirepoix returning, etc.

The presence of the Sieur Duc de Mirepoix at the court of
London having become absolutely necessary from the critical sit-
uation of affairs, it is the king's intention he should repair thither
as soon as possible.

His first care on arriving will be to represent to the King
of England and his ministers that the king has seen with surprise
the armament taking place both in England and in the English

¹ François de Bussy. See *ante*, xcv-xcvi. His unpopularity with his
fellow clerks is borne out by the notation on the dispatch. The suggestion
as to his style is of interest as it makes it not improbable that he drew his
own instructions for the negotiation of 1761.

angloises de l'Amere Septale et que son zèle constant pour le maintien de la bonne intelligence avec la couronne d'Angre et pour celui de la tranquillité generale ne lui permet pas de differer plus longtems a demander que le Roy de la Grde Be veuille bien
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s'expliquer ouvertement avec lui sur l'objet de preparatifs aussi considerables et qui paroissent si peu conformés aux principes de la pacification d'Aix la Chapelle.

Que si les gouverneurs des colonies Angloises avoient crû devoir former des pretentions sur quelque partie du territoire dont les françois etoient en possession du coté de la Riviere d'Oyo, la cour d'Angre auroit dû leur ordonner de laisser les choses comme elles etoient avant la guerre et de s'abstenir de toute entreprise violente jusqu'a ce qu'elle eût fait connoitre a la france les fondemens de cette pretention et qu'elle eût été decidée par les voies prescrites dans le Traitté d'Aix la Chapelle, pour le reglement des contestations sur les possessions respectives de l'Amerique.

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Que le roy qui de concert avec S. Mté Be a travaillée si

[*Translation*]

colonies of North America, and that his steady zeal for the maintenance of the good understanding with the crown of England, and for the general peace, allows him to defer no longer asking that the King of Great Britain have the goodness to enter into an open explanation with him on the object of preparations so considerable and apparently so little conformed to the principles of the pacification of Aix-la-Chapelle.

That if the governors of the English colonies had thought they must lay claim to a part of the territory in possession of the French on the side of the Ohio River, the court of England should have ordered them to leave things as they were before the war and abstain from all forcible undertakings until it had communicated to France the basis of the claim, and until it had been adjudicated in the manner prescribed in the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle for the settlement of disputes as to their respective possessions in America.

That the king, who in concert with His Britannic Majesty,

efficacement au retablissemnt de la paix dont l'Europe jouït actuellement n'a pas de plus sincere desir que de la maintenir, qu'il en a fait donner souvent les assûrances au Cte d'Albemarle par son ministre des affaires etrangeres, et qu'en lui faisant porter les plaintes des entreprises violentes des gouverneurs Bques sur le territoire françois du coté de la Riviere d'oyo, il l'a fait assûrer en même têmes qu'il etoit prêt a entrer dans les voyes qu'exigent leurs engagemens reciproques pour arrêter le progrès des troubles et en prevenir les consequences.

Qu'après de telles assûrances, on peut juger de la surprise du roy lorsqu'il a vu par la harangue du Roy d'Angre et par les
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adresses de son Parlement que S. M. Be et la nation paroisoient prêts a suivre sur le different survenu en Amerique d'autres principes que ceux qui ont été posés et garantis dans la pacification d'aix la Chapelle par toutes les puissances contractantes pour l'affermissement de la paix et particulierement pour le reglement des contestations concernant les possessions de la france et de l'Angre en Amerique.

[*Translation*]

has labored so effectually for the reëstablishment of the peace Europe at present enjoys, has no more sincere desire than to maintain it, as he has often through his minister of foreign affairs assured the Comte d'Albemarle. In charging him with complaints of the forcible undertakings of the British governors against French territory on the side of the Ohio River, he has at the same time had him assured that he was ready to enter on the methods dictated by their reciprocal engagements to check the progress of the troubles and forestall their consequences.

That after such assurances the surprise of the king may be imagined at seeing by the speech of the King of England and by the addresses of his Parliament, that His Britannic Majesty and the English nation appeared ready to follow principles as to the difficulties in America other than those set and agreed in the pacification of Aix-la-Chapelle by all the contracting powers for the conclusion of peace, and especially for the adjustment of disputes respecting French and English possessions in America.

Que cependant le roy est trop persuadé de la droiture des intentions de S. M. Be pour ne pas croire qu'elle ne soit animée du même desir de conserver la paix et l'union entre les 2. couronnes dont elle l'a fait assurer si souvent et que dans cette confiance

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S. Mte espere que le Roy de la Grde Be voudra bien ordonner de concert avec elle

Que les gouverneurs de leurs colonies respectives de l'Amere Septale s'abstiennent de toutes voyes de fait, que les choses soient remises par raport au territoire du coté de la Belle Riviere qui fait le sujet du different, au même état ou elles étoient ou devoient être avant la guerre et que les pretentions respectives soient deferées a la commission établie a Paris, afin que les deux cours puissent terminer le different par une prompte conciliation.

Que ce parti en arrêtant le progrès des divisions est si conforme a l'arte 9. du Tté d'Aix la Chapelle, et aux engagemens reciproques des 2. couronnes que S. Mté ne doute pas qu'il ne

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soit adopté par S. M. Be

[*Translation*]

That however the king is too well persuaded of the integrity of His Britannic Majesty's intentions not to believe him animated by the same desire of preserving the peace and accord between the two crowns, of which he has so often given assurance, and that in such confidence His Majesty hopes the King of Great Britain will be willing to join him in ordering that the governors of their respective colonies in North America abstain from all acts of violence; that affairs with respect to the territory toward the Ohio River, which is the cause of the dispute, be put in the same condition in which it was or should have been before the war; and that the respective claims be referred to the commission set up at Paris, so that the two courts may settle the dispute by a prompt conciliation.

That this course in checking the progress of discord is so conformable to Article 9 of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle and to the reciprocal obligations of the two crowns that His Majesty does not doubt its adoption by His Britannic Majesty.

Que le concert de L. Mtés sur l'exécution de cet article est d'autant plus à désirer que par la liaison intime et nécessaire qui est entre toutes les conventions du traité, il est aisé de prévoir que si l'article qui concerne la sûreté des possessions respectives de l'Amerique n'étoit point exécuté, les autres engagements courroient le même risque, et que la décision de ce point important interesse également toutes les puissances contractantes du traité.

Qu'enfin c'est par toutes ces raisons que le roy demande que S. M. Be veuille bien s'expliquer nettement sur la proposition qu'elle lui fait, ainsi que sur la destination de ses armemens, et

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qu'il espere que sa reponse sera favorable au maintien de l'union des 2. couronnes et à la conservation du repos de l'amerique et de celui de l'Europe entiere.

Le Sr Duc de Mirepoix dans l'usage qu'il fera de ces moiens sera libre de mettre le degré d'onction ou de fermeté qu'il jugera necessaire, selon les circonstances et les dispositions qu'il reconnoitra soit dans le Ministere Bque soit dans la nation.

[*Translation*]

That the concert of Their Majesties on the execution of that article is the more to be desired in view of the necessarily close connection among all the conventions and treaties, making it easy to foresee that if the article regarding the safety of the respective American possessions were not executed, other engagements would run the same risk; and the decision of this important point is of equal interest to all the powers party to that treaty.

That finally for all these reasons the king asks that His Britannic Majesty be good enough to explain himself clearly on the proposal just made, as well as on the destination of his armaments; and he hopes the reply will be favorable to the maintenance of the accord of the two crowns, and to the preservation of the peace of America and of all Europe.

The Sieur Duc de Mirepoix in using these instructions will be free to employ the degree of suavity or firmness he judges necessary in the circumstances and in the disposition of the British ministry and nation.

Comme le roy est persuadé de son zèle et de son habilité, il s'en raporte entierement a lui a cet egard, et S. Mté se reserve a lui donner dans la suite les ordres qu'exigeront la response de la cour d'Angre, et les relations que le Sr Duc de Mirepoix lui fera de ses dispositions et de ses mesures.

PRIVATE MEMOIR FOR MIREPOIX, December 31, 1754¹

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 437:437]

Env. a M. le Duc de Mirepoix le 31. xbre 1754

Memoire lu au conseil d'etat le 29. xbre 1754.

le roy a ordonné de le remettre a m le duc de Mirepoix comme contenant des materiaux dont il faira l'usage que sa prudence lui dictera suivant les circonstances, et la connaissance qu'il aura des sentimens, et des dispositions de S. Me Brittanique, du ministere et de la nation.

Memoire partr pour M le Duc de Mirepoix retournant a la cour d'Angleterre

[*Translation*]

As the king is persuaded of his zeal and skill, he refers that entirely to him, and His Majesty reserves the opportunity of giving him in the future the orders required by the response of the English court and by the reports that the Sieur Duc de Mirepoix shall make of its disposition and its measures.

Sent to M. le Duc de Mirepoix, December 31, 1754

Memoir read to the council of state, December 29, 1754

The king has ordered it dispatched to M. le Duc de Mirepoix as containing materials of which he will make use as his prudence dictates according to circumstances and to what he learns of the sentiments and disposition of His Britannic Majesty, of the ministry, and of the nation.

Private memoir for M. le Duc de Mirepoix returning to the court of England

¹ This should be considered in comparison with previous documents as a resumé of the French version of relations between the two crowns since 1749. It will be noticed that its account of French complaints in the fall of 1754 does not accord with Albemarle's dispatches.

Dés que le roi fut informé des entreprises que les gouverneurs des colonies de l'Amerique septentrionale avoient faites a main armée. sur le territoire françois dans le voisinage de la Belle Riviere, Sa Majesté toujours attentive a tout ce qui peut causer la moindre alteration a la bonne intelligence entre elle et le Roi de la Grande Brete, ne diffiera point de faire passer ses

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plaintes a Sa Mté Brite et de tacher de la porter a prendre les mesures que leurs engagements reciproques exigeoient d'elles, pour arrêter les progrès de pareils troubles et prevenir les consequences qui pouvoient en resulter au prejudice de l'union des deux couronnes et meme de la tranquillité generale.

Comme M. le Duc de Mirepoix etoit revenu en france pour retablir sa santé, M. Rouillé s'adressa vers la fin du mois d'Aoust a l'ambassadeur d'Angleterre pour faire parvenir ces representa-

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tions a Sa Majté Brite; A cet effet il lui remit une copie de la relation cy jointe des entreprises violentes des gouverneurs

[*Translation*]

So soon as the king was informed of the attempts that the governors of the North American colonies had made by armed force on French territory in the vicinity of the Ohio River, His Majesty, always heedful of what might cause the slightest change in the good understanding between him and the King of Great Britain, did not delay to have his complaints presented to His Britannic Majesty, and to try to bring him to take the measures that their mutual engagements prescribed to check the progress of such difficulties and to forestall the consequences which might result in prejudice to the accord of the two crowns and even to the general peace.

As M. le Duc de Mirepoix had returned to France for the recovery of his health, M. Rouillé addressed himself toward the end of August to the English ambassador to bring these representations to His Britannic Majesty's attention. To this end he communicated to the ambassador a copy of the annexed relation of the forcible undertakings of the English governors and asked of

Anglois et lui demanda au nom de Sa Majesté "Que le Roi d'Angre voulût bien ordonner aux gouverneurs de ses colonies de l'Amerique Septentrionale d'abandonner toute idée d'établissement sur le territoire de Sa Majté, de donner satisfaction de l'assassinat de l'officier françois que les Anglois avoient tué a coup de fusil, tandis que d'un commun accord il leur faisoit lire la sommation de se retirer des terres de France; que les gouver-

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neurs des colonies respectives s'abstinssent de part et d'autre de toute voye de fait, et s'il y avoit quelques difficultés sur l'étendue des frontieres respectives, qu'on les fit decider par la commission etablie par les deux cours en consequence du Traité d'Aix la Chapelle, pour regler les differends sur les possessions de l'une et l'autre puissance en Amerique."

Peu de tems après cette premiere demarche le roi fut informé que le danger augmentoit de jour en jour par les suites

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des entreprises violentes des gouverneurs Anglois.

Sa Majesté aprît en meme tems que les mauvais succès que

[*Translation*]

him in the name of His Majesty, "that the King of England be pleased to order the governors of his colonies in North America that they abandon all ideas of settlement on the territory of His Majesty, and give satisfaction for the assassination of the French officer the English had shot, while he was, with mutual assent, having read to them a summons to withdraw from the lands of France; that the governors of their respective colonies refrain on both sides from all acts of violence; and if there be disputes as to the extent of the respective frontiers, that they be decided by the commission established by the two courts in consequence of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle to settle disputes as to the possessions of either power in America."

Not long after this first step the king was informed that the danger daily increased from the consequences of the forcible undertakings of the English governors.

His Majesty learned at the same time that the ill success these

ces entreprises avoient rencontrés excitoient les clameurs de quelques negocians de la Virginie a Londres, et que l'on faisoit des armemens considerables tant en Angre que dans les colonies Angloises de l'Amerique septentrionale dont le but selon toutes les nouvelles etoit de soutenir les efforts des gouverneurs Brites pour se rendre maitres des terres de France qui font la communication de ses colonies du Canada et de la Louisiane.

Dans ces circonstances critiques, Sa Majté fit demander au
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Cte d Albemarle des éclaircissements sur ces preparatifs, elle lui fit remettre par Mr Rouillé une copie de la relation que l'on joint icy du progrès des troubles et renouveler ses instances, afin que Sa Mté Brite voulut bien concourir a terminer cette importante affaire par les mesures qu'exigent leurs engagemens reciproques.

La reponse du Cte d Albemarle fut "Qu'il n'avoit reçu aucune instruction sur les armemens dont on lui parloit, mais qu'il pouvoit assurer le roi que Sa Mté Brite etoit toujours dans la

[*Translation*]

enterprises had met was exciting the clamor of some Virginia merchants at London, and that considerable armaments were preparing both in England and in the English colonies in North America, the purpose of which, according to all reports, was to support the efforts of the British governors to make themselves masters of the lands of France which form the communication of its colonies of Canada and Louisiana.

In these critical circumstances His Majesty caused the Comte d'Albemarle to be asked for enlightenment as to these preparations; he had communicated to him by M. Rouillé a copy of the account annexed of the progress of the difficulties, and had renewed his instances that His Britannic Majesty would be pleased to concur in winding up this important affair by the measures which their mutual engagements prescribed.

The Comte d'Albemarle replied, "that he had received no instructions on the armaments in question, but that he could assure the king that His Britannic Majesty was invariably determined

resolution d'entretenir la bonne intelligence avec Sa Majeste et de remplir ses engagements avec fidelité" et qu'il demanderoit a sa cour de l'instruire de ce qu'il auroit a repondre concernant les armemens.

Sur la foi de ces protestations et sur celle des attentions continuelles que le roi avoit eües depuis la pacification d'Aix la Chapelle pour maintenir la bonne intelligence retablie entre les deux couronnes, Sa Majesté s'attendoit a une reponse satisfaisante de la part de la cour d Angleterre, lorsque la harangue de Sa Majté Brité a son Parlement vint a etre rendüe publique

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Mais quelle fut sa surprise, quand au lieu de trouver dans les assurances que le Roi d'Angleterre donne a son Parlement de sa resolution d'affermir la tranquillité générale, les principes posés dans la pacification d'Aix la Chapelle par toutes les puissances contractantes pour arriver a ce but et ceux des engagements pris en consequence par les deux cours sur les differends concernant leurs possessions respectives en Amerique, Sa Majté

[*Translation*]

to keep up a good understanding with His Majesty, and to fulfil his engagements with fidelity"; and that he would ask his court to instruct him as to what he should reply concerning the armaments.

Relying on these assurances and on the continual attention that the king had given since the pacification of Aix-la-Chapelle to maintaining the good understanding reëstablished between the two crowns, His Majesty was expecting a satisfactory reply from the court of England, when the speech of His Britannic Majesty to his Parliament was published.

But what was his surprise when instead of finding, in the assurances the King of England gave his Parliament of his determination to promote the general peace, the principles laid down in the pacification of Aix-la-Chapelle by all the contracting powers to arrive at that end, and the engagements taken in consequence by the two courts on the disputes as to their respective possessions

n'y trouva que des idées de guerre et le dessein d'y exciter la
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nation Britanique et de l'engager a la soutenir par les plus forts subsides, sous l'aparence de proteger des possessions que l'on ne nomme pas, contre des usurpations dont on ne designe ni le caractere ni les auteurs.

La surprise du roi fut encore bien plus grande, lorsqu'il aprit que si l'on gardoit le silence dans la harangue sur ces circonstances; l'on affectoit de repandre dans toutes les nouvelles publiques, dans les ecrits particuliers et dans tous les discours quel'on tenoit a la nation Brite que le mot de l'enigme etoit l'Amerique et la France.

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Ces bruits se trouvoient fortifies par la nature des armemens de toute espee que l'on faisoit et que l'on continuë avec la plus grande chaleur et la plus grande depense, tant dans les ports d'Angre que dans les colonies Angloises de l'Amerique, par toutes les nouvelles de la Virginie et nommément par les avis de Londres qui s'accordoient tous a marquer que les negocians de la Virginie que l'on a cités plus haut pretendoient avoir reçu

[*Translation*]

in America, His Majesty found only warlike ideas and the design of stirring up the British nation and engaging it to support a war by large subsidies, under pretext of protecting possessions that were not named against aggressions the nature and authors of which were not specified.

The surprise of the king was still greater when he learned that though the speech was silent on these details, all the public newspapers, the special accounts, and the general report throughout the British nation indicated that the answer to the riddle was America and France.

These reports were confirmed by the nature of the armaments of all kinds that were being made and that still continue with the greatest zeal and expense, both in the ports of England and in the English colonies in America, by all the news from Virginia and especially by the reports of London which all agreed that the Virginia merchants previously mentioned claimed to have received

du gouvernement Britanique une concession des memes terres de la France du coté de la Belle Riviere que les gouverneurs
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Anglois ont cherché a envahir et que le dessein doit de rompre la communication des colonies du Canada et de la Louisiane pour pouvoir les enlever plus facilement a la France.

Malgré des bruits aussi publics et soutenus par des avis particuliers d'un grand poids, le roi croiroit faire lors a la fidelité de Sa Majté Brite a remplir ses engagements s'il pensoit qu'après avoir contracté par les traités, par des conventions et par ses promesses autentiques l'obligation de terminer a l'amiable tous les differends respectifs, ce prince voulut aujourd'hui les decider
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par des mesures aussi contraires a cette obligation que le seroit le parti de porter la guerre dans ses possessions de l'Amerique ou autres, sans la declarer.

Mais le roi manqueroit en meme tems aux regles de la prudence a la protection dont il est redevable a ses sujets, a la confiance meme qu'il doit aux assurances que Sa Majté Brite

[Translation]

from the British government a grant of the same lands of France toward the Ohio River that the English governors had sought to invade, and that the plan was to break the communication of the colonies of Canada and Louisiana the more easily to wrest them from France.

In spite of such public reports supported by special information of great weight, the king believed he would do injustice to the fidelity of His Britannic Majesty to his engagements, if he thought that that prince, after he had engaged by treaties, by conventions, and by his specific promises to settle amicably all the various disputes, would let them now be decided by measures so contrary to those engagements, as making war in his American or other possessions without declaring it.

But at the same time the king would be wanting in prudence, in the protection for which he is accountable to his subjects, even in the confidence which he should have in the assurances His Britannic Majesty has so often given him of his intention of

lui a si souvent données de sa resolution de remplir ses engagements, de maintenir et la bonne intelligence des deux couronnes et la tranquillité generale, s'il tardeoit plus longtems a s eclaircir

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avec elle sur une matiere d'aussi grande importance

Dans cet esprit Sa Majté a ordonné a M le Duc de Mirepoix de se rendre au plustot auprés de ce prince de lui renouveler les plaintes portées sur l'invasion que les gouverneurs des colonies Angloises de l'Amerique Septentrionale ont faite du territoire françois, de lui rapeller tous les engagements qui l'autorisent a demander que le differend survenu a cette occasion entre les deux nations soit decidé, ainsi que tous les autres par les voyes amiables

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et qu il veuille bien s'expliquer ouvertement sur la destination des armemens considerables que l'on fait tant en Angre que dans les colonies Angloises de l'Amerique.

Les entreprises des gouverneurs Brites sur le territoire françois dans le voisinage de la Belle Riviere ne peuvent etre justifiées d'aucune façon; L'on verra par les deux relations dont

[*Translation*]

fulfilling his engagements, and of maintaining the good understanding of the two crowns and the general peace, if he delayed longer to enter into explanations with him on so important an affair.

In this spirit His Majesty has ordered M. le Duc de Mirepoix to repair immediately to the presence of this prince to renew to him the complaints on the invasion of French territory by the governors of the English colonies of North America, to recall to him all the engagements which warrant the request that the dispute that has arisen between the two nations be decided, like all others, by amicable means, and that he be good enough to reveal the destination of the considerable armaments now preparing both in England and in the English colonies in America.

The attempts of the British governors on French territory in the vicinity of the Ohio River can in no way be justified. It will be seen by the two relations mentioned above that they have

on a fait mention cy dessus qu'ils ont été les fauteurs des troubles et de leurs progrès; que les gouverneurs françois au contraire n'ont fait que defendre les terres du roi et repousser la force par

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la force; que l'assassinat de l'officier françois ayant été fait non par les sauvages mais par les Anglois seuls, ne peut etre excusé et que les droits du roi sur le territoire envahi ne sont pas contestables. La communication des colonies francoises du Canada et de la Louisiane par les terres de l'Ouest a été fréquenté sans trouble par les françois depuis l'année 1679 que la decouverte de ces terres fut constatée par le sr de la Salle gentilhomme Normand et ce n'a été qu'à la fin de la derniere guerre que les gouvrs Anglois ont tenté de couper cette communication et de travailler dans cette vüe a debaucher les nations sauvages de ces cantons qui de tout tems ont ete les alliés de la france

Mais quand meme la possession des françois ne feroit pas aussi solidement etablie qu'elle l'est, les entreprises violentes des gouverneurs Anglois n'en seroient pas plus soutenables, puis-

[*Translation*]

been the promoters of the troubles and of their development, while the French governors on the contrary have done no more than defend the lands of the king and repel force by force; it will be seen also that the assassination of the French officer having been the work not of the Indians, but of the English, is inexcusable, and that the rights of the king over the invaded territory are incontestable. The communication of the French colonies Canada and Louisiana by the lands of the West has been frequented without hindrance by the French since the year 1679 when the discovery of these lands was announced by the Sieur de la Salle, a Norman gentleman; and it was only at the end of the last war that the English governors tried to cut this communication, and to this end, to seduce the Indian tribes of those districts who at all times have been allies of France.

But even if French possession were not as solidly established as it is, the forcible attempts of the English governors would be no less indefensible since they would be no less contrary to the

qu'elles n'en seroient pas moins contraires au Traité d'Aix la Chapelle, aux engagemens du Roi de la Grande Brete et a ses promesses formelles.

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L'arte 18. de ce traité a prescrit les mesures a prendre pour les differends des deux couronnes, en stipulant "Que ce qui n'avoit pu etre réglé par le traité, le seroit incessamment a l'amiable par les commissaires respectifs"; Et c'est en consequence de cette stipulation que les deux rois ont etabli d'un commun accord une commission a Paris pour terminer toutes contestations sur leurs possessions de l'Amerique Septentrionale, et qu'en meme tems ils ont envoyé a leurs gouverneurs des ordres precis de ne faire aucune innovation a l'etat ou les choses se trouvoient par le re-tablissement de la paix.

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Il y a plus des le 2. Mars 1752 le ministere Anglois a promis de la part du Roi d'Angleterre de s'expliquer avec la plus sincere ouverture de coeur sur la conciliation de tous les differends des deux nations dans toutes les parties du monde, pourvu que

[*Translation*]

Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, to the engagements of the King of Great Britain, and to his formal promises.

Article 18 of that treaty has prescribed the measures to be taken as to the disagreements of the two crowns, stipulating, "that whatever could not be settled by the treaty should be settled forthwith, amicably, by the respective commissaries." And it is in consequence of this stipulation that the two kings have established by common accord a commission at Paris to settle all disputes regarding their possessions in North America, and that at the same time they have sent their governors precise orders to make no change in the situation in which matters were at the reëstablishment of peace.

Furthermore, March 2, 1752, the English ministry promised on behalf of the King of England to state its position with the most sincere openness of heart as to the arrangement of all the differences of the two nations in all parts of the world, provided

M le Duc de Mirepoix fut mis en état de traiter avec la même ouverture.

La proposition étoit trop conforme au désir sincère du roi d'affermir la bonne intelligence entre les deux cours pour qu'il différât de donner à son ambassadeur à Londres les ordres nécessaires pour répondre à de si louables dispositions; ils lui

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furent envoyés sans délai et Sa Majesté Brite voulut bien confirmer les assurances de ses ministres à M le Duc de Mirepoix dans une audience particulière. Si cette promesse n'a point encore eu son exécution quoique souvent sollicitée par le ministère de France et différée sous différents motifs par le ministère Brite; Sa Majesté ne doute pas qu'elle ne l'ait enfin, puisqu'elle a été donnée au nom du Roi de la Gde Brete et que ce prince a bien voulu la confirmer lui-même.

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Tels sont les titres authentiques qui condamnent les entreprises des gouverneurs Anglois et appuient la proposition de s'abstenir de part et d'autre de toutes voyes de fait et de faire

[Translation]

M. le Duc de Mirepoix was empowered to treat with the same openness.

The proposal was too conformable to the king's sincere desire of establishing permanently a good understanding between the two courts to permit him to defer giving his ambassador at London the necessary orders for replying to such laudable intentions; orders were sent him without delay, and His Britannic Majesty was pleased to confirm the assurances of his ministers to M. le Duc de Mirepoix in a private audience. If that promise has not yet had its fulfillment, though often solicited by the ministry of France and put off on various pretexts by the British ministry, His Majesty does not doubt that it will be finally performed since it was given in the name of the King of Great Britain, and since that prince has been pleased to confirm it himself.

Such are our veritable rights which impeach the enterprises of the English governors and which recommend the proposal of abstaining on either side from all acts of violence and of having

decider le nouveau differend par la commission etablie.

Comme il s'est passé de plus a ce sujet quelques circonstances particulieres qui peuvent donner une nouvelle force a ces memes titres, on croit qu'il n'est pas déplacé de les retracer icy.

Lorsque la cour Brite eût examiné les premiers memoires françois dans lesquels on éclaircissoit les droits du roi sur diverses

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possessions de l'Amerique qui lui sont contestées par les Anglois et qu'elle aprit qu'ils etoient imprimés elle en parut craindre la publication.

Dans cette disposition, elle demanda avec empressement que le roi voulut bien en suspendre la distribution, assurant qu'elle feroit servir cette condescendance aux vuës de conciliation qu'elle avoit sur ces differends, et Sa Majté en faveur du motif n'hésita point a deferer au desir de la cour Brite.

Le roi ne peut s'empêcher detirer de la deux consequences également favorables au maintien de la bonne intelligence avec

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l'Angleterre, l'une que la cour Britanique n'a pu avoir part
[Translation]

this new disagreement decided by the commission already established.

As there are some special circumstances which give additional authority to these same rights, it seems not out of place to relate them here.

When the British court had examined the first French memoirs which set forth the king's rights over the various American possessions now disputed by the English, and had learned that they were printed, it seemed to fear their publication. In this mind, it eagerly asked that the king be pleased to suspend their distribution, assuring us that it would make our complaisance serve its views of conciliating these differences; and His Majesty, approving the motive, did not hesitate to defer to the wish of the British court.

The king cannot help deducing from this, two consequences equally favorable to the maintenance of a good understanding with England. One is that the British court cannot be concerned in

aux insinuations odieuses que l'on a repandues dans le public au desavantage de la France sur les differends de l'Amerique puisqu'elle exigeoit de la complaisance du roi d'en tenir la discussion secrete. L'autre que cette cour n'a pu faire une concession aux negocians de la Virginie du territoire françois envahi par les gouverneurs Anglois, parcequ'elle auroit decidé de sa seule autorité vu differend de limites qu'elle s'est engagée avec le roi, en consequence du Traité d'Aix la Chapelle de faire decider par la com-

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mission et qu'elle a promis expressement a Sa Majesté de terminer tous ses differends avec elle par les voyes amiables.

A cette circonstance s'en joint une encore qui n'est pas d'une moindre consideration.

Quoique les commissaires Brites aient paru presser la tenue des conferences pour la decision des differends de l'Amerique, on a eu lieu de conjecturer par toutes les difficultes dont ils les ont embarrassées, que leur veritable but étoit d'en rompre le cours; ils croyoient sans doute y etre parvenus par l'incident singulier

[*Translation*]

the odious insinuations spread abroad to the disadvantage of France in the disagreements over America, since it won from the king's complaisance the concession that the discussion should be kept secret. The other is that that court cannot have made to the Virginia merchants a grant of the French territory invaded by the English governors since it would thus have decided by its sole authority a boundary disagreement that it is pledged to the king, in consequence of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, to have decided by the commission; and since it has expressly promised His Majesty to settle all disagreements with him by friendly methods.

To this circumstance is linked another of no less importance. Although the British commissaries have seemed to press for the holding of conferences to settle the American disputes, it may be conjectured from all the difficulties with which they have embarrassed those conferences, that their real end was to break them off. Doubtless they expected to do this by the remarkable incident which they developed on the subject of the language of

qu'ils avoient fait naitre au sujet de la langue des memoires. Ils avoient presenté ceux cy en françois selon l'ancien usage et sans aucune difficulté depuis le commencement de la commission jusqu'au mois de Janvier de cette année; Mais alors ils avoient pretendu ne devoir plus les remettre qu'en Anglois, et ils avoient meme porté la difficulté jusqu'a refuser de recevoir les memoires des commissaires du roi en francois si l'on ne recevoit les leurs en Anglois.

Sa Majesté voyant que cet incident pouvoit en suspendant

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le cours des conferences apporter un notable prejudice au reglement des differends des deux couronnes, elle voulut bien par une suite de l'esprit de conciliation qui anime toutes ses démarches; deroger dans cette occasion a l'usage anciennement etabli et constamment observé, pour ecarter cet obstacle et accelerer le travail de la commission

Comme donc, le retablissemnt des conferences est dû a cette nouvelle complaisance de Sa Majesté, il ne lui est pas possible

[*Translation*]

the memoirs. They had offered them in French according to the old custom and without making any difficulty from the opening of the commission until January of this year. But then they alleged that they could no longer communicate them save in English, and they carried the difficulty so far as to refuse to accept the memoirs of the king's commissaries in French, if theirs were not accepted in English.

His Majesty, seeing that this incident might suspend the conferences and prejudice seriously the settlement of the differences of the two crowns, was pleased, as a fruit of the spirit of conciliation which appears in all his proceedings, to depart on this occasion from the custom anciently established and constantly observed in order to remove this obstacle and to accelerate the work of the commission.

Since, then, the reëstablishment of these conferences is due to this new complaisance of His Majesty, he cannot possibly

d'imaginer que la cour d'Angleterre ait eu l'intention dans ce moment meme de tirer des mains des commissaires la discussion

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des differends de l'Amerique pour la faire decider par les armemens qui se font dans les ports d'Angleterre et dans les colonies Angloises.

Mais ce qui confirme encore plus le roi dans cette idéé, c'est que Sa Majté ne demande d'autres mesures que celles, auxquelles elle a acquiesce elle même sans difficulté a la requisition du Roi d'Angleterre depuis la paix et dans un cas semblable a celui qui se presente aujourd'hui du coté de la belle Riviere.

Le General Cornwallis gouverneur de la nouvelle Ecosse avoit entrepris depuis la paix d'étendre a main armée les frontieres de

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son governemt hors de la peninsule de l'Acadie, le gouverneur françois du Canada avoit repoussé la force par la force et les consequences des troubles excités dans cette partie de l'Amerique n'étoient pas moins a craindre que celles des troubles survenus

[*Translation*]

imagine that the court of England can have intended at this very moment to take from the commissaries the discussion of the American disputes in order to have them decided by the armaments now preparing in the ports of England and in the English colonies.

But what most confirms the king in this idea is that His Majesty asks no other measures than those in which he has acquiesced himself without difficulty at the request of the King of England since the peace and in a case similar to that now presented in the region of the Ohio River.

General Cornwallis, governor of Nova Scotia, had undertaken since the peace to extend by military force the frontiers of his government outside the peninsula of Acadia. The French governor of Canada had repelled force with force, and the consequences of difficulties stirred up in that part of America were not less to be feared than those from the difficulties that have arisen in the vicinity of the Ohio River. To forestall them the

dans le voisinage de la Riviere d'Oyo; Pour les prevenir le Roi de la Gde Bretagne fit proposer de deffendre a ses officiers de rien entreprendre sur mer ni sur terre qui put causer un juste sujet de mecontentement a Sa Majté, dans la confiance que de pareils ordres seroient envoyés aux gouverneurs francois pour
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qu'ils eussent a s'abstenir de toutes voyes de fait, jusqu'a ce que les droits de possession sur les limites de l'Acadie fussent réglés par les commres respectifs; Le roi de son coté ne fit aucune difficulté de deferer a cette proposition de Sa Mté Brite il envoya les ordres qui lui estoient demandés et la paix a subsisté jusqu'icy dans ces cantons.

Si le fonds de l'affaire n'a pas encore été décidé par la commission, ce n'a pas été la faute du roi, il a fait remettre tous les memoires qui pouvoient etablir la solidité de ses droits et c'est a
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cette occasion nomement que la cour Britanique lui demanda de vouloir bien en suspendre la publication, sous la promesse de vouloir faire servir cette condescendance aux vues de conciliation que ce prince avoit sur ces differends

[*Translation*]

King of Great Britain proposed to forbid his officers to undertake by sea or land anything which might justly discontent His Majesty, confident that similar orders would be sent to the French governors to abstain from all acts of violence, until the rights of possession as to the boundaries of Acadia were settled by the respective commissaries. The king on his side made no difficulty of deferring to this proposal of His Britannic Majesty. He sent the orders asked of him, and peace still obtains in this quarter.

If the basis of the matter has not yet been decided by the commission, it is not the king's fault. He has had communicated all the memoirs which demonstrate the validity of his rights, and it was on this very occasion that the British court asked him to be pleased to suspend publication under promise of making this condescension serve the views of conciliation which this prince had as to these disputes.

Le meme evenement s'offre aujourd'huy du coté de la belle Riviere, et a moins que les intentions que l'on fit paroître alors du coté de la cour d'Angre ne soient changées, ce qu'on ne doit pas suposer, elle ne peut refuser au roi de prendre pour terminer le differend actuel, les mesures aux quelles Sa Mté a acquiescé de si bonne grace en 1750 pour prevenir de pareils troubles.

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C'est le concours de tant de solides raisons et d'engagement si autentiques qui font esperer au roi que Sa Mté Brite ne differera point d'ordonner a ses gouverneurs de s'abstenir de toute innovation a l'avenir et de toute voye de fait tant par mer que par terre; Que s'il y a des difficultés sur l'étenduë des frontieres respectives elle voudra bien les remettre a la commission etablie pour les regler, ainsy qu'on est convenu entre les deux cours; qu'independant de ces mesures elle ne fera aucune difficulté de concourir avec le roi

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selon sa promesse pour terminer par les voyes les plus amiables tous les autres differends qui subsistent entre les deux nations;

[*Translation*]

The same situation appears today on the side of the Ohio River, and provided the intentions which then appeared on the side of the English court have not changed—which should not be supposed—it cannot refuse to take, with a view to ending the current dispute, the same measures in which His Majesty acquiesced with such good grace in 1750 in order to forestall similar difficulties.

The union of so many solid reasons and authentic engagements makes the king hope that His Britannic Majesty will not defer ordering his governors to abstain from all new movements in the future and from all acts of violence by sea or land. That if there are disagreements as to the extent of the respective frontiers, he will be pleased to refer them to the commission established to regulate them, as has been agreed between the two courts. That independently of such measures he will make no difficulty about agreeing with the king according to his promise to terminate by the most friendly means all the other differences

Enfin qu'elle fera donner a la france une satisfaction convenable de l'assassinat de l'officier tué a coup de fusil par les Anglois dans le tems que d'un commun accord il leur faisoit lire la somation de se retirer des terres de france, et toutes les autres satisfactions qui ont été demandées depuis si long tems au sujet de divers attentats de la part des capitaines de vaisseaux Anglois

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contre les vaisseaux et le commerce Francois dans toutes les parties du monde.

C'est sur ces importans objets et nomement sur la destination des armemens considerables qui se font en Angleterre et dans les colonies Angloises de l'Amerique que l'ambassadr du roi a ordre de demander que le Roi de la Gde Bretagne veuille bien lui donner une reponse prompte et positive; les grands interets dont elle doit decider la sollicitent autant que les raisons et les

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engagemens autentiques qu'on vient de rapporter il ne s'agit pas seulement icy de la sureté des possessions de la france, il s'agit

[*Translation*]

which exist between the two nations. Finally that he will see that France is given a proper reparation for the assassination of the officer shot by the English while by mutual consent he was having read to them the summons to withdraw from the lands of France, as well as all the other reparations that have been so long sought on the matter of various attempts of English sea captains against French shipping and commerce in all parts of the world.

It is on these important objects, and especially on the destination of the large armaments preparing in England and in the English colonies in America that the king's ambassador has orders to ask that the King of Great Britain be pleased to give him a prompt and positive reply. The great interests at stake demand this as well as the reasons and authentic engagements which have just been set forth. Here it is not only a question of the safety

encore du sisteme etabli par la paix d Utrecht pour assurer les sources du commerce et de la puissance de tous les souverains de l Europe, et c'est la cause de tous les princes contractans du Traité d'Utrecht, de tous les garans de la paix d'Aix la Chapelle, enfin de toutes les puissances de l'Europe; Le parti que l'Angleterre prendra devant diriger leurs mesures dans ces circonstances critiques. C'est avec la confiance que doivent inspirer au roi tant
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de titres respectables que Sa Majeste attend une prompte reponse du Roi d'Angre et qu'elle espere qu'elle sera favorable au maintien de l'union des deux couronnes a celui de la sureté de l'Amerique et du repos de l'Europe entiere.

[*Translation*]

of French possessions; it is a question also of the system established by the Peace of Utrecht to assure the sources of the commerce and power of all the sovereigns of Europe; and it is the cause of all the princes contracting the Treaty of Utrecht, and all the guarantors of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, in a word of all the powers of Europe. The course England takes should determine their measures in such critical circumstances. It is with the confidence which so many incontestable rights inspire in the king that His Majesty awaits a prompt reply from the King of England, and trusts it will be favorable to the maintenance of the accord of the two crowns, to the safety of America, and to the peace of all Europe.

CHAPTER III

NEGOTIATION OF MIREPOIX AND ROBINSON, JANUARY-FEBRUARY, 1755

ALDERMAN BAKER'S PROPOSED DELIMITATION FOR NORTH AMERICA¹

[Add. MSS., 33,029:315]

A project for proper seperation of the British & French dominions in North America.

That the French disavow any right to Settle on any river Issuing into the Atlantick Ocean. (or any smaller river that may fall into such river) between the Cape of Florida & the Isle of Cape Breton—or into Hudsons Bay.

That the boundaries of the two nations, in Nova Scotia be the Bay de Chaleur and a Supposed line drawn from the head of the said Bay to the Lake St Pierre or Fort Sorrell, yet so that the said line shall leave to each nation respectively Vizt.

To the English all those rivers from their heads that run into the bay of Fundy or the Gulf of St Laurence southward of Bay de Chaleurs.

& To the French all those Rivers that run into the River of St Laurence or into the Gulf of St Laurence North of Bay De Chaleurs. That the English have Crown point restored to them & possess entire the lake of Champlain & all to the Eastward of it.

That the French have (if they please) a fort on the West Side of the River of Niagara but not on the East side

That the Navigation of the lakes Erie & Ontario be Common to both Nations, the French to settle if they please on the West & the English on the East sides of such lakes

That all the lands on either side the River Ohio and on either side all the Rivers that fall into the Ohio, untill the Ohio falls into the Missisipi, be left unsettled.

¹Included as a statement of opinion from one of Newcastle's trusted advisers.

N. B. the names here made use of are taken from Popples map

Dr Mitchels is not yet publishd

[*Endorsed:*] From Alderman Baker North America. Found in 1755

CABINET MINUTE, January, 1755

[Add. MSS., 32,996:5]

NEWCASTLE HOUSE, January 16th 1755.

Present

Lord Chancellor

Lord Anson

Duke of Newcastle

Sir Thos Robinson

Earl of Holderness

Their Lordships were humbly of Opinion; That, in order to return a proper Answer to Md de Mirepoix, an Enquiry should be made, forthwith, into the State of the actual Possessions of the Crown of Great Britain in North America, at the Time of the Treaty of Utrecht:—That, if It shall appear, that all, or Most of the Encroachments, complained of, to have been made by the French in North America, have been since the Conclusion of That Treaty, or contrary to the Conditions of the Cessions made thereby: It may be advisable to shew, in the Answer, to be returned to Mor de Mirepoix, That the Terms, proposed in His

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Paper, are, by no Means, admissible, But that, to maintain, and preserve the Good Harmony between the Two Crowns, and

and

to put Every Thing upon an equitable Foot; ~~It may be advisable to propose to France; to restore the Possessions in North America, on Both Sides, to the State, they were actually in, at the Time of the Conclusion of the Treaty of Utrecht and according to the Cessions & Stipulations, made by that Treaty; and of Aix-la-Chapelle particularly, with respect to the Territories, on the Side of the River Ohio, or Belle Riviere; and to the Forts of Niagara, and Crown Point; and Those built on the River St John; and in the Isthmus of the Peninsula of Nova Scotia.—~~ That the Armaments, sent to America, are singly intended to

maintain, and support the just Rights and Possessions of His Majesty's Crown in North America, and to protect His Subjects there, without any Design to give just Offence to any Power

6

Whatsoever: or to do any thing, That may be an Infraction of the general Peace: which appears from the Nature, and Extent, of That Armament:—That His Majesty having thus given an explicit Answer to the Question, proposed in Md de Mirepoix's Paper, makes no Doubt, but That His Most Christian Majesty will, from His known Candour, and upright Intentions, give equal Satisfaction to the King, upon the great Naval Force, which is now fitting out at Brest, and at Toulon.

It appearing, That, at present, there are no large ships manned, sufficient to oppose so considerable a Number, as are now said to be fitting out at Brest, and Toulon; Their Lordships are humbly of Opinion, That proper Measures should be taken, to fill up the Guardships to their full Complement.

MIREPOIX TO ROUILLÉ, January 16, 1755

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:15]

N. 3.

A LONDRES le 16. Janvier 1755

Lu au conseil

MONSIEUR

.....
16....

Le jour d'après j'ay eû une longue conference avec M de Newcastle. J'ay trouvé ce ministre informé en general des affaires actuelles, mais selon son ordinaire peu instruit de leurs

[*Translation*]

LONDON, January 16, 1755

Read to the council

MONSIEUR:

.....

Next day I had a long conference with M. de Newcastle. I found that minister informed of affairs in general, but as usual,

circonstances et appartenances, et pour lesquelles il m'a remis à les discuter vis à vis de M. Robinson.

.....
18v....

J'ay trouvé le Chevalier Robinson mieux instruit et fort au fait de la question selon que la pretendent les Anglois ;

Il m'a dit que nos cartes françoises et leurs cartes Angloises différoient entierement sur la situation et le cours de la Riviere d'Ohio ou Belle Riviere ; que l'erreur estoit de plus de trois cens lieues, et que nos cartes françoises différoient même entre elles

En effet il m'a produit celle de Lisle et celle de d'Amville

Dans la premiere il n'est marqué qu'une seule riviere, et dans la seconde il y en a deux, L'une qui autant que je puis m'en souvenir s'appelle au douche, prend sa source asses loin de celle d'Ohio, et vient ensuite se joindre a la derniere riviere a peu près au milieu de son cours

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Les Anglois pretendent, que depuis la decouverte de M. de la Sale, les françois en differents tems ont suivi trois routes pour communiquer du Canada a la Louisiane ;

[*Translation*]

little acquainted with their detail and setting, for which he referred me to a discussion with M. Robinson.

.....
I found the Chevalier Robinson better informed and quite well acquainted with the question as the English claim it to be. He told me our French maps and their English maps differed entirely as to the location and course of the Ohio or Beautiful River ; that the error amounted to more than three hundred leagues, and that our French maps even differed from each other. Actually he produced those of Delisle and D'Anville. In the first it is set down as one river only, and in the second as two. One which as well as I can remember is called the Wabash has its source quite far from the Ohio, and finally joins itself to that last river about the middle of its course. The English claim that since M. de la Salle's discovery the French at various times have followed three routes in communicating between Canada and

Que les deux premieres s'enfonçant fort en avant dans le milieu des terres estoient fort éloignées de la Riviere d'Ohio, et même de celle qui est par de là.

Et que la troisieme route plus rapprochée, etant par de là la riviere que je nomme Audouche, ne venoit rejoindre celle d'Ohio qu'au dessous du confluent des deux rivières ;

Les Anglois disent que jamais les françois n'ont parû pretendre a la possession des terres situées vers les sources de la Riviere d'Ohio ;

Que par le traité d'Utrecht les Iroquois et les cinq Nations, qui y habitent, avoient été déclarés alliés et sujets de l'Angleterre ;

Que depuis ces Iroquois et ces Cinq Nations avoient detruit
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les autres sauvages qui y habitoient avec eux, et s'étoient emparés de tout le pays, qu'ils avoient ensuite vendu aux Anglois ;

Qu'en consequence de la vente et cession qui en avoit été faite par les sauvages, les anglois en devoient être justes possesseurs sans que nous puissions avoir aucun droit de les y troubler ;

M. de Robinson m'a ajouté que le roy son maitre ayant

[*Translation*]

Louisiana. That the two first are deep in the interior of the country, far from the Ohio and even from the other river. And that the third route, closer in, being by the river I call Wabash, only joins the Ohio below the junction of the two rivers.

The English say the French have never seemed to lay claim to the lands near the sources of the Ohio River ; that by the Treaty of Utrecht the Iroquois and the Five Nations who dwell there had been declared allies and subjects of England ; that inasmuch as these Iroquois and these Five Nations had destroyed the other Indians who dwelt there with them, and had possessed themselves of the whole country, they had then sold to the English ; that in consequence of the sale and cession made by the Indians, the English became the rightful possessors of the country, past any right of ours to trouble them.

M. de Robinson added to me that the king his master having

accordé dans ces parties, a une compagnie une concession de deux mille arpents de terre ; cette compagnie avoit voulu avant de faire ses etablissemens pourvoir a leur seureté ;

Qu'en consequence il avoit été envoyé un detachement d'une trentaine d'hommes, commandés par un lieutenant, pour prendre poste et se fortifier vers les sources de la Riviere d'Ohio,

Qu'a peine les Anglois avoient ils eû le tems de s'y etabliir, qu'il avoit parû un detachement des notres, que les Anglois disent avoir été de plus de mille hommes ;

Que l'officier commandant notre detachement avoit sommé le lieutenant Anglois d'evacuer le fort, et de se retirer avec ses gens,

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sans quoy il le feroit passer par les armes luy et sa troupe, ne luy donnant qu'une heure pour se determiner

M. Robinson m'a remis copie de cette premiere sommation que vous trouverez cy jointe ;

Il a poursuivi que les gouverneurs de leurs colonies, ayant regardé cette entreprise comme une agression, avoient assemblé leurs milices pour se mettre en etat de conserver leur terrain et de repousser la force par la force ;

[*Translation*]

made a grant of two thousand arpents of land in these parts to a company, that company had wished to provide in advance for the safety of its settlements: that in consequence it had sent a detachment of thirty men, commanded by a lieutenant, to take post and fortify toward the sources of the Ohio; that the English had scarcely had time to establish themselves, when a French detachment had appeared, of, as the English say, more than a thousand men; that the officer commanding our detachment had summoned the English lieutenant to evacuate the fort and withdraw with his people, under pain of being shot down with his men, giving him only an hour to decide. M. Robinson gave me a copy of this first summons, which you will find annexed.

He continued that the governors of their colonies, having regarded this expedition as an aggression, had assembled their militias to put themselves in a position to keep their lands and

Que de près de vingt mille hommes dont leurs milices sont composées, a peine en avoient ils trouvé cinq cens qui fussent en état et en volonté de marcher ;

Que l'officier Anglois qui commandoit ce petit corps ayant été averti par un chef de leurs sauvages, qu'il y avoit apportée de luy un detachment des notres de cinquante a soixante hommes caché dans des rochers pour eclairer les mouvements des Anglois,

Le commandant Anglois se croyant autorisé par notre precedente entreprise a user de reprisailles, avoit pris la resolution

20v

d'attaquer notre detachment qu'il l'avoit surpris au point du jour et que le tout avoit été pris ou tué, a l'exception d'un seul homme, qui s'étoit sauvé, et avoit trouvé le moyen de regagner le gros de nos gens ;

Que l'on avoit trouvé sur l'officier qui le commandoit l'instruction et sommation dont M. de Robinson m'a remis copie et que vous trouverez aussy cy jointe.

Qu'à la suite de cette action le gros de nos gens s'étant avancé sur les anglois, les avoient acculés dans un marais, et que les

[*Translation*]

to repel force by force. Of almost twenty thousand men who made up their militias, they had scarcely found five hundred who were ready and willing to march. The English officer who commanded this little party having been warned by a chief of their Indians that there was nearby a detachment of fifty or sixty of our men hidden in the rocks to watch the movements of the English, thought himself justified by our preceding expedition in making reprisals ; he had decided to attack this detachment, which he had surprised at daybreak, and all had been killed or captured save one man who had escaped and managed to return to our main body.

The English commander had found on the body of the officer who commanded, the instructions and summons of which M. de Robinson gave me a copy, and which you will also find annexed. As the result of this action, our main body had advanced on the English, had forced them into a marsh, and attacking them before

ayant attaqués avant qu'ils eussent le tems de se fortifier; apres un combat de quelques heures, il les avoit obligés de capituler, qu'ensuite nos gens s'étoient prolongés sur la Riviere d'ohio, et y avoient etabli un fort dont il m'a montré le plan;

Voila, Monsieur, le detail que m'a fait M. de Robinson des pretentions des anglois et des voyes de fait qui ont été executées dans ces parties.

Je luy ay repondu que je n'étois pas muni des instructions necessaires pour pouvoir discuter vis a vis de luy le fonds de la

21

question, et luy demontrer les droits que nous avions sur le territoire dont les Anglois pretendoient la possession, mais que l'entreprise de leurs gouverneurs, de s'établir a main armée dans un terrain en contestation, etoit contraire aux termes des traittés qui disoient formellement dans l'article dix huit de celui d'aix La Chapelle, que tous les differents pour les limites qui surviendroient en Amerique entre nos colonies, seroient raportés a la commission qui devoit s'établir a Paris, pour être ensuite terminés a l'amiable entre les deux cours;

[Translation]

they had time to fortify had, after an action of some hours, obliged them to surrender; then our people had established themselves along the Ohio River and had built a fort of which he showed me the plan. That, Monsieur, is M. de Robinson's detailed account to me of the claims of the English and the acts of violence committed in these parts.

I answered him that I had not the necessary instructions to discuss the basis of the question with him and prove the rights we had in the territory possession of which the English claim, but that the enterprises of their governors to establish themselves by armed force in a land in dispute was contrary to the terms of the treaties, which in the eighteenth article of that of Aix-la-Chapelle formally specified that all disputes over boundaries existing between our colonies in America, should be referred to the commission to be established at Paris, to be at length terminated amicably between the two courts.

Je luy ay ensuite produit, pour luy prouver que les faits n'étoient pas tels qu'ils luy avoient été raportés, les pieces justificatives que vous m'avez mis entre les mains

Mr le Chevalier Robinson m'a fort assuré qu'aucune de leurs relations n'avoit fait aucune mention ni de l'assassinat du Sieur Jumonville, ni même qu'il y eût eû aucun pourparler entre nos gens, avant l'action ou nôtre detachement ou avant garde avoit ete debellé;

21v

Qu'il n'en avoit eû la premiere nouvelle que confusement parceque luy en avoit mandé My lord Albermale, et qu'il n'étoit instruit du fait que par la communication que je luy en donnois;

Qu'il pouvoit me repondre qu'une telle action ne demeureroit pas impunie, et que quelque difficulté qu'il parût d'eclaircir la verité vû la distance des lieux et la difference des rapports qui avoient été faits a l'une et l'autre cour, Sa Majesté Britanique ne negligeroit rien pour y parvenir, et faire justice des coupables;

.....
23....

Je ne dois pas obmettre ce qu'il m'a repondu lorsque je luy

[*Translation*]

I then produced to him, to prove the facts were not as reported to him, the papers in proof you had given me. M. le Chevalier Robinson assured me none of their accounts had made any mention of the assassination of the Sieur Jumonville, nor even that there had been any parley between our troops, before the action in which our advance guard had been overcome. He had only had the first news of it confusedly since My Lord Albemarle had informed him of it, and that he was only informed of the fact by my communication. He could assure me such a deed would not go unpunished, and that however difficult it might seem to arrive at the truth in view of the distance of the place and the variety of the reports made to both courts, His Britannic Majesty would neglect nothing to arrive at it, and to do justice on the guilty.

.....
I must not omit what he answered when I indicated to him

ay temoigné que nous avions eû lieu d'être surpris que sa cour eût négligé de repondre avec plus de precision aux ouvertures de conciliation que vous aviez fait a My lord Albermale, des que nous avons eû les premieres nouvelles des differents survenus dans nos colonies ;

Il m'a repondu la dessus que My lord Albermale n'en ayant rendu compte que vaguement, et que comme d'explications particulieres qui s'étoient faites confidement entre vous et luy, on n'avoit pû y repondre que generalement par des assurances de la continuité des dispositions de Sa Majesté Britanique pour le maintien de la paix et de sa fidelité a tenir ses engagements ;

Sur ce que M. le Cher de Robinson venoit de me temoigner

23v

des dispositions de sa cour je luy ay dit que comme je le n'avois prevenu, je n'étois point muni des instructions necessaires pour être en etat de discuter avec luy les droits que nous avions sur les possessions contestées pour les limites de nos colonies ; mais que pour eviter les suites facheuses que pourroient avoir les hostilités qui s'étoient exercées de part et d'autre, et amener les choses

[*Translation*]

our grounds for surprise that his court had failed to answer more precisely to the overtures of conciliation made to My Lord Albemarle, as soon as we had the first news of the difficulties that had arisen in our colonies. As to that he replied that My Lord Albemarle having only reported it vaguely, and as special conversation confidential between you and him, they had only been able to reply generally by assurances of the continuation of His Britannic Majesty's disposition to maintain the peace, and of his fidelity to his engagements.

On what M. le Chevalier de Robinson just indicated to me on the intentions of his court, I told him that as I had already indicated, I was not provided with the instructions necessary to enable me to discuss with him the rights we had over the possessions in dispute for the boundaries of our colonies: but that to avoid annoying results which the hostilities which were taking place on both sides might cause and to bring things to a

a une prompte conciliation j'avois ordre de luy faire les propositions suivantes;

Qu'avant d'entrer en matiere sur les droits respectifs il fût envoyé des ordres precis a nos gouverneurs en Amerique pour leur deffendre toute entreprise et voye de fait;

Leur ordonner que les choses fussent remises par raport au territoire sur la Riviere d'Ohio dans le même etat ou elles estoient ou devoient être avant la guerre;

Que les differents survenus fûssent deferés a l'amiable a la commission etablie a Paris, affin que les cours puissent parvenir a une prompte conciliation;

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Et que pour dissiper toute impression d'inquietude Sa Majesté Britanique veuille bien s'expliquer ouvertement sur la destination et les motifs de l'armement qui avoit été fait en dernier lieu;

M. le Chr de Robinson m'a demandé mes propositions par escrit, affin qu'il fût mieux en etat d'en rendre compte au conseil, et de me donner promptement une reponse;

[*Translation*]

prompt conciliation I had orders to make him the following proposals:

That before going into the matter of the respective rights precise orders should be sent to our governors in America to forbid them all enterprises and acts of violence; to order them that affairs with respect to the territory of the river Ohio be put in the same state in which they were or should have been before the war; that the disputes that had arisen be amicably referred to the commission established at Paris that the courts might arrive at a prompt conciliation; and that to dispel all disquieting ideas His Britannic Majesty be pleased to explain himself openly on the destination and purposes of the armament lately made.

M. le Chevalier de Robinson asked my proposals in writing that he might be in a better condition to report to the council and give me a prompt answer. On this, Monsieur, using the per-

Et sur ce Monsieur, suivant la permission que vous m'en avez donné, j'ay extrait des differents memoires que vous m'avez remis les articles contenant nos propositions, et en ay dressé le memoire dont je joins icy copie, et dont j'ay remis l'original a M. Le Chr de Robinson

Je joins a la copie que je vous en envoie des notes sur ce que
24v

je conjecture que repondront les Anglois sur les differens articles qui y sont contenus

.....

MIREPOIX' MEMOIR FOR ROBINSON, January 16, 1755

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:31]

joint a la depeche du duc de Mirepoix du 16. Janver 1755

Memoire remis par le Duc de Mirepoix a M. Robinson contenant les propositions de la france touchant les discussions dans les colonies respectives de l'Amerique

Comme il est important de prevenir promptement les suites que pourroient avoir les discussions survenues dans les colonies respectives de l'Amerique Septentrionale, et les hostilités dont

[*Translation*]

mission you gave me, I extracted from the various memoirs sent me, the articles containing our propositions, and drew up the memoir a copy of which I annex, the original of which I have communicated to M. le Chevalier de Robinson.

I annex to the copy I send you notes of what I conjecture the English will reply to the different articles comprised.

.....

Annexed to the dispatch of the Duc de Mirepoix Jan. 16, 1755

Memoir communicated by the Duc de Mirepoix to M. Robinson containing the proposals of France as to differences in the respective American colonies.

As it is important to forestall promptly the results which may develop from the disputes that have arisen in the respective

elles ont été accompagnées; le roy propose a Sa Majesté Britanique, qu'avant d'examiner le fonds et les circonstances de la querelle, il soit préalablement envoyé des ordres positifs a nos gouverneurs respectifs, pour leur deffendre désormais toute nouvelle entreprise et voye de fait;—

Leur ordonner au contraire que les choses soient remises sans

31v

retardement par rapport au territoire du cote de la Riviere d'Ohio ou Belle Riviere, au meme etat ou elles estoient, ou devoient être avant la dernière guerre, et que les pretentions respectives soient a l'amiable deferées a la commission établie a Paris, afin que les deux cours puissent terminer le different par une prompte conciliation

Le roy desireroit aussy, pour dissiper toute impression d'inquietude et faire jouir ses sujets en toute tranquillité des doux fruits de la paix, que Sa Majesté Britanique veuille bien

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s'expliquer ouvertement sur la destination et les motifs de l'armement qui s'est fait en dernier lieu en Angleterre;

[*Translation*]

colonies of North America and the hostilities that have accompanied them, the king proposes to His Britannic Majesty that, before examining the basis and the circumstances of the dispute, positive orders be sent to our respective governors to forbid them henceforth all new enterprises and acts of violence.

They are on the contrary to be instructed that matters are to be restored without delay with respect to the territory toward the Ohio or Beautiful River to the same situation in which they were or should have been before the last war, and that the respective claims be referred amicably to the commission established at Paris so that the two courts may terminate the matter in a prompt conciliation.

The king could also wish, in order to remove any disquieting ideas and to suffer his subjects to enjoy in all tranquillity the sweet fruits of peace, that His Britannic Majesty would be pleased to express himself frankly as to the destination and purposes of the armament now taking place in England.

Le roy a trop de confiance dans la droiture des intentions de Sa Majesté Britanique, pour ne pas esperer qu'elle concourra volontiers a des propositions aussy convenables a l'affermissement de la paix, et au maintien de la tranquillité publique et de la bonne harmonie entre nos deux cours.

MIREPOIX FORECASTS THE ENGLISH ANSWER

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:33]

avec la lettre du Duc de
Mirepoix du 16. Janvr 1755.

▲ le Duc de Mirepoix

Réponse que ▲ je presume que donneront les Anglois sur le memoire que je leur ai remis. Les Anglois ne consentiront pas aux deux premiers articles tels quils sont stipulés, et ne les accepteront que conditionnellement. Ils demanderont pour condition de l'armistice que le fort que nous avons etabli soit démoli, et que nous evacüions tous les etablissemens que nous avons pu faire en dernier lieu sur la Riviere d'ohio; ils consentiroient peut être que tout le terrain demeurât

[*Translation*]

The king has too much confidence in the uprightness of the intentions of His Britannic Majesty not to hope that he will willingly concur in proposals so calculated to the establishment of peace and the maintenance of the public tranquillity and the good harmony between the two courts.

With the letter of the Duc de
Mirepoix of January 16, 1755

the Duc de Mirepoix

Reply which ▲ I thinks the English will give to the memoir I have communicated to them. The English will not consent to the two first articles as stipulated and will only accept them conditionally. They will demand as a condition of the armistice that the fort that we have established be razed, and that we evacuate all the settlements we may have lately made on the river Ohio; they will perhaps consent that all the territory be

33v

prohibé a l'une et a l'autre nation jusques a la decision du fond de l'affaire. Les Anglois refuseront absolument le 3eme article, et ne voudront point que la discussion de la querelle soit deferée a la commission etablie a Paris. Ils demanderont quelle soit traitée de cour a cour, ou par moy a celle de Londres, ou a la notre, par la personne quils nommeront pour remplacer le Cte d'albemarle; Quant au 4eme art. il ne peut souffrir de difficultés; comme les ministres n'en ont point faite pour s'expliquer avec moy
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des motifs, et de la destination de leur armément, ils n'en peuvent faire de le declarer comme nous le demandons

[*Translation*]

forbidden to either nation until the basic decision of the matter. The English will absolutely refuse the third article and do not wish the discussion of the dispute referred to the commission at Paris. They will demand that it be treated court to court, either by me at London, or at our court by the person they will name to replace the Comte d'Albemarle. As to the fourth article it can occasion no difficulty; as the ministers have made none of explaining to me the purposes and destination of their armament they can make none of declaring it as we ask.

ROBINSON'S MEMOIR, January 22, 1755

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:38]

1755. Janver 22.

Copie du memoire remis par M. le Cher de Robinson en réponse a celui qui luy a été donné par M. le Duc de Mirepoix

Le roy a vû avec regret les disputes survenues dans l'Amerique Septentrionale, et les voyes de fait dont elles ont été accompagnées: Sa Majesté souhaiteroit, autant que le Roy tres Chretien, d'y mettre fin, ne reclamant que ce qui est fondé sur des traittés, et ce qui est conforme aux justes droits et possessions de sa couronne, et a la protection de ses sujets dans ces pays la

Le roy ne croit pas que la proposition, remise par Son Excellence, M. le Duc de Mirepoix remplisse cet objet; Cependant pour temoigner son desir de maintenir la paix, l'union et
38v

l'harmonie la plus parfaite avec Sa Majesté tres Chretienne; et pour que les choses soient retablies sur un pied equitable, Sa

[Translation]

January 22, 1755

Copy of the memoir communicated by M. le Chevalier de Robinson in reply to that given him by M. le Duc de Mirepoix

The king has seen with regret the disputes that have arisen in North America and the acts of violence that have accompanied them. His Majesty could desire, like the Most Christian King, to put an end to them, claiming only what is conformable to the just rights and possessions of his crown and to the protection of his subjects in that country.

The king does not believe that the proposal communicated by His Excellency M. le Duc de Mirepoix can attain that object. However to testify his desire to maintain the most perfect peace, accord, and harmony with His Most Christian Majesty, and in order that affairs may be reëstablished on an equitable footing,

Mt propose, que la possession du territoire du ct de la Riviere d'Ohio ou Belle Riviere, soit remis dans le mme tat ou elle toit actuellement au tems de la conclusion du Traitt d'Utrecht, et selon les stipulations de ce mme traitt, renouvel comme il a t par celui d'Aix la Chapelle, et de plus que les autres possessions dans l'Amerique Septentrionale soient restitues dans le mme tat, ou elles toient au tems de la conclusion dudit Traitt d'Utrecht, et selon les cessions et les stipulations portes

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par ce traitt, et on pourra traiter sur les moyens d'instruire les gouverneurs respectifs, et de leur defendre desormais toutes nouvelles entreprises et voyes de fait, et on pourra remettre les pretentions de part et d'autre pour tre promptement et finalement discutes et ajustes a l'amiable de cour a cour ;

Tels sont les sentimens du roy. La deffense de ses droits et possessions, et la protection de ses sujets ont t les seuls motifs de l'armement qui a t envoy dans l'Amerique Septentrionale ; lequel s'est fait sans intention d'offenser quelque puissance que

[*Translation*]

His Majesty proposes that the possession of the territory toward the Ohio or Beautiful River be restored to the same state in which it actually was at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of Utrecht, and in accord with the stipulations of that same treaty, renewed as it was by that of Aix-la-Chapelle ; and further that other possessions in North America be restored to the same state in which they were at the time of the conclusion of the said Treaty of Utrecht and in accord with the cessions and stipulations of that treaty ; the means of instructing the respective governors, and of forbidding them henceforth all new enterprises or acts of violence may be matter of negotiation ; the claims on either side may be promptly and finally discussed and adjusted amicably court to court.

Such are the king's sentiments. The defense of his rights and possessions, and the protection of his subjects have been the sole purposes of the armament sent to North America, which has

ce puisse être, ou de rien faire qui puisse donner atteinte a la paix generale.

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On n'a qu'a considerer la nature et l'etendue de cet armement pour en être convaincu, Et le roy ne doute pas que Sa Majesté tres Chretienne ne veuille, selon la droiture si connue de ses intentions, s'expliquer aussy ouvertement par raport a la grande force navale, qui se prepare a Brest, et a Toulon.

Signé T. ROBINSON.

[Translation]

been done with no intention of offending any power whatsoever or of doing anything which may harm the public peace.

It is only necessary to consider the nature and the extent of the armament to be convinced of this. And the king does not doubt that His Most Christian Majesty will be pleased, in view of the uprightness of his intentions, so generally recognized, to explain himself with similar openness with regard to the great naval force now preparing at Brest and at Toulon.

Signed: T. ROBINSON

NEWCASTLE MEMORANDA

[Add. MSS., 32,996:11]

(?) NEWCASTLE HOUSE Jan y 22d.

Memr for Sr J. Barnard	The Intelligence about the French
Sr J. B.	armament The Orders for the Press
You must fit out your	& The Two Irish Regts.
Fleet as the French fit	M. de Mirepoix paper.
out Theirs, or you will	The Proposed Answer.
have no Fleet, or seamen.	

.....	
11v	The Measures to be taken in N.
.....	America The Completing the
.....	Regiments There to 1000 men each.
.....	

12

Sir J. Barnard.

That we should have No Forts or
Fortifications on The other side
of the Mountains, or beyond
Wills Creek.

That the French shall have no
Fortifications on This side the Lakes.
That The French may Continue Their
Fort at Niagara.

? Whether we may not agree to a sus-
pension of arms, as soon as The forts
on the Ohio, & any other Forts of
This side of The Lakes are demolished.
Doubtful about Crown Point & the
Right to it.

My Lord Granville.

Gov Knowls, Gov of Jamaica

[*Endorsed:*] Jany 22. Mem. Sir J. Barnard.

PROJECT OF REPLY TO ROBINSON'S MEMOIR, February 3, 1755

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:94]

Recû le 6.fever 1755. Avec la lettre du 3 fevrier 1755. No ler

Projet de replique au mémoire de M. Robinson

Le roi est trop persüadé des dispositions sinceres du Roi de
la Grande Bretagne à maintenir la bonne intelligence entre les
deux courones, ainsi que la tranquillité générale pour douter que
Sa Mté Britannique ne voye avec peine les dangers dont l'une et

[*Translation*]

Received February 6, 1755

With the letter of February 3, 1755, No. 1

Project of reply to the memoir of M. Robinson

The king is too well persuaded of the sincere disposition of
the King of Great Britain to maintain the good understanding
between the two crowns as well as the general tranquillity to
doubt that His Britannic Majesty sees with pain the dangers with
which both are menaced by the difficulties that have arisen in

l'autre sont menacées par les différends survenus dans l'Amérique Septentrionale du côté de la Rivière d'Ohio.

C'est dans ce même esprit que Sa Mté a fait proposer par son ambassadeur à la cour d'Angleterre, que les deux rois avant

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que d'entrer dans la discussion du fonds de la querelle et dans la recherche des moyens qui peuvent la terminer à l'amiable, envoyassent des ordres positifs à leurs gouverneurs respectifs dans cette partie de l'Amérique pour qu'ils eussent à s'abstenir de toutes voyes de fait et de toute nouvelle entreprise, et à remettre les choses dans l'état où elles étoient, ou devoient être avant la dernière guerre.

Si Sa Majté Britannique a pu croire au premier aspect que cette proposition ne remplissoit pas l'objet des deux cours, on est persuadé qu'elle en jugera différemment, quand elle voudra bien

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considérer que ses prétentions sont entièrement inconnues à la France; que depuis 1679 que les François ont découvert la belle Rivière, les Anglois n'y ont eu aucune possession ni de fait ni de

[*Translation*]

North America toward the Ohio River.

It is in the same spirit that His Majesty has had proposed by his ambassador to the court of England that the two kings, before entering into a discussion of the basis of the dispute, and into a search for means that may end it amicably, should send positive orders to their respective governors in that part of America to abstain from all acts of violence and new enterprises, and to restore things to the state in which they were or should have been before the last war.

If His Britannic Majesty has thought at first view that this proposal did not attain to the intention of the two courts, we are convinced he will judge of it otherwise, if he will be pleased to consider that his claims are entirely unknown to France; that since 1679 when the French discovered the Ohio River, the English have had no possession in fact or in right, and that the Treaty of

droit, et que le Traité d'Utrecht dont la cour d'Angleterre semble reclamer les stipulations, n'en a pas même fait la moindre mention.

La voye qu'on propose à Sa Mté Britannique, est entièrement conforme aux engagements du Traité d'Aix la Chapelle, aux mesures prises depuis cette époque et nommément aux conditions demandées en 1750 et 1751 par l'Angleterre même et consenties

95v

sans difficulté par Sa Mté au sujet des troubles qui s'elevent alors pour les limites de la frontiere de la nouvelle Ecosse et du Canada.

En conséquence de ces raisons et de ces engagements Sa Mté propose:

1. Que les deux rois ordonnent à leurs gouverneurs respectifs de s'abstenir de toute voye de fait et de toute nouvelle entreprise.

2. de remettre les choses au meme etat ou elles estoient ou devoient estre avant la derniere guerre dans toute l'étenduë de l'Amerique Septentrionale, conformément à l'Article 9 du Traité d'Aix la Chapelle.

[*Translation*]

Utrecht, whose terms England appears to invoke, does not make the least mention of it.

The method proposed to His Britannic Majesty is entirely conformable to the obligations of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, to measures taken since, especially to the conditions asked in 1750 and 1751 by England herself and consented to without demur by His Majesty on the subject of the difficulties which then arose on the boundary of Nova Scotia and Canada.

In consequence of these reasons and obligations His Majesty proposes:

1. That the two kings order their respective governors to abstain from all acts of violence and all new enterprises.

2. To restore things to the same state in which they were or should have been before the last war, in the whole extent of North America, conformably to Article 9 of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle.

3. Que conformément a l'article 18 du même traité, Sa
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Mté Britannique fasse instruire la commission établie à Paris, de ses prétentions et des fondemens sur les quels elles sont appuyées.

Et que les ministres des deux cours soient autorisé à negocier pour trouver les moyens de terminer le différend à l'amiable.

C'est avec la confiance que doivent inspirer au roi des conditions aussi justes et aussi raisonnables, qu'elle les propose au Roi d'Angleterre; Sa Mté a d'autant plus lieu d'esperer qu'elles seront acceptées, qu'elle est persuadée que S. Mté Britannique
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est animée du meme desir qu'elle, d'écarter des sujets de mésintelligence et de troubles qui par l'opposition des interets, la complication des objets, et par la nature des engagements des traités peuvent devenir aussi dangereux pour la paix des deux couronnes que pour celle de toute l'Europe.

Quant à l'armement que le roi fait, la cour d'Angleterre est

[*Translation*]

3. That conformably to article 18 of the same treaty, His Britannic Majesty should instruct the commission established at Paris of his claims and the foundation on which they are based.

And that the ministers of the two courts be authorized to negotiate to find the means of amicably ending the dispute.

It is with the confidence which such just and reasonable conditions should inspire in the king, that he proposes them to the King of England. His Majesty has the more reason to hope they will be accepted in that he is persuaded that His Britannic Majesty is moved by the same desire as himself, to avoid subjects of misunderstanding and difficulty which by the clash of interests, the complication of purposes, and the nature of treaty obligations, may prove quite dangerous for the peace of the two crowns and for that of Europe as well.

As to the armament that the king is preparing, the court of England is in a position to penetrate its purposes, since it is the

en état d'en pénétrer les motifs, puisque ce sont les armements qu'elle a annoncés à toute l'Europe et exécutés en partie, qui ont rendu les précautions de la France nécessaires; mais S. M^{té} de-
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clare expressément que ces préparatifs n'ont aucune vue offensive et n'ont d'autre objet que la défense de ses possessions et des droits de sa couronne.

ROUILLÉ TO MIREPOIX, February 3, 1755

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:81]

Recue le 6. fev
No 1.

A VERSAILLES le 3. fevrier 1755.

J'ay reçu, Monsieur, avec la lettre dont vous m'avez honoré le 23 du mois dernier, la réponse de la cour d'Angleterre au mémoire que vous aviez remis à M. le Cher Robinson, concernant nos discussions en Amérique.

Vous jugerez aisément qu'une matière aussi importante a donné lieu à des réflexions très sérieuses de la part du roy et de son conseil, et je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire qu'elles ont eu de toute préférence pour motif et pour objet, le désir et les moyens

[*Translation*]

armaments which it has announced throughout Europe, and has partially executed, that have rendered the French precautions necessary. But His Majesty expressly declares that these preparations have no offensive intent and no other object than the defense of his possessions and the rights of his crown.

Received February 6
No. 1

VERSAILLES, February 3, 1755

I have received, Monsieur, with the letter with which you honored me the twenty-third of last month, the reply of the English court to the memoir you communicated to M. le Chevalier Robinson concerning our disputes in America.

You will easily infer that so important a matter has caused serious reflection to the king and his council, and I do not need to tell you that such reflection has been all in favor of finding

de maintenir et de perpétuer, s'il est possible, la paix et la bonne intelligence qui subsistent heureusement entre Sa Majesté et le Roy de la Grande Brétagne.

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Vous demandés, Monsieur, des instructions pour vous mettre en état d'entamer la négociation que le roy vous confie; mais comme le point essentiel à terminer actuellement, est celui qui concerne le territoire de la Rivière d'Ohio, tout ce que nous pouvons vous dire à ce sujet, c'est qu'il appartient incontestablement au roy, et a toujours été regardé comme une partie de ses possessions en Amérique. Le Traité d'Utrecht que l'Angleterre réclame, ne fait aucune mention ni de cette rivière ni des terres

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adjacentes, et ce n'est que depuis fort peu de tems que cette couronne à formé des prétentions à cet égard. Sa Majesté ne pourroit consentir à les reconnoître, sans admettre les Anglois au centre de ses domaines, et leur laisser la facilité de s'emparer ensuite de la Louisiane ou du Canada. Au reste c'est à la cour

[*Translation*]

the means of perpetuating if possible the peace and good understanding happily existing between His Majesty and the King of Great Britain.

You ask, Monsieur, for instructions to enable you to carry on the negotiation the king confides to you; but as the essential point to terminate is that which concerns the territory of the Ohio River, all that we can tell you on the subject is that it belongs incontestably to the king and has always been regarded as a part of his American possessions: the Treaty of Utrecht which England invokes makes no mention of that river or of the adjacent lands; and it is only very recently that that crown has set up claims in that respect. His Majesty could not consent to them without admitting the English to the center of his dominions, and leaving them free to get possession next of Louisiana or Canada. For the rest it is for the court of London to produce the incidents

de Londres à produire les moyens sur les quels elle fonde cette moderne prétention, et nous espérons qu'il ne nous sera pas difficile de les refuter solidement.

Il n'étoit pas possible, Monsieur, de vous exprimer avec plus de dignité et de modération que vous l'avés fait dans vos conversations avec Mrs les ministres Anglois, et le roy n'a à vous prescrire que le même langage que vous avés déjà tenu. Sa

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Majesté désire vivement la paix, et ne négligera pour la maintenir, aucun des moyens compatibles avec sa gloire et avec la protection qu'elle doit à ses sujets, mais si on la force à faire la guerre, elle n'en craindra ni la dépense ni les dangers.

L'armement que le roy fait préparer n'à qu'un objet purement défensif, et n'en aura point d'autre, tandis qu'on n'obligera point Sa Majesté à user des represailles, mais si on la met dans cette nécessité, il ne seroit ni juste ni prudent de s'en tenir aux opérations d'une simple défense dans les endroits, où l'Angleterre pourroit nous attaquer avec trop d'avantage.

.....
[Translation]

on which it founds this most recent claim, and we trust that it will not be hard for us to refute them unanswerably.

It was not possible, Monsieur, for you to express yourself with more dignity and moderation than you have employed in your conversations with the English ministers, and the king has only to prescribe to you the same language you have already used. His Majesty eagerly wishes for peace, and to maintain it will neglect no means compatible with his glory and with the protection he owes to his subjects; but if he is forced to make war he will fear neither the expense nor the danger.

The armament which the king is having made has only a defensive purpose, and will have no other, so long as he is not forced to reprisals; but if he is put under that necessity, it would be neither right nor prudent to limit himself simply to defensive operations at points where England may attack us with but too much advantage.

.....

CABINET MINUTE, February 7, 1755

[Add. MSS., 32,996:25]

NEWCASTLE HOUSE Feby 7th 1755.

Present.

Lord Chancellor

Earl of Holdernessee

Duke of Newcastle

Sir Thomas Robinson

That Sir Thomas Robinson should express to Mo de Mirepoix His Readiness to enter into Negotiation with Him, in consequence of that Ambassador's Full Powers: and should propose to Him an immediate Evacuation of the Countries upon the Ohio, and a total Demolition of all the Forts and Settlements in those Parts; so that the said Country, from the Back of His Majesty's Colonies to the Lakes, and as far as the River Oubash, may be left in the same state It was by the Treaty of Utrecht.

That Sir Thomas Robinson should endeavour to discover from Mo. de Mirepoix, How far He is authorised, by His present

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Full Powers, to Negotiate upon the Foot of the Plan proposed in the year 1752, to put an end to all Differences between the Two Crowns, in North America, particularly with regard to the Forts at Niagara, and Crown Point, and Those on the River St John, and on the Isthmus of the Peninsula of Nova Scotia.

CABINET MINUTE, February 9, 1755

[Add. MSS., 32,996:27]

POWIS HOUSE. Feby 9th 1755.

That, in Consequence of Monsr de Mirepoix's Full-Power, an Agreement should be forthwith Concluded, and sign'd, with Him, That Orders should be immediately sent, on Both Sides, to The respective Officers, and Governors, in North America, for Evacuating The Ohio, and Demolishing all Forts, That may have been built on any Part of That River, or in The Neighbourhood; And for leaving That Country a Neutral Country, where Each Nation may have The Liberty To Trade; but to be possess'd by The Natives only.

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That There should be a Suspension of Arms for—Months, to be computed from The Signing of the Preliminaries here.

That, during That Time, The several Points in Dispute, (which should be particularly specified,) should be adjusted amicably.

That, if The Time, agreed on for The Suspension, should be found not sufficient for That purpose, and That The Ohio shall have been evacuated, according to Agreement;—The Suspension, Then, to be further prolong'd.

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But That, during The Time of The Suspension, and from The Date of The Preliminaries to be sign'd here, Neither Party shall be at Liberty, to send either Ships of War, or Troops, to North America. [*in margin*: or to make any further Levies in North America.]

That, If The French should have sent any Ships to North America, between This Time, and The Conclusion of The Preliminary Treaty; In That Case, and not otherwise, The King may be at Liberty to send an Equal Force; But That neither Side afterwards should send any more.

CABINET MINUTE, February 10, 1755

[Add. MSS., 32,996:29]

1st That the River Ohio, with the Countries on Each Side of The sd River, from The Allegany Mountains to The Lake of Ontario, The River of Niagara, The Lake of Erie, and The River Oubach, or St Jerome, be forthwith evacuated; & all Forts, & Establishments, which have been made within The District, so describ'd, since The Treaty of Utrecht, be demolish'd.

That The sd District, so evacuated, & put into The Condition It was at The Time of The Treaty of Utrecht, shall so remain, for The future, With a Liberty only for both The English, and French, To pass, & repass, in a peaceable Manner, for The sole Purposes of Travelling, & Trading; But not in Corps of Armed Men, or in any Hostile Manner whatever.

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That a free Passage shall be open, To both The English, & French, upon The Lakes Ontario, & Erie, & as well up & down The River Niagara, as across That River, from & to The Countries, lying within The Great Lakes.

2d That such Fort, or Forts, as are situated on The Western Side of The River Niagara, & likewise Fort Frederick, or Crown Point, on The Lake Champlain, be demolish'd.

3d That It be agreed, That The Isthmus of the Peninsula of Nova Scotia, with all The Coast, Neighbouring Islands, & Banks, to the North, & North East, together with a Tract of Land, on The West Side of The Bay of Fundy, Leagues broad; Extending one Way towards New England, And The

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Other to The Gulph of St Laurence, shall appertain in full Property, & Sovereignty, to The King of Great Britain, & shall be entirely evacuated by The French; & left, with all The Forts, & Establishments, which have been made since The Treaty of Utrecht, in The State They now are.

That The Rest of the Country, from The sd Tract of Leagues, to be bounded by The Gulph, & River of St Laurence, & by a Line, dropped perpendicularly from The River St Laurence, opposite to The Mouth of The River Penobscot, be left uninhabited by both The English, or French.

4th These Conditions once agreed upon, in good & due Form, Orders shall be sent forthwith to The respective Officers in America, to put Them into Execution, with The utmost Expedition.

HALIFAX'S OBSERVATIONS ON ROBINSON'S PROPOSALS

[Add. MSS., 33,029:167]

As It is stated, that all the Lands, between the Apalachean Mountains, & the Lakes Ontario & Erie, are to be evacuated, & left unpossessed by either Party, for the future, It is to be supposed, that a line is intended to be drawn, from some part of these Mountains to some part of the Lake Ontario; But as It is

not expressed from what part of these Mountains this Line is to be drawn, or to what part of the Lake Ontario: this Proposition is not intelligible; and It is impossible to form a Judgement of it, or of the Consequences, that will attend it.

If the Line is to be drawn from any given Point at the North

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Eastern Extremity of the Apalachean Mountains to any part of the Lake Ontario, It will be yielding up near One Third of the Province of Pensylvania, as an Uninhabited Country: & it is worthy Consideration, & Enquiry; what Townships & settlements may be broken up by such an Agreement—How far It may trespass upon the Right of the Proprietors of this Province: & how far It may be legal, just, or proper, in the Crown to attempt it

If the supposed Line is to be drawn from the same Point to the North East End of the Lake Ontario, It will not only exclude from Settlement still a greater Part of Pensylvania, but will also exclude a great Part of New York, where we already have a con-

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siderable Establishment, & within which there are several Tracts of Land, held under Grants from the Crown.

It must be further observed upon this Proposition, that a Line drawn from the Apalachean Mountains to any Part of the Lake Ontario will effectually exclude His Majty's Subjects from the Right, which they most undoubtedly have, by the Treaty of Utrecht, of building Forts, & making Settlements, within the Territory, belonging to the Six Nations, on the South Side of Lake Erie: and should the Line be drawn from a given Point, at the North East Extremity of the Apalachean Mountains, to the North East End of Lake Ontario, It will likewise prevent His

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Majty's Subjects from the Enjoyment of the Right, which They have by the same Treaty, of building Forts, & making Settlements on the South East Side of the Lake Ontario.

If It should be stipulated, That The Territories, on the South, & South East Sides of these Lakes, should be put into the Condition, in which they were, at the Time of the Treaty of Utrecht, & so remain for the future: tho' such a Stipulation, if carried

into Execution, might appear favorable to Great Britain, inas-much as the unjustifiable Encroachments, which the French have been suffered to make, since the Treaty of Utrecht, on these sides

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of the Lakes, would be removed; yet It is well worthy Consideration, whether the positive Right of the Crown of Great Britain, as fixed by that Treaty, will not be thereby given up, and all future Measures for Trading with, & for the Defence of the Six Nations, entirely defeated: For altho' It be proposed, that a free Passage shall be open to Both Nations on the Great Lakes, It requires some skill to determine, how Power is to be preserved, or Trade carried on upon the said Lakes, if the French are to be suffered to remain in Possession of the Forts, & Trading Houses, They have unjustifiably erected on the Lands of the Six Nations, on the North Sides of these Lakes, & the Subjects of

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Great Britain excluded from taking the like measures for their Security, on the South, & South East Sides of these Lakes, where the French have no Shadow of Claim.

Upon the whole, It must be observed, on this Proposition, that, if the Forts, & Settlements, made & erected by France, on the East, & South East Sides of the Lakes; are only to be evacuated, & they are to be left in Possession of Those, on the Northern, and Western Sides, which is equally within the Territory of the Six Nations, while Great Britain is excluded from all Settlement, or Possession whatever, either on the one Side, or the other, That Article of the Treaty of Utrecht, by which the

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Dominion of the Six Nations, & consequently the Possession of their Territory, is yielded to Great Britain, will not only be annulled, but That great & important Question, which is the Basis of our principal Rights in North America; & which was by that Treaty, after a Contest of so many Years, determined in our Favor, will by such an Agreement, be determined in Favor of France; And this Proposition is the more improper, as It renders the subsequent Stipulation of a reciprocal Navigation on the Lakes, absolutely nugatory: Since It will be impossible for His

Majty's Subjects, without having Forts. & Settlements thereon, to Enjoy this Right.

As to the second Point, that such Fort, or Forts, as are situated on the Western Side of the River Niagara, & likewise Fort Frederick, or Crown Point, be demolished; It is supposed, that what is called the Western Side of the River Niagara, is meant, the South Eastern, there being no Forts, that We know of, on the Western Side; But, however this be meant, if the French are suffered, to have Forts & Establishments, either on the One Side, or the Other, It will be equally destructive of the Rights, & Interests of Great Britain, by preventing a free Passage to the greatest Part of the Territory of the Six Nations: As to the Demolition of Crown Point, the Proposition appears to be defective & imperfect, unless It be stipulated at the same time, That France shall not build any other Fort, or Forts, upon any

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Part of Lake Champlain, the whole of which is within the Territory, clearly belonging to Great Britain.

As to the last Proposition, concerning Nova Scotia, It is not so precisely stated, as clearly to appear what is intended: It must, however, be observed, in general, that, as His Majty's Right to the whole of this Province, Extending Westward to Penobscot River, & North ward to St Lawrence River, has been so clearly & fully made out, any Concessions in this particular, will probably be determined, by Concessions of equal Importance, made by France, in other Parts of North America.

[*Endorsed:*] Lord Halifax's Observations on Sir Thos Robinson's Paper of Points. ? Feb 1755.

HARDWICKE TO NEWCASTLE, February 16, 1755

[Add. MSS., 32,852:505]

POWIS-HOUSE Febr 16th 1755
Sunday night.MY DEAR LORD,—
505v. . . .

After Court, I went by Appointment to Sir Tho: Robinson's where He shew'd me his *Paper of Points* altered in consequence of Lord Halifax's Observations, which we examin'd together by Dr Mitchel's Map. That Map warrants what is said that the Boundaries stated in the *first Paper* would break in upon the Provinces of *Pensylvania & New York* in the manner Lord Halifax represents; and, if that Map be correct, makes the Apalachian or Alligany Mountains a most uncertain & dangerous Rule. He has therefore now described his Boundaries by *Lines*, which will be most certain. Sir Thomas will shew Your Grace all This; but one thing is material to mention now. I find the Board of Trade are just publishing, or encouraging the publication of, this Map; &, if not stopt, it will be out forthwith. I fear very inconvenient Consequences from it, for it carries the Limits of the British Colonies as far, or farther than any other, which I have seen. If it should come out just at this juncture, with the supposed Reputation of this Author, & the Sanction of the Board of Trade, it may fill people's heads with so strong an opinion of our strict Rights, as may tend to obstruct an Accommodation, if attainable, on the foot

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of Convenience, & make what may be necessary to be done to avoid the fatal Evil of a War, the Subject of great Clamour. I beg Your Grace would not mention me as first giving this hint; but my opinion is that it is desirable that it should be stopt for the present, & some proper method taken for stopping it in a prudent way.

I am most truly & unalterably,

My dear Lord,

Ever Your's

HARDWICKE.

CHAPTER IV

THE FRENCH CASE, FEBRUARY-MARCH, 1755

ROUILLÉ TO MIREPOIX, February 19, 1755

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:175]

Recue par un courrier le 23 fevr

No. 3.

A VERSAILLES le 19. fevrier 1755

L'affaire, Monsieur, que nous avons à traiter avec la cour de Londres, est si importante par elle même, et pourroit avoir des suites si considerables, qu'on ne peut trop éclaircir la matiere: C'est dans cet esprit qu'indépendemment de la premiere lettre que j'ai l'honneur de vous écrire aujourd'hui, et qui sera ostensive, si vous le jugés à propos, je crois devoir entrer avec vous dans de plus grands détails sur les objets de nôtre négociation, et c'est ce qui va faire le sujet de cette seconde lettre, dans laquelle je vais parcourir de nouveau les articles de la convention provisionelle, dont je vous envoie le projet.

.....

[*Translation*]

Received by courier

February 23

No. 3

VERSAILLES, February 19, 1755

The affair, Monsieur, that we have to negotiate with the court of London is so important in itself, and may have such important consequences, that too much light cannot be shed on it. It is in that mind, that apart from the first letter I have the honor to write you today, which may be shown if you think fit, I feel that I should go into the greatest detail with you as to the objects of our negotiation, and it is that which will form the subject of this second letter, in which I shall run over again the articles of the provisional convention the project of which I send you.

.....

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Mr le Chever Robinson est lui même convenu avec vous, qu'en remettant les choses sur le pied où elles étoient, ou devoient être avant la dernière guerre, il faudroit que les Anglois se retirassent en deçà des montagnes qui sont leurs anciennes et véritables limites.

En partant de ce principe que les ministres Britanniques eux mêmes ne contestent pas, on doit nécessairement conclure que le roi fait un sacrifice réel, en consentant que le territoire entre l'Ohio, et les montagnes sera évacué par ses sujets, comme par les Anglois; mais Sa Majesté ne portera pas sa complaisance jusqu'à étendre la neutralité à la rivière d'Ouàbache, tant depuis sa source, jusqu'à sa jonction avec l'Ohio, que depuis cette jonction,

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jusqu'à son embouchure dans le fleuve St. Louis. Les Anglois ne peuvent pas dire qu'ils ont été dépossédés de ce pays là, puisqu'ils n'y ont jamais eû aucun établissement, ni ancien, ni moderne; au lieu que les François en ont sur l'Ouabache, fort

[*Translation*]

M. le Chevalier Robinson has himself agreed with you that in restoring matters to the footing on which they were or should have been before the last war, it would be necessary for the English to retire behind the mountains which are their true and ancient bounds.

Setting out from this principle which the British ministers themselves do not contest, one should necessarily conclude that the king makes a real sacrifice by consenting that the territory between the Ohio and the mountains be evacuated by his subjects, as well as by the English. But His Majesty will not carry his complaisance so far as to extend the neutrality to the Wabash River, either from its source to its junction with the Ohio or from that junction to its outlet in the Mississippi River. The English cannot say they have been dispossessed of that country, since they have never had any settlement there, ancient or modern. On the contrary the French have had them on the Wabash long before

anterieurs aux discussions actuelles; d'ailleurs on ne pourroit comprendre ce pays dans la neutralité, sans y comprendre au moins une partie de la rive du fleuve St. Louis.

Ce qui se trouve a la fin de l'arte 2. par raport aux concessions qui seront reputées nulles, et comme non avenües, ne peut et ne doit souffrir aucune contradiction, et Mr le Chever Robinson s'est expliqué avec vous sur cet article d'une façon si nette et si précise, que je croirois superflü d'insister sur la nécessité et la justice de cette stipulation.

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Arte 3.
Interdiction
de commerce
et de passage.

Il n'est pas possible, Monsieur, d'adhérer à la proposition de laisser un passage libre aux Anglois sur le territoire de l'Ohio; et c'est un effort de complaisance de la part du roi, que de vouloir bien l'interdire aussi a ses sujets. Ce pays ne conduit à aucune des colonies ou possessions Angloises, et il nous est nécessaire pour faire le trajet du Canada à la Louisiane.

Quant au commerce, dont on voudroit a Londres reserver la mutuelle faculté aux deux nations dans le territoire dont il s'agit,

[*Translation*]

the present controversy: moreover that country cannot be included in the neutrality without including at least a part of the bank of the Mississippi River.

What appears at the end of article 2 with respect to the grants to be considered null and void, cannot and should not suffer any contradiction, and M. le Chevalier Robinson has expressed himself to you on that point in a fashion so clear and precise that I should think it superfluous to insist on the necessity and justice of that stipulation.

Article 3
Prohibition
of trade and
of passage

It is not possible, Monsieur, to adopt the proposal of leaving a free passage to the English over the territory of the Ohio; and it is an effort of complaisance on the king's part, that he is pleased to prohibit it to his subjects as well. This country leads to none of the English possessions or colonies, and it is necessary to us in crossing from Canada to Louisiana.

As to trade, for which at London they wish a mutual facility for both nations in the territory in question, that liberty can

on ne pourroit gueres faire usage de cette liberté, qu'en y formant quelques etablissements; Puisqu'il n'y a point de lieu de seureté, qui puisse servir d'azile aux traiteurs et à leurs effets, on seroit obligé de constrüire des maisons fortes, ou au moins entourées de

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pieux, afin de se précautionner contre l'avidité et la violence des sauvages.

Ce n'est donc pas assés d'exclure les établissemens purement militaires, il faut aussi supprimer ceux de commerce qui, par la nature du pays, et par la nécessité des circonstances deviennent des especes de forts. C'est ainsi et sous ce pretexte, que les Anglois, contre la lettre et l'esprit des traités ont élevé une maison fortifiée à chouguen sur les bords du Lac Ontario, malgré les protestations faites dans le tems, et en vain par le gouverneur du Canada; Il en seroit vraisemblablement de même sur le territoire de l'Ohio, si les Anglois avoient la liberté d'y aller, et les discus-

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sions qui ont donné lieu aux voyes de fait qu'il faut arrêter, se renouvelleroient sans cesse; D'ailleurs l'expérience que l'on a que

[*Translation*]

scarcely be enjoyed, save by making several settlements. Since there is no place of strength that may serve as a refuge for the traders and their goods, it would be necessary to build strong houses, at least picketed ones, as a precaution against the greed and violence of the Indians.

It is not then sufficient to exclude purely military establishments; it is necessary also to suppress commercial ones, which by the nature of the country, and the force of circumstances become a sort of forts. It was thus, and under this pretext that the English, contrary to the letter and spirit of treaties, have built a fortified house at Oswego on the shore of Lake Ontario, despite the protests made immediately and in vain by the governor of Canada. It would probably be the same in the Ohio country if the English were free to go there; and the disputes which have caused the acts of violence that must be checked, would be renewed without ceasing. Otherwise our experience that those already

ceux qui y sont déjà venus, ont travaillé à susciter les sauvages contre nous, doit nous engager à prévenir pour la suite les effets de cette mauvaise volonté, qui donneroient souvent lieu à des scenes sanglantes, et qui nous remettroient bientôt les uns et les autres dans une situation plus facheuse, et plus critique, que celle, à laquelle on cherche actuellement à remedier.

Arte 4.
demolition
des forts.

C'est porter bien loin de nôtre part Monsieur, l'amour de la conciliation, que de consentir provisionnellement à la démolition de nos forts sur la belle Riviere. L'Angleterre reclame les stipulations du Traité d'Utrecht; mais quoique les articles 10. 11. 12. 13.

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14. et 15 de ce traité entrent dans les plus grands détails sur les possessions respectives qui doivent appartenir aux deux puissances, il n'y est fait aucune mention de cette riviere ni de son territoire. La cour de Londres auroit elle omis d'en parler, si elle s'étoit imaginée alors, qu'elle eût quelque droit sur le pays dont il s'agit? Ce traité ne peut donc point autoriser les Anglois à demander la demolition de nos forts sur un territoire qui a constamment été

[*Translation*]

there have worked to stir up the Indians against us, should engage us to forestall in the future such fruits of ill will, which might often occasion bloody scenes, and might soon leave us both in a more vexatious and critical situation than the one we are actually trying to remedy.

Article 4
Demolition
of forts

It is carrying on our part, Monsieur, the love of conciliation very far to consent provisionally to the destruction of our forts on the Ohio River: England alleges the stipulations of the Treaty of Utrecht: but although articles 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 of that treaty go into the greatest detail as to the respective possessions which should belong to the two powers, no mention is made of that river or of its territory. Would the court of London have failed to mention it, if it had then imagined that it had any right to the country in question? That treaty then cannot authorize the English to demand the demolition of our forts in a territory which has constantly been regarded as under the king's rule, and in

regardé comme de la domination du roi, et sur lequel ils n'ont jamais eu, ni formé aucune prétention; Cependt le roi veut bien que ces forts soient détruits; mais la loi doit être générale, et réciproque; et en même tems que nous démolirons des forts construits sur un terrain qui nous appartient évidemment, il faut que les

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Anglois fassent démolir ceux qu'ils ont élevés dans des pays, dont la propriété leur est, et leur a toûjours été contestée. Tels sont les forts de chouaguen, de chignitou, de beaubassin, des Mines¹ &ca....

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Si la convention preliminaire et provisionelle n'étoit pas fixée a un tems determiné, il y a grande aparence que le traité definitif n'auroit jamais lieu, Les Anglois contents de nous avoir deposés de fait du territoire de la belle Riviere eluderoient la negociation qui devoit en constater le droit en nôtre faveur, et par là, ce qui ne seroit que passager, suivant la convention, deviendroit permanent par les difficultés qu'on ne manqueroit pas d'opposer

Arte 5. La convention provisoire ne sera que pour deux ans.

[Translation]

which they have never had or formed a claim. However the king is willing that those forts be destroyed. But the rule must be general and reciprocal; and while we demolish forts built in a country which patently belongs to us, the English must demolish those they have built in lands the property of which is and always has been disputed to them. Such are the forts of Oswego, Chignecto, Beaubassin, Minas,¹ etc....

If the preliminary and provisional convention were not limited to a definite time, there would be great likelihood that the definitive treaty would never exist. The English, content with having dispossessed us de facto of the territory of the Ohio River, would avoid a negotiation which would determine the right in our favor; and as a result, what was to be only temporary according to the convention, would become permanent from the difficulties they

Article 5
Provisional convention to be for two years only

¹ Chignecto, Beaubassin, and Minas were on the Nova Scotia frontier.

a une conclusion finale. Cet inconvenient, dont vous sentirés aisement les conséquences nous engagent a borner a deux ans la durée de la convention que nous nous offrons a signer des à present

Les reflexions contenues dans mon autre lettre sur l'article 6.

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ne me laisse que peu de chose a y ajouter;

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Il reste un article, dont il n'est point parlé dans le projet de convention, mais qu'il est essentiel de discuter et d'aprofondir.

Les Anglois paroissent apuyer principalement toutes leurs pretentions modernes relativement a l'Amerique Septentrionale, sur l'article 15. du Traité d'Utrecht, où il a été stipulé "que les sujets de france habitans du Canada et autres n'inquieront ni ne molesteront en aucune maniere les Cinq Nations ou cantons Indiens, qui sont sous la domination de la grande Bretagne ni les autres Americains ses alliés; que les sujets de la grande Bretagne pareillement vivront en paix avec les Americains, qui sont sujets

[*Translation*]

would not fail to raise as to a final settlement. This inconvenience, the consequences of which you will easily perceive, engages us to limit to two years the term of the convention that we offer to sign at once.

The reflections contained in my other letter on article 6 leave me little to add. . . .

There remains an article which is not mentioned in the project of a convention, but which it is necessary to discuss and to enlarge on.

The English appear to base all their recent claims in North America principally on Article 15 of the Treaty of Utrecht, which stipulates, "that the French subjects inhabitants of Canada and others shall disturb or molest in no wise the Five Nations or Indian cantons, which are under the dominion of Great Britain, nor the other American natives who are her allies; that the subjects of Great Britain shall similarly live in peace with the Ameri-

Arte 6.
instructions
et ordres a
donner aux
ministres &
commres
respectifs

Article 6
Instructions
and orders to
give to the
respective
ministers and
commissaries

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ou amis de la france, et que les sujets de l'une et de l'autre couronne auront une entiere liberté d'aller et venir parmi ces nations pour faire leur commerce."

Il y a, Monsieur, plusieurs observaõns importantes a faire sur cette stipulation du Traité d'Utrecht.

L'enonciation des nations Indiennes, qui seroient soumises a la domination de l'une ou de l'autre des deux couronnes, n'est ni exacte ni fondée, et ne peut changer la nature des choses. Les nations Americaines ont conservé leur liberté et leur independance; c'est une verité constante, non seulement parmi les nations Iroquoises; mais aussi chez toutes les autres nations qui sont a portée de les frequenter. Tout le monde sait que l'angre n'y a, ni

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gouverneur, ni magistrat; et il est certain que si quelque Anglois pretendoit s'arroger quelque autorité sur ces peuples, la commission dont il seroit revetû par sa cour ne garentiroit point sa vie du danger dont elle seroit menacée de leur part.

[*Translation*]

can natives who are subjects or allies of France: and that the subjects of either crown shall have a full liberty to go and come among these tribes to ply their trade."

There are, Monsieur, several important observations to make as to this stipulation of the Treaty of Utrecht.

The enumeration of Indian tribes who are subject to the domination of either of the two crowns is neither exact nor well founded, and cannot change the nature of things. The American tribes have preserved their liberty and their independence. It is a constant truth not only with the Iroquois tribes but also with all the other tribes who are close enough to resort to them. Everyone knows that England has neither governor nor magistrate there; and it is certain that if any Englishman claimed to exercise any authority over this people, the commission with which his court equipped him would not guarantee his life against the danger with which they would threaten it.

On estoit aussi convenu dans le Traité d'Utrecht arte 15. "Que les commissaires nommés de part et d'autre speciferoient exactement et distinctement quels peuples sont ou doivent être censés sujets ou amis de la grande Bretagne, et quels le seront de la France.

Cette stipulation na jamais été exécutée et elle ne pouvoit pas l'être. deux raisons en rendent l'exécution absolument impossible.

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La première est que ces nations sont indépendantes, et que ni les Français ni les Anglois n'oseroient leur contester leur liberté. Telle de ces nations est aujourd'hui amie d'une des deux couronnes, qui demain sera ennemie de cette même couronne; et par conséquent l'état qu'on auroit pu dresser, n'auroit eu aucune consistance, ni stabilité permanente.

La seconde raison est, que le territoire de ces nations est aussi incertain que leur alliance. ces peuples n'ont presque aucune idée de propriété: Il n'y a de territoire pour eux que celui qu'ils occupent dans le moment présent, ils changent souvent de demeure, et les nations Iroquoises en sont elles mêmes un exemple

[*Translation*]

It was also agreed in Article 15 of the Treaty of Utrecht "that commissaries named on both sides should specify exactly and distinctly which peoples were or ought to be held subjects or friends of Great Britain, and which of France."

This stipulation has never been executed and it could not be. Two reasons render its execution absolutely impossible.

The first is that these tribes are independent, and that neither the French nor the English would dare contest their liberty: one of these tribes today is friendly to one of the two crowns; tomorrow it will be an enemy of that same crown. As a result the register that would be drawn up would have no consistency or permanent stability.

The second reason is that the territory of these tribes is as uncertain as their alliance. These peoples have scarcely any idea of property. For them there is no territory save that which they occupy at the present moment. They often change their dwelling place and the Iroquois tribes are themselves a terrible and re-

terrible et remarquable. du tems de Mr de Champlain gouverneur du Canada elles habitoient principalement les bords du lac auquel
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on a donné le nom de ce gouverneur, et depuis ce tems là, elles ont abandonné ce pays, pour s'établir ailleurs. Rien n'empêche que d'un jour à l'autre elles aillent occuper un nouveau terrain, et ces sortes de transmigrations sont fréquentes: Il étoit donc impossible de fixer un district et des limites a des nations qui n'en ont jamais connu, et qui ne veulent point en connoître.

L'intention des puissances contractantes a Utrecht, n'a point été de donner atteinte aux loix respectives des deux couronnes, et qui font les mêmes pour interdire a tous autres qu'a leurs sujets l'entrée dans leur colonie. S'il y a eu quelques stipulâõs qui soient contraire a cette loy commune, elles sont contre l'esprit du

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traité et ne doivent être attribuées qu'au peu de connoissance qu'avoient, des affaires de l'amerique les ministres chargés de negocier les conditions de la paix de 1713.

.....

[Translation]

markable example. In the time of M. de Champlain, governor of Canada, they chiefly inhabited the shores of the lake to which the name of that governor has been given; since that time they have abandoned that country to seat themselves elsewhere. Nothing from day to day prevents them from going to occupy a new territory, and such transmigrations are frequent. It would therefore be impossible to fix a district and boundaries for tribes which have never known them and which do not wish to know them.

The intent of the contracting powers at Utrecht was not to give attaint to the respective laws of the two crowns, which forbid entry into their colonies to all but their subjects. If there were any stipulations counter to this common law, they are contrary to the spirit of the treaty and should be ascribed only to the small acquaintance with American affairs of the ministers charged with the negotiation of 1713.

.....

FRENCH PROJECT FOR A PRELIMINARY CONVENTION,
February, 1755

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:154]

Envoyé copie à M. le Duc de Mirepoix

le 19. fevrier 1755

No. 1 Joint a la depeche

du 19. fevrier 1755.

Projet d'une convention preliminaire

Les discussions qui depuis la paix signée à Aix la Chapelle le 18. 8bre 1748. se sont elevées dans l'Amérique Septentrionale, entre les sujets de sa Majesté très chretienne et de Sa Majesté Britannique, ayant occasionné de part et d'autre contre l'intention de leurs Majestés des voyes de fait dont il est extrêmement important d'arrester et de prévenir les suites ; Leurs Majestés animées d'un commun désir de rétablir la tranquillité dans cette partie du nouveau monde, et de resserrer de plus en plus l'amitié et la bonne

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intelligence qui subsistent heureusement entre elles, ont resolu de prendre de concert les moyens les plus prompts et les plus efficaces pour parvénir au but salutaire qu'elles se proposent. En

[*Translation*]

Copy to M. le Duc de Mirepoix,

February 19, 1755

No. 1 Annexed to the dispatch

of February 19, 1755

Project of preliminary convention

The disputes which, since the peace signed at Aix-la-Chapelle, October 18, 1748, have arisen in North America between the subjects of their Most Christian and Britannic Majesties having occasioned, contrary to the intention of Their Majesties, acts of violence which it is very important to check while forestalling the consequences: Their Majesties, animated by a common desire to reëstablish peace in that part of the New World, and to draw closer and closer the bonds of amity and good understanding happily existing between them, have resolved to take in concert the most prompt and efficacious means of arriving at the salutary end which they propose to themselves. In consequence they have

conséquence elles ont autorisé les ministres soussignés munis des pleins pouvoirs nécessaires à cet effet, à convenir des conditions préliminaires et provisionnelles contenues dans les articles suivants.

Article 1er

Sa Majesté très chrétienne et Sa Majesté Britannique s'engagent à envoyer immédiatement après l'échange des ratifications de la présente convention leurs ordres les plus précis à leurs gouver-

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neurs respectifs en Amérique de faire cesser toutes voyes de fait entre les deux nations, et les duplicata de ces ordres seront remis de part et d'autre avec les ratifications de la présente convention, aux ministres tant de sa Majesté très chrétienne que de sa Majesté Britannique.

Arte 2d

Les sujets de Sa Majesté très Chrétienne et de Sa Majesté Britannique évacueront tout le pays situé entre la Riviere d'Ohio et les montagnes qui bornent la virginie et se retireront sçavoir

[Translation]

authorized the undersigned ministers, furnished with the full powers necessary to that end, to agree on the preliminary and provisional conditions contained in the following articles.

Article 1

Their Most Christian and Britannic Majesties agree to send, immediately after the exchange of ratifications of the present convention, most precise orders to their respective governors in America to cause to cease all acts of violence between the two nations. And the duplicates of these orders shall be communicated on either side with the ratifications of the present convention, to the ministers both of Their Most Christian and Britannic Majesties.

Article 2

The subjects of Their Most Christian and Britannic Majesties shall evacuate all the country situated between the river Ohio and the mountains which bound Virginia, and shall withdraw, the

les françois au delà de lade Riviere d'Ohio, et les Anglois en deça des dites montagnes, de sorte que tout le terrain qui se trouve entre lade riviere et les des montagnes, sera regardé comme un
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pays neutre pendant tout le tems que durera la présente convention, et toutes les concessions s'il y en a quelqu'une, de part et d'autre, sur ledit territoire, seront regardées comme nulles et non avenües.

Arte 3.

Pour assûrer d'autant plus l'exécution de l'arte ler de la présente convention, et pour prévenir toute occasion de nouveaux troubles, les sujets respectifs de sa Majesté très Chretienne et de sa Majesté Britannique ne pourront fréquenter pendant la durée de la présente convention, le dit territoire situé entre la Riviere d'Ohio et les des montagnes sous pretexte de commerce ni de

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passage qui seront également interdits aux deux nations pendant le mesme espace de tems.

[*Translation*]

French beyond the said river Ohio, and the English behind the said mountains, so that all the lands between the said river and the said mountains shall be regarded as a neutral territory during the term of the present convention; and all grants, if there are any such on either side for the said territory, shall be held null and void.

Article 3

To assure the fuller execution of the first article of the present convention and to forestall all occasion of new difficulties, the respective subjects of Their Most Christian and Britannic Majesties may not for the term of the present convention frequent the said territory situated between the Ohio River and the said mountains under pretext of trade or of passage, both which shall be forbidden to both nations alike during the aforesaid space of time.

Arte 4.

Conformement à l'arte 9. du Traité d'Aix la Chapelle toutes choses seront remises dans l'Amérique Septentrionale dans l'estat où elles estoient ou devoient estre depuis le Traité d'Utrecht, et en conséquence on démolira tous les forts qui depuis cette époque auroient esté construits de part et d'autre tant sur ledit territoire de l'ohio que dans toutes les autres parties de l'Amérique Septentrionale contestées entre les deux Nations.

Arte 5.

La présente convention préliminaire n'aura lieu que pendant deux ans à compter du jour de l'échange des ratifications, cet espace de
156v

tems paroissant suffisant, pour terminer finalement par la voye d'une conciliation amiable, toutes les discussions relatives à l'Amérique Septentrionale qui pourroient occasionner par la suite de nouvelles broüilleries entre les sujets des deux puissances.

[*Translation*]

Article 4

Conformably to Article 9 of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle everything in North America shall be restored to the condition in which it was or should have been after the Treaty of Utrecht; and in consequence all forts built since that period on either side both in the said territory of the Ohio and in all other parts of North America disputed between the two nations, shall be demolished.

Article 5

The present preliminary convention shall exist for two years only, counting from the day of exchanging ratifications, that extent of time seeming sufficient to terminate finally by the channel of a friendly conciliation, all disputes relative to North America which might occasion in the future new embroilments between the subjects of the two powers.

Arte 6.

Sa Majesté très chretienne et Sa Majesté Britannique s'engagent à donner incessamment tant à leurs ministres respectifs à Londres, qu'à leurs commissaires à Paris, les instructions et les ordres nécessaires pour les mettre en estat de terminer à l'amiable le plustost que faire se pourra, et au plus tard dans l'espace de deux ans par un traité definitif tous les differends qui se sont elevés

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entre les sujets des deux couronnes relativement à leurs possessions, droits et pretentions dans l'Amerique Septentrionale

Arte 7.

La presente convention sera ratifiée par leurs Majestés très Chretienne et Britannique, et les ratifications en bonne et dñe forme seront échangées en cette ville de Londres dans l'espace de quinze jours ou plustost, s'il est possible, à compter du jour de la signature de la presente convention.

En foy de quoy &ca

[Translation]

Article 6

Their Most Christian and Britannic Majesties agree to give immediately both to their respective ministers at London, and to their commissaries at Paris, the necessary instructions and orders to enable them to terminate amicably as soon as may be, and at the latest in the period of two years, by a definitive treaty all the disputes which have arisen between the subjects of the two crowns relative to their possessions, rights, and claims in North America.

Article 7

The present convention shall be ratified by Their Most Christian and Britannic Majesties, and the ratifications in good and due form shall be exchanged in this city of London in the space of two weeks or sooner, if it may be, counting from the day of the signature of the present convention.

In testimony of which, etc.

ROUILLÉ TO MIREPOIX, February 19, 1755

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:163]

Recûe par un courrier le 23 fev

No 2

A VERSAILLES le 19 fevrier 1755

Six heures du soir

J'ai reçu, Monsieur, la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 10. de ce mois, et sur le compte que j'en ai rendu au roi dans son conseil, Sa Majesté m'a ordonné de vous mander que, quoiqu'elle ne vous eût pas autorisé à faire à Mrs les ministres Anglois l'ouverture que vous leur avez faite, concernant une convention préliminaire et provisionelle à signer entre les deux cours, cependant Sa Majesté approuve que vous ayés pris sur vous de communiquer cette idée.

.....
166. ...

L'article 2e est une preuve bien sensible des facilités que le
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roy aporte à la conciliation. Tout le terrain entre l'Ohio, et

Arte 2d
evacuation
du territoire
de l'ohio

[Translation]

Received by courier

February 23

No. 2

VERSAILLES, February 19, 1755

Six o'clock in the evening

I received, Monsieur, the letter you did me the honor to write me the tenth of this month; and on the account of it which I gave the king in his council, His Majesty has ordered me to inform you that, though he had not authorized you to make to Messieurs the English ministers the overture you made to them concerning a preliminary and provisional convention, to be signed between the two courts, he nevertheless approves your having taken it on yourself to communicate this idea.

.....
Article 2 is a very evident proof of the facilities which the king affords for a conciliation. All the land between the Ohio and

Article 2
Evacuation
of the Ohio
territory

les montagnes qui bornent la Virginie, appartient incontestablement à Sa Majesté; Les Anglois eux mêmes ne disconviennent pas que les limites de la Virginie se terminoient autrefois aux montagnes. ce fait a été constamment regardé comme si indubitable, que dans toutes les occasions où l'on a découvert des traiteurs Anglois qui avoient passé ces limites, pour aller commercer dans le territoire de l'ohio, nous avons saisi leurs personnes et leurs marchandises, sans que la cour de Londres se soit jamais crû en droit de réclamer contre ces saisies.¹

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Les concessions que Mr le Chever Robinson vous a dit, Monsieur, n'avoir été accordées qu'en 1750 et 1751. à une compagnie Angloise, pour former des établissemens entre les montagnes et l'ohio, et la forme incomplète de ces concessions, prouve non seulement que l'entreprise de s'établir dans ce territoire est une idée fort moderne de la part des Anglois; mais aussi qu'elle a paru assés peu fondée, pour ne point autoriser d'une façon autentique la compagnie dont il est question à faire valoir

[*Translation*]

the mountains which bound Virginia incontestably belongs to His Majesty. The English themselves do not deny that the boundaries of Virginia formerly ended at the mountains. This fact has always been regarded as so indubitable, that on all occasions when English traders have been found to have passed these limits to go and trade in the Ohio territory, we have seized their persons and their goods, without the court of London's ever thinking it had the right to complain of such seizures.¹

The grants of which M. le Chevalier Robinson spoke to you were made only in 1750 and 1751 to an English company to make settlements between the mountains and the Ohio, and the incomplete form of these grants proves not only that the enterprise of settling that territory is a very modern idea on the part of the English, but also that it has seemed to have so little basis, that the company in question was not authorized in authentic fashion to

¹ In this as in other places, Albemarle's memoir of March 7, 1752 is ignored.

des prétentions que le gouvernement en Angleterre regardoit au moins comme fort équivoques; Il s'ensuit évidemment que tout ce
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qui vient d'être exposé que le roy en consentant que le terrain entre l'ohio et les montagnes restent dans un état de neutralité pendant deux ans, sacrifie à son amour pour la paix, la jouissance d'un païs qui a toujours, et sans aucune contradiction, fait une partie de ses possessions dans l'amérique Septentrionale.

L'Article 3. contient une stipulation d'autant plus essentielle, que si on laissoit aux sujets respectifs le droit de commerce, et de passage dans le territoire qu'ils doivent évacüer, ce seroit s'exposer
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a voir renaître sans cesse de nouvelles occasions de dispute et de brouillerie entre les deux nations; Il est plus aisé de prévenir le mal, qu'il ne le seroit d'y remédier, et c'est par cette raison qu'il est de la plus grande importance que tout commerce et passage soit également interdits aux françois et aux Anglois pendant tout le tems que durera la convention provisionnelle: Cette condition au reste est gênante pour nous, et ne peut être onéreuse

Arte 3.
interdiction
de tout
commerce, et
passage sur
le territoire
de l'Ohio

[Translation]

press claims which the English government regarded as at best very doubtful. It evidently results from all that has been set forth that the king, by consenting that the territory between the Ohio and the mountains should remain in a neutral condition during two years, sacrifices to his love of peace the enjoyment of a country which has always and without any contradiction formed a part of his possessions in North America.

Article 3 contains a stipulation the more essential, in that if we left to the respective subjects the right of trade and passage through the territory they are to evacuate, it would subject us to seeing ceaselessly renewed occasions of dispute and embroilment between the two nations. It is easier to anticipate the evil than to remedy it, and it is for that reason that it is of the greatest importance that all trade or passage be equally forbidden to French and English during the whole period of the provisional convention. This condition is otherwise annoying to us, and cannot be

Article 3
Prohibition
of all trade
or passage in
the Ohio
territory

pour les Anglois; independamment de la proprit qui nous
partient, le pas dont il s'agit, nous devient ncessaire pour la
facilit de ntre communication entre le Canada et la Louisiane,
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au lieu qu'il est absolument inutile aux Anglois qui ne pour-
roient vouloir s'y rserver une passage que dans la vue de
pntrer dans nos possessions et d'y faire une commerce prohib.
Le roi renouvellera les defenses les plus formelles tous ses
sujets d'entrer dans les colonies Angloises, et Sa Majest compte
que le Roy Britannique donnera de son ct les mmes ordres.

.....
172....

Les concessions accordes des ngocians dans le territoire
de l'ohio, sont l'ouvrage du gouvernement Anglois; on peut mme
les regarder comme l'origine de la prsente querelle, et elles n'ont
p que persuadee que ce pas partenoit au Roi d'angre: Enfin le
terme odieux d'usurpation qui a t employ dans la harangue du
Roi d'Angleterre, et qui dans la circonstance actuelle n'a p

[*Translation*]

onerous to the English. Quite apart from the propriety, which
pertains to us, the country in question is necessary for us for the
ease of our communication between Canada and Louisiana; on
the contrary it is absolutely useless to the English, who could only
wish to reserve a passage there in the intention of penetrating our
possessions and carrying on a prohibited trade. The king will
renew the most formal prohibitions to all his subjects to enter the
English colonies: and His Majesty counts on the British King
giving the same orders on his side.

.....
The grants made to merchants in the Ohio territory are the
work of the English government. They may even be regarded as
the origin of the present dispute, and they can only be based on
the idea that this country belongs to the King of England.
Moreover the odious term of usurpation employed in the speech
of the King of England and which in the actual situation can only

s'appliquer qu'à la France, les préparatifs immenses qu'on presse dans les Isles Britanniques pour de nouveaux armemens, le soin
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de faire graver à Londres des cartes géographiques où l'on affecte d'étendre fort au delà de leurs bornes, et à nos dépense les possessions Angloises, sont autant de circonstances qui justifient en quelque sorte l'opinion populaire qu'on cherche à établir, que toute la raison est du côté de l'Angleterre, et que nous seuls avons tort. Si la nation Angloise étoit exactement instruite des faits, et de tout ce qui peut avoir rapport aux discussions actuelles, elle seroit moins animée, et nous rendroit plus de justice : . . .

[Translation]

apply to France, the great preparations for new armaments pressed on in the British Isles, the pains taken to have maps engraved at London, which pretend to extend the English possessions far beyond their boundaries at our expense, are so many circumstances which in some sort justify the popular opinion sought to be established, that all the right is on the side of England and that we only are in the wrong. If the English nation were exactly informed of the facts and of all that may pertain to the actual discussions, it would be less aroused and would do us more justice. . . .

CABINET MINUTE, February 20, 1755

[Add. MSS., 32,996:34]

WHITEHALL Feby 20th 1755.

Present

Lord Chancellor	Earl of Halifax
Lord President	Lord Anson
Duke of Newcastle	Sir Thos Robinson
Earl of Holderness.	

Their Lordships, having taken into further Consideration the state of Affairs in North America, were humbly of opinion, that the following Points may be offered, as a proper Foundation for

the Negotiation to be entered upon with the Duc de Mirepoix, in consequence of the Full Powers, which He has exhibited, and of such further Instructions as He is expecting to receive from His Court.

1st That with respect to the Lands upon the Ohio, and Parts adjacent, It be ascertained by specifick Lines, what shall be the Limits on Both Sides, leaving an intermediate space to be unpeopled by the Subjects of Either Crown.

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2d That the Territories, to be occupied and possessed by Great Britain, be bounded by a Line, to commence on the East Side of Canagahogue Bay, on the South Side of Lake Erie, and to be drawn due South untill It touches the 40th Degree of Northern Latitude, and from thence, to be continued due Southwest, untill It touches the 37th Degree of the said Latitude; And that all Forts and Fortresses erected; and Settlements made by the Crown of France, or her Subjects, to the Eastward of the said Line; either upon the Ohio, or upon Lake Erie, or on any other Part, within the Extent of the said Line from North to South, be abandoned and relinquished, allowing a reasonable Time, not exceeding Months, to the Officers, and Subjects of the said Crown, to remove themselves and their Effects.

3d That the Territories, to be occupied and possessed by

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France, be bounded by a Line to commence at the Embouchure of the River Miamis, on the South Side of Lake Erie, and to be drawn South, or South West, to the Head, or first spring of the River Oubache or St Jerome, and, from thence, to be continued, down the said River, to Its Confluence with the Ohio, and, from thence, due South, to the afore-mentioned 37th Degree of Northern Latitude.

4th That all the Lands, and Territories, lying within the said Two Lines, within the Extent thereof from North to South, be left unsettled or unpeopled by either Party, and not otherwise used, or resorted to, but for the Purposes of Traffick with the Natives, which shall be free and open to Both, without any Hindrance, or Molestation whatever.

5th. That all Forts and Fortresses erected, or Settlements
35v

made, by Either Crown, or their Subjects, within the said Territory, lying between the said Lines, be forthwith demolished, and no other erected, or made, at any Time, or upon any Pretence whatever.

6th That proper Persons shall be appointed by the respective Governors of Both Crowns, within—from the Ratification of this Agreement, who shall forthwith proceed to run, mark out, and ascertain the said Lines.

7th. That Fort Frederick, at Crown Point, upon Lake Champlain, as also all Forts erected, and Settlements made, by the Crown of France, or her Subjects, upon the said Lake, and upon the River of Niagara, either on the one side, or the other, between Lakes Ontario, and Erie be demolished and relinquished, and that no other Fort be erected, or Settlements made, upon the

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said River, or Lakes, by the Crown of France, or her Subjects, upon any Pretence whatever: But a free Passage be left to the Subjects of Both Crowns, up and down, and to and from the said River, and Lakes, and Countries adjacent, and that they be allowed to carry on, reciprocally, an open, and uninterrupted Trade with all the Indians, Inhabiting the Countries, lying around, and within the Great Lakes, as well Those, who are Subjects, and Friends of Great Britain, as Those, who are subjects, and Friends of France.

8th That, with respect to Nova Scotia, the River Penobscot, or Pentagoet, from It's Embouchure to It's Head Spring, and a Line, drawn from thence, due North, to the River St Laurence, shall be the Bounds, and Limits, of the said Province, to the Westward.

9th That a Line be drawn, from a certain Point, on the
36v

East Side of the said River Penobscot, or Pentagoet, at the Distance of Leagues, (in a direct Line from the Mouth or Embouchure of the said River) quite across the Continent to a certain Point on the Coast of the Gulph of St Laurence, at the

Distance of Leagues from Cape Tourmentin, in a straight Line.

10th That all the Lands, & Territories, lying on the South Side of the said Line, be acknowledged, and declared to belong, of absolute Right, to the Crown of Great Britain, and that all Forts or Fortresses erected, or Settlements made, by the Crown of France, or her Subjects, be forthwith abandoned and relinquished, allowing a reasonable Time to His Most Christian Majesty's Officers, and Subjects, to remove themselves and their Effects.

11th That all the Lands, and Territories, lying on the North
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Side of the said Line, as far as the River St Laurence, be left unsettled and unpossessed, by the Subjects of Either Crown, and not to be used or resorted to, but for the Purposes of Traffick and Commerce, with the Indians.

12. [Demolition of forts of both powers]

13. [Commissaries to run boundaries]

MIREPOIX TO ROUILLÉ, February 28, 1755

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:232]

N. 12.

A LONDRES le 28. fevrier 1755

Rep. le 5. Mars

lu au conseil

MONSIEUR

La reponse des Anglois ne sera point aussy prompte que j'aurois dû l'attendre des premieres conferences que j'ay eû avec

[*Translation*]

No. 12

LONDON, February 28, 1755

Answered March 5

Read to the council

MONSIEUR:

The English answer will not be so prompt as I was led to expect by the first conferences I had with the Duc de Newcastle

le Duc de Newcastle et le Chevalier de Robinson après l'arrivée de mon dernier courrier ;

Il ne me seroit pas possible d'entrer dans tous les details de ce qui a été debatu contradictoirement dans de tres longues conferences que j'ay eû journallement avec eux, depuis le retour de mon susdit courrier ;

Je me borne a vous rendre compte des points sur les quels

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roulent la difficulté

Les Anglois voudroient que dans l'accommodement provisionel il y fut fixé des points convenus, qui servissent de base a la negociation ulterieure, et que ces points embrassassent toutes les parties en contestation, et particulierement les limites de l'acadie, ainsy que les confins des deux nations sur la Riviere d'ohio ;

Ils voudroient, relativement a ce dernier objet, que l'article second concernant les evacuations a faire de part et d'autre sur la Riviere d'ohio, et les points a y fixer fût plus amplement expliqué ;

Premierement, que la neutralité s'étendit dans tout le terrain qui est entre l'Ohio et l'aubache, nous laissant cependant la

[*Translation*]

and the Chevalier de Robinson after the arrival of my last courier. It would be impossible for me to go into all the details of what has been discussed back and forth in the very long conferences I have had with them each day since the return of the courier mentioned. I confine myself to giving you an account of the points on which the difficulty turns.

The English wish certain points agreed on in the provisional accommodation to serve as the basis of the later negotiation ; they wish these points to include all the places in dispute and especially the boundaries of Acadia as well as the boundaries of the two nations on the Ohio River.

As to this last object they wish the second article respecting the evacuations to be made on either side on the Ohio River, and the points which are to fix them more amply explained. First they wish the neutrality extended over all the territory between the Ohio and the Wabash, leaving us however possession of the

propriété de la dernière rivière sur l'un et l'autre bord jusques a
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son confluent avec celle d'ohio, et celle ensuite de l'une et de l'autre reunies, jusques a son embouchure dans le fleuve saint Louis;

Ils disent que la stipulation générale, que les montagnes de la Virginie serviront de bornes aux Anglois, ne peut suffire par les raisons suivantes;

1. Parceque le cours de la rivière n'est point parallele a celui des montagnes;

2. Parceque celui des montagnes est encore plus irregulier que celui de la rivière, et que tandis que dans des endroits elles s'avancent en pointe sur l'Ohio, elles se reculent dans d'autres sur elles mêmes par de vastes sinuosités;

3. Parceque ces montagnes dont les chaînes sont redoublées dans la Virginie, embrassent dans leur épaisseur la plus grande partie de cette province, et qu'il y a d'anciennes habitations
233v

Angloises dans les vallons qui les separent;

[*Translation*]

latter river on both banks up to its junction with the Ohio, as well as of the two when united as far as its outlet into the Mississippi River.

They say the general stipulation that the mountains of Virginia shall serve as boundaries to the English cannot suffice for the following reasons:

1. Because the course of the river is not parallel to that of the mountains.

2. Because the course of the mountains is even more irregular than that of the river, so that while in places they extend as far as the Ohio, in others they bend back on themselves in great sinuosities.

3. Because these mountains the chains of which redouble in Virginia include in their depth the greatest part of the province, and because there are old English settlements in the valleys which separate them.

Et 4 parceque de la Virginie, ces montagnes courent au travers et partagent leur colonies de la Pensilvanie, de la Nouvelle Angleterre et de la nouvelle Yorck, et que partout elles sont remplies, de même que dans la Virginie, de leurs anciennes habitations ;

Nota qu'ils pretendent que par les chartres accordées par Charles second au Chevalier Pen, la Pensilvanie s'étend jusques au Lac Irie, et que par tout il y a d'anciennes habitations

Ils ajoutent que les principes que nous etablissons de nôtre propriété sur les terres de la Riviere d'ohio, sur les lacs et sur le terrain des environs, sont si directement contradictoires aux pretentions et droits des Anglois, qu'ils ne laissent nul espoir au succès de la negociation ;

.....
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Dans les conferences que j'ay eû avec le Duc de Newcastle et le Chevalier Robinson, il m'a paru que sans être encore decidés sur leurs reponses ils inclinoient a dresser deux contreprojets dont ils nous donneroient l'option ;

[*Translation*]

4. Because from Virginia these mountains cross and divide their colonies of Pennsylvania, New England, and New York and that everywhere they are full of their old settlements.

Note, that they claim that by charters granted by Charles II to Chevalier Penn, Pennsylvania extends as far as Lake Erie, and that everywhere there are old settlements. They add that the principles on which we establish our sovereignty over the lands of the Ohio River, over the lakes and over the adjoining lands, are so directly contrary to the claims and rights of the English that they leave no hope for the success of the negotiation.

.....

In my conferences with the Duc de Newcastle and the Chevalier Robinson it has seemed to me that while they have not yet decided on their answer they are inclined to draw up two counter-projects and give us our choice of them. One would be

Dans l'un se renfermant comme dans le nôtre a un accommodement provisoire sur le territoire de l'ohio, et dans l'autre embrassant les autres points des parties contestées entre les deux nations;

Il y a encore quelque difference et difficulté sur l'article 3. et 4. de nôtre projet;

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Les Anglois voudroient que dans le pays qui restera prohibé les deux nations y eüssent le passage et commerce libres; mais que l'une ni l'autre n'y püssent entrer a main armée, et ni pussent faire aucune espece d'établissement, ce qui selon eux arrive au meme objet que le nôtre, puisque selon nous, ni l'une ni l'autre nation ne peut y commercer qu'avec les precautions d'y avoir des endroits de seureté, soit maisons fortes ou terrain entourré de pieux;

Quant a l'article 4e concernant la demolition des forts etablis de part et d'autre depuis le Traitté d'Utrecht dans les parties contestées, ils voudroient que les susdits forts fussent designés de part et d'autre;

Comme ils m'ont temoigné, qu'outre les forts nouvellement

[Translation]

confined like ours to a provisional accommodation in the Ohio territory; and the other would include the other points respecting districts contested between the two nations.

There is also some difference and difficulty on articles 3 and 4 of our project. The English wish that in the country which is to remain forbidden, the two nations may have free passage and trade, but that neither may enter in armed force, or make any sort of settlement, which would come to the same thing as ours, since as we allege, neither nation can trade there without the precaution of having places of refuge, either strong houses, or land surrounded with pickets.

As for article 4, concerning the demolition of forts established on either side since the Treaty of Utrecht in the contested regions, they wish the forts in question to be designated on either side. Since they have indicated that besides the forts recently

etablis sur l'ohio, ils demanderoient que nous demolissions celui de frederic, et un autre dont je ne me rapelle pas bien le nom,
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mais situé aux environs des Lacs Irié et Ontorio, j'ay crû ne devoir pas leur nommer ceux de leur dependance que vous me designés dans vôtre seconde depêche du 19.

Leur intention est d'insérer dans leur contre projet la liste des nôtres dont ils demandent la demolition, et de laisser en blanc celle des leurs que nous voulons être detruits

.....

ROUILLÉ TO MIREPOIX, March 5, 1755
[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:247]

No 6.

Recüe le 11. duds mois

A VERSAILLES le 5. mars 1755.

J'ai reçu, Monsieur, les lettres Nos 10. 11. et 12. dont vous m'avés honoré le 21. le 24 et le 28 du mois dernier.

[*Translation*]

established on the Ohio, they will demand that we demolish Fort Frederick, and another the name of which I do not recall, but which is situated in the region of Lakes Erie and Ontario, I have thought that I should not name those of theirs that you designated in your second dispatch of the nineteenth.

Their intention is to insert in their counter-project the list of our forts the demolition of which they demand, and to leave blank the list of those that we wish destroyed.

.....

No. 6

Received the 11th of
the month stated

VERSAILLES, March 5, 1755

I have received, Monsieur, the letters number 10, 11, and 12, with which you honored me the 21st, the 24th, and the 28th of last month.

J'ai fait écrire au dépôt de la marine à Paris, pour avoir les cartes géographiques que vous demandés, et si elles me parviennent avant le départ de votre courrier, je le chargerai de vous les remettre; mais je vous les adresserai au plus tard par le second exprés que vous m'annoncés.

A en juger, Monsieur, par les dernières conversations que vous avez eues avec Mrs les ministres Anglois, il ne nous est guères possibles de leur suposer une intention sincère de conclure dès à présent une convention provisionelle, et faire cesser les voyes de fait en Amérique; Cependant il faut avant que de fixer nôtre jugement à cet égard, attendre les réponses formelles et

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ministérielles que la cour de Londres jugera à propos de faire au projet de convention que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous envoyer, et aux raisons solides dont je l'ai apuyé.

Je me bornerai donc à vous communiquer aujourd'hui quelques réflexions que votre dépêche du 28. de fevrier m'a donné lieu de faire.

[*Translation*]

I have written to the depot of the marine at Paris for the maps you request, and if I get them before the departure of your courier I will instruct him to deliver them to you; but at the latest I will send them to you by the second express, of which you give me notice.

To judge, Monsieur, by your last conversations with Messieurs the English ministers, it is scarcely possible for us to credit them with a sincere intention of at present concluding a provisional convention, and of having the acts of violence in America stopped. However we must, before making up our minds on that point, await the formal and ministerial replies which the court of London will think proper to make to the project of a convention I had the honor to send you, and to the solid reasons with which I supported it.

I shall then limit myself to communicating to you today some reflections which your dispatch of February 28 has given me occasion to make.

De quel droit les Anglois prétendroient-ils étendre la neutralité dans tout le terrain qui est entre les montagnes de la Virginie et la Rivière d'ouabache? Nous sommes encore à savoir sur quoi ils fondent leur prétentions sur le territoire de l'ohio, et je crois qu'ils seroient eux mêmes fort embarrasses de nous le dire. Il ne nous seroit pas du moins difficile de refuter solidement tout ce qu'ils pourroient alléguer à cet égard. Mr le Cher Robinson est convenu avec vous, que les montagnes qui bordent la Virginie du côté du Canada, étoient les anciennes limites des

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Anglois. Le Traité d'Utrecht qui entre dans les plus grands détails sur leurs possessions dans l'Amérique Septentrionale, ne dit pas un mot de la Rivière d'ohio ni de son territoire. Ce n'est que quarante ans après la signature de ce traité, que les Anglois se sont avisés de former des prétentions dont on n'avoit jamais entendu parler, et de construire en conséquence un fort sur ce territoire. Le roi par amour pour la paix veut bien, malgré la justice de son droit, et sa possession constante, établie provisionnellement la neutralité dans tout le pays qui est entre les montagnes

[*Translation*]

By what right do the English claim to extend the neutrality over all the territory between the mountains of Virginia and the Wabash River? We have yet to learn on what they base their claims to the Ohio territory, and I think they would themselves be quite embarrassed to tell us. It would be no less easy for us to refute solidly all they can allege on that point. M. le Chevalier Robinson agreed with you that the mountains bordering Virginia on the side of Canada were the old English boundaries. The Treaty of Utrecht, which enters into the greatest detail as to their possessions in North America, says not a word of the Ohio River nor of its territory. Not until forty years after the signature of that treaty have the English been advised to bring forward claims never heard of before, and to construct, in consequence, a fort in that territory. The king for love of peace is pleased, despite the justice of his right, and his constant possession, to establish a provisional neutrality in all the country between the mountains and

et la belle Rivière, et au lieu de sentir tout le prix d'une complaisance portée aussi loin, on voudroit en abuser pour exiger encore un plus grand sacrifice. C'est à quoi, Monsieur, Sa Majesté ne me paroît nullement disposée à consentir. Nous procedons avec candeur et bonne foi; qu'on agisse de même à notre égard, et la tranquillité sera bientôt rétablie en Amérique, et ne sera pas exposée au danger d'être troublée en Europe.

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Je ne conçois pas quel argument on prétend tirer de l'irrégularité tant du cours de l'Ohio, que de la chaine des montagnes de la Virginie; Il me semble que tout ce qu'on peut en conclure, c'est que le terrain dans lequel on établira la neutralité, sera également irrégulier, et qu'importe, si les Anglois et nous l'évacuons entièrement, et si nous nous retirons au delà de l'Ohio, et eux en deçà des montagnes?

Il est vrai que toutes les cartes de la Virginie présentent des chaines redoublées de montagnes qui séparent cette province du Canada; mais en demandant que ces montagnes servent de limites aux Anglois, nous entendons seulement, qu'ils se retireront en

[*Translation*]

the Ohio River; but instead of valuing a complaisance carried so far, they want to abuse it to exact a still greater sacrifice. To that, Monsieur, His Majesty appears in no wise disposed to assent. We proceed with candor and good faith; let them act similarly toward us, and quiet will soon be reestablished in America, and will not be exposed in Europe to the danger of being disturbed.

I cannot conceive what argument they claim to draw from the irregularity both of the course of the Ohio and of the mountains of Virginia. It seems to me that all one can conclude from that, is that the terrain in which neutrality will be established will be correspondingly irregular: and what matters that if the English and we evacuate it entirely, and if we withdraw behind the Ohio, and they behind the mountains?

It is true that all the maps of Virginia show redoubled chains of mountains separating that province from Canada; but by asking that these mountains serve as the boundary for the English,

deça de la dernière chaîne qui est limitrophe du Canada ; ainsi tous les établissemens qu'ils ont dans l'intérieur de ces montagnes, demeureront tels qu'ils ont été jusqu'à présent, et il ne s'agit point

de faire abandonner aux Anglois les habitations qu'ils y possèdent.

Je vous avoue, Monsieur, que c'est avec la plus grande surprise que nous voyons que la cour de Londres non contente d'afficher des prétendus droits sur le territoire de l'Ohio, veut encore les étendre sur les lacs et sur le terrain qui les environne, et qu'elle nous cite comme une preuve à cet égard la charte accordée par Charles second au Cher Pen ; mais c'est sur quoi il ne s'agit point actuellement de discuter le fonds. Ce travail est réservé aux ministres qui négocieront de cour à cour, et aux commissaires qui auront ordre de reprendre et de presser leur conférences sur tous les points qui peuvent être susceptibles de contestation. Notre objet commun est de commencer par un accord provisionnel qui fasse cesser les hostilités, et qui serve de base à une conciliation totale et définitive.

[Translation]

we understand merely that they are to retire behind the last chain which is contiguous to Canada. Thus all the settlements that they have in the interior of the mountains will remain as they have been up to now, and there is no question of making the English abandon the dwellings they have there.

I profess to you, Monsieur, that it is with the greatest surprise that we see the court of London, not content with posting its pretended rights in the Ohio territory, wishes also to extend them over the lakes and the land which surrounds them ; and that as a proof it cites the charter granted by Charles II to the Chevalier Penn. However there is no need of actually discussing fundamentals. That labor is reserved for the ministers who will negotiate from court to court and for the commissaries who will be ordered to begin anew and to hasten their conferences on all points which may be susceptible of dispute. Our common object is to begin by a provisional accord which will stop hostilities, and which will serve as the basis of a full and final conciliation.

CHAPTER V
THE ENGLISH COUNTER-PROJECT,
MARCH 7, 1755

ENGLISH COUNTER-PROJECT OF March 7, 1755

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:253]

Memoire remis le 7. Mars
1755. par M. le Chever Robinson
au feu Duc de Mirepoix

Contre Project d'une convention préliminaire.

Les discussions, qui depuis la paix signée à Aix la Chapelle le 18. 8bre 1748. se sont élevées dans l'amerique Septentrionale, entre les sujets de Sa Majesté Bne et de S. Mté très chretienne ayant occasionné de part et d'autre, contre l'intention de L. Mtés, de voyes de fait, dont il est extremement important d'arrêter, et de prevenir les suites, LL. M.M. animées d'un commun désir d'y rétablir la tranquillité, et de resserrer de plus en plus l'amitié et la bonne intelligence qui subsistent heureusement entre elles, ont résolu de prendre de concert les moyens les plus promts et les plus

[Translation]

Memoir communicated March 7, 1755,
by M. le Chevalier Robinson to the
late Duc de Mirepoix

Counter-project for a preliminary convention

The disputes which, since the peace signed at Aix-la-Chapelle October 18, 1748, have arisen in North America between the subjects of Their Britannic and Most Christian Majesties having occasioned on both sides, contrary to the intention of Their Majesties, acts of violence which it is extremely important should be checked and the consequences of which forestalled: Their Majesties, animated by a common desire to reëstablish tranquillity and to knit more and more the friendship and good understanding which happily exist between them, have resolved to take in concert the most prompt and effectual means of arriving at the bene-

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efficaces pour parvenir au bût salutaire qu'elles se proposent ; En conséquence, elles ont autorisé les ministres soussignés munis des plein pouvoirs necessaires a cet effet, à convenir des conditions préliminaires et provisionelles, contenües dans les articles suivans.

Art. 1er

Sa Majesté Britannique et Sa Majté Très Chretienne, s'engagent à envoyer immédiatement après l'échange des ratifications de la présente convention leurs ordres les plus precis a leurs généraux et gouverneurs respectifs en Amerique d'arrêter et prevenir toutes voyes de fait entre les deux nations, et les duplicata

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de ces ordres seront remis de part et d'autre avec les ratifications de la présente convention aux ministres tant de Sa Majté Bne que de Sa Majesté Très Chretienne.

Art. 2d

Qu'à l'egard de la Riviere d'Ohio et des terres adjacentes, il est convenu et arrêté, que pareils ordres seront envoyés, en même

[*Translation*]

ficial end which they intend. Consequently they have authorized the undersigned ministers, furnished with the full powers necessary to that end, to agree on the preliminary and provisional conditions contained in the following articles.

Article 1

Their Britannic and Most Christian Majesties agree to send immediately after the exchange of ratifications of the present convention their most precise orders to their respective generals and governors in America to check and forestall all acts of violence between the two nations: and the duplicates of these orders shall be communicated on either part with the ratifications of this convention to the ministers of Their Britannic and Most Christian Majesties.

Article 2

With respect to the Ohio River and the lands adjacent, it is agreed and determined that similar orders be sent at the same

tems, avec copies de la présente convention, aux dits généraux et gouverneurs de faire démolir dans l'espace de six mois, ou plutôt, si faire se pourra, à compter du jour de la signature de la présente convention tous les forts construits, sur la presqu'Isle dans le Lac Erie; et sur la Rivière aux boeufs et sur l'ohio.

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De même, il est convenu entre Sa Majesté Britannique et Sa Majesté Très Chretienne, qu'une ligne à commencer du côté oriental de la Baye de Canagahogue, sur la rive méridionale du Lac Erie, sera tirée directement au sud, jusqu'à ce qu'elle touche le 40e degré de latitude septentrionale, et, delà, continuée au sud ouest, jusqu'à ce qu'elle touche le 37eme degré de la dite latitude.

de même, une ligne a commencer à l'embouchure de la Rivière Miamis, du côté meridional du Lac Erie, sera tirée au sud ou sud ouest, jusqu'à la source de la Rivière Oubache ou St Jerome; et

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delà, continuée, le long de la dite rivière, jusqu'à son confluent avec l'ohio, et, delà, en droite ligne au sud, jusqu'au susmentionné 37e degré de latitude septentrionale.

[*Translation*]

time, with copies of the present convention to the said generals and governors, directing them to have demolished, within the term of six months or sooner if it may be, counting from the date of signature of the present convention, all forts built at Presqu'Isle in Lake Erie, on the river aux Boeufs, and on the Ohio. Similarly it is agreed between Their Britannic and Most Christian Majesties that a line beginning on the east side of Cuyahoga Bay on the southern shore of Lake Erie, shall be drawn due south until it touches the fortieth degree of north latitude: thence it shall be continued to the southwest until it touches the thirty-seventh degree of the said latitude.

Similarly a line beginning at the mouth of the Maumee River on the south shore of Lake Erie shall be drawn south or southwest to the source of the Wabash or St. Jerome River; and thence, continue along the said river to its junction with the Ohio and thence due south to the aforesaid thirty-seventh degree of

Tous les forts, et toutes les forteresses construits, où les établissemens faits, par l'une ou par l'autre des deux couronnes, où par leurs sujets respectifs, dans le dit territoire, situé entre les dites lignes, seront démolis, dans l'espace susdit de six mois, à compter du jour de la signature de la présente convention, ou plutôt si faire se pourra, et resteront aussi démolis, jusqu'à ce que les présentes disputes soient terminées à l'amiable entre les

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deux cours; de sorte que tout le pays, qui se trouve entre les deux lignes susdites, dans son étendue du nord au sud, restera, et sera regardé, pendant ce tems là, comme un pays neutre; Et on ne s'en servira que pour y commercer avec les natifs, ce qui sera libre et permis aux deux nations, sans aucun empêchement, où molestation que ce soit.

Que les généraux et gouverneurs respectifs des deux couronnes nommeront des personnes entendues, dans l'espace de trois mois, à compter du jour de la signature de la présente convention, ou plutôt si faire se pourra, qui tireront et marqueront les dites

[*Translation*]

north latitude.

All forts or fortresses or settlements made by either of the two crowns or by their respective subjects in the said territory between the said lines, shall be demolished in the aforesaid term of six months counting from the day of signature of the present convention or sooner if it may be; and they shall remain demolished until the present disputes are amicably terminated between the two courts; in such sort that all the country included between the two lines aforesaid, extending north and south, shall remain and be regarded during this period as a neutral country. And it shall be used only for trade with the Indians which shall be free and permissible for the two nations without any hindrance or molestation whatever.

The respective generals and governors of the two crowns shall nominate competent persons, within the term of three months, counting from the day of the signature of the present convention or sooner if it may be, who shall draw and mark the

lignes dans l'espace de trois mois au plus, à compter du jour
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 qu'elles seront nommées à cet effet.

Art. 3e

En outre, il est convenüe et arrêté, que les deux forts sur la Riviere de Niagara, et le Fort Frederick où Cronn Point, sur le Lac Champlain, construits depuis le Traité d'Utrecht renouvelé et confirmé par celui d'Aix la Chapelle, seront démolis, dans le même espace de six mois, à compter du jour de la signature de la présente convention; Et que par raport à la susdite Rivière de Niagara, et les Lacs d'Erie, et d'ontario, et de Champlain, il sera libre aux sujets des deux couronnes, de les passer, monter, et
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descendre en toute sureté; et de commercer, sans aucune molestation, ou empechement avec les Indiens, qui habitent les pays situés aux environs des grands Lacs, tant avec ceux qui sont sujets et amis de la grande Brete qu'avec ceux qui sont sujets et amis de la France.

[Translation]

said lines in the term of three months at the longest, counting from the day on which they shall be nominated for this purpose.

Article 3

Moreover it is agreed and determined that the two forts on the Niagara River, and Fort Frederick or Crown Point on Lake Champlain, being built since the Treaty of Utrecht, renewed and confirmed by that of Aix-la-Chapelle, shall be demolished within the same term of six months, counting from the day of the signature of the present convention. And with respect to the afore-said Niagara River, and Lakes Erie, Ontario, and Champlain, the subjects of the two crowns shall be free to pass, ascend, and descend in all security, and to trade without molestation or hindrance with the Indians who inhabit the lands in the neighborhood of the Great Lakes, whether they are subjects and friends of Great Britain or of France.

Arte 4e

.....
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Arte 5e

S. Mté Bne et S. Mté Très Chretienne, s'engagent à donner, sans delaï, après la ratification de la présente convention, les instructions, et les ordres necessaires, à leurs ministres respectifs, pour les mettre en etat de terminer, de cour en cour, par la voye d'une conciliation amiable, le plustôt que faire se pourra, par une traité définitif, tous les differends, qui se sont elevés entre les sujets des deux couronnes, relativement à leurs possessions, droits

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et prétentions, dans l'Amerique, et qui ne sont pas finalement termin [MS. illegible] par la présente convention.

Arte 6eme

La présente convention sera ratifiée par Leurs Majestés Britannique et très chretienne, et les ratifications en bonne et dñe forme, seront echangées en cette ville de Londres, dans l'espace de

[Translation]

Article 4

[Line of demarcation in Nova Scotia.]

Article 5

Their Britannic and Most Christian Majesties bind themselves to give without delay after the ratification of the present convention, the instructions and necessary orders to their respective ministers to enable them to terminate from court to court by the way of an amicable conciliation, as soon as may be, through a definitive treaty, all the differences which have arisen between the subjects of the two crowns respecting their possessions, rights, and claims in America, and which are not finally terminated by the present convention.

Article 6

The present convention shall be ratified by Their Britannic and Most Christian Majesties, and the ratifications in good and proper form shall be exchanged in this city of London, in the

quinze jours, où plustôt s'il est possible, à compter du jour de la signature de la présente convention.

En foy de quoy &ca

[*Translation*]

space of two weeks or sooner if it may be, counting from the day of signature of this present convention.

In testimony of which, etc.

NEWCASTLE MEMORANDA, March 7, 1755

[Add. MSS., 32,996:44]

Little difficulty about the Ohio. The Duke de Mirepoix rather seemed only curious to know, whether the hither shore of the Oubach was comprized in the Neutral Country.

No formal objection to the free Trade of the English & French in the Countries about & upon the Great Lakes, after it was proved to him that France had not the least pretence to claim those Countries & Lakes as their own. But as to the Forts he could say nothing.

Nova Scotia was the Great Difficulty, because definitive.

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The Line cross the Continent excluded, he said, the immediate communication with the Island St Jean. He asked what would be to be done with the french Inhabitants who may be settled to the North of the Bay of Fundi within the Line.

Great Instances for preserving the Commissaries, were it only out of Complaisance for certain persons at the Court of France.

Upon the whole he was afraid the Thing would not do, because the Counter project went so much beyond the view of France, which was to confine the present Negotiation to a bare provisional Cessation des voyes de fait, in order to find the means,

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afterwards, for an amicable Conciliation. But he offered to return tomorrow night at 8 of the Clock to shew the points upon which he should write in consequence of all that had passed. This to avoid Mistakes, and perhaps to shew his own good personal

Intentions, but at parting he said Il en souhaitoit le Succès autant que personne au monde, mais il ne le croyoit pas.¹

[Endorsed:] WHITEHALL March 7th 1755. 10½ oClock.

ROBINSON TO KEENE, March 11, 1755²

[Add. MSS., 32,853:179]

Secret WHITEHALL 11th March 1755.

.....
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He [Mirepoix] produced, in order to take off; in some Degree, the Impression that the Conduct of his Court might make here, the Full Powers, which He had received, by the same Courier, from his Court; which being conceived in friendly Terms, and expressing a seeming good Intention, (as you will see by the inclosed Copy thereof) He imagined that They would

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convey an Opinion of more, Sincerity, on the Part of his Court, than could possibly be collected from the *Projet de Replique* itself; And He gave me to understand, in several Conferences upon this Subject, that He was authorized, in the fullest Manner, to negotiate the Accommodation of all Points whatever in North America even that of Nova Scotia, upon the Foot of what had been in agitation formerly; and that with Regard to the Ohio in particular, all the Forts and Establishments, which have been built there, should be demolished, and that the whole Territory, from the Apalachean Mountains, to the Great Lakes, and the River Oubache, should be evacuated by the French Forces, and restored to the Natives in it's former State, reserving only

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a free Passage to both the English & French with a Liberty for them to trade with the Indians. Mor de Mirepoix beginning to flatter Himself, that by the Means of the above mentioned

¹ He desired its success as much as anybody in the world, but he did not expect it.

² This is an account of the negotiation furnished to the English minister to Spain. For Keene, see *ante*, xxxv.

Insinuations, and the Manner, in which they had been received here, He might soon be authorized to make Proposals in Form to that Purpose, dispatched a Courier to his Court, with an Account of what had passed, who returned with the inclosed Project of a Preliminary Convention, which was but too conformable to the Spirit of the first Papers, and soon proved to be still more inadmissible than all that had preceded it, when explained by Mor Rouillé's Despatches, which Mor de Mirepoix read to me, and which but too clearly contained a Confirmation of what had been so long apprehended, That France did intend

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to support, at all Hazards, a Claim to every Thing on the Back of the British Colonies as their own Right & Property; and that they considered the Stipulations, which had been made by the Treaty of Utrecht, with regard to the acknowledged Subjection of the five Nations to the Crown of Great Britain, as Vain & Nugatory; and all the Grants of Lands, which, from that Time, have been made to British Subjects, as void, & ineffectual. The Views of France, with regard to Nova Scotia or Acadie, were not less Evident, by the Tenor of Mor Rouillé's Letter, which plainly pointed out the clearest Intimation, that They did not intend to leave to His Majesty's Subjects the quiet Possession of even half of the Peninsula; And I need not tell your Excy what

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such Proposals speak for Themselves: How inadmissible and Offensive they appeared to the King; and that, so far from their containing any one Motive to induce His Majesty to disarm, the causes for not doing it were only multiplied, in proportion, as the imaginary Rights, and unjust Pretensions of France were disclosed, & avowed. The King was, therefore, pleased to direct His Servants to prepare the inclosed Counter Project of a Preliminary Convention, by way of Answer to the French Court, & with a View to ascertain the Rights of His Crown, in North America, & to bring this loose, & hitherto, on the Part of France, very insidious Negociation, to some precise & determined Point. Your Excy cannot read this Counter Project, with the Knowledge you have already of this Affair, without observing His Majesty's

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great Moderation, & even Condescensions, for the Sake of Peace: and that you may perfectly understand those Articles, that relate more immediately to the River Ohio, & the Great Lakes, The King has commanded me to send you the inclosed Paper, containing a Deduction of the several British Rights, founded upon the Treaty of Utrecht, & derived from the Grants, & Cessions, made by the Five Nations, so formally & solemnly acknowledged, by France, in that Treaty, to be Subjects of Great Britain. This Counter Project was accordingly delivered, two Days ago, by The King's Order, to Mor de Mirepoix, to be transmitted to His Court; & which I had His Majesty's Commands to lose no Time in sending to you, to be communicated to His Catholick Majesty, as a Mark of the most unbounded Confidence & Regard:

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& as a Means to prevent any false Impressions, which the Diligence of the Court of France might endeavour to make at Madrid, thro' M. de Duras,¹ contrary to the true & real State of Things, & to The King's earnest Endeavours to maintain the publick Tranquility, as far as it can be done, consistent with the Honor & Dignity of His Crown, & the Protection of His Subjects. The King is persuaded, that your Excy will make the most prudent Use of these ample Communications at the Court of Madrid; & will particularly point out, to Mor. Wall, the Dangers which the immense Claims of France, in America, threaten the Rights & Settlements of the Spaniards Themselves, as those Claims, & Pretensions, under Colour of Mor de la Salle's Discoveries, may extend as far on the Western, as on the Eastern Side of the Mississippi, & embrace all Mexico itself, a Consideration so alarming, that the bare Mention of it is surely sufficient

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to excite the utmost Jealousy, in the Court of Spain, and to shew to all Europe, that the Pretensions of France are circumscribed by no Line, or Limits whatever, but such as may appear most eligible to their Ambition, & Convenient to their Interest.

I am &c

T. ROBINSON.

¹ For Duras, see *ante*, xxxv.

ROBINSON TO KEENE, March 11, 1755

[Add. MSS., 32,853:185]

Separate WHITEHALL March 11th 1755.

SIR,

I reserve for this separate Lr, some Particulars, which, were you even not to communicate Them, to the Court of Spain, might still be of Use, in directing your Excy, towards winding up the whole Narrative of this Negotiation. It has lasted about nine Weeks, but if, during that time, any Glimpse of Hopes may have appeared from the real good Intentions of M. de Mirepoix to succeed, or from his being deceived, the first, by his own Court, yet no one vigorous Measure, which could well have been taken, according to the ordinary Rules of this Government, or without giving France new room to charge England with a premeditated Design to begin the War, has been omitted.

The inclosed *Note*,¹ which is entrusted with your Excy was
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taken down, in his Presence, perused & adjusted with him, and, afterwards, he received it, as the Result of his Conference with me, upon his producing his *Projet de Replique*, But the fruit of it was, the *Projet de Convention preliminaire*, which, however artfully & speciously penned, was, but too clearly, explained by M. de Rouillé's own Letters, which the French Ambassador communicated to me, probably by Order of his Court, which might be thinking it was time to unmask, or, unguardedly, by M. de Mirepoix, out of too earnest a Desire to disculpate himself, for having promised so much. Be this as it will, Nothing is clearer, from his first *Memoire*, from the *Projet de Replique*, and from the *Projet d'une Convention Preliminaire*, than that the only Meaning of his Court, has been, to obtain a bare Cessation of Arms, and to keep Things in Suspence, during
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two Years, according as it shall please France to conciliate Matters definitively, or to have Recourse to Arms again. In these Circumstances His Majesty was pleased to order the *Contre*

¹ The note in question is not with this letter.

Projet to be drawn, which your Excy has, in the other Letter, with a View to shew His own Subjects, the Care He has of their real Interests, and the Firmness and Uniformity of all His Measures, from the Day that the first Dispositions were made, for securing Ourselves against any Encroachments, and, at the same time, shew, all the World, that Moderation in His Claims, which, France, to cover its own unjustifiable Pretensions, was representing, as boundless, & dangerous in every Court of Europe. I am &c.

THOS ROBINSON.

ROUILLE TO MIREPOIX, March 17, 1755

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:280]

Recue le 20 dudit
No 1

A VERSAILLES le 17. Mars 1755

Vous verrés, Monsieur, par la lettre cy jointe que j'ay l'honneur de vous ecrire, quelle impression à fait sur le roy et sur son conseil, le contreprojet que le ministere Britannique vous a remis, comme un plan de conciliation, sans le quel il n'étoit pas possible à la cour de Londres de procéder à un accommodement provisionel; (car nous ne pensons pas que les modifications que M. Robinson vous a dit pouvoir être admises dans quelques articles, changent rien d'essentiel aux conditions qu'on prétend exiger

[*Translation*]

Received the 20th of the month
No 1

VERSAILLES, March 17, 1755

You will see, Monsieur, by the annexed letter that I have the honor to write you, the impression made on the king and his council by the counter-project which the British ministry communicated to you as a plan of conciliation, without which it was not possible for the court of London to proceed to a provisional arrangement (for we do not think that the modifications that M. Robinson has told you can be admitted in some articles change anything essential in the conditions which they claim to exact

de nous.)

Il est vraisemblable que M. le Duc de Newcastle et M. le cher. Robinson ont donné lieu, sans le vouloir et sans le prévoir,

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à la nécessité forcée où ils se trouvent aujourd'hui de poursuivre avec vigueur, les mesures qu'ils ont prises avec trop de précipitation, mais c'est à eux à se tirer de l'embarras dans lequel ils se sont mis par la peur d'y tomber.

Quelque bonne opinion qu'ils aient de notre désir de conserver la paix, ils ne nous soupçonneront pas apparemment de le porter jusqu'au point de servir aux dépens de notre gloire et de nos intérêts, le besoin qu'ils ont de justifier aux yeux de leur nation les dépenses prodigieuses des armemens qu'on fait en Angleterre. S'ils ne peuvent maintenir leur crédit et leur considération, qu'en produisant un traité qui fixe sur le pied qu'ils ont eû le courage de nous proposer, l'état de nos colonies respectives dans l'Amérique Septentrionale, on peut conjecturer qu'ils ne

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conserveront pas longtemps l'influence qu'ils ont eue jusqu'à

[*Translation*]

from us).

It is likely that M. le Duc de Newcastle and M. le Chevalier Robinson have yielded without wishing or foreseeing it, to the forced necessity under which they find themselves today of pursuing with vigor measures which they took too hastily; but it is for them to get themselves out of the embarrassment in which they have been put by the fear of falling into it.

However good an opinion they may have of our desire to keep the peace, they need not suspect us of carrying it to the point of ministering, at the expense of our glory and our interests, to their need of justifying in the eyes of the nation the prodigious expenses of armaments now preparing in England. If they cannot maintain their credit and consideration, save by producing a treaty which fixes on the footing they have had the temerity to propose, the status of our respective colonies in North America, it may be conjectured that they will not long retain the influence

présent dans l'administration des affaires de leur cour.

Au reste de quelle utilité pourroit être pour le repos et le bonheur public, la sincérité des intentions pacifiques de Mrs de Newcastle et de Robinson, s'ils ne prevoyent pas les suites des démarches qu'ils font, ou s'ils n'ont pas assés de force pour les soutenir contre les clameurs populaires?

Nous voyons avec regret, Monsieur, que la guerre peut seule terminer nos discussions, et je n'ai rien à ajouter sur ce sujet à la lettre ostensive que je joins icy. Les propositions contenues dans le contreprojet anglois ont soulevé avec raison le roy et son conseil, et M. le cher Robinson à même dû regarder comme une preuve bien sensible de nôtre amour pour la paix, la complaisance que

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vous avez eüe de vous charger de les envoyer au roy. Vous avés très bien jugé vous même qu'elles ne pouvoient pas être acceptées, et l'intention de Sa Majesté est que vous vous renfermiés désormais dans une conduite purement passive, relativement à cette négociation que nous regardons comme absolument rompüe,

[*Translation*]

which they have had till now in the administration of the affairs of their court.

For the rest, of what utility for peace and public welfare is the sincerity of the pacific intentions of Messieurs de Newcastle and de Robinson, if they do not foresee the consequences of the steps they take, or if they have not enough strength to sustain them against popular clamor?

We see with regret, Monsieur, that war alone can end our differences, and I have nothing to add on this point to the public letter that I annex. The proposals of the English counter-project have justly raised the indignation of the king and his council; and M. le Chevalier Robinson should even regard as a very palpable proof of our love for peace, the complaisance you showed in agreeing to transmit it to the king. You yourself have well judged them unacceptable; and it is His Majesty's intention that henceforth you take refuge in a purely passive line of conduct with respect to this negotiation, which we regard as absolutely

à moins que les ministres anglois ne cherchent à traiter encore la matiere avec vous. Dans ce cas là le roy vous autorise à les écouter, et les observations qui accompagneront cette dépêche vous mettront en état de discuter avec eux tous les articles de leur contreprojet. Si contre toute espérance ils vous proposent de nouvelles conditions d'accomodement, qui puissent vous paroître raisonnables, et se rapprocher à peu de chose près de celles que nous

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avons offertes, vous les recevrez pour en rendre compte au roy, mais vous ne devez, Monsieur, leur faire de vôtre côté aucune ouverture ultérieure à ce sujet. Si l'on est déterminé à Londres à allumer une guerre, tout ce que nous pourrions dire pour prévenir ce malheur, ne l'empêcheroit pas. On prendroit même nôtre modération comme un symptôme de timidité, qui seroit pour les anglois un motif de plus de précipiter leurs opérations offensives. Si au contraire les ministres Britanniques craignent réellement une rupture, et qu'ils se croient encore assés accredités pour faire prévaloir leurs sentimens et leurs vûes, le seul moyen d'exciter à

[*Translation*]

broken off, at least unless the English ministers try to treat of the matter with you again. In that case the king authorizes you to listen to them; and the observations which will accompany this dispatch will enable you to discuss with them all the articles of their counter-project. If contrary to all expectation they propose to you new conditions of accommodation which seem to you to be reasonable, and to approach nearly to those we have offered, you will receive them and give an account of them to the king; but you yourself, Monsieur, must make on your side no further overture on the subject. If they are determined at London to kindle a war, all we can say to forestall that evil will not prevent it. They will even take our moderation as a sign of timidity, which for the English would be one motive more for hurrying on their offensive operations. If on the contrary the British ministers really fear a rupture, and believe they have enough credit to make their sentiments and views prevail, the only way of

cet égard leur empressement, est de ne leur en montrer aucun de nôtre part, et de nous renfermer dans un silence de dignité qui

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marque également et notre regret de renoncer à l'espérance de la paix, et nôtre résolution de faire la guerre avec vigueur, si nous sommes forcés de l'entreprendre. L'Europe ne pourra certainement voir qu'avec surprise 1. qu'un objet aussi médiocre que le territoire de l'ohio ait donné lieu à former de la part de l'Angleterre des prétentions aussi monstrueuses que celles qu'on met en avant sans aucun titre et sans nulle apparence de droit. 2. Que le roy ayant proposé de remettre les choses dans l'Amérique sur le pied où elles étoient immédiatement après le Traité d'Utrecht, la cour de Londres ait rejeté une proposition aussi raisonnable et aussi modérée. 3. [*MS. illegible*] que les Anglois pour satisfaire des vûes injustes d'ambition et de conquete, veuil-

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lent détruire dans le nouveau monde l'équilibre de puissance qu'il est essentiel d'y maintenir pour la sûreté et les intérêts de toutes les nations commerçantes. 4. Que la cour de Londres sans

[*Translation*]

inciting their eagerness is to show none on our part, and to cloak ourselves in a dignified silence which testifies both our regret at giving up hope of peace and our resolution to make war with vigor if we are forced to undertake it. Europe can certainly only see with surprise: 1. that so trifling an object as the Ohio territory should have given England occasion to formulate such extravagant claims as those advanced with no title and no color of right; 2. that the king having proposed to restore things in America to the footing on which they were immediately after the Treaty of Utrecht, the court of London should have rejected so reasonable and moderate a proposal; 3. that the English, to satisfy unjust views of ambition and conquest, wish to destroy in the New World, the balance of power which it is essential to maintain there for the safety and interest of all the commercial powers; 4. that the court of London, without motive or even without

motif et même sans prétexte plausible expose toute l'Europe aux dangers d'une nouvelle guerre.

.....

OBSERVATIONS ON THE ENGLISH COUNTER-PROJECT

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:139]

Jt à la lettre de Mr Rouillé N. 30. 13. Fevrier 1755 [*incorrect*]
No 6.

Observations sur le contre projet des Anglois pour
une convention preliminaire.

Il paroît que le ministere Angre n'a pas été bien informé par rapport aux faits et aux éclaircissemens sur les qu'els il a formé ce contre projet.

Il est inutile de parler de l'arte ler sur le quel on est d'accord,

Arte 2

Cet arte a pour objet de designer un terrain neutre qui s'étendroit depuis le Lac Erié jusqu'au 37e degré de latitude et dont le trait à été marqué par Mr Robinson sur la carte jointe

[*Translation*]

plausible pretext, is exposing all Europe to the danger of a new war.

.....

Annexed to M. Rouillé's letter No. 30

No. 6

Observations on the English counter-project for a
preliminary convention

It appears that the English ministry is ill advised with respect to the facts and interpretations on which it has based this counter-project.

It is useless to discuss article 1, on which we are in accord.

Article 2

This article has for its object the designation of a neutral zone extending from Lake Erie to the thirty-seventh degree of latitude, which has been marked by M. Robinson on the map an-

à la lettre de M le Duc de Mirepoix. par cet arte on detruit tous les forts qui se trouvent dans le terrain circonscrit, et on permet aux deux nations d'y pouvoir commercer. Ce seul arte et les explications données par la depêche de M le Duc de Mirepoix du 8. Mars donnent lieu a plusieurs observations: 1. Loin
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d'admettre que les sources de la riviere d'Ohio soient au milieu des possessions des Angs comme M Robinson l'a avancé, on croit pouvoir assurer qu'ils n'ont jamais eu aucun établissement dans le pays où sont ces sources qui ne viennent pas des montagnes de la Virginie, mais du coté des lacs du Canada. 2. M Robinson n'a pas été mieux informé lorsqu'il a dit à M de Mirepoix que tout le terrain depuis les montagnes jusqu'a la rivière d'Ouabache est rempli d'établissements Angs pour le commerce, soit maisons forts soit espaces entourés de pieux et que tous ces établissements seront detruit par la presente convention. Il est constant dans le fait que les Angs n'y ont aucun fort, ni aucun établissement. Les pers Angs qui aient été sur la rivière d'Ohio etoient des traiteurs par-

[*Translation*]

nexed to the letter of M. le Duc de Mirepoix. By that article all the forts in the included area are to be destroyed, and the two nations are permitted to trade there. This article itself and the commentary in M. le Duc de Mirepoix' dispatch of March 8, call for several observations:

1. Far from admitting that the sources of the Ohio River are in the midst of the English possessions as M. Robinson has averred, we think it certain that they have never had any settlement in the country where these sources are, which come, not from the mountains of Virginia, but from the lakes of Canada.

2. M. Robinson was insufficiently informed when he told M. de Mirepoix that all the country from the mountains to the Wabash River was filled with English trading posts, whether stronghouses or places surrounded with pickets, and that all these settlements would be destroyed by the present convention. Actually it is certain that the English have no fort or settlement there. The first English who were on the Ohio River were

ticuliers que les françois en ont d'abord fait retirer, en les pre-
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venant que s'il y revenoient, on les arresteroit et on confisqueroit leurs effets, comme c'est la loi reciproque des deux nations pour le commerce de contrebande et d'interlope, en consequence il y a eu des traiteurs angs arrêtés en 1750; Leurs effets ont été confisqués et leurs personnes envoyées en france où elles ont été constituées en prison à la Rochelle. feu M le Cte d'albermale n'a point reclamé contre ces jugemens, mais il s'est interesse pour leur procurer la liberté et elle leur a été rendue sur sa demande, cequi montre bien évidemment qu'il y a eu un tems même assez recent que le territoire de l'ohio n'étoit pas contesté a la france

3. La methode proposée par M. Robinson de determiner les limites par les degres de latitude seroit une source de discussions. Les bornes ordres sont les montagnes et les rivières; Ce sont les
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plus sensibles et les moins équivoques; On ne voit pas pourquoy les sinuosités des montagnes empecheroient, comme le pretende M. Robinson, qu'on ne puisse les prendre pour limites si une

[Translation]

private traders whom the French first compelled to withdraw, warning them that if they returned they would be arrested and their goods confiscated as is the mutual law of the two nations on contraband and smuggled trade. Accordingly English traders were arrested in 1750. Their goods were confiscated, and they were sent to France, where they were imprisoned at La Rochelle. The late M. le Comte d'Albemarle did not protest against their sentences, but he interested himself in procuring their liberty, and on his request it was accorded them, which quite evidently shows that at a very recent time the Ohio territory was not disputed to France.

3. The method proposed by M. Robinson of determining the boundaries by degrees of latitude would be a source of disputes. Mountains and rivers are the usual boundaries. They are the most evident and the least doubtful. We do not see why the sinuosity of the mountains should, as M. Robinson suggests,

partie de ces montagnes avance vers les terres de la riviere d'ohio, ce sera un avantage pour les angs Il en sera encore un pour eux s'ils ont des valons etablis entre les montagnes, parceque l'on ne prendra pour limites que celles où se trouve la pente des eaux vers la riviere d'Ohio;

4. Dans la suposition que les Angs avoient un gde nombre d'establissemnts sur l'ohio et vers l'ouabache, la demolition mutuelle des forts dans cette partie paroissoit assujettir l'une et l'autre nation; mais comme les Angs n'en ont aucun, cette stipulation seroit entieremt et uniquemt a la charge des françois; et par la

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manière dont elle est libellée on accorderoit à l'angre au delà même des pretentions qui avoient été annoncées dans le entre-tiens precedents que l'ambr de france a eus avec le ministre Brit puisque cet arte comprend non seult la demolition des forts de l'hoio et de la riviere aux Boeufs, mais qu'il entraineroit encore la demolition du fort de la presque Isle sur le lac Erié où les angs n'ont encore jamais mis le pied, et celle du fort de St ange ou de

[*Translation*]

hinder taking them as boundaries. If a part of the mountains extends out toward the lands of the Ohio River, that will be an advantage for the English. It will also be advantageous for them if they have settlements in valleys among the mountains, for only those mountains will be taken as boundaries that are the watershed of the Ohio River.

4. On the supposition that the English had a great number of settlements on the Ohio and toward the Wabash, the mutual demolition of forts in that area would seem to bind both nations. But since the English have none, that stipulation would be entirely and solely at the expense of the French; and by the way in which it is phrased, England would be accorded more even than the claims announced in preceding conversations of the French ambassador with the British ministry: for that article includes not only the demolition of the forts of the Ohio and the river aux Boeufs, but it entails also the demolition of the fort at Presqu'Isle on Lake Erie where the English have never set foot, and that of

Vincennes situé en deça du confluent de l'ouabache avec l'ohio entre ces deux rivières, dependant de la Louisianne et qui subsiste dès les premiers tems de l'établissement de cette dernre colonie.

5. La stipulation inserée dans le même arte pour la liberte respective des deux nations d'aller commercer avec les sauvages

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dans les terres neutres seroit une source interrissable de troubles et d'altercations ; Ceux qui y commerceroient ne seroient contenus par aucune loi ni par aucune autorité ; Cette stipulation ne peut donc être favorable qu'a la cupidité de quelques traiteurs particuliers ; c'est même ce qui a donné lieu aux contestations actuelles puisque ce n'est que depuis que quelques traiteurs ang's ont penetré de ce coté là qu'on a élevé en Angre des pretentions sur la riviere d'Ohio ; Il vaudroit donc mieux dans le cas où l'on conviendrait d'une neutralité provisoire pour une certaine etendue de terre, laisser aux sauvages qui s'y trouveroient la liberté d'aller faire leur commerce comme ils le voudroient, chez les françois ou chés les Ang's

[*Translation*]

Fort St. Ange or Vincennes, situated above the junction of the Wabash with the Ohio, between these two rivers ; the latter is dependent on Louisiana and has existed since the first settlement of that colony.

5. The stipulation inserted in the same article for the respective freedom of the two nations to go to trade with the Indians of the neutral zone would be an interminable source of trouble and altercation. Persons trading there would be restrained by no law and no authority. That provision can benefit only the cupidity of private traders, which has occasioned the present disputes. For it has only been since English traders penetrated in that direction that England has raised claims on the Ohio River. It would then be better in case a neutrality is agreed on for a certain extent of territory, to leave to the Indians who are there the freedom of going to trade as they wish with the French or the English.

Arte 3.

On stipule par cet arte la demolition du fort st frederic et du
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fort de Niagara qui apartiennent à la france et de plus la liberté aux Angs de commercer dans les grands lacs du Canada.

Cet arte cōme le precedt seroit entieremt a la charge de la france; et ce qui fait bien connoitre la maniere de proceder des Angs c'est la demande qui a été faite de leur part lorsque l'ambr de france leur a parlé de la demolition du fort de Chouagen qu'ils apellent oswego contre lequel le gouverneur du Canada fit dans le tems une protestation formelle, et contre lequel on n'a cessé de reclamer dans toutes les occasions. Il faut observer que dans le fait on demande de M. le Duc de Mirepoix la demolition des deux forts sous pretexte qu'ils ont été construits depuis la paix d'Utrecht; et parcequ'il propose d'en demolir un, non seulement construit depuis la paix d'Utrecht mais contre l'establissemnt duquel
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on a protesté, on luy repond par la proposition nouvelle de

[*Translation*]

Article 3

This article stipulates the demolition of Fort St. Frederick and Fort Niagara, which belong to France, as well as freedom for the English to trade on the Great Lakes of Canada.

This article, like the preceding one, would be entirely at the expense of France. The English manner of proceeding may be easily understood by the demand they made when the ambassador of France spoke to them of the demolition of the fort at Choueghen which they call Oswego, against which the governor of Canada made a formal protest at the time it was built, and which has on all occasions been complained of. It must be observed that actually M. le Duc de Mirepoix was asked for the demolition of the two forts on the pretext that they had been built since the Peace of Utrecht; and because it was proposed to demolish one, not only built since the Peace of Utrecht, but against the establishment of which protest had been made, answer was

demolir un fort situé au de là du Lac Ontario qui ne peut être que le fort de Frontenac établi dans les anciens tems de la colonie. On pouvoit a aussi juste titre luy demander la demolition de Quebec.

La proposition de demolir le fort de st frederic et le fort de Niagara ne pourroit avoir lieu qu'autant que ces forts auroient été construits dans des endroits qui auroient été contestés.

Mais jusqu'icy on ne s'est jamais avisé de contester à la france ni le Lac Champlain ni le fleuve st Laurent qui est principalement formé par les lacs qui en font la partie la plus considerable. Le fort st frederic est construit sur le lac Champlain; Il y a 25 ans qu'il a été bâti sans aucune plainte ni reclamation de la part de l'angre ce n'est pas pour menaçon les colonies anglaises c'est pour la seureté du Canada qui etoit si exposé de ce costé là,

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que c'est presque le seul obstacle que l'on ait a surmonter pour venir a Montreal.

Quant au fort de Niagara il avoit été construit de 1687. Il est vrai qu'il avoit été abandonné durant quelques années et qu'il a été retabli en dernr lieu en 1726; mais independamt de ce que sa

[*Translation*]

made by a new proposal, to demolish a fort situated beyond Lake Ontario, which can be no other than Fort Frontenac, established in the ancient days of the colony. As justly could they have demanded the demolition of Quebec.

The proposal to demolish Fort St. Frederick and Fort Niagara could be entertained only in the case that these forts had been built in disputed territory. But until now, no one has ventured to dispute with France either Lake Champlain or the St. Lawrence River the principal part of which is the lakes. Fort St. Frederick is built on Lake Champlain. It has stood for twenty-five years without any complaint or protest from England. It is not designed to threaten the English colonies; it is for the safety of Canada which was previously so exposed on that side, that the fort is almost the sole obstacle that would have to be surmounted before reaching Montreal.

As to Fort Niagara, it was built in 1687. It is true that it was abandoned for some years and was finally reestablished in

situation sur le fleuve St Laurent suffit pour constater la propriété de ce fort, son ancienne construction en 1687 montre que l'occupation de ce terrain par les françois n'est pas une entreprise nouvelle. Au surplus ce fort ne gesne point la liberté du commerce et d'ailleurs les Angs n'ont aucun droit de cretiquer les etablissemens que les francs font dans leurs colonies.

Quant à la liberté de frequenter les grands lacs du Canada et par consequent d'y former des etablissemens de commerce, l'on ne doit pas dissimuler que cette proposion à la suite de toutes les autres a soulevée tous les esprits dans le conseil du roy. La seule

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observation que l'on peut faire a ce sujet, c'est que si le Roy d'angre persistoit dans cette pretention il pourroit demander la cession entiere du Canada puisqu'il deviendroit impossible de le conserver, des qu'il seroit libre aux Angs de s'establir par tout et à leur choix dans le centre de cette colonie.

L'esprit du Te d'Utrecht n'a point été ni n'a pû être de permettre aux deux nations d'aller indistinctemt dans le territoire

[*Translation*]

1726; but apart from that its situation on the St. Lawrence River suffices to establish its ownership; its first construction in 1687 shows that the occupation of this country by the French is not a new enterprise. Moreover this fort does not hinder freedom of trade; and, further, the English have no right to complain of settlements made by the French in their own colonies.

As to the freedom of frequenting the Great Lakes of Canada and by consequence of establishing trading posts there, it should not be concealed that this proposal, coming after all the others, has nettled all the members of the king's council. The only observation that can be made on this subject is that if the King of England persists in this claim, he might as well demand the cession of all Canada, since it would become impossible to preserve it, once the English were at liberty to settle everywhere and at their pleasure in the heart of the colony.

The spirit of the Treaty of Utrecht never has allowed or never can allow the two nations to go without distinction into each other's territory and to make settlements independent of the

l'une de l'autre et d'y former des établissemens independants du souverain a qui le territoire appartiendrait. Il n'a jamais ete question dans ce traite du territoire des sauvages parcequ'ils n'en ont ni de circonscrits ni de limites et qu'ils en changent suivant leurs volontés. Les Angs ne peuvent tirer aucun droit a cet egard de ce qui se trouve sous la denomination vague des cinq nations. Ce n'est qu'une simple énonciation qui ne peut jamais être decisive sur l'état de ces nations qui sont fort éloignées de reconnoître la souveraineté des Angs cette enonciation est encore bien plus

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indifferente pour decider de nos possessions a moins que d'admettre que partout ou un de ces sauvages auroit porté au porteroit ses pas, il nous en enleveroit la propriété pour l'acquérir aux anglois.

Par raport a la faculté mutuelle de pouvoir commercer chez les nations sauvages amies et alliées, le te d'Utrecht porte qu'il sera fait un etat de ces nations et cet arte est resté sans execution. Il seroit même impossible de l'executer puisqu'il arrive souvent que telle nation qui est amie devient ennemie le lendemain.

[*Translation*]

sovereign to whom the territory belongs. In this treaty there has never been question of the territory of the Indians because they have neither limits nor boundaries and change their habitations according to their caprice. The English can derive no right in this respect from what is found in the treaty under the vague designation of the Five Nations. It is but a simple enumeration which cannot be decisive as to the status of these tribes, which are very far from admitting English sovereignty. This enumeration is even more indecisive for establishing our possessions, at least as implying that wherever one of those Indians has set his foot, he has taken the propriety from us and given it to the English.

With respect to the mutual faculty for trading among the friendly and allied Indian tribes, the Treaty of Utrecht provides that a list of the tribes shall be made; and that provision has remained unexecuted. It would even be impossible to execute it, since it often happens that a nation which is friendly today, tomorrow becomes hostile.

De part et d'autre on n'a point toléré que les sujets respectifs sous prétexte du commerce avec les sauvages puissent aller traiter dans les terres les uns des autres; on a observé dans cette colonie la prohibition gñale qui s'observe dans toutes les colonies Europeennes; et ce seroit faire une exception unique en faveur des angs que de leur permettre de frequenter les lacs du Canada qui sont dans le centre de cette colonie. La france peut sur ce point en rapeller a l'opinion gnälent receue dans toute l'Europe, et quoi que les angs ayent usurpé sur le bord du lac Ontario le poste

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d'Oswego, dont il est parlé cy dessus ils n'ont cependant jamais tenté de faire naviguer un canot même sur ce lac.

Art. 4.

Cet arte concerne les limites de l'acadie;....

.....
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Arte 5.

L'objet de cet arte est de donner des pouvoirs pour parvenir a un traité definitif. Il est inutile de s'étendre sur l'inconvenient de

[Translation]

On both sides our respective subjects are forbidden to trade on the lands of the other power under pretext of trade with the Indians. In this colony the general prohibition which obtains in all European colonies has been observed. To permit the English to frequent the lakes of Canada, which are in the heart of that colony, would be to make a solitary exception in their favor. France can on this point invoke the opinion generally received in all Europe; and though the English have usurped on the shore of Lake Ontario the post of Oswego, mentioned above, they have nevertheless never tried to sail even a canoe on that lake.

Article 4

This article concerns the boundaries of Acadia....

Article 5

The subject of this article is the issue of powers for the negotiation of a definitive treaty. It is useless to enlarge on the inexpedi-

ne pas mettre un terme à une convention preliminaire, ce seroit la rendre definitive au choix de l'une des deux parties.

Quant a la commission etablie a Paris comme M. Robinson a assuré que sa cour ne se refuseroit point a la continuer cette assurance de sa part previent des observations que l'on pourroit faire a ce sujet.

L'arte 7. et derner n'est que de stile l'on vient de toucher la reflexion gnâle par laquelle on finira ces observations, C'est qu'au lieu d'une convention prelimre et provisoire dont il a d'abord ete

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question entre les deux cours, celle de Londres en propose une qui deviendroît infailliblemt definitive pour ce qui concerne l'amerique septentrionale

Il ne doit pas etre difficile de retablir vis a vis les ministres anglois les faits qui les ont conduits, a insister sur des propositions que la france ne peut admettre sans consentir en même tems a la porte du Canada, et d'ailleurs l'on doit prevenir le ministere angls que la france ne consentira point a finir definitivemt sur l'amerique septentrionale qu'on ne finisse au même tems, ainsi qu'on est

[*Translation*]

ency of putting no time limit to a preliminary convention. It would amount to making it definitive at the will of one of the two parties.

As to the commission established at Paris, since M. Robinson has given assurance that his court will not refuse to allow it to continue, comment is unnecessary.

Article 7 and last is only a matter of style. The general reflection with which these observations will end has already been touched on. It is that in lieu of a preliminary and provisional convention, which was at first in question between the two courts, the court of London proposes one which infallibly would become definitive as concerns North America.

It should not be difficult to refute to the English ministers the facts that have led them to insist on proposals that France cannot admit without at the same time consenting to the loss of Canada. Further the English ministry should be warned that France will not consent to make a definitive treaty on North

convenu, cequi concerne les isles contentieuses et les autres sujets de contestations entre les deux couronnes.

La voye d'une convention prelimre et provisoire estoit certainement la plus courte et la plus simple, Le contre projet remis
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par M le Chevr Robinson change absolutment l'etat et la nature de la negociation. Cependant la cour de france ne s'eloigneroit pas d'un traité definitif sur tous les points et les instructions ne s'en feroient point attendre de sa part, si la cour de Londres faisant des propositions raisonnables insistoit sur des conventions definitives, mais pour en esperer une heureuse fin, il est indispensable que l'angre renonce au projet de s'emparer du Canada par un traité.

Il seroit bien triste et bien facheux pour l'humanité et pour toute l'Europe que l'angre ralluma une guerre dont personne ne peut prévoir ni l'etendüe ni les suites, pour un intérêt qui doit être regardé comme presque nul de sa part si on le separe de toutes vües pour s'emparer de nos colonies.

[*Translation*]

America, without settling at the same time, as is stipulated, the question of the contested islands and the other subjects of dispute between the two crowns.

The method of a preliminary and provisional convention was certainly the shortest and simplest. The counter-project communicated by M. le Chevalier Robinson changes completely the state and character of the negotiation. However the court of France would not refuse its assent to a definitive treaty on all points, and instructions on its part would be forthcoming, if the court of London insisted on a definitive convention and at the same time made reasonable proposals. But if a fortunate outcome is to be hoped for, it is indispensable for England to give up her plan of getting possession of Canada by a treaty.

It would be very sad and vexatious for mankind and for all Europe, if England rekindled a war the extent or results of which no one can foresee, for interests which must be regarded on her side as almost nothing, if separated from all designs to get possession of our colonies. A little more or a little less territory in

Ce n'est point un peu plus ou un peu moins de terre dans l'amerique septentrionale qui doit occasionner la guerre; chacune des deux nations en possede plusqu'elle n'en pourra cultiver d'icy a un tems tres considerable.

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L'objet de l'une et de l'autre paroist devoir être, non de s'accroitre mais de pourvoir a la seureté de ce qu'elle possede et c'est l'interest sensible de toute l'Europe. Le commerce ou la traite de la riviére d'ohio qui a donné lieu aux troubles actuels n'est peut être pas un objet de mille pistolles par an; Quiconque connoitra ce pays et son commerce ne pourra contredire ce fait; cependant on a trouvé le moyen d'échauffer les esprits comme si la france vouloit envahir et usurper tout le commerce des colonies Angses de l'Amerique septentrione

Si le cours de l'ohio conduisoit dans les colonies anges quoique le roy y ait des droits certains il pourroit en faire le sacrifice au bien de la paix, mais cette riviere conduit dans le centre de l'établissent françois; C'est par cette raison que S Me a interest a tous égards d'en conserver la possession. Il est aisé de

[*Translation*]

North America should not cause a war; each nation possesses more than she can use for a long time to come. The object of each power appears to be, not to expand, but to insure the security of what it possesses, and that is the evident interest of all Europe. The commerce or trade of the Ohio River which has occasioned the actual disputes is perhaps not worth a thousand *pistoles* a year. No one knowing the country and its trade can deny this; but it has been made the means of inflaming men's minds as though France wished to invade and usurp all the commerce of the English colonies of North America.

If the course of the Ohio led into the English colonies, the king, even though he has certain rights there, might sacrifice them for the sake of peace; but that river leads into the heart of the French settlements. It is for that reason that His Majesty is interested in keeping possession of it by all means. It is easy to

juger combien elle seroit dangereuse pour la france si elle passoit
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en d'autres mains, au lieu qu'elle ne nous donne aucune facilité pour envahir ; Aussi sommes nous si peu touchés du produit de ce commerce que par l'arte du traité provisoire que nous avons proposés on consentoit a ne point y aller commercer ;

On ne parle pas de la proposition d'ouvrir aux Angs les lacs du Canada qui jusques icy leur ont été fermés. Le fait en est la preuve. Jamais il n'y a paru un canot ang. Cette pretention n'est pas moins excessive que celle qui regarde la propriété de la rive meridionale du fleuve st Laurent.

[*Translation*]

judge how dangerous it would be for France if it passed into other hands, whereas it affords us no facility for invasion. Further we are so little impressed by the returns of its trade, that by the article of the provisional treaty we have proposed, we have agreed not to trade there.

Nothing is said of the proposal to open to the English the lakes of Canada which up to now have been closed to them. The fact is our proof. Never has an English canoe appeared there. This claim is no less excessive than that respecting the south bank of the St. Lawrence River.

CHAPTER VI

AT CROSS PURPOSES. MARCH-APRIL, 1755

MIREPOIX TO ROUILLÉ, March 22, 1755

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:297]

Recue le 24.

N. 19.

A LONDRES le 22. Mars 1755

Rep. le 27.

MONSIEUR

J'ay eû l'honneur par ma depeche du 20. de vous accuser le retour de mon courier, et la reception de vôtre expedition du 17.

Mon courier arriva a une heure apres midi, et après avoir lû vos depeches j'envoyay chez M. le Chevalier de Robinson pour luy demander a le voir dans la soirée du même jour.

M. de Robinson se rendit chez moy a l'issue de son dinner;

Avant d'entrer en matiere sur ce que j'avois a luy communiquer il me dit, qu'en sortant de chez moy il devoit se trouver

[*Translation*]

Received the 24th

No. 19

LONDON, March 22, 1755

Answered the 27th

MONSIEUR:

I had the honor by my dispatch of the twentieth to acknowledge the return of my courier and the receipt of yours of the seventeenth. My courier arrived at one in the afternoon, and after having read your dispatches, I sent to M. le Chevalier de Robinson to ask to see him that same evening.

M. de Robinson came to my house at the end of his dinner. Before going into what I had to communicate to him he told me that after leaving my house he was to go to a conference of

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a une assemblée des principaux du Parlement, affin d'y resoudre la forme et les mesures a prendre pour le bill illimité que le Roy d'Angleterre devoit demander au Parlement dans la sceance de mardy prochain 25.

Il m'ajouta, que cette precaution leur estoit indispensable, qu'elle estoit une suite necessaire de leurs mesures anterieures et qu'il croyoit devoir m'en prevenir, pour ne me laisser aucun soupçon qu'elle peut estre consequente a ce que je pourrois luy communiquer des dernieres reponses de ma cour;

Je luy communiquay ensuite vôtre depêche ostensible, dont il me temoigna être fort consterné, et apres quelques courtes reflexions sur la fatalité des circonstances, il me quitta pour aller rendre compte au Duc de Newcastle, de qui je recus le soir un

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billet pour m'inviter a une conference dans la matinée du lendemain;

Le Duc de Newcastle me temoigna encore plus de consternation que M. le Chevalier de Robinson;¹

[Translation]

the leaders of the Parliament to settle the form and the manner of proceeding on the unlimited act that the King of England was to ask of his Parliament in the session of next Tuesday, the twenty-fifth. He added that this precaution was indispensable for them, as a necessary result of previous measures, and he wished to give me advance notice of it to leave me no ground for suspicion that it might be a result of what I might communicate of the last answers of my court. I then communicated to him your public dispatch, at which he expressed great consternation, and after a few short reflections on the fatality of the circumstances, he left me to go and inform the Duc de Newcastle, from whom I received that evening a note asking me to a conference next morning.

The Duc de Newcastle expressed to me yet more consternation than M. le Chevalier de Robinson.¹ He asked me if the king

¹ It is quite likely that Mirepoix overestimated the consternation of the English ministers. See *ante*, xlix. He was certainly wrong as to George II.

Il me demanda si le roy estoit enfin resolu a la guerre, et si vous ne me marquiez rien de ce qui avoit pû deplaire dans les propositions de sa cour et determiner la nôtre a rompre la negociation;

Je luy repondis que le roy persistoit toujours et invariablement dans les mêmes dispositions pour la conciliation, et pour maintenir autant que sa gloire le luy pourroit permettre la tranquillité publique;

Mais que la contradiction de nos principes avec ceux qu'ils avoient etablis par leur contreprojet, ne laissoit a ma cour nul
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espoir pour le succès de la negociation

Le Duc de Newcastle se recria que leur contreprojet n'étoit point un ultimatum,

Que sa cour ne l'avoit point delivré dans cette intention; mais dans celle d'arriver aux moyens de conciliation en s'ouvrant avec la notre sur ce qu'elle desiroit et pretendoit, et que la notre voulût s'expliquer sur ses droits et convenances;

Je repliquay que leur contreprojet ne m'avoit point été delivré avec cette modification;

[*Translation*]

had finally decided on war, and if you had indicated nothing to me of what might have displeased in the propositions of his court, and have decided ours to break off the negotiation. I replied that the king always and constantly remained in the same disposition to conciliation and to the maintenance, so far as his glory would permit, of the public quiet. But that the conflict of our principles with those which they had set up in their counter-project left my court with no hopes of the success of the negotiation.

The Duc de Newcastle exclaimed that their counter-project was in no sense an ultimatum; that his court had not delivered it with that intention, but in the expectation of reaching a method of conciliation by setting forth to our court what they desired and claimed, and in the hope that ours would be pleased to express itself on its rights and its convenience.

I replied that their counter-project had not been delivered

Que M. le Cher de Robinson en me le remettant m'avoit déclaré que le ministere Britannique ne pouvoit rien conclure sans assurer les pretentions de sa nation exposées dans cette piece;

Que j'avois pris la precaution de communiquer ma depêche a
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M. le Cher de Robinson, et qu'il avoit approuvé de même le compte que je rendois des dispositions de sa cour sur ses propositions, comme celuy des explications qu'il m'avoit donné sur tous les differents articles;

Le Duc de Newcastle reprit, qu'il estoit vray qu'il y avoit deux points dont sa cour ne pouvoit se departir;

Le premier et le plus important estoit sur ses pretentions sur l'acadie, pour toute la peninsule, et pour une communication par terre le long de la côte de la Baye françoise, qui ne puisse être interceptée par aucune de nos possessions;

Et l'autre que nous ne puissions pas les fermer sur les derrieres de leurs colonies, et y faire des etablissemens qui pussent
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les menacer, mais que leurs propositions sur l'un et l'autre article estoient soumises a nos modifications et convenances

[*Translation*]

to me with this modification; that M. le Chevalier de Robinson in communicating it had declared to me that the British ministry could agree to nothing without making sure of the claims of the nation as set forth in the document; that I had taken the precaution of communicating my dispatch to M. le Chevalier de Robinson, and that he had himself approved the account I gave of the views of his court on the proposals, as well as of the explanations he had given me on the various articles.

The Duc de Newcastle replied that it was true that there were two points which his court could not abandon. The first and the most important was the claim for the whole peninsula of Acadia and for a land communication along the coast of the Bay of Fundy which could be intercepted by none of our possessions. The other was that we should not shut them in on the back of their colonies and make settlements which might threaten them; but that their proposals on both articles were subject to modifica-

.....
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Quant a l'article de l'ohio il me repeta qu'il leur etoit bien moins important que celui de l'Acadie;

Que cependant, qu'il y avoit pour eux des considerations dont ils ne pouvoient se departir;

Celle que nous ne puissions faire des etablissemens menaçans derriere leurs Colonies, ni interdire leur commerce avec les sauvages

Je luy demanday une explication sur ce dernier article.

savoir s'ils pretendoient que les Anglois pussent aller commercer avec les sauvages, ou simplement qu'il fût libre aux sauvages de commercer dans leurs colonies;

Il me dit la dessus qu'il avoit besoin d'eclaircissements avant de pouvoir me donner une reponse positive.

J'avois toujours observé la conduite passive que vous m'avez
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prescrite Le Duc de Newcastle voyant que je l'ecoutois sans de

[*Translation*]

tions and conveniences.

.....
As to the article for the Ohio he repeated to me that it was much less important to them than that for Acadia. That however there were two considerations for them which they could not abandon. They were that we should not make threatening settlements behind their colonies, nor prohibit their commerce with the Indians.

I asked an explanation of the last point, desiring to know if they claimed that the English might go and trade with the Indians, or merely that the Indians should be free to go and trade in their colonies.

He told me he should need information before he could give me a positive reply.

I continually maintained the passive conduct that you prescribed to me. The Duc de Newcastle, seeing that I listened without entering into the matter on my side, pressed me warmly

mon coté entrer en matiere, me pressa vivement de luy communiquer ce que vous aviés pû me marquer des objections a faire a leurs propositions ;

J'ay crû qu'il n'étoit point encore tems de luy faire l'ouverture du memoire des objections qui etoit joint a vôtre depêche, je luy ay dit qu'il connoissoit la droiture et la franchise avec lesquelles je traittois ;

Que si j'étois muni de quelque ouverture qui pût l'aider a se demeler de ces circonstances, je ne luy en ferois pas mistere, mais que mes ordres portoient expressement comm'il l'avoit pû juger de vôtre depêche ostensible,—de me renfermer dans une conduite passive ;

Qu'il m'étoit seulement permis d'ecouter les nouvelles propositions
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qu'ils pourroient avoir a me faire ; mais de n'en rendre compte qu'autant que je jugerois qu'elles se rapprochoient de nos principes

Le Duc de Newcastle se recria fortement sur la reserve qui m'étoit prescrite, qui le mettoit dans l'impossibilité malgré ses bonnes intentions et celles de sa cour de pouvoir suivre la negociation.

[*Translation*]

to communicate to him what you had indicated to me as objections to their proposals. I thought it not yet time to open to him the memoir of objections annexed to your dispatch ; I told him he knew the uprightness and frankness with which I treated ; that if I were furnished with any overture which might help him in getting out of the difficulty, I would make no mystery of it to him, but that my orders indicated expressly what he might gather from the public dispatch—to confine myself to a passive conduct ; I was allowed to listen to any new proposals they might have to make, but to give an account only of those that I should judge came close to our ideas.

The Duc de Newcastle exclaimed strongly against the reserve prescribed to me, which made it impossible despite his good intentions and those of his court to pursue the negotiation.

Je luy representay la dessus que sa cour par leur dernier contreprojet, outre ce qu'il y avoit d'extraordinaire et d'excessifs dans ses propositions avoit entierement changé la nature de la negociation anterieure

Que jusques la il n'avoit été question que d'un accord provisionel pour etabliir l'armistice ;

Que la cour Britannique avoit parû vouloir abuser de notre complaisance, pour inserer dans cet accord provisionel des points decidés selon ses avantages, sans y ajouter rien qui par reciprocité

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pêut favoriser les nôtres

Que cependant le roy concouroit si sincerement et invariablement au maintien de la tranquillité publique, que je pouvois luy declarer, que Sa Majesté estoit encore disposée a donner les mains a un accord definitif, pourvû que cet accord embrassat non seulement l'Amerique septentrionale ; mais les isles contentieuses, et tous les points en contestation entre les deux nations

Le Duc de Newcastle me dit avec vivacité et satisfaction que c'étoit les mêmes intentions de sa Cour, et qu'elle y concouroit

[*Translation*]

On this I represented to him that his court by its last counter-project, beside what was extraordinary and excessive in its proposals, had entirely changed the nature of the previous negotiation ; that till then it was a question only of a provisional accord to establish an armistice ; that the British court had appeared to wish to abuse our complaisance by inserting in that provisional accord, points decided on the basis of its advantages of position, without adding anything that by way of reciprocity might favor ours ; but nevertheless the king concurred so sincerely and unchangeably in the maintenance of the public quiet that I could declare to him that His Majesty was also disposed to agree to a definitive accord, provided it included not only North America, but also the contested islands, and all points in dispute between the two nations.

The Duc de Newcastle said to me with vivacity and satisfaction that his court had the same intentions and would concur

avec autant et plus d'empressement que la nôtre ;

En effet luy et M. le Cher de Robinson m'ont toujours temoigné que c'étoit veritablement l'intention de leur cour de terminer par un accord definitif qui embrassat tous les points contestés en Amerique

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Je fis la dessus l'observation au Duc de Newcastle que de part et d'autre nos escadres estoient prêtes ou ne tarderoient pas a l'être

Que si elles sortoient de leur ports, ou du moins que les chefs ne fussent pas munis d'instructions concertées entre les deux cours, l'on ne pouvoit repondre des evenemens, et que quelque activité que l'on pût mettre de part et d'autre dans la negociation pour parvenir a un accord definitif sur tous les points, il ne seroit pas possible de terminer assez promptement pour prevenir les inconvenients ulterieurs ;

Le Duc de Newcastle après avoir pezé et approuvé ces considerations me dit, mais les isles ne nous tiennent pas si a coeur que l'acadie

Si vôtre cour veut consentir a nous donner satisfaction pre-

[*Translation*]

with as much or more eagerness than ours. In effect both he and M. le Chevalier de Robinson have always professed to me that it was really the intention of their court to finish the matter with a definitive accord including all the points of dispute in America.

On this I observed to the Duc de Newcastle that on both sides our squadrons were or would soon be ready ; that if they left their ports, at least if their commanders were not supplied with instructions concerted by the two courts, the event could not be answered for, and that however much haste was put into the negotiation on either side to arrive at a definitive accord on all points, it would not be possible to decide promptly enough to prevent ulterior embarrassments.

The Duc de Newcastle after having weighed and approved these considerations, said to me, "but we have not the islands so much at heart as Acadia. If your court will consent to give us

ablement sur la peninsule et la Baye françoise, nous trouverons les moyens de luy en donner sur les isles ;

Et quant aux autres points soyés seur que nous ne voulons point approcher du fleuve St. Laurent n'y y former d'establissement qui puisse donner de l'inquietude a vos colonies, ni gener votre navigation, et qu'ainsy nous trouverons les moyens de nous ajuster.

Nôtre conference avec le Duc de Newcastle a duré plus de quatre heures

J'ay taché de vous en rapporter fidellement les principaux points et vous sentéz bien Monsieur, qu'il m'est impossible de vous rendre compte de tous les details

En me renfermant comme ministre et sur les affaires, dans la conduite passive que vous m'avez prescrite, je me suis servi du ton de confiance et d'amitié dont nous traittons ensemble, pour luy

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faire considerer ses circonstances particulieres, et luy faire sentir que son intérêt propre exige de luy de proceder avec plus de fermeté sur les moyens de conciliation entre nos deux cours ;

[*Translation*]

satisfaction on the peninsula and the Bay of Fundy, we will find means to give it to them on the islands ; and as to the other points, be sure that we don't wish to come near the St. Lawrence River or to make any settlement there which can make your colonies uneasy or hinder your navigation, and thus we shall find the means to adjust with each other."

My conference with the Duc de Newcastle lasted more than four hours. I have tried to report to you faithfully the principal points, and you will easily perceive, Monsieur, that it is impossible for me to give you an account of all the details. In keeping myself ministerially to the passive conduct you have prescribed me, I have employed the tone of confidence and amity with which we are accustomed to treat, to make him consider his own circumstances, and to make him feel that his own interest requires him to proceed with more firmness as to means of conciliation between the two courts.

Le Duc de Newcastle en nous separant exigea de moy que je passasse chez M. le Cher de Robinson

Ce dernier me repeta ce que m'avoit dit le Duc de Newcastle ;
Que leur contreprojet excepté pour la presque Isle de l'Acadie et la Baye françoise n'étoit point un ultimatum

Que ce n'étoit nullement l'intention de sa cour, et que ce n'étoit proprement qu'une pierre d'attente de l'edifice, ce sont ses termes, pour l'ajuster ensuite avec nos convenances et pretentions ;

Il a parcouru ensuite plus en detail que le Duc de Newcastle tous les points en contestation, tant du coté du fleuve St Laurent et des lacs, que du côté de l'ohio

304

Mais comme dans la soirée il devoit avoir une conference avec le Duc de Newcastle et les autres ministres, et qu'en consequence de ce qu'il y sera resolu, il ne differera point selon toutes les apparences de m'inviter de reconferer de nouveau avec luy, je crois inutile pour ce moment de vous rendre compte de ce qui s'est dit ;

Celuy que je pourray vous rendre de nôtre premiere entrevue sera plus circonscié et plus positif ;

[*Translation*]

The Duc de Newcastle as we separated exacted it of me that I should go to M. le Chevalier de Robinson. The latter repeated to me what the Duc de Newcastle had told me ; that their counter-project except for the peninsula of Acadia and the Bay of Fundy was not an ultimatum ; that was in no wise his court's intention ; it was only, as he put it, a binding stone in the building to fit itself to our conveniences and claims. He then went over in more detail than the Duc de Newcastle all the points in dispute, both on the side of the St. Lawrence River and the lakes, and on the side of the Ohio. But as he was to have a conference with the Duc de Newcastle and the other ministers this evening, and as he will not delay according to appearances to invite me to confer with him again as a result of what is there decided, I think it useless for the present to give you an account of what we said. What I can report to you from our next interview will be more circumstantial and positive.

Tout ce que je puis vous ajouter sur mes conferences avec ces deux ministres, c'est qu'ils sont tous deux et particulièrement le Duc de Newcastle dans l'intention de faire tout leur possible pour renouer la negociation;

Si je pouvois être aussy seur de la fermeté du dernier que
304v

de sa bonne volonté actuelle, je croirois pouvoir vous repondre
du succès de nos soins

Les petites choses sont souvent aussy utiles a observer que de plus importantes

Le Duc de Newcastle en me quittant fût chez le roy son maitre

Il y affecta la contenance la plus assurée, et il dit aux ministres etrangers qu'il y trouva, que mon courrier étoit arrivé de la veille;

Que je luy avois communiqué nôtre reponse, et qu'il voyoit plus de jour a la conciliation qu'il n'avoit jamais osé a l'esperer

Cette demarche de sa part ne peut avoir que deux motifs;

L'un de ne pas echauffer les esprits dans ces moments qui precedent la demande que le Roy d'Angleterre doit faire mardy

[*Translation*]

All that I can add as to my conferences with the two ministers, is that they both, the Duc de Newcastle, especially, intend to do their utmost to renew the negotiation. If I could be as sure of the latter's firmness as I am of his good intentions, I think I could answer for the success of our efforts.

Little things are often as worth noticing as more important ones. The Duc de Newcastle on leaving me went to the king his master. He affected the most assured countenance, and told the foreign ministers he met that my courier had arrived the night before, that I had communicated our reply, and that he saw more daylight as to the conciliation than he had ever dared to hope. This maneuver on his part can have but two motives. One is not to inflame men's minds immediately before the request the King of England is to make Tuesday for the bill for an un-

du bill de credit illimité, de peur qu'on ne profite de l'occasion pour gêner les mesures du ministere

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Et l'autre celuy de complaire au roy son maitre, et ne luy presenter les affaires que sous les couleurs qui puissent luy être agreables;

Le Roy d'Angleterre ne veut point la guerre, et peu affecté des interets et des colonies Angloises, il voudroit moins pour cette raison que pour toute autre, voir troubler le reste de son regne;

De plus toute autre raison cessante il veut aller a hannover cette année;

[*Translation*]

limited credit, lest occasion be taken to hinder the measures of the ministry. The other is to please the king his master and to present affairs to him under agreeable colors only. The King of England does not want war, and, little concerned with the English interests and colonies, he would be less willing to see a war disturb the rest of his reign for that reason, than for any other. Moreover if there were no other reason, he wants to go to Hanover this year.

ROBINSON TO NEWCASTLE, March 22, 1755

[Add. MSS., 32,853:437]

WHITEHALL March 22, 1755.

MY LORD,

Mr de Mirepoix has made me a visit of three hours, and is to be with me again to morrow night at Seven. He swears to me that the paper of observations which he read to Your Grace and me was all he had, or could shew. But he has entered with me into a larger field. He began with Nova Scotia. He agrees to what we ask for ourselves there without exception, But in return asked at once one of our Islands. That I evaded, and endeavoured to find out what he would expect to have done with the land to the North of our line. He could not speak positively,

but believed that the line drawn to the River St Lawrence might be bent so as to fall upon a point over against Quebec and that a communication should be left to be marked by Lines or by rivers

437v

for the French from Quebec to the Island of St John, and that each side of the said line of communication should be left to the natives with a prohibition to either french or English to make forts or establishments or even to trade.

Another view he has is to remove fort Frederick lower down lake Champlain, but I think he will consent to demolish it.

The worst point is the pretention to the Lakes Erie and ontario. He would have a liziure from the line over against Quebec along the River St Lawrence the lake Ontario the River Niagara and Lake Erie to the Presque Isle of 20 leagues broad, within which Liziure the British subjects shall have neither forts nor establishments, nor the French themselves but upon so much of the said Liziure as shall lye upon the River St Laurent. If this point destroys the forts of Niagara it destroys oswego likewise.

438

He insists upon a like liziere of 20 leagues on this side of the Oubache. The great remaining difficulty is our line upon the back of the Colonies, he proposes to drop a line from Venango to the point where it shall touch the mountains, and then that those mountains, let them go as far as they can stretch, be the limit on this side of the desert country to within 20 leagues of the Oubache. NB If the top of our line can be adjusted, I should humbly think the mountains stretching as they do so far to the West would be a very advantagious boundary for our Carolinas. Another great & general point with him is that all the Countries to be left desert or to the Indians shall not be frequented by either English or French. I shall be turning my thoughts as well as I can upon these subjects to morrow, after sleeping upon them, but shall not know what to do with him tomorrow, for want of advise and instruction. The treaty is to be definitive. I have done for the best, I see more light than ever.

Projected Neutral Zones II

----- Proposal of Mirepoix

March 22, 1755

Drawn on a sketch from Mitchell's Map, 1755

438v

Il s'est deboutonné assez, but if it is not with authority, he may be disavowed, what is certain he has no authority to treat in form, pen to pen and hand to hand.¹

Lord Holderness & I found The King in the best disposition imaginable today in all respects & upon all points, and particularly with the justice I did to the manner in which Your Grace talked to the Lords last night. His Majesty is absolutely for a *definitive* treaty. I send your Grace Mr Keene's letters & made good use with the King of the state of things in Spain with respect to the Queen of Spain's health & Wall's situation as an argument for Peace. I add Mr Keene's private letter to myself & desire Your Grace's advice whether I should communicate all or none of it, or what part if any to the King.

I have the honour to be with the greatest respect imaginable

My Lord

Your Grace's

most obedient

& most humble Servant

T. ROBINSON

P. S. I forgot to tell Your Grace that the Ambassador Sent a Courier today with an account of what he had done since the arrival of his last letters.

¹ See *ante*, 1. Newcastle and Robinson believed that Mirepoix had private instructions from a higher authority than Rouillé much more conciliatory in nature. The Prussian ambassador at Paris believed that Louis XV had a private correspondence with Mirepoix of which Rouillé knew nothing. This may well have been so; but it is impossible to trace its course; and the higher authority was never exerted to moderate unpromising instructions reiterated in Rouillé's dispatches.

MIREPOIX TO ROUILLÉ, March 24, 1755

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:307]

Recue le 26.

N. 20.

A LONDRES le 24. Mars 1755

Rep. le 27.

MONSIEUR

Les anglois, comme j'ay eû l'honneur de vous en prevenir par une lettre du 22., acceptent la proposition d'un accord definitif pour y comprendre les isles et les autres parties contestées entre les deux nations, ainsy que l'Amerique Septentrionale, et promettent d'y proceder avec toute la promptitude et diligence que nous pouvons desirer;

Sur les assurances reiterees qui m'ont été données par M. le Chevalier Robinson, ainsy que par le Duc de Newcastle, que leur contre-projet n'étoit point un ultimatum dans tous ses articles
307v

Que l'intention de l'Angleterre n'étoit point d'etendre ses pretentions jusques sur des points qui pûssent nous donner des inquietudes dans nos possessions,

[*Translation*]

Received the 26th

No. 20

LONDON, March 24, 1755

Answered the 27th

MONSIEUR:

The English, as I had the honor to predict to you by a letter of the twenty-second, accept the proposal of a definitive accord to include the islands and other regions contested between the two nations as well as North America. They promise to proceed with all the promptitude and diligence we could desire.

On the reiterated assurances given me by M. le Chevalier Robinson as well as the Duc de Newcastle that their counter-project was not an ultimatum in all its articles; that it was not the intention of England to extend its claims on points which can disquiet us as to our possessions, and that they were entirely

Et qu'ils étoient entièrement disposés à les expliquer, et les modifier selon nos propositions; mais qu'il leur étoit impossible de le faire si nous ne leur donnions part de nos objections; j'ay crû que selon les intentions de Sa Majesté et celles de son conseil, les circonstances m'autorisoient à faire usage du mémoire des objections joint à votre dépêche du 17 de ce mois,

En conséquence de nos objections et de ce qui a été ensuite agité, je crois devoir vous prévenir des propositions et modifications ou inclinent les Anglois

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Je me sers de cette expression parceque M. le Chevalier de Robinson m'a prevenu qu'il ne pouvoit prononcer positivement sans le concours de ses collegues, et qu'il ne peut être muni de cette formalité que dans le council, qui se tiendra ou ce soir, ou demain au plus tard; mais selon toutes les apparences le conseil autorisera ses propositions;

.....
309....

Quant au Lac Champlain la possession ne nous en est pas

[*Translation*]

disposed to explain and to modify them according to our proposals; but that it was impossible for them to do so if we did not impart our objections: I thought according to the intentions of His Majesty and of his council circumstances authorized me to make use of the memoir of objections annexed to your dispatch of the seventeenth of this month.

In consequence of our objections and of what has since been discussed, I think I can forecast for you the proposals and modifications to which the English are disposed: I use that expression because M. le Chevalier de Robinson has forewarned me that he could not speak positively without the concurrence of his colleagues, and that he could be furnished with that formality only in the council which will be held this evening or tomorrow at the latest; but according to all appearances the council will authorize his proposals.

.....

As to Lake Champlain the English do not contest its posses-

disputée, mais les Anglois persistent a demander la demolition du Fort Frederic qui menace de trop près leurs colonies, et demandent qu'il soit reculé.

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Ils demanderont aussy sur ce lac la navigation libre de leurs sauvages.

Par dela le Lac Champlain et nos etablissements aux environs de Montreal, ils demandent sous[?] la rive meridionale du fleuve jusques au Lac Ontario, le long de ce lac, et de la riviere qui communique a celuy d'Erie;

Que les choses y soient retablies comme elles ont toujours été depuis le Traité d'Utrecht, c'est a dire que le pays reste a leurs sauvages, que de part et d'autre l'on n'i pourra faire des etablissements

Que les sauvages aurent la navigation libre des lacs, et qu'ils pourront aller commercer avec l'une et l'autre nation sans empeschement ni molestation;

A l'egard de la Riviere d'Ohio, les Anglois ne veulent point

310

se departir des commencements de cette riviere jusques a un endroit marqué sur leurs cartes, Venango, pretendant que toute

[*Translation*]

sion with us, but they persist in demanding the demolition of Fort Frederick, which menaces their colonies too closely, and ask that it be moved back. They also ask the free navigation of that lake for their Indians. Beyond that lake and our settlements in the vicinity of Montreal, they ask the south bank of the river as far as Lake Ontario, along that lake, and along the river which communicates with Lake Erie. They also ask that things be restored as they always have been since the Treaty of Utrecht, that is, that the country remain to their Indians, and that neither side be permitted to make settlements. They ask that the Indians have the free navigation of the lakes and that they may be free to go and trade with either nation without hindrance or molestation.

With respect to the Ohio River, the English are unwilling to give up the beginnings of that river as far as a place marked as Venango on their maps, claiming that that whole section is

cette parti est remplie de leurs anciennes habitations, mais offrent de tirer une ligne qui partant du susdit Venango, suive la riviere aux Boeufs jusques au Lac Erie, mais n'aprophe que vingt lieues de ce lac, et suivant le cours de sa rive termine a cette hauteur leurs possessions.

Que la susdite ligne soit ensuite prolongée directement jusques a leurs montagnes de la Virginie, dont les dernieres, celles dont les eaux tombent dans la Riviere d'Ohio, seront leurs limites ;

Que les notres auront la Riviere d'Ouaubache et vingt lieues en deça se sa rive, jusques a son confluent avec l'ohio.

310v

Les Anglois consentent que, comme nous l'avons proposé tout le pays contenu entre ces limites respectives soit abandonné aux sauvages, et reste prohibé aux deux nations ; mais ils croient qu'il y auroit moins d'inconvenients pour l'un et pour l'autre d'y permettre la liberté du commerce sans cependant y tollerer de part ni d'autre aucune sorte d'establissement

Voila Monsieur le precis de mes dernieres conferences avec M. le Cher de Robinson

[*Translation*]

full of their ancient habitations ; but they offer to draw a line from the Venango mentioned, to follow the river aux Boeufs to Lake Erie, but not to come within twenty leagues of that lake, and, following the course of its bank at that distance, to bound their possessions. The line in question is then to be prolonged directly to their mountains of Virginia, the last of which, whose waters flow into the Ohio River, are to be their boundary. Our boundary will be the Wabash River and twenty leagues beyond its bank as far as its junction with the Ohio.

The English consent that, as we have proposed, all the country included between these respective boundaries shall be abandoned to the Indians, and remain forbidden to both nations ; but they think there will be less inconvenience for both to allow freedom of trade without however permitting any kind of settlement on either side.

That, Monsieur, is the summary of my last conferences with M. le Chevalier de Robinson. Although it contains nothing posi

Quoy qu'il ne contienne rien de positif ainsy que j'ay l'honneur de vous le marquer, mais comme selon les apparences le conseil Britannique autorisera les premieres ouvertures de M. le Cher de Robinson, jay crû devoir vous en prevenir, pour que si

311

Sa Majesté juge que les propositions des Anglois soient admissibles, et leurs modifications suffisantes, vous puissiez être en état de m'envoyer plus diligemment les instructions necessaires sur la negociation deffinitive;

Comme nous touchons au moment du depart de nos escadres, j'ay crû important de mettre tous les instants a profit

Les ministres de cette cour affectent de repandre, depuis le retour de mon courier, que les choses se preparent a une prompt conciliation.

Il paroist que leur motif est de tacher de retenir le Roy d'Angleterre;

Ce prince leur a declaré, que soit que la conciliation eût lieu, ou que les choses eu vinssent a une rupture il vouloit aller a hannover.

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Les ministres cherchent a gagner du tems pour reculer son

[*Translation*]

tive as I have the honor to point out to you, according to appearances the British council will authorize the first overtures of M. le Chevalier de Robinson; I have therefore thought I should give you advance notice of them, that if His Majesty judges the English proposals are admissible and their modifications sufficient, you may be prepared to send me more promptly the necessary instructions for the definitive negotiation.

As we approach the moment for the departure of our squadrons, I have thought it important to make use of every instant. The ministers of this court affect to give it out, since the return of my courier, that things are tending to a prompt conciliation. Apparently their motive is to try to keep the king in England. That prince however has told them, that whether the conciliation takes place, or whether things come to a rupture, he wants to go to Hanover. The ministers are trying to gain time to postpone

depart et ensuite trouver les moyens d'eluder ce voyage

Peut-être aussy veulent ils essayer l'effet que les apparences du calme feront sur les esprits, et en tirer des conjectures pour determiner leurs demarches ulterieures

J'ay l'honneur d'être avec respect

Monsieur

Vôtre tres humble et tres obeissant serviteur

LE DUC DE MIREPOIX

le fort que les Anglois avoit precedemment demandé qui fust demoli par reciprocité de celuy d'Oswego, n'est point celui de frontenac, mais celuy qui sur leurs carttes est marqué toronto a l'esgard des païs contenu entre les lacs Erie et ontario, et les grands lacs, les anglois ne pretendent point quil leur soit libre d'y aller, et encore moins d'y faire des etablissements. ils demendent cette liberté pour leurs sauvages et quils puissent de le venir vendre leurs fourrures soit aux Anglois soit aux francois sans aucun empeschement n'y molestation.¹

[*Translation*]

his departure and then find means to prevent the trip. Perhaps they also wish to try the effect that the apparent calm will have on people's minds, and make deductions to determine their further moves.

I have the honor to be with respect,

Monsieur,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,

THE DUC DE MIREPOIX

The fort the English had previously demanded to be demolished by reciprocity with Oswego, is not Frontenac, but the one marked Toronto on their maps. Regarding the country between Lakes Erie and Ontario and the Great Lakes, the English do not claim the freedom to go there, still less to make settlements. They ask that freedom for their Indians, as also that they may come to sell their furs to the English or the French without hindrance or molestation.¹

¹ The postscript is in Mirepoix' own hand.

ROBINSON'S THREE POINTS OF RECOMMENDATION, March, 1755¹
[Add. MSS., 32,996:61]

Sir Thomas Robinson's

Three Points of Accommodation.

First.

One Line from the Bay of Canogohogue in The Lake Erie, till It touches The Mountains of Virginia, to The 39th Degree of Northern Latitude.

Second.

The French to have Both Sides of the River Oubache, and the remaining Part of the Ohio.

The Lakes Erie, and Ontario, to be put upon the Foot of the Treaty of Utrecht.

That The Five Nations shall be consider'd as Subjects of the Crown of Great Britain, and be no more molested on the River

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Niagara, and Those Lakes; And, consequently, The Forts on the Niagara to be demolish'd.

Third.

A Line to be drawn from the Bay of Newbur strait to Fort Chamblé or the Bottom of Lake Champlain, and from Thence in a strait Line to the Western Source of The River St Jean: and from Thence to Bay ————— upon The Gulph of St Laurence—The French Side to belong to Them, in full Sovereignty: The other Side, to The Crown of Great Britain.

N. B.

If not left in full Sovereignty on Both Sides; In that

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Case, what is left, to be Neuter: And only so much of The other Side, as belongs to Nova Scotia, to be neuter; Except what shall be within The Line, first propos'd to be drawn at Twenty Leagues Distance from our Frontier.

In this last case of The Countries to be neuter, Crown Point, or Fort Frederick, may be demolish'd.

[*Endorsed:*] SIR THOS ROBINSON. Three Points of Accommodation March 26, 1755.

¹ See *ante*, 1.

ROBINSON TO THE KING, March 31, 1755

[Add. MSS., 32,853:524]

WHITEHALL March 31st 1755

Mons de Mirepoix has read to me Monsr de Rouillé's Letter of the 27th Instant, & after giving me an Extract of It in Form, which I have the Honor to submit to your Majesty, He let me note down the other inclosed Paper, as the Precis of the rest of Mons de Rouille's Letter, & I have thought It my Duty to lose no Time in laying them before your Majesty

T. ROBINSON

Answer I think this Proposal is like the Former: which is, That as they find us before Hand with Them, to Hinder our Progress by an Armistice

CABINET MINUTE, April 3, 1755

[Add. MSS., 32,996:69]

NEWCASTLE HOUSE April 3d 1755.

Present.

Lord Chancellor	Earl of Holdernesse
Lord President	Lord Anson
Duke of Newcastle	Sir Thos Robinson.

Their Lordships were humbly of Opinion, that, an answer to an Extract of a letter, of the 27th past, from Mo de Rouillé to M. de Mirepoix, should be given in Writing, shewing, that there is Nothing particularly specified in that Letter, but the Renewal of the Proposition of a Suspension of Arms, to which there remain the same Objections, which occurred at first; and which is looked upon rather as a Means to continue the Disputes, than to put an End to Them. That It had been necessary to propose a Counter Project, by way of Answer to the Plan of a Convention,

69v which had been given in by Mo de Mirepoix: And in that Counter Project, Nothing was proposed, but what appeared clearly, by Treaty, to belong by Right, to the Crown of Great Britain: That the English had even departed from that Right, in many Instances for the Love of Peace, and to shew their Desire

of Living in the most perfect Friendship with France: But the Court of France had neither specified any Objections to that Counter Project, nor made any particular Demands, which seemed to have been the regular and natural way of Negotiating, if the Intention, had been as sincere, at Versailles, for Peace, as the English have shewn Their's to have been by their Proceedings.

ROBINSON TO NEWCASTLE, April 5, 1755

[Add. MSS., 32,854:55]

WHITEHALL April 5th, 1755.

MY LORD

I sent Mr de Mirepoix his paper back last night after I had seen Your Grace and My Lord Chancellor. He was with me this morning, and had only added what Your Grace will find underlined in the inclosed paper. That passage is totally left out and he will send the paper this evening or tomorrow morning as your Grace now has it without that passage. The King was pleased to approve my proceeding, thinking it was right to humour the French ambassador thus far, but not hoping for any great good, or rather doubting whether war was not preferable, France being so low, we so superior at Sea & such the alacrity in the whole nation

55v

—England would never have such an opportunity— My Lord Chancellor saw the paper before I went into the Cabinet, & was so good as to make the objection to the Words, which I have been since with Mr de Mirepoix to have omitted. The Chancellor too thought it right I should go to the President, who at first was for no *whittling*, but since it was the French Ambassador's own act and deed, thought it perfectly right. This paper could do no harm, might do good. The ambassador must either have private instructions to go such a length, or must be the weakest of ambassadors; In either case nothing so right as to lay hold of the advantage of one, or the other.

I told the King that I had seen your Grace at Lord Chancellor's & had your joint sanction. His Majesty gives no more than *ten* days for the return of this *decisive* Courier. I attributed, in speaking to The King, this extraordinary step in the French

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Ambassador to the mortification and despair which Your Grace's discourse to him yesterday morning had thrown him into.

As the French Ambassador was going out of my house this morning, he met Mr Amyand & told him how satisfied he was with what had passed, and that if the peace was not made, it would not be from either want of Zeal or attention on our part or his.

I have the honour to be with the greatest respect imaginable

My Lord

Your Grace's

Most obedient

& most humble Servant

T ROBINSON.

MIREPOIX TO ROUILLÉ, April 6, 1755

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:362]

Reçue le 9. par un Exprès
N. 23.

A LONDRES le 6. Avril 1755
Rep. le 13 po 17

MONSIEUR

J'ay l'honneur de vous envoyer la reponse des Anglois qui ne m'a été remise que hier par M. le Chevalier de Robinson

Vous verréz Monsieur, que comme j'ay eû l'honneur de vous en prevenir par ma dépêche du per de ce mois, ils refusent votre

[*Translation*]

Received the 9th by
an express
No. 23

LONDON, April 6, 1755
answered the 13th by No. 17

MONSIEUR:

I have the honor to send you the English answer communicated to me only yesterday by M. le Chevalier de Robinson. You will see, Monsieur, as I had the honor to forewarn you by my dispatch of the first of this month, they refuse our proposal of con-

proposition de concerter entre les cours les ordres a donner a nos gouverneurs et commandants respectifs

Leurs raisons sont toujours les mêmes, qu'ils ne peuvent vis
362v

a vis leur nation se preter a ces mesures respectives jusques a tems que par un accord definitif il soit decidé de l'etat ulterieur des deux nations

Ils n'ont point voulu non plus comprendre dans leur reponse les ouvertures qui m'ont été faites par le Chevalier Robinson et le Duc de Newcastle sur les explications et interpretations a donner aux articles de leur contre projet

Leur opinion est, qu'ils ne peuvent les donner par ecrit, ni meme les prononcer ministerialement que dans la discussion de la negociation, lorsque par les instructions que vous m'auréz envoyé je seray en etat d'etablir vis a vis d'eux nos pretentions et nos convenances.

Comme je commençois cette depeche j'ay recû la vôtre du 3.
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de ce mois par le courrier que vous m'avés renvoyé

Je n'entreray point dans le detail des reflexions que vous

[*Translation*]

certing between the courts the orders to be given to the respective governors and commanders. Their reasons are ever the same, that they cannot with regard to their nation lend themselves to such reciprocal measures until a definite accord has settled the final situation of the two nations: they have been unwilling also to include in their reply the overtures made to me by the Chevalier Robinson and the Duc de Newcastle as to the explanations and interpretations of the articles of their counter-project. Their opinion is, that they cannot give them in writing or even speak them ministerially save in the discussion of the negotiation, after, by the instructions you will send me, I shall be in a situation to set forth face to face with them our claims and our conveniences.

As I began this dispatch I received yours of the third of the month by the courier you sent back to me. I will not go into the

faites sur ce qui s'est passé dans les deux chambres du Parlement
a la sceance du 25. du mois dernier

Il est certain que la conduite du ministere auroit pû eviter
tout ce qui s'y est passé, mais il est bien certain aussy que s'il ne
l'a point fait il ne la pas scû faire

Le Roy d'Angleterre le Duc de Newcastle et tout le ministere
veulent bien sincerement eviter une rupture¹

Nos dispositions etant les memes il est bien malheureux que
pour des objets aussy mediocres nous soyons de part et d'autre a
la veille d'en venir aux dernieres extremités

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Le ministere Anglois par la forme de son gouvernement, mais
bien plus par sa foiblesse et par les fausses mesures ou il s'est
prêté n'est plus le maitre de terminer, que par un accord definitif

Toute autre proposition ne luy est plus admissible

Le Duc de Newcastle est plus intimidé que jamais

Ceux qui veulent l'exclurre du ministere connoissant son
foible chechent de toutes parts a augmenter ses allarmes

[*Translation*]

detail of your reflections on what passed in the two houses of
Parliament the twenty-fifth of last month. It is certain that the
ministry might have avoided all that took place, but it is also very
certain that they did not do it, because they did not know how.
The King of England, the Duc de Newcastle, and all the ministry
sincerely desire to avoid a rupture.¹ Our dispositions being the
same it is very unfortunate that for such trifling objects we should
be on either side on the eve of coming to the last extremities.
The English ministry by its form of government, but much more
from its weakness and from the false measures to which it has
lent itself, is no longer able to end the matter, save by a definitive
accord. Any other proposal is no longer admissible. The Duc de
Newcastle is more alarmed than ever. Those who wish to exclude
him from the ministry, knowing his weakness, seek on all sides to

¹ Again the question arises as to how far Mirepoix was correct in his
estimate of the situation of the English ministry. Robinson's letters to
Newcastle, and the cabinet minutes tell a different story.

Le Lord Granville a profité des circonstances pour reprendre son ancienne preponderance dans le conseil, et c'est luy qui actuellement dispose principalement de la conduite et des demarches de sa cour

364

Ce n'est peutêtre pas un mal pour nous, ses intentions comme celles du Duc de Newcastle sont pour la conciliation et il est plus assuré dans ses demarches

J'ay eû en dernier lieu une longue conference avec luy, il m'a confirmé les ouvertures qui m'avoient été faites par le Chevalier Robinson et le Duc de Newcastle

L'objet general des Anglois pour la negociation ulterieure est comme j'ay eû l'honneur de vous en rendre compte, que nous leur cedions la Presqu'Isle de l'Acadie et vingt lieues sur la côte de la Baye françoise

Que la Riviere Pantagoet de son embouchure et remontant tout son cours fixe les limites des possessions Angloises et

364v

qu'ensuite elles soient de ses sources fixées par une ligne qui remontera en declinant a la hauteur de Quebec, sans cependant

[*Translation*]

increase his fears. Lord Granville has profited by circumstances to recover his former influence in the council, and he it is who principally determines the conduct and the maneuvers of his court: this is not perhaps an evil for us; his intentions like those of the Duc de Newcastle are for conciliation, and he is bolder in his moves. I recently had a long conference with him. He confirmed the overtures made me by the Chevalier Robinson and the Duc de Newcastle.

The general object of the English for the final negotiation is, as I had the honor to inform you, that we cede them the peninsula of Acadia and twenty leagues on the coast of the Bay of Fundy: that the Penobscot River from its mouth and ascending shall fix by its whole course the boundary of the English possessions, and that then from its sources they shall be fixed by a line which will ascend, turning at the level of Quebec, without however approach-

aprocher de la rive meridionale du fleuve St Laurent, que jusques a la distance que nous voudrons proposer

Que pour toutes les autres parties le fleuve St Laurent les Lacs Ontario et Erie servent de limites entre les deux nations, consentant a concerter les mesures par nous a proposer pour que par tout les possessions Angloises ou etablissements ne puissent aprocher de la rive meridionale du fleuve qu'a une certaine distance, mais demandant que le terrain contenu entre le fleuve et les lacs et les limites que nous prescrirons soit abandonné aux sauvages, sans que l'une ni l'autre nation puissent y faire des etablissements

365

Et que pour la partie de l'ohio nous ne puissions, derriere les montagnes de la Virginie ou ils accorderont de se renfermer, faire des etablissements qui puissent les menacer dans leurs colonies et leur interdire tout commerce avec les sauvages

En consequence ils n'accorderont point que nous puissions faire des etablissements sur la Riviere d'ohio jusques a son confluent avec L'ouabache

[*Translation*]

ing the south bank of the St. Lawrence River save at such a distance as we shall propose.

For all other regions the St. Lawrence River and Lakes Ontario and Erie shall serve as boundaries between the two nations, the English consenting to concert with us on the measures we are to propose, so that everywhere the English possessions or settlements may not approach the southern bank of the river save at a certain distance; but they demand that the territory included between the river, the lakes and the boundaries that we prescribe shall be abandoned to the Indians, with neither nation allowed to make settlements.

In the region of the Ohio we may not, behind the mountains of Virginia which they allow as their limit, make settlements which can threaten them in their colonies and prevent their trade with the Indians. Consequently they will not agree that we may make settlements on the Ohio as far as its junction with the

Et quant à cette dernière rivière le Cher Robinson dans ses ouvertures m'a déjà proposé que nous puissions avoir vingt lieues en deçà ; je ne croirois pas que s'il nous convient de nous étendre à quelque distance de plus, la proposition souffrit de difficulté

365v

Le point capital dont je crois que dépend entièrement la négociation ultérieure est la cession que demandent les Anglois de la Presqu'Isle de l'Acadie et de vingt lieues sur la côte de la Baye française

C'est leur objet essentiel et sur lequel nous ne devons pas nous flatter de les amener à aucune modification.

.....

[Translation]

Wabash. As to this last river the Chevalier Robinson in his overtures has already proposed that we have twenty leagues beyond it. If we saw fit to extend it some distance further I do not think there would be any difficulty.

The capital point on which I think the ulterior negotiation entirely depends, is the cession which the English ask of the peninsula of Acadia and of twenty leagues on the coast of the Bay of Fundy. That is their essential object, and on it we may not flatter ourselves that we can bring them to any modification.

.....

CABINET MINUTE, April 10, 1755

[Add. MSS., 32,996:73]

NEW CASTLE HOUSE April 10th 1755.

Present.

Lord Chancellor	Marquess of Hartington
Lord President	Earl of Holderness
Lord Privy Seal	Earl of Rochford
Lord Steward	Lord Anson
Lord Chamberlain	Mr. Fox
Duke of Newcastle	Sir Thomas Robinson
Duke of Dorset	

The present State of the Negotiation with France, since the Counter Project was delivered to Mr de Mirepoix, and an Ex-

tract of Mor de Rouillé's Letter of the 27th past, to That Ambassador, together with the Answer, which was returned, in writing, on the 5th Instant, by His Majesty's Order, having been laid before Their Lordships: And all the Intelligence which has been received, concerning the Armaments of the French, at Brest,

73v

Rochfort, and Rochelle, having been likewise, taken into Consideration: Their Lordships were humbly of Opinion, That It might be advisable for His Majesty to give Directions for the Sending, as soon as conveniently can be, a Squadron of seven ships of War to North America; in order to protect and defend His Majesty's Colonies, and to oppose any Force; That may be sent thither by the French, with proper Instructions to the Commander of the said Squadron, for seizing, and securing any French ships of War, or ships having Troops or Warlike Stores on board, which He may meet in those parts; and for Taking and Destroying any such Ships, in case of Opposition to His so Seizing and Securing Them.

ROUILLÉ TO MIREPOIX, April 13, 1755

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:397]

Recue le 16. dudt
No. 13.

A VERSAILLES le 13 Avril 1755.

J'ay receu, Monsieur, mercredi au soir la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 6. et le memoire qui vous avoit esté remis le 5. par M. le Chevalier Robinson.

.....
[Translation]

Received the 16th
of the said month
No. 13

VERSAILLES, April 13, 1755

I received, Monsieur, on Wednesday evening the letter you did me the honor to write me the sixth, and the memoir transmitted to you the fifth by M. le Chevalier Robinson.

.....

398v....

Quant à la communication entre l'Acadie et la nouvelle Angleterre, elle est absolument impraticable par terre, tant par la longueur, que par l'extreme difficulté des chemins et du passage des rivières qu'il faudroit traverser vers leur embouchure. Cette communication est au contraire très courte et très facile par mer

Il est démontré par conséquent que le seul objet des Anglois, est de se ménager les facilités d'une invasion dans le Canada, et c'est à quoy le roy ne peut ni ne doit consentir, non seulement par cette raison, mais encore parceque le terrain le long de la Baye

399

françoise du costé du Canada nous est indispensablement nécessaire, pour la communication de Quebec, durant une partie de l'année, tant avec l'Europe; qu'avec l'Isle Royale et l'Isle St Jean.

Vous nous confirmés, Monsieur, ce que vous aviez déjà mandé dans vos precedentes lettres, que la cour de Londres propose par raport à la partie du Canada située au dessus de Quebec et de Montreal, *que le fleuve St Laurent et les Lacs Ontario et Erié servent de limites entre les deux nations.*

[Translation]

As to the communication between Acadia and New England, it is absolutely impracticable by land, both from the distance, from the extreme difficulty of the roads, and from the rivers which must be crossed near their mouths. This communication is on the contrary very short and easy by sea.

As a result it is demonstrated that the sole purpose of the English is to reserve themselves facilities for an invasion of Canada; and that the king cannot and should not accord, not only for that reason, but also because the lands along the Bay of Fundy on the side of Canada are absolutely necessary to us for communication with Quebec during a part of the year both from Europe and from Isle Royale and Isle St. John.

You confirm to us, Monsieur, what you have already reported in your previous letters, that the court of London proposes with respect to the part of Canada situated above Quebec and Montreal, *that the St. Lawrence River and Lakes Ontario and Erie should serve as boundaries for the two nations.*

C'est sur la fixation de ces limites, que Mrs les ministres Anglois prétendent aussy établir la baze de la negociation. C'est à dire qu'après nous avoir dépouillés de la partie la plus precieuse
399v

et la plus interessante du Canada, ils veulent bien par amour pour la paix, se prester aux convenances que nous pourrons leur proposer, en partant de ce preliminaire.

Bien loin, Monsieur d'entrer en aucune explication sur cet article, le roy ne consentira jamais, que sa souveraineté sur la rive meridionale du fleuve St Laurent, et sur les Lacs Ontario et Erié, soit mise en question, et que ces parties qui ont de tous tems esté regardées comme le centre du Canada, en deviennent les limites. La prétention de l'Angleterre à cet egard, ne tend à rien moins, qu'à nous rendre fort onereuse et meme impossible la conservation
400

de la partie du Canada qui nous resteroit apres ce démembrement.

Enfin, Monsieur, vous nous mandez que la cour de Londres ne consentira point, que nous puissions faire des établissemens

[*Translation*]

It is on this arrangement of boundaries that Messieurs the English ministers claim to establish the basis of the negotiation. That is to say, after having despoiled us of the most precious and interesting part of Canada, they are pleased for love of peace to lend themselves to conveniences we can propose on the basis of this preliminary.

Very far, Monsieur, from entering into any explanation on this article, the king will never consent that his sovereignty over the south bank of the St. Lawrence River, and over Lakes Ontario and Erie, be called into question, and that those territories which have in all time been regarded as the heart of Canada, should become its boundaries. The claim of England in that respect tends to nothing less than rendering very burdensome and even impossible the preservation of the part of Canada which remains to us after that dismemberment.

Finally, Monsieur, you inform us that the court of London will not consent that we make settlements between the rivers

entre la Riviere d'Ohio et celle d'Ouabache, si ce n'est peut estre à quelques lieues en deçà de la rive gauche de cette derniere riviere. Nous avons offert d'abandonner le terrain entre les montagnes de la Virginie et l'Ohio, et d'y établir la neutralité, mais nous ne pouvons rien accorder de plus, sans renoncer à notre communication entre la Louisiane et le Canada.

De tout ce que je viens de vous exposer Monsieur, vous jugerez aisement qu'il seroit totalement inutile d'entrer en aucune

400v

discussion, par raport aux stipulations ou aux convenances sur lesquelles on voudroit nous faire expliquer, Nous differons trop essentiellement d'interêts et de vues sur les points que Mrs les ministre Anglois regardent comme une baze nécessaire de la negociation.

.....

[*Translation*]

Wabash and Ohio, save a few leagues beyond the left bank of that last river. We have offered to abandon the terrain between the mountains of Virginia and the Ohio, and to establish neutrality there, but we can accord nothing more without giving up our communication between Louisiana and Canada.

From all I have just set forth to you, Monsieur, you will easily judge that it would be quite useless to enter into any discussion with respect to stipulations or conveniences on which they wish us to explain ourselves. We differ too essentially in interests and views on the points that Messieurs the English ministers regard as a necessary base of the negotiation.

.....

ROUILLÉ TO MIREPOIX, April 24, 1755

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:426]

Recue le 27. dudt
No 15.

A VERSAILLES le 24. Avril 1755.

J'ay deja eû l'honneur, Monsieur, de vous accuser par ma dépesche du 13. de ce mois la reception de vostre lettre du 10, et j'ay reçu depuis ce tems là, celles dont vous m'avez honoré le 16. et le 17.

Vous jugerez aisement que les insinuations qui vous avoient esté faites par M le Comte de Granville, ont excité d'autant plus l'attention du roy et de son conseil, qu'il n'est pas vraysemblable qu'un homme aussi éclairé, et aussy accrédité, hazarde de pareilles ouvertures sans y estre autorisé, ou du moins sans une certitude morale qu'il agit suivant l'esprit et les intentions de sa cour. Cette

426v

conjecture nous a paru si raisonnable, que nous nous attendions à des explications plus spécifiques et plus precises, soit de la part

[*Translation*]

Received the 27th
of the said month
No. 15

VERSAILLES, April 24, 1755

I have already had the honor, Monsieur, to acknowledge by my dispatch of the thirteenth of this month the receipt of your letter of the tenth, and I have received since, those with which you have honored me the sixteenth and seventeenth.

You will easily judge that the insinuations made to you by M. le Comte de Granville have the more awakened the attention of the king and his council, since it is not likely that a man so well informed, and of so great credit, should risk such overtures without being authorized, or at least without a moral certainty that he is acting in accord with the spirit and intentions of his court. That conjecture has appeared to us so reasonable, that we are awaiting more specific and precise explanations, either on the

de Milord Granville, soit de la part de Mrs les Duc de Newcastle et Cher de Robinson mais vos dernieres depesches n'ayant fait aucune mention des circonstances dont il s'agit, on pourroit soupçonner, ou que le ministère Britannique a changé de dispositions, ou que son intention avoit peut estre esté par les propos que M. de Granville avoit laissé échaper en deux différentes occasions, de nous faire concevoir des esperances de conciliation qui pourroient rallentir, ou mesme suspendre nos armemens.

.....
429....

Vous aurez vû, Monsieur, par ma dépêche du 13. de ce mois, que le roy ne se determinera jamais à abandonner les vingt lieües de pays le long de la Baye françoise, la rive meridionale du fleuve St Laurent, et les lacs dont les eaux se jettent dans ce fleuve; enfin le territoire qui est entre l'Ohio et l'Ouabache. Que les Anglois se désistent des prétentions qu'ils ont formées sur ces trois points, et nous suivrons la négociation sur tout le reste, de façon à ne leur laisser aucun doute sur nostre désir de nous prêter

[*Translation*]

part of My Lord Granville, or on the part of the Duc de Newcastle and of Chevalier de Robinson. But your last dispatches having made no mention of the circumstances in question, it might be suspected either that the British ministry has changed its attitude, or that the intention had been perhaps, by the proposals that M. de Granville had let fall on two different occasions, to make us conceive hopes of conciliation which might relax or suspend our armaments.

.....
You will have seen, Monsieur, by my dispatch of the thirteenth of this month, that the king will never bring himself to abandon the twenty leagues of country along the Bay of Fundy, the south bank of the St. Lawrence River, and the lakes whose waters fall into that river; or finally the country between the Ohio and the Wabash. Let the English desist from the claims they have set upon these three points, and we will pursue the negotiation on all the rest in such fashion as to leave them in no doubt of

à leurs convenances, mesme par des sacrifices que nous sommes disposés à leur faire, et qui seront également utiles à leur sûreté
429v

et à leur commerce.

Que pouvons nous faire de mieux pour proceder avec franchise et accélérer le succès de la négociation, que de nous expliquer nettement, et avec précision sur les articles qu'il ne nous est pas possible d'admettre, et de témoigner l'empressement le plus sincere pour nous concerter avec l'Angleterre sur tous les points qui sont susceptibles de modifications et d'arrangements.

.....

[*Translation*]

our desire to lend ourselves to their convenience, even by the sacrifices we are disposed to make them, sacrifices which will be equally useful to their security and to their trade.

What better can we do to proceed with frankness, and to promote the success of the negotiation than to explain ourselves distinctly and with precision on articles we cannot possibly admit, and to testify to the most sincere desire of concerting measures with England on all points susceptible of modifications or arrangements.

.....

CHAPTER VII

THE RUPTURE OF NEGOTIATIONS, APRIL-JULY, 1755

ENGLISH NOTE, April 25, 1755

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 438:440]

avec la lettre de M. le Duc de Mirepoix du 25. Avril 1755.

La cour de la Grande Bretagne voit avec regret, que la réponse amiable remise à S. E. M. de Mirepoix le 5^e de ce mois, en consequence de la lettre de M. de Rouillé du 27^e du mois passé, n'a pas produit de telles instructions de sa cour, qui l'eussent mis en état d'entrer immédiatement en negociation sur les differens points contenus dans le contre projet, qui lui avoit été remis dès le 7^e de Mars; mais qu'au contraire M. de Rouillé declare dans l'extrait de sa lettre du 13^e de ce mois, lequel a été communiqué
440v

au Chevalier Robinson, par l'ambassadeur de France, que la

[*Translation*]

With the letter of M. le Duc de Mirepoix of April 25, 1755

The court of Great Britain sees with regret that the friendly reply communicated to His Excellency M. de Mirepoix the fifth¹ of this month, in consequence of the letter of M. de Rouillé of the twenty-seventh of last month, has not produced such instructions from his court as would have put him in a position to enter immediately into negotiation on the different points contained in the counter-project which had been communicated to him March 7; but that on the contrary M. de Rouillé declares in the extract of his letter of the thirteenth of this month, communicated to the Chevalier Robinson by the ambassador of France, that France de-

¹ The answer of April 5 was essentially in the words of the cabinet minute of April 3, *ante*, 199. It has accordingly not been reproduced.

France demande que la cour Britannique, préalablement à aucune negociation, *se desiste formellement de la prétention de faire abandonner par la France:*

1. *La cote meridionale du fleuve St Laurent, & les lacs dont les eaux se jettent dans ce fleuve.*

2. *Les vingt lieues de pays qu'ils demandent sur la Baye Française.*

3. *Le territoire entre l'Ohio & l'Oubache.*

A l'égard du premier de ces points, Mr de Rouillé l'a exposé fort brièvement, & d'une maniere differente de ce qu'on avoit

441

intention de faire entendre par le contre projet susmentionné; mais à l'égard de ce point, aussi bien que des deux autres, la cour Britannique se rapporte & s'en tient à ce qui y a été exposé, comme étant fondé sur les traités, & paroissant absolument nécessaire à sa sureté.

Elle est portée, néanmoins, à entrer dans un examen de tous les points contestés: dans le cours de cet examen on pourra decouvrir en quoi consistent les differens les plus essentiels entre

[Translation]

mands that the British court, as a preliminary to any negotiation, "desist formally from the claim to have France abandon:

1. The south bank of the St. Lawrence River, and the lakes whose waters flow into that river.

2. The twenty leagues of country that they demand on the Bay of Fundy.

3. The territory between the Ohio and the Wabash."

With respect to the first of these points, M. Rouillé has set it forth very briefly, and in a different manner from that intended to be conveyed by the counter-project mentioned; but with respect to this point as well as to the two others, the British court refers to, and holds to what is there set forth, as founded on treaties and as absolutely necessary to its security.

It is nevertheless disposed to enter into a consideration of all the contested points; in the course of that examination it may be found out in what the most essential differences between the

les deux cours ; & le desir mutuel de la paix pourra faire trouver les moyens d'en faciliter l'accomodement.

MIREPOIX TO ROUILLÉ, May 1, 1755

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 439:4]

N. 34.

A LONDRES le per May 1755

Rep. le 7.

Lu au conseil

MONSIEUR

.....
5v....

J'ay eû occasion de voir hier matin le Chevalier de Robinson,
....

.....
8....

Quant aux Lacs Ontario et Erie, il m'a laissé entrevoir que la propriété ne nous en seroit pas disputée, mais qu'il y auroit quelque difficulté a resoudre sur la possession que nous pretendions sur leurs rives meridionales, parceque leurs sauvages y

[*Translation*]

two courts consist ; and the mutual desire for peace will make it possible to find means of facilitating an accommodation.

No. 34

LONDON, May 1, 1755

Answered the 7th

Read to the council.

MONSIEUR :

.....
I had occasion to see, yesterday morning, le Chevalier de Robinson....

.....
As to Lakes Ontario and Erie, he let me see that the propriety was not disputed to us, but there was some difficulty to settle as to the possession we claimed on the southern shores, because their Indians were settled there, and that consequently if the

étoient établis, et que par conséquent si la propriété des rives nous étoit accordée, il s'ensuivroit que leurs sauvages deviendroient de nôtre dependance ;

Ils insisteront aussy sur ces lacs a la navigation libre pour leurs sauvages

8v

Quant a l'Ohio, il me dit que si nous consentions a tirer une ligne du Lac Erie entre les sources et les commencements de cette riviere, ils consentiroient que nous restassions les maitres de tout le terrain par de la, pourvû que la Riviere d'Ohio jusques a son confluent avec l'Ouabache restat neutre ;

Ils consentiront aussy que tout le terrain entre l'Ohio et les montagnes qui ferment leurs colonies soit prohibé pour l'une et l'autre nation

M. de Robinson termina par m'assurer que quoyqu'il ne fût pas autorisé a s'expliquer ministerialement, c'étoient la les veritables dispositions de sa cour ;

Que nous pouvions y prendre une entiere confiance, et qu'en

9

consequence il étoit tout prêt d'entrer en matiere avec moy et même de terminer, si ces dispositions se rapprochoient des nôtres

[*Translation*]

propriety of the shores were accorded us, it would result that their Indians would become dependent on us. They will also insist on the free navigation of these lakes for their Indians.

As to the Ohio, he told me that if we consented to draw a line from Lake Erie between the sources and beginnings of that river, they would consent that we remain masters of all the territory beyond, provided the Ohio River as far as its junction with the Wabash remained neutral. They will also consent that all the territory between the Ohio and the mountains which bound their colonies be prohibited for both nations. M. de Robinson finished by assuring me that though he was not authorized to speak ministerially, such were the real intentions of his court ; we could put our full confidence in it, and consequently he was ready to go into the matter with me, and even to settle it finally, if these ideas came close to ours.

Quoy que toutes les apparences soient contraires, tant par les bruits publics, et ceux même des gens principaux, que par le declin du Duc de Newcastle, cependant, Monsieur, les ouvertures du Chevalier de Robinson me paroissent si precises et si positives que je n'ay pas crû devoir differer de vous en rendre compte

J'ay soupçonné en dernier lieu que ces gens cy vouloient gagner du tems

L'on pourroit croire dans ce moment, que les dernieres nouvelles qu'ils ont eû de la force de nôtre armement plus con-

9v

siderable qu'ils ne s'y attendoient, les ont rendu plus faciles

Mais le Roy d'angleterre est parti Lundy 28: le Duc de Newcastle avant hier 29. ils ne peuvent avoir eû des nouvelles qu'après le depart du Roy d'Angleterre

D'ou je conclurrois que le Chevalier de Robinson n'a pû me parler si positivement hier qu'en consequence des dispositions anterieures

J'ay taché en consequence des semi ouvertures de Mylord

[*Translation*]

Though all appearances are to the contrary, both in the public reports, and those even among leading men, as well as by the decline of the Duc de Newcastle's influence, nevertheless, Monsieur, the Chevalier de Robinson's overtures seemed so precise and positive that I thought I should not delay giving you an account. I have suspected latterly that these people were trying to gain time. At the moment it may be supposed that their latest reports of the strength of our armament, as being greater than they expected, have rendered them more facile. But the King of England set off Monday the twenty-eighth; the Duc de Newcastle day before yesterday, the twenty-ninth. They cannot have had the news in question before the King of England's departure. From this I should conclude that the Chevalier de Robinson was able to speak so positively yesterday only as a result of a previous decision.

I tried in consequence of the partial overtures of My Lord Granville to get him to speak more openly as to the orders given

Granville de le faire expliquer plus ouvertement sur les ordres donnés a l'amiral Boscawen ;

Je l'ay trouvé fort reservé sur cet article, et il m'a même
10

temoigné qu'il ne pouvoit m'y donner de reponse Je luy ay dit qu'il estoit facheux qu'il ne pût s'expliquer sur une matiere aussy interessante

Que les dispositions pacifiques des deux cours pourroient peut être vaincre les inconveniens qui pourroient resulter des hostilités qui seroient exercées sur terre dans les parties contestées, mais qu'il n'en seroit pas de même de celles qui seroient executées par mer, et qu'il estoit inevitable que le premier coup de canon entre nos escadres ne decidat la rupture :

J'ay terminé par luy temoigner que s'il avoit été autorisé a me donner des assurances que les Anglois ne commenceroient pas
10v

les hostilités j'aurois pû l'être a l'assurer que nous ne serions pas les agresseurs

Le Chevalier de Robinson a repris brusquement la dessus, *mais si M. de Macnamara va débarquer les troupes dans la peninsule de l'acadie pour nous y chasser de nos etablissements*

[Translation]

Admiral Boscawen. I found him very reserved on that point, and he even indicated that he could give me no answer. I told him it was annoying that he could not speak out on so important a matter ; that the pacific disposition of the two courts might perhaps overcome the embarrassments which might result from hostilities by land in the disputed regions, but that it would not be the same with those at sea, and that it was inevitable that the first cannon shot between our squadrons should result in the rupture. I ended by assuring him that if he had been authorized to give me assurances that the English would not begin hostilities I could have assured him that we would not be the aggressors.

The Chevalier de Robinson replied sharply, "But if M. de Macnamara is going to land troops in the peninsula of Acadia to drive us from our settlements—" I replied that there was no

Je luy ay repondu qu'il n'y avoit nulle apparence que nous attaquions les leurs quand ils n'entreprendroient point sur les notres

Sans vouloir s'engager a plus d'ouvertures il me dit qu'un prompt accord entre les cours estoit le moyen le plus expedient pour prevenir les evenemens ulterieurs, toujours a craindre entre

11

des flottes qui sont a la mer, malgré les ordres et les instructions données aux commandts

Je n'ay pû voir Mylord Granville Il est bien certain que c'est luy qui a determiné les dernieres demarches de sa cour et a dicté sa reponse ;

.....

[*Translation*]

appearance that we would attack their settlements if they undertook nothing against ours.

Without wishing to engage himself to further overtures he told me a prompt accord between the courts was the surest means of preventing the ulterior events always to be feared between fleets at sea despite the orders and instructions given their commanders.

I have not been able to see My Lord Granville. It is very certain that it is he who has determined the last steps of his court and has dictated its reply.

.....

FRENCH MEMOIR, May 9, 1755

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 439:38]

du 9. May 1755—recu le 12

Remis au ministere Anglois

le 14.

Memoire

Les discussions entre les cours de France et d'angleterre concernant l'Amerique, ont pour objet 1. Les limites de l'Acadie. 2. les limites du Canada. 3. Le cours et le territoire de l'ohio. 4. Les Isles de Ste Lucie, de St Vincent, de la Dominique et de Tabago

Pour discuter ces quatre points, on ne peut etablir d'autres principes generaux de la negociation, que ceux de la justice, de la seureté des colonies respectives, et des convenances mutuelles;

C'est a ces principes que l'on doit rapporter toutes les discussions particulieres sur les quatre objets dont il s'agit, et qu'on va traiter sommairement et successivement

[Translation]

May 9, 1755

Received the 12th

Communicated to the English ministry
the 14th

Memoir

The disputes between the courts of France and England concerning America have for their subjects: 1. The boundaries of Acadia; 2. The boundaries of Canada; 3. The course and territory of the Ohio; 4. The islands of St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Dominica and Tobago.

For the discussion of these four points, no other general principles of negotiation can be invoked but justice, the security of the respective colonies, and mutual convenience. To these principles should be referred all special discussion of the four points in question, which will be treated successively and summarily.

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Arte 1er
Des limites de l'Acadie

.....
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Arte 2.
sur les limites du Canada

La cour de France a rejezté decisivement et rejettera toujours
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la proposition qui a été faite par l'Angleterre, *que la rive meridionale du fleuve St Laurent et les Lacs Ontario et Erie servent de limites entre les deux nations*

Il faut etablir pour baze de la negociation relativement a cet article, que le fleuve de St Laurent est le centre du Canada ; Cette verité est justifiée par tous les titres, par tous les auteurs, et par la possession

Tout ce que la France pourra admettre, après avoir etablí ce principe qui ne sauroit souffrir de contradiction raisonable, c'est d'examiner par raport a cet objet, si la convenance reciproque des deux nations peut exiger a cet egard quelque arrangement par-

[Translation]

Article 1
On the boundaries of Acadia

.....

Article 2
On the boundaries of Canada

The court of France has decisively rejected and will always reject the proposal made by England, "that the south bank of the St. Lawrence River and Lakes Ontario and Erie serve as boundaries between the two nations."

It must be understood as the basis of the negotiation on this article that the St. Lawrence River is the heart of Canada. That truth is evidenced by all titles, by all authors, and by possession.

All that France can concede, once this principle, which can not reasonably be gainsaid, is assumed, is that she will examine whether on this point the mutual convenience of the two nations may call for some special arrangement that will fix past dispute

tuculier, pour fixer invariablement les limites respectives

Le seul pretexte dont les Anglois se servent pour colorer leurs pretentions est tiré de l'article 15e du Traité d'Utrecht, mais en
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examinant avec attention toutes les expressions de cet article, il est evident que rien n'est moins fondé que les inductions que la cour de Londres veut en tirer, en effet,

1. Il n'est question dans cet article que de la personne des sauvages et nullement de leur pays ou prétendu territoire, puisqu'ils n'en ont aucun de déterminé, et qu'ils ne connoissent de propriété que l'usage actuel qu'ils font du terrain qu'ils occupent aujourd'huy, et qu'ils cesseront peut être d'occuper demain

2. Il seroit absurde de pretendre que par tout ou un sauvage ami ou sujet de l'une des deux couronnes feroit une residence passagere, le pays qu'il auroit habité appartiendrait à la couronne, dont il seroit le sujet ou l'amy

3. Les sauvages dont il s'agit sont libres et independants, et

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il n'y en a point qu'on puisse appeller sujets de l'une ou de

[*Translation*]

their respective boundaries.

The sole pretext which the English employ to give color to their pretensions is drawn from Article 15 of the Treaty of Utrecht; but on examining with care all that is said in that article it is evident that nothing can be more ill founded than the deductions that the court of London seeks to make from it.

1. That article only deals with the persons of the Indians and in no wise with their country or pretended territory, since they have none that is definite, and know no property but the actual use they make of the land they occupy today, which they may cease to occupy tomorrow.

2. It would be absurd to claim that wherever an Indian who was friend or subject of either crown had a temporary abode, the country he dwelt in belonged to the crown whose subject or friend he was.

3. The Indians in question are free and independent, and none of them can be termed subjects of either crown.

l'autre couronne, l'enonciation du traité d'Utrecht a cet egard est fautive, et ne peut changer la nature des choses, Il est certain qu'aucun Anglois n'oseroit, sans courir le risque de se faire massacrer, dire aux Iroquois qu'ils sont sujets de l'Angleterre. Ces nations sauvages se gouvernent par elles mêmes, et sont autant et plus amies et alliées de la France que de l'Angleterre

Plusieurs familles françoises sont même affiliées parmy les Iroquois et ont habité avec eux pendant le cours de la dre guerre, pendant laquelle les Cinq Nations ont gardé la plus exacte neutralité

4. L'article 15. du Traité d'Utrecht renferme les memes stipulations, tant en faveur des françois qu'en faveur des Anglois, et ces stipulations sont mutuelles, les françois pourroient donc

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soutenir a meilleur titre que les Anglois ne le pretendent des Iroquois, que les nations *Abenakis* et *souriquois*, autrement *Mumas Malecites*, *Canibas*, &c sont sujets de la France, et comme il y a des souriquois qui habitent l'extremité de la peninsule du côté du Cap fourchu et du Cap de sables, il s'en suivroit que les

[Translation]

The statement of the Treaty of Utrecht in that respect is faulty and cannot change the nature of things. It is certain that no Englishman would dare, without running the risk of being murdered, to tell the Iroquois they were English subjects. These Indian tribes govern themselves and are as much or more friends and allies of France as of England. Several French families are even adopted among the Iroquois and dwelt with them during the last war, during which the Five Nations preserved the most exact neutrality.

4. Article 15 of the Treaty of Utrecht contains the same stipulations in favor of the French as of the English and these stipulations are mutual. The French therefore can maintain by a better title than that by which the English claim the Iroquois, that the Abnaki and Souriquois, sometimes called Mumas, Malecite, Canibas, etc., are subjects of France; since some of the Souriquois live at the end of the peninsula toward Forked Cape and Cape Sable, it would follow that the French could claim to

françois pourroient pretendre y former des etablissemens avec autant de droit que les Anglois en ont formé a Osvego ou Chouegen sur les bords du Lac Ontario en 1726. ou 1727., et par consequent longtems apres la Paix d'Utrecht ; La France n'a point cessé depuis ce tems la de se plaindre de cette entreprise, et elle s'attend que le fort de Chouagen sera detruit

5 On a mal interpreté le Traité d'Utrecht en pretendant qu'il autorisoit les françois et les Anglois a aller negocier indis-

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tingement chez toutes les nations sauvages sous pretexte de sujettion, d'alliance ou d'amitié. Cet article bien entendu et bien developé, assure seulement la liberté du commerce que les sauvages peuvent faire entre eux ou chez les nations Europeennes, et n'autorise nullement celles cy a sortir des bornes de leurs colonies, pour aller faire le commerce chez les sauvages

6. Enfin cet article 15. porte qu'on reglera respectivement qu'elles seront les nations Ameriquaines qui seront censées sujettes ou amies des deux couronnes. Cette stipulation n'a pas été executée, parcequ'en effet elle n'est gueres susceptible d'execu-

[*Translation*]

make settlements there with as much right as the English have for their post established at Oswego or Choueghen on the shores of Lake Ontario in 1726 or 1727, and consequently long after the Peace of Utrecht. Since that time France has not ceased to protest against that aggression, and she expects the fort of Oswego to be demolished.

5. The Treaty of Utrecht has been ill interpreted, in claiming that it authorizes French and English to go to trade indiscriminately among all the Indian tribes under pretext of subjection, alliance, or amity. That article properly understood and interpreted secures only the freedom of the trade the Indians may carry on among themselves or with European nations, and in no sort authorizes Europeans to leave the limits of their colonies to go to trade with the Indians.

6. Finally that article 15 directs that it shall be determined which American tribes are subjects or allies of either crown. This stipulation has never been executed, because in truth it is

tion, puisque telle nation sauvage qui aujourd'huy est amie, demain devient ennemie et que par consequent la fixation qui en auroit été arrêtée seroit continuellement contredite par le fait;

Tout ce qu'on vient d'exposer prouve clairement qu'en dis-
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cutant suivant les regles de la justice et du droit l'article 15. du Traité d'Utrecht, il sera aisé de detruire les fausses interpretations qu'on luy donne, il ne sera pas moins facile de demontrer que les Anglois ne doivent être determinés par aucun motif d'interêt a mettre en avant les pretentions qu'ils ont formées; Il n'est pas question dans ces vastes regions de l'Amerique, de se disputer un peu plus, ou un peu moins de terrain, l'interet essentiel se borne a deux objets, celui de la seureté et celui du commerce, et la cour de France sera toujours disposée a concerter a ces deux egards avec celle de Londres des arrangements equitables et solides, tant pour le present, que pour l'avenir.

Arte 3.

sur le cours et le territoire de l'ohio

[*Translation*]

scarcely capable of being executed, since an Indian tribe that is friendly today becomes hostile tomorrow; consequently the determination arrived at would be continually contradicted by the facts.

What has been set forth clearly proves that once Article 15 of the Treaty of Utrecht is considered according to rules of justice and right the false interpretations given it can be easily demolished. It will be no less easy to prove that no motive of self-interest need have prompted the English to advance the claims they have made. In the vast regions of America it is not a question of arguing for a little more or a little less territory. Essential interest is confined to two ends, security and trade; and the court of France will always be ready on those two points to concert with the court of London as to arrangements that will be equitable and solid for the present or the future.

Article 3

As to the course and territory of the Ohio

Il est incontestable d'après les principes qui s'accordent avec

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les titres, avec la justice, avec la convenance et avec la seurete mutuelle, que l'ohio doit faire partie des possessions de la france; Les Anglois n'ont aucun etablissement sur cette riviere, et lorsque Mrs les ministres Britanniques ont avancé que les sources de cette riviere sont remplies d'anciens etablissements de leur nation, ils ont trop facilement ajouté foy a des relations infideles; Les françois ont toujours regardé cette riviere comme une dependance du Canada, et elle leur est essentielle pour la communication du Canada a la Louïsiane, ils l'ont frequentée dans tous les tems et en forces; C'est même par cette riviere que l'on fit passer le detachement des troupes qui furent envoyées a la Louïsiane vers 1739 a l'occasion de la guerre de Chicachas:

S'il y avoit eü alors des etablissements Anglois sur cette

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riviere, et si elle eût fait partie des colonies Britanniques, auroit on permis aux françois de la descendre dans tout son cours, ou du moins la cour de Londres n'en auroit elle pas porté des plaintes; Mais alors il n'avoit point encore été question de la

[*Translation*]

It is indisputable according to principles which are in accord with titles, with justice, with convenience, and with mutual security that the Ohio should be a French possession. The English have no settlement on that river and when Messieurs the British ministers averred that the sources of the river were full of ancient settlements of their nation, they gave too easy credence to unreliable reports. The French have always considered that river a dependency of Canada; and it is essential to them for the communication between Canada and Louisiana. They have frequented it at all times and in force. It was even by that river that troops were sent to Louisiana about 1739 on the occasion of the Chickasaw war. If there had been English settlements on the river, and if it had formed part of the British colonies, would the French have been allowed to descend the whole course of the river, or at least would not the court of London have made complaints?

pretention nouvelle qu'on a élevée depuis, sans preuve, sans titre et sans aucune sorte de fondement

Il est vrai que dans les dernières années quelques traitteurs Anglois ont passé les montagnes de la Virginie, et se sont hasardés de venir faire du côté de l'ohio un commerce de pelleteries avec les sauvages ; Les gouverneurs françois du Canada se sont d'abord bornés a leur faire dire qu'ils étoient sur la territoire de la France, et a leur enjoindre de n'y point revenir, sous peine d'avoir leurs effets saisis, et d'être constitués prisonniers ; Ils y sont revenus

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et leurs effets ont été confisqués et vendus, les traitteurs ont été personnellement arrêtés, conduits a Quebec, et de la en france, ou ils ont été renfermés dans les prisons de la Rochelle

Il n'y a eû nulle reclamation et nulle plainte de la part de la cour de Londres, on ne les a considerés que comme des contrebandiers que leur cupidité avoit exposé aux risques d'un commerce illicite

Après avoir établi aussy solidement qu'on vient de le faire, le droit et la possession de la france sur l'ohio et son territoire,

[*Translation*]

But then there was no question of the new claim that has since been set up without proof, title, or any sort of foundation.

It is true that in the last few years some English traders passed the mountains of Virginia and took the risk of coming to carry on the fur trade with the Indians toward the Ohio. The French governors of Canada at first contented themselves with having them told that they were on French territory, and having them enjoined not to return to it, under pain of having their goods confiscated and of being themselves made prisoners. They returned, and their goods were confiscated and sold ; the traders themselves were arrested, carried to Quebec, and thence to France, where they were imprisoned at La Rochelle.

No protest or complaint whatever was made by the court of London ; the men were considered only as smugglers whose greed had exposed them to the risks of an illicit trade.

After having established so solidly as has just been done the right and possession of France on the Ohio and its territory, it

on doit regarder comme une preuve bien sensible de son amour
pour la paix, qu'elle veuille bien consentir a stipuler que tout le
terrein entre l'ohio et les montagnes qui bornent la Virginie
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demeurera neutre, et que tout commerce et passage y seront
interdites, tant aux françois qu'aux Anglois
Arte 4e
sur les isles contentieuses

MIREPOIX TO ROUILLÉ, May 15, 1755
[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 439:76]

35.

A LONDRES le 15. May 1755
Rep. le 21.
lu au conseil

MONSIEUR

J'ay remis hier a M. le Chevalier de Robinson le memoire
signé cotte numero 2. qui etoit joint a vôtre depêche du 9 de ce
mois;

[Translation]

should be thought most evident proof of her love for peace, that
she should be pleased to agree that all the lands between the
Ohio and the mountains bordering Virginia should remain neutral,
and that all trade and passage should be forbidden to both French
and English.

Article 4
As to the disputed islands

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LONDON, May 15, 1755
Answered the 21st
Read to the council

MONSIEUR:

I communicated yesterday to M. le Chevalier de Robinson the
signed memoir, number 2, annexed to your dispatch of the ninth.

Je n'ay delivré cette piece qu'après avoir notifié a tous les ministres Britanniques les intentions de Sa Majesté pour la suite de la negociation, et m'être assuré qu'elle seroit repondue dans la même forme.

Quoy que les ministres Britanniques m'ayent temoigné que

76v

nous etions encore éloignés tant par nos principes que par nos pretentions, cependant le memoire a été bien accueilli, et ils m'ont renouvelé dans cette occasion, les assurances les plus positives de la sincerité des intentions de leur cour, pour chercher tous les moyens d'éviter une rupture, et se prêter a tous ceux qui leur seroient praticables pour parvenir a une prompte conciliation ;

Mais Mylord Granville m'a dit devoir me prevenir, que quoy-que tout leur ministere fût entierement determiné a proceder avec candeur et confiance, cependant par la constitution et les circon-

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stances de leur gouvernement, ou les ministres estoient toujours responsables de leur conduite, ils n'oseroient peutêtre pas, tant

[*Translation*]

I delivered it only after having notified all the British ministers of His Majesty's intentions for the remainder of the negotiation, and being assured that the memoir would be answered in the same form.

Although the British ministers indicated to me that we were still so far apart as to both our principles and our claims, the memoir was nevertheless well received, and they on this occasion renewed to me the most positive assurances of the sincerity of the intentions of their court in seeking all means of avoiding a rupture, and in lending its support to all possible means of arriving at a prompt conciliation.

But My Lord Granville said he must forewarn me that although all the ministers are fully determined to proceed with candor and confidence, nevertheless by the constitution and circumstances of their government, in which the ministers were always responsible for their conduct, they could not perhaps, while

que pourroit durer l'incertitude du succès de la negociation, s'expliquer entierement par escrit sur leurs dernieres resolutions;

Il m'a cité pour exemple l'Isle de Ste Lucie

Il m'a dit qu'il étoit bien convaincu qu'elle nous appartenoit de droit, et que de plus la cession n'en étoit de nulle importance pour les Anglois;

Que si nous en étions a signer le traité, le ministere Britan-
77v

nique n'hesiteroit pas a nous en accorder la propriété; mais qu'il doutoit que ses collegues osassent d'avance y consentir dans leur reponse;

Mylord Granville et les autres ministres m'ont confirmé de nouveau qu'ils ne pouvoient se desister de leurs pretentions sur la totalité de la Presqu'Isle de l'Acadie compris l'isthme, et sur la Baye françoise.

Quant a ce dernier objet je crois toujours que nous pourrons peutêtre les amener a consentir que toute cette côte soit prohibée, ainsy que nous le proposons pour celle du nord de la peninsule;

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mais ils ne nous en accorderont pas la possession. Je ne crois

[*Translation*]

the success of the negotiation remained uncertain, explain their final decisions entirely in writing. He cited the island of St. Lucia as an example. He said he was convinced it belonged to us by right, and that moreover the cession of it was of no importance whatever for the English; that if we were at the point of signing a treaty the British ministry would not hesitate to accord us its ownership; but that he doubted if his colleagues would dare to consent to it in advance in their reply.

My Lord Granville and the other ministers have assured me anew that they could not recede from their claims for all the peninsula of Acadia including the isthmus, and for the Bay of Fundy. As to this last object I still think we might perhaps get them to consent that the whole coast be forbidden as we propose for the northern coast of the peninsula; but they will not accord us possession of it.

pas que nos pretentions sur la rive meridionale du fleuve St Laurent souffrent de grandes difficultés ;

Les Anglois, selon les apparences sans s'expliquer tout a fait sur nos susdites pretentions, feront des propositions pour la fixation des limites respectives, mais ils insisteront sur la demolition du fort frederic

Ils demanderont aussy celle du fort Niagara, et quant aux Lacs Ontario et Erie le Chevalier Robinson m'a dit plusieurs fois, que leur ministere trouveroit de grandes oppositions pour nous en

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accorder la propriété, mais que comme jusques a present, il n'y avoit eû aucune discussion entre les deux nations sur cette partie, il croyoit que le mieux seroit pour eviter toute difficulté, de ne point entrer en explications sur cet article, et d'y stipuler generalement, que les choses y füssent invariablement conservées et maintenues comme elles l'avoient été precedement.

Je ne scais ce que les Anglois proposeront pour les sources de l'Ohio, et peutêtre ne le savent ils pas encore eux mêmes

[*Translation*]

I do not think our claims on the south bank of the St. Lawrence River will suffer great difficulty. The English, according to appearances, without being entirely explicit as to our claims, will make proposals for fixing the respective boundaries; but they will insist on the demolition of Fort Frederick. They will also demand the demolition of Fort Niagara. As to Lakes Ontario and Erie, the Chevalier Robinson has told me several times that the ministry would encounter great opposition if it allowed us the propriety of them, but as up to now there had never been any controversy between the two nations in that region, he thought the best way of avoiding all difficulty, would be to enter into no explanations on the point, stipulating in general that things be kept and maintained as they formerly had been.

I do not know what the English will propose for the sources of the Ohio, and perhaps they do not yet know themselves. But

Mais selon les apparences ils insisteront pour que cette
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riviere jusques a son confluent avec l'ouabache reste neutre, et
serve de limite aux deux nations;

L'on pourra ensuite les amener a consentir que le terrain
entre cette riviere et les montagnes de la Virginie reste prohibé;

Quant aux isles, vous voyes Monsieur, parceque m'a dit
Mylord Granville, que cet article ne paroît pas devoir souffrir de
grandes difficultés;

Selon luy celle de Tabago ne doit pas nous être utile, et elle
devroit être comprise dans le nombre de celles que nous voulons
qui restent en propriété aux Caraïbes;

.....

[*Translation*]

according to appearances they will insist that that river remain
neutral and serve the two nations as a boundary, as far as its
junction with the Wabash. They can then be induced to assent
that the territory between that river and the mountains of Vir-
ginia remain closed.

As to the islands, you see, Monsieur, by what My Lord Gran-
ville said to me, that that article should not suffer great difficulty.
According to him Tobago is useless to us, and should be included
among those that we wish to remain in possession of the Caribs.

.....

ENGLISH ANSWER OF June 7, 1755¹

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 439:172]

Envoyé a la cour
le 7. Juin 1755
avec la lettre
No. 39.

Copie de la reponse du ministere Anglois au
memoire qui luy a été remis par M. le Duc de
Mirepoix le 14. May 1755.

.....
174v....

Arte 2e
Des limites du Canada

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Il sera difficile de se former une idée precise de ce qu'on
appelle dans le memoire le centre du Canada, et moins encore
peut on admettre pour base de la negociation que la riviere de St.
Laurent soit le centre de cette province. Cecy est avancé sans
preuve, et il est impossible que le cours d'une riviere de cette

[*Translation*]

Sent to the court
June 7, 1755 with
letter No. 39

Copy of the reply of the English ministry to the
memoir communicated by M. le Duc de Mirepoix,
May 14, 1755

.....
Article 2

As to the boundaries of Canada

It will be difficult to form an exact idea of what in the
memoir is called the heart of Canada; and still more difficult to
admit as a basis of negotiation that the St. Lawrence River is
the heart of that province. This is averred without proof; and
it is impossible that the course of so great a river could form

¹ This appears in various places, mistakenly dated, under the title, "Sur
les Quatre Points a discuter relatifs a L'Amerique."

etendue puisse former le centre d'aucun pays. D ailleurs la Grande Brete ne sauroit convenir que le pays entre la cote septentrionale de la Baye du fundy et la rive meridionale de la riviere St Laurent, que la Grande Bretagne a dejà offert de laisser neutre et non possédé par aucune des deux nations (a la reserve de la liziere qu'on propose d'en tirer) doive être regardé, ou qu il ait jamais été considéré, comme partie du Canada puisque le contraire a été démontré par les preuves les plus autentiques.

La Grande Bretagne ne sauroit non plus admettre que la france ait droit aux Lacs Ontario et Erié et a la riviere de Niagara et a la navigation de ces eaux exclusivement, puisqu'il est evident par des faits incontestables que les sujets de la Grande Bretagne et de la France, aussy bien que les Cinq Nations Iroquoises, se sont servies indistinctement de la navigation de ces lacs et de cette riviere suivant que les occasions et la commodité l'ont requis; Mais a l'égard d'une telle partie du pays situé sur la côte meridionale de la riviere St Laurent exclusivement de ce qu'on a deja proposé de laisser neutre dont les bornes sont en dispute

[*Translation*]

the heart of any country. Moreover Great Britain could not agree that the country between the north side of the Bay of Fundy and the south bank of the St. Lawrence River, which Great Britain has already offered to leave neutral and not possessed by either nation (except for the border to be drawn there), should be regarded, or that it has ever been considered, as part of Canada: especially since the contrary has been proved by most authentic proofs.

Nor could Great Britain admit that France has a right to Lakes Ontario and Erie and the Niagara River, nor to the exclusive navigation of these waters, since it is evident by incontrovertible facts that the subjects of France and Great Britain as well as the Iroquois Five Nations have enjoyed without distinction the navigation of the lakes and river in question, whenever occasion and convenience suggested. But as to a portion of the country on the south bank of the St. Lawrence River—exclusive of what it has already been proposed to leave neutral—the

entre les deux nations et leurs colonies respectives, la cour de la
175v

Grande Brete est prete a entrer dans une discussion a cet egard, et a en fixer les limites par une negociation amiable, mais sans prejudice neanmoins aux droits et possessions d'aucune des cinq nations.

A l'égard de l'exposition qu'on fait dans le memoire Francois du 15 arte du Traitté d'Utrecht, la cour de la Grande Bretagne ne conçoit pas quelle soit autorisée ni par les paroles ni par l'intention de cet arte

1 La cour de la Grande Brete ne sauroit admettre que cet article ne regarde que la personne des sauvages et non leur pays. Les paroles de ce traitté sont claires et precises, savoir, que les cinq Nations ou cantons Indiens sont sujets a la domination de la Grande Bretagne, ce qui par l'exposition recue de tous les traittés doit se rapporter au pays aussy bien qu'a la personne des habitans, c'est ce que la France a reconnu le plus solennellement, elle a bien peze l'importance de cet aveu au tems

[*Translation*]

boundaries of which are in dispute between the two nations and their respective colonies, the court of Great Britain is willing to discuss the matter and to fix boundaries by a friendly negotiation, without prejudice however to the rights and possessions of any of the Five Nations.

As to the interpretation of the fifteenth Article of the Treaty of Utrecht given in the French memoir, the court of Great Britain cannot think it authorized by the letter or spirit of that article. 1. The court of Great Britain could not admit that the article concerns only the persons of the Indians and not their country. The words of the treaty are clear and precise, namely that the Five Nations or Indian tribes are subject to the domination of Great Britain; and this according to the true interpretation of all treaties must refer to the country as well as to the persons of its inhabitants. This France has recognized in the most solemn manner; she weighed well the importance of the admission at the time of the signature of the treaty, and Great

de la signature de ce traité, et la grande Bretagne ne saura jamais s'en départir.

Les pays possédés par ces Indiens sont tres bien connus et ne sont nullement aussy indeterminées qu'on le pretend dans le memoire, ils les possèdent, et les transportent comme le font d'autres propriétaires partout ailleurs

2 La Grande Bretagne n'a jamais pretendu que le pays ou un sauvage feroit une residence passagere appartiendrait a la couronne dont il seroit le sujet ou l'amy

3 Quelques libres et independants que les sauvages en question puissent etre (ce qui est un point lequel la cour de la grande

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Brete ne veut point discuter) ils ne peuvent être regardés que comme sujets de la Grande Bretagne et traités comme tels par la France en particulier puisqu' elle s est solennellement engagée par le Traité d'Utrecht, renouvelé et confirmé dans la meilleur forme par celui d'Aix la Chapelle a les regarder comme tels, la nature des choses n'est point changée par le Traité d'Utrecht, le meme peuple le meme pays existent toujours; mais la recon-

[*Translation*]

Britain could never abandon it.

The countries possessed by these Indians are very well known and are in no wise so indefinite as the memoir alleges. The Indians hold and transfer them like other proprietaries everywhere.

2. Great Britain has never claimed that the country in which an Indian has a transient residence belongs to the crown whose subject or friend he is.

3. However free and independent the Indians in question may be (it is a point on which the court of Great Britain will enter into no discussion) they can be regarded only as subjects of Great Britain, or treated by France as such, since she has solemnly engaged by the Treaty of Utrecht, renewed and confirmed in the best form by that of Aix-la-Chapelle, to regard them as such. The nature of things is not changed by the Treaty of Utrecht; the same people and the same country exist always; but

naissance faite par la France de la sujettion des Iroquois a la Grande Bretagne est une preuve perpetuelle de son droit a cet egard qui ne peut jamais lui être disputé par la france.

4 Il est vray que le 15 arte du Traitté d'Utrecht renferme les memes stipulations en faveur des françois qu'en faveur des anglois a l'egard de telles nations Indiennes qui seroient apres la conclusion de ce traitté, censees par les commissaires être sujetes a la Grande Bretagne, ou a la France, mais pour ce qui est des cinq Nations, ou cantons Iroquois sus mentionnés la France a distinctement et specifiquement déclaré par ledit 15 arte qu'elles sont sujettes de la Grande Bretagne, "*Magnae Britanniae imperio subjectae* et par consequent c est un point a n'être plus disputé.

5 De quelle manière que l'on interprete le Traitté d Utrecht, par raport au commerce quil sera permis aux anglois et aux françois de faire indistinctement avec les nations sauvages, il est neanmoins très certain qu'un tel commerce general n'est nullement deffendu par ce traitté; C est un droit ordre et naturel que

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d'aller negocier avec ses propres sujets alliés ou amis mais

[*Translation*]

France's recognition of the subjection of the Iroquois to Great Britain is a perpetual proof of her right in that respect which France can never dispute with her.

4. It is true that the fifteenth Article of the Treaty of Utrecht contains stipulations in favor of the French as of the English with respect to such Indian nations as might be regarded after the conclusion of that treaty as subjects of Great Britain or France; but as for the Five Nations or Iroquois tribes above mentioned, France has distinctly and specifically declared by the said fifteenth article that they are subjects of Great Britain, "subject to the authority of Great Britain," and consequently it is a point to be argued no more.

5. In whatever way the Treaty of Utrecht is interpreted with respect to the trade to be permitted to the English and French without distinction among the Indian tribes, it is none the less quite certain that such a general trade is in no wise forbidden by the treaty. To go to trade with one's own subjects or friends

de venir en forces sur les terres appartenantes aux sujets ou alliés d'une autre couronne, d'y bâtir des forts, leur enlever dans leurs territoires et se les approprier c'est ce qui n'est ni ne sauroit être autorisé par aucune prétention, pas même par la plus incertaine de toutes savoir la convenance; Cependant tels sont les Forts de Frederick de Niagara de la Presqu' Isle de la Riviere aux Boeufs et tous ceux qu'on a pû construire sur l'ohio et dans les terres adjacentes.

Quelque pretexte que la France puisse alleguer en regardant ces pays comme des dependances du Canada, il est certainement vray qu'ils ont appartenu, et d'autant qu'ils n'ont pas été cédés ou transportés aux Anglois appartiennent encore aux mêmes nations Indiennes, que la France est convenue par le 15^e Article du Traitté d'utrecht de ne point molester "nullo in posterum impedimento aut molestia officient."

6 Il a déjà été prouvé que la France a par des paroles expresses dudit traitte, pleinement et absolument reconnu les Iroquois comme sujets de la Grande Bretagne:

[Translation]

is a natural and ordinary right, but to appear in force upon lands belonging to the subjects or allies of another crown, to build forts there, to carry them off and appropriate their territory, is what can never be authorized by any pretext, not even by the most uncertain of all, convenience. However such are Forts Frederick, Niagara, Presqu'Isle, river aux Boeufs and all those that may have been constructed on the Ohio and on neighboring lands.

Whatever pretext France may allege, regarding these countries as dependencies of Canada, it is certainly true that they have belonged, and where they have not been ceded and conveyed to the English, still belong to the same Indian tribes that France is bound by the fifteenth Article of the Treaty of Utrecht not to molest. "They shall not for the future offer them any hindrance or molestation."

6. It has already been proved that France by the express words of the aforesaid treaty has fully and absolutely recognized the Iroquois as subjects of Great Britain.

Il n'auroit pas été aussy difficile qu'on le pretend dans le memoire de s'accorder au sujet des autres Indiens, si pendant tant de commissions qui sont emanées pour regler ce point, il y avoit eû une disposition mutuelle d'en venir a une conclusion. Les actes de ces commissions ont suffisamment fait voir les veritables raisons qui ont empeché l'execution du 15^e Arte du traité
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d'utrecht sans recourir a une suposition imaginaire, comme si le Traitté n'etait pas capable d'être executé suposition qui se détruit evidement par le traité luy même a l'egard des nations Iroquoises.

Arte 3

Du cours et du territoire de l'Ohio

Malgré tout ce qui est avancé dans cet arte la cour de la Grande Bretagne ne sauroit admettre que la France ait le moindre titre a la riviere d'Ohio et au territoire en question celui même de possession n'est ni ne peut être allegué a ce sujet, puisque la France ne sauroit pretendre en avoir eû avant le Traitté d'Aix la

[Translation]

It would not be so difficult as it is claimed in the memoir, to agree on the subject of the other Indians, if during so many commissions for settling this point there had been a mutual desire to come to a conclusion. The proceedings of these commissions have made sufficiently apparent the real reasons which have hindered the execution of the fifteenth Article of the Treaty of Utrecht, without taking refuge in the imaginary supposition that the treaty is incapable of execution, a supposition which is manifestly invalidated by the treaty itself with respect to the Iroquois tribes.

Article 3

As to the course and territory of the Ohio

Despite all that is advanced in this article the court of Great Britain cannot admit that France has the faintest title to the Ohio River and the territory in question. Possession is not or cannot be pleaded on the point since France cannot claim having had it before or since the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, save for

Chapelle ni de depuis, si ce n'est celle de certains forts injustement construits en dernier lieu sur des terres qui appartiennent évidemment aux Cinq Nations, ou que celles cy ont transportées a la couronne de la Grande Bretagne ou a ces sujets, ce qu'on peut prouver par des traittés et des actes les plus autentiques. Le titre sur lequel la france paroît insister le plus, c'est de s'être servie de cette riviere comme d'une communication entre le Canada et la Louisiane mais en effet, elle n'en a pas fait usage si ce n'est occasionnellement ou secretement, et comme il est peut être arrivé dans des pays si vastes d'une manière a n'être pas remarquée, ce qui pourtant ne sauroit donner la moindre couleur de droit.

Ce sont les rivieres de Miamis et d'oubache qui ont servi
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et cela seulement depuis quelques années de communication entre le Canada et la Louisiane, non que la Grande Bretagne puisse admettre que la France y ait aucun droit, beaucoup moins encore a un passage aussy voisin que celui de la Riviere d ohio. Pour ce qui est de l'usage que l'on a fait de cette dre riviere a l'occasion de la guerre avec les chicachas alliés et amis de la

[*Translation*]

certain forts wrongfully built very recently on lands belonging to Great Britain or those transferred to the crown of Great Britain or to its subjects, as can be proved by the most authentic treaties and public acts. The title on which France seems most to insist is having used the river as a communication between Canada and Louisiana; but actually she has never used it save very occasionally or secretly; this in such vast territories, may have happened in a manner that was not noticeable; but this can afford not the faintest color of right.

It is the Maumee and Wabash rivers that have served, and they only some years since, as a communication between Canada and Louisiana; not that Great Britain can admit that France has any right to it, far less to a passage so close as that of the Ohio River. As to the use made of that last river on the occasion of the war against the Chickasaw, allies and friends of Great

Grande Bretagne, quand même la Grande Bretagne n'en auroit point porté des plaintes formelles, il ne s'en suivroit pas qu'une violence commise dans certains moments delicats et critiques puisse servir de fondement a de nouveaux empietemens; il en est de même de ces procedez temeraires et inconsiderés d un gouverneur d'une colonie éloignée, qui deffendrait aux Anglois de passer les montagnes de la Virginie sous peine d'avoir leurs effets saisis et d'être constituteés prisonniers. La manière dont la cour de la Grande Brete s'est plainte de pareils procédés en reclamant ces prisonniers et leurs effets a été suffisamment manifesté par le memoire que feu le Comte d'Albermale presenta le 7 de Mars 1752 a la cour de france elle même, ce que la cour de la Grande Bretagne affirme et sur quoy elle insiste, c'est que les cinq Nations Iroquoises, reconnues par la france être sujettes de la Grande Bretagne sont d origin ou par droit de conquete les proprietaires legitimes de la riviere
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et du territoire de l'ohio en question. Et pour ce qui est du territoire qu'à été cédé et transporté par ce peuple a la

[*Translation*]

Britain, even if Great Britain made no formal complaints, it would not follow that an aggression committed in a delicate and critical moment can serve as an argument for new encroachments. It is of a piece with the rash and ill-advised proceedings of a governor of a distant colony, who would forbid the English to pass the mountains of Virginia under penalty of having their goods seized and of being made prisoners. The manner in which the British court complained of such proceedings, when demanding the release of these prisoners and their goods, has been sufficiently manifested by the memoir which the late Comte d'Albermarle presented March 7, 1752, to the court of France itself. What the court of Great Britain affirms and insists on is that the Iroquois Five Nations, recognized by France as subjects of Great Britain, are by origin or by right of conquest legitimate proprietors of the Ohio River and its territory in question. And as to the territory ceded and transferred by this people to Great

Grande Bretagne, ce qu'on ne peut avouer être la maniere la plus juste et la plus legitime d'en acquerir elle le reclame comme luy appartenant, n'ayant par laissé de le cultiver depuis plus de 20 annees et de faire des etablissements dans plusieurs parties, depuis les sources même de l'ohio jusqu'a Peckarvillan au centre du territoire située entre l'ohio et l'oubache.

Mais malgré des faits si clairs et si evidents, la cour de la Grande Bretagne par amour pour la paix et affin de conserver la bonne harmonie entre les deux couronnes, a proposé pour prevenir toute dispute a l'avenir de laisser neutre et desert cette partie de terrain dans ces quartiers la, telle qu'on la deja exposée a la cour de france et dont la Grande Bretagne est prête d'ajouter et de limiter l etendue precise, par une negociation amiable.

Art 4

Sur les isles contestées

[Translation]

Britain, which is the most just and legitimate way of acquiring it, she claims it as belonging to her, since she has not ceased to cultivate it for more than twenty years and to make settlements in various parts of it, from the sources as far as Pickawillany in the heart of the territory between the Ohio and the Wabash.

But despite facts so clear and evident, the court of Great Britain for love of peace and to preserve good feeling between the two crowns has proposed in order to forestall all future disputes, to leave neutral and desert a portion of territory in those regions, that has already been set forth to the court of France, the exact extent of which Great Britain is ready to adjust by a friendly negotiation.

Article 4

On the disputed islands

DRAFT MEMOIR LA GALISSONNIÈRE TO ROUILLÉ¹
[A N Colonies C11E 7:181]

Remi copie a M. Rouillé
le 22. juin 1755.

.....
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et je dois avertir que si par les suites d'une guerre malheureuse ou par les raisons qu'on pourroit avoir de ne s'y pas exposer on étoit obligé d'abandonner aux anglois ce qu'ils pretendent dans ce dernier memoire quand bien mesmes on obtiendroît quelque legere modification; on doit s'attendre a avoir incessamment la guerre avec l'angleterre dans ces mesmes pays cedés sur les limites desquelles il luy sera très facile de faire naître de nouvelles difficultés ainsi dès le lendemain d'un pareil traité on doit faire dans ces pays là mesme tous les preparatifs necessaires pour y soutenir une guerre desavantageuse puisque l'on ne peut douter des vues de l'angleterre sur toute l'Amerique et qu'on ne doit pas se flatter que d'elle mesme elle y mette des bornes quand elle sentira qu'elle n'a plus

[*Translation*]

Copy to M. Rouillé
June 22, 1755

.....
and I must warn you that if as the result of an unsuccessful war or in order not to expose ourselves to such a one, we were obliged to abandon to the English what they claim in this last memoir, even with some slight modifications in our favor, we should have to look forward to war with England on the very lands ceded; on their boundaries it would be quite easy for her to provoke new difficulties. Accordingly on the morrow of such a treaty all preparations should be made in that country to sustain a war at a disadvantage: for it is impossible to doubt England's designs on all America; it is vain to flatter oneself that she will set limits to

¹ In several memoirs of this period La Galissonnière traversed the English arguments and asserted France's rights and the essentials for her safety. This is taken from a draft in the Archives des Colonies. It is crossed out, and probably was not submitted to the minister; but it represents admirably the policy La Galissonnière urged.

qu'un pas a faire pour être maitresse du Canada et de la louisiane
qui luy parassoit aujourd'hui faire le seul obstacle a ses vastes
projets

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Voici un petit abregé des depenses qu'il faudroit faire pour
le canada et les illinois seulement sans parler du reste du Mis-
sissipi dont il faudroit augmenter aussi très considerablement les
troupes et sur lesquelles il faudroit continuellement augmenter
a mesure que l'angleterre en feroit de son coté

Augmenter considerablement les fortifications de Louisbourg

.....

.....
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Dépenses en dedans du canada

a lisle aux coudres un fort dont la garnison serviroit quelques
batteries

Pour ce fort trois cens hommes et du canon

achever les fortifications de Québec. Clorre la basseville &c

Rendre le débarquement des troupes difficile surtout depuis le

[Translation]

herself when she feels that she has but one step to take to be
mistress of Canada and Louisiana, which today seem to her the
sole obstacle to her vast designs.

Here is a brief statement of the expenses that must be under-
taken for Canada and the Illinois alone, without speaking of the
rest of the Mississippi where the troops must be much increased,
expenses which must be continually augmented as England does
so on her side. Increase considerably the fortifications of
Louisburg.....

.....

Expenses in the interior of Canada

A fort at the Isle aux Coudres with a garrison that can serve
several batteries.

For that fort three hundred men and artillery.

Finish the fortifications of Quebec. Wall the Lower Town.

Render the landings difficult for troops, especially from the Falls

sault de mont morenci jusqu'a Quebec
Rendre difficile le passage de cette rivière
un fort au dessus de la Beaumt en allant vers la nouvelle angle-
terre.
agrandir le fort st. frederic et le mettre en etat de soutenir un
siege avec du canon et de recevoir douze cent hommes de garnison
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Suite des depenses du Canada

les troupes qui avec ce qu on y a envoie cette année font le fond
de trois mille cinq-cent hommes doivent etre portées a six mille
hommes
un fort considerable a la présentation
un fort considerable a Niagara
refaire a neuf le fort frontenac
une ville bien fermée avec un fort de pierre assés grand pour trois
cent soldats au détroit.
un fort au miamis et au moins cent cinquante hommes de garnison
Plusieurs forts et deux cents hommes au moins de garnison sur
ouabache surtout vers son embouchure dans le mississipi

[Translation]

of Montmorency to Quebec.
Make the passage of the river difficult.
A fort above Beaumont on the side of New England.
Enlarge Fort St. Frederick and put it in condition to sustain a
siege with artillery and to receive a garrison of 1,200 men.
Additional expenses for Canada
The troops which with those sent there this year amount to 3,500
men should be increased to 6,000 men.
A considerable fort at La Presentation.
A considerable fort at Niagara.
Rebuild Fort Frontenac.
A well walled town with a stone fort large enough for 300
soldiers at Detroit.
A fort at the Miamis and at least 150 men for a garrison.
Several forts and 200 men at least in garrison on the Wabash,
especially toward its outlet into the Mississippi.

une ville bien fermée avec un fort de pierre aux illinois
remettre en bon état tous les forts de ce pays et en augmenter
considérablement les garnisons

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Fortifier également et augmenter en garnisons tous les postes
voisins du fleuve Mississipi surtout les embouchures des rivières
qui viennent du côté de la virginie et autres colonies angloises.

[*Translation*]

A well walled town with a stone fort at Illinois.

Put all the forts of the country in good condition and increase the
garrisons considerably.

Also fortify and increase the garrisons of all the neighboring
posts of the Mississippi River, especially at the mouths of rivers
flowing from Virginia and other English colonies.

CHAPTER VIII

PROJECTS OF SETTLEMENT, 1759-1761

MEMOIR OF SILHOUETTE ON INEXPEDIENCY OF ABANDONING CANADA¹

[A E Mém. et Doc. Amér., 24:259]

fevrier 1759.

Premier mémoire où l'on traite la question, s'il
convient ou non d'abandonner le Canada.

.....
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Une partie des troupes réglées ont été levées dans l'amerique
même. De toutes ces colonies, celles qui sont les plus fertiles en
hommes et en soldats, et qui par là sont le plus redoutables, sont,
ainsi qu'on lá exposé dans la seconde partie de ce memoire, la

[*Translation*]

February, 1759

First memoir dealing with the question whether
or not it is expedient to abandon Canada

.....
A part of the [English] troops in question have been raised
in America itself. Of all the English colonies those which are
most fertile in men and in soldiers, and which are accordingly the
most to be feared, are, as is set forth in the second part of this

¹ This and the succeeding memoir are offered as illustrations of the controversy as to the value of Canada which developed about this time. The scheme for the abandonment of Canada, a measure which Montcalm himself had suggested, is outlined in the beginning of the second memoir. The two memoirs summarized are by Etienne de Silhouette and were written in answer to the memoirs which had been submitted to his judgment by a minister, probably the Duc de Choiseul. Silhouette's answer, conjecturally assigned as addressed to Berryer, then minister of marine, is in translation in *N. Y. C. D.*, 10:940-943; the letter of submission is in *A E Corr. Pol. Angl.*, 442:33.

nouvelle angleterre et les autres colonies qui l'avoisinent jusqu'à la Pensilvanie.

Ce sont précisément les mêmes colonies que flanke le Canada ; et tant que le Canada sera entre les mains des françois, la nouvelle angleterre n'osera se dégarnir de ses forces.

En 1751. M. de la Galissonniere, recommandable par ses vertus, par ses connoissances et par son zele pour la gloire du roi

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et de l'etat, presenta un mémoire dont tous les ministres du roy voulurent avoir une copie, concernant les colonies de la france dans l'amerique Septentrionale. Il avoit commandé dans le Canada : Il avoit été dans toutes nos colonies : il les avoit étudiées et il les connoissoit. Il regardoit le Canada comme le boulevard de toutes les autres colonies ; et comme son temoignage doit a tous égards être d'un grand poids, on joint ici une copie de ce memoire.

Si en effet le Canada cessoit de contenir les forces qui sont dans la nouvelle angleterre et que désormais rien ne gênât leur liberté et leur activité, il n'y a rien en amerique qui pût resister

[Translation]

memoir, New England and its neighboring colonies as far as Pennsylvania.

These are just the colonies that flank Canada ; and while Canada is in the hands of the French, New England will not dare strip herself of her forces.

In 1751, M. de la Galissonnière, praiseworthy for his virtues, for his knowledge, and for his zeal for the glory of the king and the state, produced a memoir copies of which were sought by all the king's ministers, concerning the French colonies in North America. He had commanded in Canada. He had been in all our colonies ; he had studied them and he knew them. He regarded Canada as the outwork of all the other colonies ; and as his testimony should have great weight, a copy of his memoir is annexed.

If, indeed, Canada no longer contained the forces in New England, and nothing remained to bridle their liberty and

a l'impulsion d'une nation qui pourroit d'autant plus aisement rassembler et transporter 30. mille hommes de troupes dans tel endroit de cette partie du monde qu'elle le jugeroit apropos, qu'on

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a vû ci-dessus qu'actuellement elle en a près de 50 mille a sa disposition, et que la nouvelle angleterre ne manque ni de vivres, ni de vaisseaux de transport

La Louisianne tomberoit sous le premier effort dont elle auroit a se garantir: Les Anglois pourroient se porter de la Caroline, vers le bas de la colonie, et en attaquer les hauts par la rivierre d'Ohio. En partant des sources de cette rivierre, où ils avoient déjà commercé a former des etablissemens, ils auroient pour eux le cours des eaux et un beau climat, au lieu qu'ils sont obligés pour attaquer le Canada de remonter les fleuves, et de combattre la dureté et l'apreté du climat qui interrompt et qui suspend necessairement leurs operations pendant une partie considerable de l'année. Les forts qu'on auroit pû établir soit au

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confluent de l'Ohio et de l'Ouabache, soit a celui de l'Ohio dans

[*Translation*]

activity, nothing in America could resist the onset of a nation which can the more easily assemble and transport 30,000 troops into whatever part of the world she thinks fit, since it has been seen that she has actually close to 50,000 at her disposal, and that New England lacks neither provisions nor vessels for transport.

Louisiana would fall before the first attempt made on her. The English could move from Carolina against the lower part of the colony, and attack the upper part by the Ohio River. Starting from the sources of that river where they have already begun to settle, they would have the current of the river and a fine climate in their favor, instead of being obliged, in attacking Canada, to ascend the rivers and to struggle with the harshness and asperity of a climate which interrupts and necessarily suspends their operations for a considerable part of the year. The forts that might be built at the junction of the Ohio and the Wabash, or at that of

le fleuve St Louis, suivant la proposition qui en est faite dans le projet de la transmigration des Canadiens à la Louisianne, qu'on discute dans un autre mémoire, ne pourroient faire une longue resistance; tant par la difficulté qu'il y auroit d'y envoyer des secours et des munitions, que par la superiorité des forces avec lesquelles ils seroient attaqués; et ces forteresses au surplus ne sont point encore faites, mais sont a construire.

Il faut de plus se rappeler ici ce qu'on a observé dans l'article precedent au sujet de ce qu'on doit présumer de la population future de la Louisianne: on ne pourroit pas esperer, malgré cette transmigration, qu'elle devint jamais une pepiniere d'hommes comme l'est la nouvelle angleterre. Il faut pareillement se rappeler

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ce qui a été observe sur la longueur de sa navigation et sur la nécessité de passer sous la Jamaïque, où les anglois tiennent toujours des forces de mer considerables.

Les anglois auroient même le choix de suspendre, s'ils le vouloient, l'invasion de la Louisianne, pour attaquer les isles. Les

[Translation]

the Ohio with the Mississippi, following the proposal made in the project for the transmigration of the Canadians to Louisiana, discussed in another memoir, could offer no long resistance, both from the difficulty of sending reënforcements and munitions, and from the overwhelming forces with which they would be assailed; and moreover these fortresses are not yet established, but are still to be built.

It is necessary also to recall here, what was observed in the preceding article as to what should be calculated respecting the future population of Louisiana; despite the migration, there is no hope that it might ever become a nursery of men like New England. What has been said as to the length of the navigation and on the necessity of passing Jamaica, where the English always keep a considerable naval force, must also be recalled.

The English would even have the option if they wished of postponing the invasion of Louisiana in order to attack the

établissmens de la Louisianne, trop éloignés de la nouvelle angleterre et des autres colonies angloises limitrophes, ne les inquieteront jamais; ils ne sont pas consequent nullement propres a en contenir les forces.

Le trajèt de la nouvelle angleterre aux isles est beaucoup plus court, que de la veille angleterre; les transports par consequent en sont plus faciles; Il y auroit d'ailleurs moins d'inconvenient pour les ennemis a dégarnir la nouvelle angleterre de 30. mille hommes, que si l'on en degarnissoit la vielle angleterre a la vüe et au scû

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de toute l'Europe; Enfin les expeditions seroient plus secrettes, plus promptes, moins prevües, moins dispendieuses et le climat des isles, quoique dangereux encore pour les americains et pour ceux qui ont passé quelques années dans l'amerique Septentrionale, l'est infiniment moins que pour ceux qui y débarquent en arrivant d'Europe.

De ces differentes considerations il resulte deux verités que l'on croit pouvoir établir en maximes concernant les affaires de l'amerique.

[*Translation*]

islands. The settlements of Louisiana, too remote from New England and the neighboring English colonies, could never make them uneasy: they are therefore in no sense fit to contain their forces there.

The voyage from New England to the islands is much shorter than from old England. The transport therefore is casier. There would be less difficulty in the enemy's taking 30,000 men from New England than in taking them from old England in the sight and knowledge of all Europe. Finally the expeditions would be more secret and prompt, less easy to foresee and less expensive: and the climate of the islands, though still dangerous for the Americans and for those who have spent some years in North America, is infinitely less so than for those who land from Europe.

From these different considerations two truths result, thought fit to be set forth in maxims concerning affairs in America.

La premiere, que dès que l'on cessera de contenir la nouvelle angleterre, ses forces réunies avec celles de la vieille Angleterre pourront tout oser, entreprendre, et executer dans toutes les parties de l'amerique et il sera impossible a toute puissance Européenne de leur opposer aucune digue qui puisse en arrêter le cours et les progrès.

La seconde, que ce n'est que par le Canada seul qu'on peut

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contenir les forces de la nouvelle angleterre; que le Canada par conséquent doit être regardé comme le rempart et le boulevard de toutes les autres colonies; et que l'abandon du Canada en entraineroit inévitablement la perte.

En combinant ces deux verités, avec ce qui a été observé dans le premier article, concernant l'influence du sistême de l'amerique sur celui de l'Europe, la conséquence et le resultat général de ce mémoire est que la proposition d'abandonner le Canada est le conseil que l'on puisse donner le plus conforme aux vûes des Anglois, et le plus funeste pour la gloire et l'interêt veritable de la monarchie.

[*Translation*]

The first is that so soon as New England ceases to be contained, its forces, united to those of old England, may venture, undertake, and execute anything in any part of America, and that it will be impossible for any European power to oppose to them any dike that can check their march and progress.

The second is, that it is by Canada alone that the forces of New England may be contained; that Canada should therefore be regarded as the rampart and outwork of all the other colonies; and that the abandonment of Canada would inevitably entail their loss.

Combining these two truths with what has been noted in the first article, as to the influence of American policy on that of Europe, the conclusion and general result arrived at by this memoir is that the proposal of abandoning Canada is the counsel most conformable to England's wishes, and the most fatal for the glory and true interest of this monarchy.

MEMOIR OF SILHOUETTE ON MIGRATION PROPOSED FROM
CANADA TO LOUISIANA

[A E Mém. et Doc. Amér., 24:273]

fevrier 1759.

Second Mémoire

Examen du projet de faire passer les habitants du
Canada à la Louïsianne

Il a été présenté deux mémoires pour faire connoître la nature du Canada et de la Louïsianne, et pour proposer d'abandonner le Canada et d'en faire passer les habitants à la Louisianne.

Sur l'examen de ces deux mémoires, il en a été fait un premier où l'on traite la question générale, s'il convient ou non d'abandonner le Canada? On croit avoir démontré qu'on ne peut le faire, sans concourir aux vûes des anglois, et leur donner la facilité d'envahir toutes les autres colonies de la france en Amerique, même celles des autres nations, lorsqu'ils jugeront

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apropos d'en faire l'entreprise.

Mais pour ne laisser rien a desirer sur cette matiere et pour la traiter complètement, il est nécessaire d'entrer dans un examen

[Translation]

February, 1759

Second Memoir

Examination of the plan of transferring the in-
habitants of Canada to Louisiana.

Two memoirs have been presented to set forth the nature of Canada and Louisiana, and to propose the abandonment of Canada and the transfer of its inhabitants to Louisiana.

In examining these two memoirs, a first memoir has been prepared dealing with the general question whether or not it is proper to abandon Canada. It is thought that the fact has been demonstrated that it cannot be done without meeting the wishes of the English and giving them the opportunity of invading all the other colonies of France in America, as well as those of other nations, whenever they think fit to undertake it.

But to leave nothing to be desired on the matter and to treat it fully, it is necessary to examine more particularly the

plus particulier du projet de la transmigration des habitans du Canada a la Louïsianne.

On commencera par l'exposition de ce projet on en discutera ensuite les motifs et les raisons

Article premier

Exposition du projet de transmigration

On propose de faire cette transmigration en trois parties et successivement en trois ans

Les habitans qui formeroient la premiere transmigration, iroient s'établir depuis le fort aux Boeufs, le long de la rivierre de ce nom, jusqu'à l'Ohio et le fort Duquesne. on propose d'y avoir une garnison, des magasins et d'y former le plan d'une ville.

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Le second etablissement à former par les habitans de la seconde transmigration, seroit entre la Rivierre d'Ohio, et celle d'Ouabache. On propose de bâtir une ville au confluent de ces deux rivierres, de la fortifier par la suite, et d'y établir le gouvernement général de la partie de l'Ohio.

[Translation]

project for the transfer of the inhabitants of Canada to Louisiana.

We may begin by outlining the project, and may then discuss the motives and reasons for it.

Article first

Outline of the project for transmigration

It is proposed to effect this migration in three parts in three successive years.

The inhabitants composing the first migration would settle at Fort aux Boeufs, along the river so named, as far as the Ohio and Fort Duquesne. A garrison and magazines are to be established, and a city laid out at this last point.

The second settlement, to be made by the inhabitants in the second migration, would be between the Ohio and Wabash rivers. A city is to be built at the junction of the two rivers, to be fortified at some future time, and to be the seat of the general government of the Ohio region.

La dernière transmigration se feroit en deux parties, dont l'une descendant l'Ohio iroit s'établir à son embouchure dans le fleuve St Louis, autrement apellé le fleuve Mississipi, où l'on établiroit et l'on fortifieroit encore une ville.

L'autre partie, composée des principaux habitans qui n'auroient pas voulu partir avec les premières transmigrations, ainsi que des religieux et des religieuses, seroit transportée par mer, jusqu'à la nouvelle Orleans, et delà à Manchac, où l'on se propose de bâtir une ville nouvelle pour être la capitale de la Louïsianne.

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On fourniroit des subsistances a tous ces habitans pendant la première année, et des outils pour la culture des terres.

Telle est en peu de mots l'exposition du projèt qui a été proposé pour l'abandon du Canada et la transmigration de ses habitans. On peut consulter la carte particuliere du Canada et de la Louisianne par Danville sur toutes les positions dont il est ici parlé.

Autant que l'on peut juger de ce projet, qui n'est pas suffisamment développé, il paroît que l'idée en est de conserver la posses-

[*Translation*]

The last migration would be made in two divisions, one of which would descend the Ohio and settle at its junction with the St. Louis, otherwise called the Mississippi River, where another city would be built and fortified. The other part, made up of those of the chief inhabitants who had not cared to leave with the first migrations, as also of those men and women professed to religion, would be carried by sea to New Orleans, and thence to Manchac, where it is proposed to build a new city to be the capital of Louisiana. Subsistence would be supplied all the inhabitants for the first year, as well as implements for the cultivation of the soil.

Such in a few words is the outline of the project proposed for the abandonment of Canada and the migration of its inhabitants. The detail map of Canada and Louisiana by D'Anville may be consulted for all the places named.

As far as this project, which is not sufficiently developed,

sion de toutes les terres dont les eaux vont tomber dans le fleuve St Louis.

Ce n'est pas a proprement parler abandonner tout le Canada. On ignore qu'il y ait eû jusqu'ici des limites précises entre cette colonie et celle de la Louïsiannie, mais on a regardé de tous tems et invariablement, au moins le haut de la Rivierre d'Ohio, où est

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situé le fort Duquesne, comme faisant partie du Canada; et en général tout le país qui s'étend depuis les montagnes qui bordent et terminent les colonies Angloises, jusqu'aux grands lacs du Canada.

Article 2e

Examen des motifs du projet de la transmigration des habitans du Canada à la Louisianne.

Pr motif.

Ce premier motif est fondé sur la beauté du sol et du climat de la Louisianne, et sur l'apreté et la sterilité du Canada. On objecte au Canada de n'avoir pas même de quoi nourrir ses habitans, et

[Translation]

may be appraised, it would seem that the idea is to retain possession of all the lands whose waters fall into the Mississippi River. Strictly speaking this is not abandoning all Canada. It is not known if exact boundaries have ever been fixed between that colony and Louisiana, but at all times without variation, at least the upper Ohio River, where Fort Duquesne is situated, has been regarded as part of Canada: and in general all the country stretching from the mountains which border and terminate the English colonies, as far as the Great Lakes of Canada.

Article 2

Examination of the motives for the project of the migration of the inhabitants of Canada to Louisiana

First motive

The first motive is based on the beauty of the land and the climate of Louisiana and on the asperity and sterility of Canada. Canada is objected to as having not even wherewithal to feed her inhabitants, so that during the war they are in danger of hunger

qu'ils sont pendant la guerre exposés a péril de faim et de misère.

Réponse

On ne peut contester la beauté du sol et du climat de la Louïsianne.

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On ne peut non plus nier que le Canada n'ait été jusqu'à present une colonie assés ingrate et fort a charge.

Mais il s'en faut beaucoup que ce païs soit sterile au point de ne pouvoir nourrir ses habitans. Il y a dans le Canada beaucoup de terres a bled, et cette colonie, jusqu'à la presente guerre, avoit non seulement fourni à la subsistance de ses habitans actuels, mais elle avoit en sus un excédent qui la mettoit en etat d'entretenir un commerce de vivres avec les isles françoises du tropique.

Il ne faut donc pas rejeter le défaut de vivres sur l'apreté et la sterilité de celles des terres du Canada qui ne sont point propres à la culture, mais sur la diminution de la culture et sur les accidens extraordinaires qu'ont éprouvés les dernieres récoltes.

Au surplus la superiorité de la beauté du climat et de la fertilité du sol, n'est pas une raison sufisante pour déterminer a

[*Translation*]

and distress.

Answer

The beauty of land and climate in Louisiana is undeniable. Nor can it be denied that up to now Canada has been an ungrateful and chargeable colony.

But this country falls far short of being barren to the point of not being able to feed its inhabitants. There is in Canada much good wheat land, and that colony till the present war had not only supplied the food of its own inhabitants, but it had a surplus, which enabled it to maintain a trade in provisions with the French islands of the tropics.

The lack of provisions cannot be charged to the asperity and sterility of those lands of Canada which are not fit for culture, but to the decrease of cultivation and the extraordinary accidents which have befallen the last harvests. Moreover the superior beauty of the climate and fertility of the soil is not a sufficient reason to resolve on the abandonment of a country already settled,

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abandonner un païs déjà établi, quoique moins beau et moins fertile, surtout lorsqu'il y a d'autres raisons essentielles et capitales pour ne point concourir aux vûes des ennemis de la france, et au succès des efforts immenses qu'ils font pour s'en rendre les maitres.

Second motif.

L'entretien des troupes et des forts qui sont dans le Canada, coute beaucoup à la france, quoique cette colonie ne raporte presque rien au royaume; d'ailleurs nonobstant la dépense ordinaire qu'elle occasionne, les Canadiens ne peuvent resister en tems de guerre, si on ne leur envoie des secours considerables, qu'il est très difficile et très dispendieux de leur faire passer.

Réponse

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Quant au surplus des motifs qui sont allegués pour l'abandon du Canada, les secours qu'il faut y envoyer pour le soutenir en tems de guerre, et les risques et les frais avec lesquels on les y fait passer, prouvent simplement le peu d'attention qu'on a eüe de

[Translation]

even if less beautiful and fertile, especially when there are other essential and capital reasons for not falling in with the aims of France's enemies and contributing to the success of the vast efforts they are making to gain possession of it.

Second motive

The maintenance of the troops and forts in Canada costs France much, although the colony brings in almost nothing to the kingdom: moreover despite its ordinary expense, the Canadians cannot maintain themselves in time of war if considerable reinforcements are not sent them, which are very difficult and expensive to send out.

Answer

.....
As to the remaining motives alleged for the abandonment of Canada, the reinforcements that must be sent to support it in time of war, and the risks and expenses with which they are sent

mettre cette colonie en état de défense. Le Canada, nonobstant tout ce qu'on peut alleguer contre le climat et le sol, est susceptible

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d'être mis en état, non seulement de subvenir par lui même a sa propre défense, mais encore d'en imposer et d'inspirer même de la crainte et de la terreur aux colonies anglaises de la nouvelle angleterre, et de la nouvelle york, et a celles qui en sont limitrophes.

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Troisième motif.

Les Canadiens ne se sont soutenus jusqu'à présent que par la mesintelligence des colonies anglaises entre elles, et que parce que les anglais ont partagé leurs forces. A supposer même que les

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Canadiens pussent conserver la partie septentrionale du fleuve St Laurent, de quel secours seroit le Canada pour la conservation de la Louisiane? Les anglais pourroient marcher par la Caroline et la Georgie, prendre le fort Duquesne, s'avancer par l'Ohio et attaquer la Louisiane. Il suffit de jeter les yeux sur la carte

[Translation]

out, simply prove how little attention has been given to putting the colony in a posture of defense. Canada, despite all that can be urged against its climate and soil, is capable of being put in a state, not only to provide for her own defense, but also to strike fear into the English colonies of New England and New York, as well as those that bound them.

.....

Third motive

The Canadians up to now have been able to sustain themselves only from the lack of coöperation among the English colonies, and because the English have divided their forces. Even supposing the Canadians can keep the north part of the St. Lawrence River, of what assistance would Canada be for the preservation of Louisiana? The English could move by Carolina and Georgia, take Fort Duquesne, advance by the Ohio, and attack Louisiana. It is enough to cast one's eyes on the map to see the

pour voir la possibilité de la conquête, et l'impossibilité de la deffense.

Réponse.

Quoique la mesintelligence des colonies angloises entre elles, et que la separation des forces des anglois aient été très favorables au Canada, est-ce a ces deux causes seules que l'on doit attribuer jusqu'ici le salut de cette colonie et doit-on regarder ces deux causes comme des cas purement fortuits?

La mesintelligence de leurs colonies est sans doute une faute de leur part; mais cette mesintelligence aura lieu beaucoup plus frequemment, lorsque plusieurs de leurs colonies seront exposées

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a être attaquées. En abandonnant le Canada, on renonceroit aux points d'attaque qui peuvent leur inspirer le plus de crainte et d'inquietude: on leur donneroit par consequent plus de facilité pour agir avec sureté, avec union et avec intelligence.

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Enfin ne doit-on point mettre au nombre des causes qui ont

[Translation]

possibility of the conquest and the impossibility of defense.

Answer

Although the lack of coöperation among the English colonies, and the division of the English forces may have been very favorable for Canada, is it to these causes only that should be ascribed the safety of that colony, and should those two causes have been regarded as purely the fruit of chance?

The lack of coöperation of their colonies is doubtless a weakness on their side; but that lack of coöperation will be much more prevalent if several of their colonies are exposed to attack. By abandoning Canada we would give up the points of attack which can most inspire them with fear and uneasiness; as a result they will have more opportunity for acting with security, union, and coöperation.

.....
Finally should there not be included among the causes which have up to now contributed to the support of Canada, the intel-

contribué jusqu'ici au soutien du Canada, l'intelligence des officiers et la bravoure avec laquelle les troupes du roy, celles de la colonie et les Canadiens se sont comportés dans tout le cours de cette guerre?

Dans le fait, il n'y a aucune proportion entre le nombre des forces des anglois dans l'amerique Septentrionale, qui monte suivant un etat fait en 1758. à 49230. hommes, et entre les forces que le roi y entretient. Qu'on change les Canadiens de sol et de climat, les mettra l'on par là en etat de resister a des forces aussi redoutables? Ils le seroient beaucoup moins, par ceque les anglois,

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comme on l'a observé, pourroient se réunir et agir avec plus de facilité et plus de sureté.

On ne peut voir qu'avec etonnement et surprise qu'une poignée de monde dans le Canada ait pû jusqu'ici arrêter le progrès de forces si nombreuses; que n'eut 'on point dû attendre des efforts de cette brave et fidele colonie, si l'état des finances du roy eut permis de profiter de la paix pour mettre ses places et ses forteresses dans un meilleur etat de deffense, pour y faire passer,

[*Translation*]

ligence of the officers and the bravery with which the troops of the king and the colony, and the Canadians have borne themselves in the whole course of the war?

Actually there is no proportion between the number of the forces of the English in North America which amounts, according to a summary made in 1758, to 49,230 men, and the forces the king maintains there. If soil and climate are changed for the Canadians, will that enable them to resist forces so great? They would be much less able to do so, since the English as has been observed could unite and act with greater ease and safety.

It is with astonishment and surprise that we have seen a handful of men in Canada able till now to check the advance of such numerous forces; what could not be expected from the efforts of that brave and faithful colony, if the state of the king's finances had allowed profiting by the peace to put his places and his fortresses in a better state of defense, to send over as was

comme on l'avoit proposé, les soldats qui ont été reformés a la fin de la dernière guerre; et pour faire usage de plusieurs ouvertures qui ont été faites pour fortifier cette colonie et en augmenter la culture; c'est dans ces circonstances, et non dans la nature du sol et du climat, qu'il faut rechercher les causes des revers que l'on a essayés, et de ceux encore plus fâcheux dont on est menacé.

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En consultant la carte, on voit a la vérité que la Georgie et la Caroline sont a proximité de la Louisianne; mais en consultant la nature et l'état de ces deux colonies, on sait que leurs forces ne sont point a redouter; et que ce ne seroit jamais que la plus
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extrême faiblesse de la Louisianne qui pourroit la mettre en danger, si elle n'avoit a craindre que la Caroline et la Georgie.

En consultant l'état des forces angloises dans l'Amérique Septentrionale en 1758., on verra que la nouvelle Angleterre et les colonies limitrophes jusques et compris la Pensilvanie ont fourni pour le service des armées que les Anglois ont mises en campagne

[Translation]

proposed, soldiers discharged at the end of the last war, and to follow out the various proposals made to fortify the colony and increase its cultivation. In such circumstances and not in the nature of the soil and climate must be sought the causes of the reverses we have suffered, and the much worse ones that threaten.

.....
By consulting the map, it is seen, true enough, that Georgia and Carolina are close to Louisiana; but by consulting the nature and condition of those two colonies, it is evident that their forces are not to be dreaded, and that it could only be the extreme weakness of Louisiana which could put it in danger if it had only Carolina and Georgia to fear.

By consulting the summary of the English forces in North America in 1758, it will be seen that New England and the neighboring colonies including Pennsylvania have furnished for the armed services of the English campaigns, 20,380 men; that Mary-

20380. hommes que le Mariland en devoit fournir mille qui n'ont point été levés; que la Virginie en a fourni 2600. et que la Caroline ni la Georgie n'ont pas fourni un homme.

Ce détail est une nouvelle preuve de l'importance de contenir la nouvelle angleterre et les colonies limitrophes et par consequent d'en être a proximité, objet qui ne peut être rempli qu'en conservant et fortifiant le Canada.

Quatrieme et der motif

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On demande si la france à de quoi peupler le Canada et la Louïsiannie; si elle ne le peut pourquoi s'acharner a conserver celui de ces deux païs qui ne produit rien, a peine la subsistance de ses habitans, et qui occasionne de grandes depenses? et abandonner l'autre qui en fournissant toutes les comodités de la vie a ses habitans, les mettra en etat de resister aux Anglois, s'ils viennent les y attaquer, et sera une source de richesses pour la france? Des gens qui combattent sur leur terrain et pour leurs possessions, sont de meilleurs deffenseurs que ceux qui viennent de 400. lieües pour conserver un païs desert.

[*Translation*]

land should furnish a thousand, which have not been raised; that Virginia furnished 2,600, and Carolina and Georgia have not furnished a man. This detail is a new proof of the importance of containing New England and the neighboring colonies, and consequently of being near them, an object that can only be attained by preserving and fortifying Canada.

Fourth and last motive

It is asked if France has wherewithal to people Canada and Louisiana; if she cannot, why devote herself to saving the one of the two countries which produces nothing, hardly even the subsistence of its inhabitants, and which occasions great expenses; and why abandon the other which by furnishing all the comforts of life to its inhabitants will enable them to resist the English, if they seek to attack it, and which will be a source of riches for France? People who fight on their own soil, and for their possessions are better defenders than those who come four hundred leagues to save a desert country.

Réponse.

Sur la demande si la France à de quoi peupler le Canada et la Louisianne, on pourroit demander si l'Angleterre avoit de quoi peupler toutes les vastes colonies qu'elle possède dans l'Amérique Septentrionale?

Mais, dirat'on, les Anglois ont été plus attentifs et plus
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habiles; et ils ont été mieux servis par les circonstances. Il faut devenir aussi attentifs et aussi habiles qu'eux les circonstances servent ceux qui savent les préparer et les saisir: elles nous deviendront aussi favorables qu'à eux: les fautes qu'on a commises à cet égard ne sont point irréparables.

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[Translation]

Answer

As to the question if France has wherewithal to people Canada and Louisiana, it might be asked if England had wherewithal to people all the vast colonies it possesses in North America?

But, it will be said, the English have been more attentive and more adroit; and they have been better served by circumstance. We must become as attentive and adroit as they; circumstances serve those who know how to prepare and take advantage of them; faults committed in this respect are no ways irreparable.

.....

KINNOULL¹ TO NEWCASTLE, October 30, 1759

[Add. MSS., 32,897:500]

BRODSWORTH Octr 30th 1759.

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This vexes me the more because I see by a Confidential Memorandum which I read with the Greatest Satisfaction, that Mr Pitt thinks very reasonably about the Terms of Peace.

I think he is as moderate about America as one could wish. Crown Point, Niagara & The Lakes and The True Boundary of Nova Scotia by The River St Laurence may not be departed from. These are essential to the security of our Colonies. I

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own I wish Louisbourg could be kept: For two Reasons 1er Because The Possession of Louisbourg and the Island of St John's would be a great Security to Your Northern Frontier, Nova Scotia, and The French would not have it in their Power to disturb that Colony or to carry on their Intrigues with the Indians on that Side, which they allways have done and allways will continue to do from these Settlements when in their Possession. But 2dly The Greatest Effect of our Possession of Cape Breton & the Island of St John's would be the Entire Fishery of the Banks, uninterrupted by the French. This would not only be an Addition to our Wealth & Naval Strength, but so much taken out of the Ballance of France, & would be a Great Check to the Recovery of Their Naval Strength by depriving Them of one Great Nursery of their Seamen. . . .

¹ Thomas Hay, Earl of Kinnoull, June 4, 1710-December 27, 1787. One of Newcastle's trusted advisers, especially on finance.

CHOISEUL TO OSSUN, January 6, 1760

[A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 527:111]

A M le Mis d'Ossun

No. 14.

A VERSAILLES le 6. Janvier 1760.

J'ai déjà eu l'honneur de vous mander, Mr que la rédaction d'un projet d'articles préliminaires pour notre paix avec l'Angleterre, n'étoit pas un ouvrage facile à faire, et je suis persuadé que les raisons sur lesquelles cette opinion étoit fondée vous auront paru justes et solides; mais le désir que le Roi d'Espagne a témoigné à cet égard a prévalu sur toute autre considération, et en conséquence le roi pour donner une nouvelle preuve de sa confiance à Sa Mté Cathe, m'a ordonné de dresser le plan d'articles¹ que je joins icy, et que Sa Mté vous autorise à remettre au roi son cousin.

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Notre procès avec les Anglois est certainement très juste de

[Translation]

To M. le Marquis d'Ossun

No. 14.

VERSAILLES, January 6, 1760

I have already had the honor to inform you, Monsieur, that the preparation of a project of preliminary articles for our peace with England was not an easy task; and I am persuaded that the reasons on which this opinion was based will appear to you just and weighty; but the desire that the King of Spain has expressed in that respect has prevailed over all other considerations and in consequence the king, to give a new proof of his confidence in His Catholic Majesty, has ordered me to draw up the plan of articles¹ which I annex, and which the king authorizes you to communicate to the king his cousin.

.....
Our cause against the English in principle is certainly a very

¹For the background of this French statement of terms, see *ante*, pp. lxxiv-lxxvii, lxxiv-lxxxv.

notre part dans son principe, mais les événemens nous l'ont fait perdre, et il faut ceder aux circonstances; ainsi le roi s'est déterminé par rapport aux objets qui ont été la cause ou le prétexte de la guerre en Amérique à accepter les conditions de paix qui

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furent proposées en 1755. par la cour de Londres. Vous les trouvez dans le mémoire remis le 7. Mars de la même année par le Cher Robinson au feu Duc de Mirepoix. Ces conditions furent alors rejetées parcequ'elles ne s'accordoient ni avec la justice des droits du roi, ni avec lequilibre de puissance et de commerce à maintenir entre les deux nations en Amérique;

Ce qui regarde les limites de l'Acadie et les frontières du Canada a été si exactement traité par les comres du roi dans les mémoires qui ont été publiés, que je ne pourrois rien ajouter à l'évidence des raisons et des titres sur lesquels ils ont établi nos droits et nos possessions. Ces memoires vous ont été adressés à Naples, mais dans le doute ou je suis, si vous les aurez portés en Espagne, j'en remets un exemplaire *in 12.* du courrier que je

[*Translation*]

just one, but events have made us lose it, and one must yield to circumstances. Accordingly the king has decided with respect to the matters that have been the cause or pretext for the American war to accept the conditions of peace which were proposed in 1755 by the court of London. You will find them in the memoir communicated March 7, of the same year by the Chevalier Robinson to the late Duc de Mirepoix. These conditions were then rejected because they did not conform to the just rights of the king, nor with the balance of power and trade to be maintained between the two nations in America.

What concerns the boundaries of Acadia and the frontiers of Canada has been so precisely treated by the king's commissaries in the memoirs that have been published that I can add nothing to the evidence of reasons and of titles by which they have demonstrated our rights and possessions. Those memoirs were sent you at Naples, but as I am in doubt whether you have carried them to Spain, I send a copy in duodecimo by the courier I

vous dépêchè. J'y ajoute le précis des faits in 4. Ces différentes pièces démontrent le peu de fondement des prétentions des Anglois, et tout l'odieux de leurs procédés, mais comme je vous l'ai déjà dit les malheurs que nous avons éprouvés, et le desir qu'a le roi de procurer la paix à ses peuples l'engagent à faire les

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sacrifices que la cour de Londres a demandés elle même.

Ce qui concerne l'Ohio et les pays situés entre cette rivière et les Apalaches, ou qui s'étendent depuis les grands lacs jusqu'au fleuve de Mississipi n'est pas plus fondé ni en droit ni en possession de la part de l'Angleterre. Il y avoit plus de quatre vingts ans que la France en jouissoit tranquillement, sans que la cour de Londres eut jamais réclamé contre cette jouissance, lorsqu'elle y commença les hostilités en 1755.

Le roi sent parfaitement qu'en acceptant les propositions faites la même année par M. Robinson il cède à l'Angleterre une supériorité trop grande de puissance dans l'Amerique Septentrionale, ou les François n'auront plus en quelque sorte qu'une

[Translation]

am dispatching you. I add the summary of facts in quarto. These different pieces show how little foundation the English have for their claims, and the full odiousness of their proceedings; but as I already told you, the misfortunes we have experienced and the king's desire to procure his people peace induce us to make the sacrifices that the court of London itself required.

What concerns the Ohio and the country situated between that river and the Appalachians, or extending from the Great Lakes to the Mississippi River, is no more founded on right or possession on the part of England. France enjoyed it in quiet for more than eighty years without the court of London having ever protested that enjoyment until it began hostilities there in 1755.

The king fully realizes that by accepting the proposals made the same year by M. Robinson, he yields to England an over large superiority of power in North America where the French will retain no more than a precarious communication and trade,

communication et un commerce preciaire surtout si les fortifications de Louisbourg sont démolies. Sa Mté. prevoit en meme temps que par l'arrangement proposé par les Anglois relativement a la partie des Grands lacs et de l'Ohio, il ne restera plus rien de ce cote là qui puisse les empeche de pénétrer dans la Louisiane

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quand ils le croient utile à leur ambition et à leur cupidité. Le Roi d'Espagne est trop éclairé sur ses propres intérêts pour ne pas être affecté de cette reflexion par raport a la floride et au Mexique.

Quoiqu'il en soit, Mr il seroit très possible que la cour de Londres aveuglée par ses succès voulut porter aujourd'huy ses pretentions encore plus loin qu'en 1755. Dans ce cas là, le roi qui s'en rapporte absolument et avec une confiance sans bornes au jugement de Sa Mté Cathe lui promet d agréer les conditions qu elle croira être les plus justes et les plus convenables a l'honneur de sa maison et a l'avantage des deux couronnes.

.....

[*Translation*]

especially if the fortifications of Louisburg are demolished. His Majesty also foresees that by the arrangement proposed by the English with regard to the region of the Great Lakes and the Ohio, nothing will be left on that side to hinder their penetrating into Louisiana whenever they think it may serve their ambition or cupidity. The King of Spain is too well informed as to his own interests not to be moved by this consideration with respect to Florida and Mexico.

However it may be, Monsieur, that the court of London, dazzled by success, may wish today to carry its claims still farther than in 1755. In that case the king, who refers himself absolutely with boundless confidence to the judgment of His Catholic Majesty, promises him to assent to such conditions as he may judge most just and expedient for the honor of his house and the advantage of the two crowns.

.....

FRENCH PROPOSALS FOR PEACE, January, 1760¹

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 442:275]

Env. copie a M. le C. de Choiseul

le 9 Janvier 1760. No 1er

No 1.

Projet d'articles préliminaires de pacification entre
la France et l'Angleterre.

Le Roy d'Espagne animé du desir de retablir la paix et l'union entre la France et l'Angleterre, a proposé a Sa Mté tres Chretienne de luy confier les conditions quelle croiroit pouvoir servir de baze a un ouvrage si desirable pour le bonheur du monde entier. Sa Mté tres Chretne qui n'a rien plus a coeur que de donner des preuves de l'envie sincere quelle ne cesse point d'avoir, d'arrêter le fleau de la guerre, s'est empressée de marquer en cette occasion a Sa Majesté Catholique sa plus parfaite confiance et son desir de concourir de tout son pouvoir a des vûes, et a des sentimens aussy utiles à l'humanité que ceux qui dirigent les intentions de sa

[Translation]

Copy to M. le Comte de Choiseul

January 9, 1760

No. 1

Project of preliminary articles of pacification between
France and England

The King of Spain, animated by the desire to reëstablish the peace and union between France and England, has proposed to His Most Christian Majesty to confide to him the conditions which he thinks may serve as the basis of a work so desirable for the welfare of the whole world. His Most Christian Majesty, who has nothing more at heart than to give proofs of the sincere desire he ceases not to cherish of arresting the scourge of war, has hastened to indicate on this occasion to His Catholic Majesty his most perfect confidence and his desire to concur to the extent of his power, in views and sentiments so valuable to humanity as those which dictate the intentions of His Catholic Majesty.

¹ See preceding document and note.

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Majesté Catholique.

C'est dans cette disposition que le roy va exposer au Roy d'Espagne ses idées sur les artes préliminaires qui pourroient servir de baze au traité définitif a conclure sous la mediation de Sa Mté Cathe pour fixer les limites contestées en Amerique, y apaiser les discussions qui y sont relatives et assurer par une tranquillité solide et durable les possessions des differentes puissances dans cette partie du monde.

Mais comme les contestations qui regardent l'Amerique ont occasionné l'extension du feu de la guerre en Asie, en afrique et en Europe, le roy pense devoir distinguer les propositions qui concernent chacune de ces parties du monde.

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Amerique

Article 1er

L'etendüe de l'Acadie, les frontieres du Canada et les etablissemens sur la Riviere d'ohio ont été les motifs de la guerre entre la france et l'Ange. Le roy pour ne laisser aucun doute sur le desir qu'il a de parvenir a la paix, veut bien sur ces trois objets, adopter comme preliminaires les articles proposés par la cour

[Translation]

It is in that disposition that the king is about to set forth to the King of Spain his ideas as to the preliminary articles which might serve as the basis of a definitive treaty to be concluded under the mediation of His Catholic Majesty to settle the disputed boundaries in America, quiet the contest they have evoked, and secure by a solid and durable peace the possessions of the various powers in that part of the world.

But as the contests concerning America have caused the fire of war to spread to Asia, Africa, and Europe, the king thinks he should separate the proposals concerning each part of the world.

America

Article 1

The extent of Acadia, the frontiers of Canada, and the settlements on the Ohio River have been the motives for the war between France and England. The king, to leave no doubt on his desire to attain peace, is pleased on these three objects to adopt as preliminaries the articles proposed by the court of Eng-

d'Angleterre elle même, et qui furent remis a Londres le 7. Mars 1755. par le Chevalier Robinson au Duc de Mirepoix Lon joint icy ce projet de convention regardé comme juste par Sa Mté Brite quoy qu'il gêne infiniment les possessions du roy en Canada Sa Majesté se determinera à ce sacrifice pour retablir l'union entre la

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france et l'Angleterre, et procurer aux parties interessées une paix durable.

Si le Roy d'Ange ne croyoit pas devoir s'en tenir actuellement au projet qu'il a proposé luy même en 1755. Le roy dans ce cas là, s'en remettroit absolument a la decision du Roy d'Espe, et promet de ratifier tous les articles que Sa Mte Cathe regleroit sur lesdits trois objets.

Arte 2e

L Angleterre restituera à la france l'Isle Royal l'Isle St Jean et tous les pays sans exception dont elle s'est emparée dans le Canada [*in margin*: Na Le roy remit a la disposition de Sa Mté Cathole d'offrir aux anglois, si elle le juge indispensable, la de-

[Translation]

land itself, and which were communicated at London, March 7, 1755, by the Chevalier Robinson to the Duc de Mirepoix. Annexed is this project of a convention, considered just by His Britannic Majesty; though it straitens infinitely the king's possessions in Canada, His Majesty will resolve on this sacrifice to reëstablish the accord of France and England and procure for the interested parties a lasting peace.

If the King of England thinks he ought not hold to the project which he himself proposed in 1755, the king in that case will leave himself absolutely to the decision of the King of Spain and promises to ratify all the articles that His Catholic Majesty may arrange on the three objects mentioned.

Article 2

England will restore to France, Isle Royale, Isle St. John, and all the lands without exception that she has gained in Canada. [*in margin*: Note—The king refers it to the discretion of His Catholic Majesty to offer to the English, if he thinks it indispensable, the demolition of Louisburg conformably to the terms under-

molition de Louisbourg conformément aux termes souslignés, mais Sa Mte ne l'en a proposé que la restitution pure et simple] et le roy s'engagera a faire demolir les fortifications de Louisbourg, et a ne point en faire construire de nouvelles sur le terrain de cette place.

.....

OSSUN TO CHOISEUL, February 22, 1760

[A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 527:268]

No 31.

A MADRID le 22. Fevrier 1760.

Rep. le 10. Mars

MONSIEUR,

.....
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Enfin, Monsieur, je n'ay jamais reconnu dans Sa Mté Catho. une volonté aussi déterminée de venir au secours de la France, ou en luy procurant une paix raisonnable, ou en l'aidant de ses forces, que celle que ce prince m'a témoignée en cette occasion, et je crois

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pouvoir assurer que le roy doit faire fonds sur les bonnes dis-

[Translation]

lined; but His Majesty only proposes the restitution pure and simple.] The king will engage himself to have the fortifications of Louisburg demolished and to build no new ones in the vicinity.

.....

No. 31

MADRID, February 22, 1760

Answered March 10

MONSIEUR:

.....

In a word, Monsieur, I have never perceived in His Catholic Majesty so determined an intention of coming to the help of France, either by procuring her a reasonable peace or by aiding her with his forces, as that which this prince manifested to me on this occasion; I think I may assure you that the king may build

positions de Sa Mté Catho. Si les négociations de M. de Fuentes ne réussissent pas ou que, pendant leur cours, nos ennemis entreprennent avec succès de nouvelles conquêtes. mais le Roy Catho. se flatte encore de pouvoir concilier nos différends avec l'Angleterre, et il m'a dit que, selon les dernières lettres du Pce Albertini, M. Pitt s'étoit expliqué assés favorablement à ce sujet dans une longue conférence qu'il avoit eüe avec le ministre Napolitain; qu'il s'étoit même ouvert sur les conditions de la paix jusqu'à faire entrevoir qu'il nous rendroit Quebeck, la Guadeloupe et au

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delà de ce que portent les propositions dont le Roy d'Espagne est dépositaire de nôtre part; qu'à la vérité, l'Angleterre demanderoit la démolition de tous les forts construits en Acadie, sur la Rivière de l'Ohio et dans le Canada depuis le Traité d'Utrecht, de plus la possession d'une étendue assés considérable sur la rive droite du Fleuve St Laurent; qu'au reste, M. Pitt avoit parlé sur le ton d'une simple conversation et n'avoit point voulu entrer en négociation pour une paix séparée avec la France; qu'il avoit, au

[*Translation*]

on the good disposition of His Catholic Majesty, if the negotiations of M. de Fuentes do not succeed, or if during their course, our enemies successfully undertake fresh conquests. But the Catholic King flatters himself that he can yet arrange our disputes with England, and has told me that by the last letters of Prince Albertini, M. Pitt had expressed himself quite favorably on that point in a long conference with the Neapolitan minister. He had even opened himself as to the conditions so far as to let it be seen that he would return to us Quebec, Guadeloupe, and otherwise what is implied in the conditions we lodged with the King of Spain; actually that England would demand the demolition of all the forts built in Acadia, on the Ohio River, and in Canada since the Treaty of Utrecht; further she would demand possession of a considerable part of the right bank of the St. Lawrence. However M. Pitt spoke in the tone of simple conversation and did not wish to enter into negotiation for a separate peace with France; on the contrary he gave assurance that he

contraire, assuré qu'il ne se départiroit jamais d'une paix générale et qui réglât le sort du Roy de Prusse.

.....

OSSUN TO CHOISEUL, July 4, 1760

[A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 529:22]

No 78.

A MADRID le 4. Juillet 1760.
Rep. le 15.

MONSIEUR,

.....
26v....

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Je reviens à present, Monsieur, à ce que m'a dit Sa Mté Catho. sur les mêmes objets.

.....
28v....

Representa-
tion qu'il a
faite ensuite
au Roy Cate

J'ay répondu que je reconnoissois bien dans les sentimens de Sa Mté Catho. l'auguste sang qui couloit dans ses veines trop accoutumé à donner la loy pour se plier à la recevoir; qu'inde-

[Translation]

would never abandon the idea of a general peace in which the future of the King of Prussia would be arranged.

.....

No. 78

MADRID, July 4, 1760
Answered the 15th

MONSIEUR:

.....
I return at present, Monsieur, to what His Catholic Majesty said to me on these same topics.

Representa-
tion which he
then made to
the Catholic
King on the

.....
I replied that I easily recognized in His Catholic Majesty's sentiments the august blood that flowed in his veins, too accus-
tomed to laying down the law, to bow to receiving it; that quite

pendamment des lieux de parenté et d'amitié qui unissoient si étroitement les deux monarques, il étoit évident qu'il étoit essentiel à la seureté de la monarchie Espagnole que la France restât dans une situation avantageuse, soit en Europe, soit en Amerique, et que la chose étoit réciproque entre les deux couronnes. *Je le pense comme vous*, m'a dit le Roy d'Espagne, *Nous sommes des alliés naturels et nécessaires: nos etats se touchent dans les deux continents, et nous avons les mêmes ennemis à craindre.*

.....
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J'ay ensuite, Monsieur, remercié Sa Mté Catho. de ce que le Sr d'Amarillas, qui vient de mourir gouverneur de la Vera Cruz,

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avoit fait passer (ainsi que je l'ay appris avec certitude) des poudres et quelques munitions de guerre à M. de Vaudreuil. Sa Mté Catho. m'a répondu que ç'avoit été par ses ordres, et que je pouvois être très seur qu'elle rendroit à la sourdine tous les services qu'elle pourroit à la France.

[Translation]

apart from the bonds of relationship and of friendship which so closely united the two monarchs, it was evident that it was essential for the safety of the Spanish monarchy that France should remain in a favorable situation both in Europe and America, and that the interest was mutual between the two crowns. "I think as you do," the King of Spain said to me. "We are natural and necessary allies; our dominions touch on the two continents, and we have the same enemies to fear."

.....
I then, Monsieur, thanked His Catholic Majesty for what the Sieur d'Amarillas, governor of Vera Cruz who has just died, had had sent (as I have certainly learned) in powder and other munitions of war to M. de Vaudreuil. His Catholic Majesty replied to me, that it was by his orders and that I might be very sure that he would render by stealth all the services to France that he could.

sur l'intéret qu'avoit l'Espe que la france restat dans une situation avantageuse soit en Europe, soit en Amerique.

Remercie-mens qu'il a fait a ce prince des services à M. de Vaudreuil par le gouverneur de la Veracruz qui vient de mourir; assurance que ce prince luy a donné à cette occasion.

interest Spain had that France should remain in an advantageous position in both Europe and America.

Thanks that he offered that prince for the services accorded to M. de Vaudreuil by the governor of Vera Cruz, who has just died. Assurance which that prince gave him on that occasion.

ordre envoyé
au gouver-
neur de la
havane d'y
recevoir les
vaisseaux
françois qui
seroient
contraints
d'y relâcher
pour le tems
de la guerre;
motif de
cette
restriction.

J'ay pris la liberté, Monsieur, de luy renouveler mes instances pour qu'elle ordonnât au nouveau gouverneur de la Havane de recevoir les vaisseaux François qui se trouveroient contraints d'y relâcher. Elle m'a dit qu'elle luy en avoit donné l'ordre pour le tems de la guerre, sauf à regler les choses sur un

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piéd stable après la paix. Ce prince a ajouté qu'il avoit mis cette restriction pour ménager la délicatesse des Espagnols: elle vient, Monsieur, de ce que les François s'établirent à la Louïsiane non seulement sans l'aveu de l'Espagne, mais même en dépit des mesures qu'elle prit pour les en empêcher. Il en est résulté un ordre de ne permettre à aucun de nos navires de relâcher au port de la Havane, et il est arrivé dans le cours de la presente guerre que les bâtimens Anglois y étoient admis et les nôtres renvoyés, ce qui en a fait prendre ou périr plusieurs.

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ouverture
que le Roy
d'Espe luy a

Le Roy d'Espagne, Monsieur, ajouta, *Il faudra que je m'arrange avec la France après la paix pour la Louïsiane au*

[Translation]

Order sent to
the governor
of Havana to
admit French
vessels com-
pelled to put
in there in
time of war.
Reason for
the restric-
tion.

I took the liberty, Monsieur, of renewing to him my instances that he order the new governor of Havana to receive French vessels which might be forced to put in. He told me he had given the order for the period of the war, subject to the regulation of things on a stable footing after the peace. This prince added that he had included this limitation to humor the punctilio of the Spaniards; it arises, Monsieur, from the fact that the French established themselves in Louisiana not only without the permission of Spain but even in despite of the measures she took to prevent them. An order resulted to permit none of our ships to put into the port of Havana; and it has happened in the course of the present war that English ships have been received, and ours sent away, which has caused several of them to be taken or cast away.

Overture
which the
King of

The King of Spain, Monsieur, added, "I must arrange with France after the peace for Louisiana on the basis of some ex-

*moyen de quelque échange.*¹ Je luy répondis que peut être la partie Espagnole de St Domingue pourroit nous convenir; que cependant je n'étois instruit ni des intentions de ma cour ni de l'importance des deux possessions. Il me repliqua, *Je ne le suis pas assés non plus pour vous rien dire à cet égard.* Cependant, Monsieur, je crois en sçavoir assés pour présumer que le marché

faite pour
l'échange de
la louisiane;
maniere dont
il y'a repondu
et observaon
à cet egard.

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que j'ay indiqué seroit avantageux à la France.

CHOISEUL TO OSSUN, July 15, 1760

[A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 529:73]

A M le Mis d'ossun

No 75.

A VERSAILLES le 15. Juillet 1760.

74....

Nous n'avons pas été peu surpris, Mr de l'insinuation que Sa Mté Cathe vous a faite au sujet de la Louisiane. L'échange

conduite qu'il
doit tenir à

[Translation]

change."¹ I answered him that perhaps the Spanish part of San Domingo might suit us; that however I was instructed, neither as to my court's intention nor of the importance of the two possessions. He replied to me, "Nor am I sufficiently so to say anything to you in that respect." However, Monsieur, I think I know enough of the matter to suppose the bargain I indicated advantageous to France.

Spain made
him for the
exchange of
Louisiana;
manner in
which he
replied, and
observation
on the matter.

To M. le Marquis d'Ossun

No. 75

VERSAILLES, July 15, 1760

We were not a little surprised, Monsieur, by the insinuation His Catholic Majesty made you on the subject of Louisiana.

Conduct
which he
should follow

¹For a discussion of this bid for Louisiana on the part of Charles III, and the answer to it, see *ante*, lxxxvii-lxxxviii.

l'égard de
l'échange de
la Louisianne
dont le Roy
Cate luy a
parlé, ce qui
ne pusse
nullement
nous con-
venir.

dont ce prince vous a parlé ne peut nullement nous convenir, et je vous en détaillerai les raisons dans une autre occasion. ainsi M. il faut absolument laisser tomber cette idée, et dans le cas ou soit le Roi d'Espagne, soit son ministère voudroit traiter avec vous cette matière, vous devez éviter scrupuleusement toute réponse qui pourroit être interprétée comme une disposition de notre part à nous prêter à l'échange dont il s'agit.

CHOISEUL TO OSSUN, August 19, 1760

[A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 529:180]

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Plus on réfléchit Mr sur la conduite de l'Espagne depuis que Charles 3 en occupe le trône, plus on est porté a penser que la cour de Madrid, sous des dehors specieux de bonne volonté pour la france, et de resentment contre l'Angleterre, n'a reellement pour objet que de satisfaire son ambition particulière,

[*Translation*]

with regard
to the
exchange of
Louisiana of
which the
Catholic
Majesty
spoke to him,
and which
can in no
wise suit us.

The exchange of which that prince spoke to you can in no wise suit us, and I will detail the reasons to you on another occasion. Accordingly, Monsieur, the idea must absolutely be dropped; and in case either the King of Spain or his minister may wish to treat with you on the matter, you must carefully avoid any answer which might be interpreted as a disposition on our part to the exchange in question.

The more one reflects, Monsieur, on the conduct of Spain since Charles III has occupied the throne, the more one is inclined to think that the court of Madrid under specious pretexts of good-will for France, and of resentment against England, has really for her object only the satisfaction of her private ambition,

en faisant servir au succès de son projet les deux puissances qu'elle affecte de vouloir réconcilier.

Nous savons certainement que Mrs de fuentes et de Grimaldi ont ordre de soutenir, quand ils en auront l'occasion la propriété

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legitime de l'Espe sur les isle de Ste Lucie, de St Vincent de Tobago et de la Dominique. Le Roi Catholique vous a fait lui même une première insinuation sur son desir de se procurer la Louisiane par un échange qu'il feroit avec nous. On vous parle aujourd'hui d'un droit de pesche sur le banc de Terre-neuve.

Il n'est pas probable que l'Espe compte serieusement de parvenir à son but sur ces differents objets, mais elle les met tous en avant, dans l'esperance d'en obtenir quelqu'un en se faisant un mérite du sacrifice des autres. On peut conjecturer que c'est en présentant a Sa Mte Cath le succès comme possible ou meme facile, que M. Wall entretient ces idees dans l'esprit de ce prince. L'intention de ce ministre est de flater par là les vues ambitieuses de son maître, et plus encore de preparer et de

[*Translation*]

by making the two powers she pretends to wish reconciled to each other, labor for the success of her plans.

We know of a certainty that Messieurs de Fuentes and de Grimaldi have orders to support, when they may see occasion, the legitimate propriety of Spain over the islands of St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Tobago, and Dominica. The Catholic King himself made you a first insinuation of his wish to procure Louisiana by an exchange with us. Today they talk to you of a right of fishing on the banks of Newfoundland.

It is not likely that Spain seriously counts on obtaining her end on these different objects, but she advances them all, in the hope of getting some one of them by making a merit of sacrificing the others. It may be conjectured that it is by representing to His Catholic Majesty that success is possible or even easy, that M. Wall instills these ideas into the mind of that prince. That minister's intention is thus to flatter his master's ambitious aims, and further to prepare and foment subjects of ill feeling and

fomenter des sujets de mecontentement et de brouillerie entre la France et l'Espagne. C'est un piège dans lequel nous ne donnerons pas, mais il nous suffit de le prévoir, pour nous confirmer de plus en plus dans le système politique de conduite que nous
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suivons actuellement vis à vis la cour de Madrid. Vous devez en conséquence, Mr continuer d'avoir l'air de la confiance, la plus entière, et de vous renfermer dans les bornes de la plus grande circonspection sur tout ce qui peut avoir rapport à la paix et aux moyens de la faire.

.....

LOUISIANA IN FRENCH DIPLOMACY¹

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 446:306]

Aoust
1762

Observations

Topographiques sur l'intérêt de l'Espagne dans la présente négociation relativement à ses possessions dans l'Amérique Septentrionale

.....

[Translation]

variance between France and Spain. It is a snare into which we shall not fall; but that we foresee it, suffices to confirm ourselves more and more as to the politic plan of conduct we are actually pursuing with the court of Madrid. Consequently, Monsieur, you should continue to wear an air of the most entire confidence, and to withdraw into the greatest circumspection on everything that may relate to peace and to the means of making it.

.....

August, 1762

Topographical observations on the interest of Spain in the present negotiation with respect to its possessions in North America

.....

¹ Internal evidence dates the memoir, of which this is an extract, as no earlier than September 6, 1762. The author was not aware of the current diplomatic situation of that moment and, therefore, his suggestions

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Section II.

Des inconvénients qui pourroient naître, pour l'Espagne, du nouveau système local qui resulteroit de quelques articles du futur traité;

C'est encore ici le cas d'une division: car, selon les différentes conditions qui seroient proposées où acceptées relativement à la Louisiane, selon, enfin, que la nécessité des circonstances nous en arracheroit la cession en tout ou en partié, ces inconveniens pourroient naître du voisinage des Anglois

1. ou avec le nouveau Mexique
2. ou avec la floride Espagnole

Article 1er

Des inconvénients, pour l'Espagne, qui pourroient naître du voisinage des Anglois avec le nouveau mexique

[Translation]

Section 2

Concerning the inconveniences which may arise for Spain from the new local situation which would result from certain articles of the future treaty;

Here, also, is the place for a division; for, according to the different conditions which may be proposed or accepted with relation to Louisiana, according, further, to the necessity of circumstances which may exact from us its cession, entire or in part, the following inconveniences may arise from the nearness of the English:

1. To New Mexico
2. To Spanish Florida

Article 1

Inconveniences for Spain which might arise from the vicinity of the English to New Mexico

are not especially pertinent for the negotiation of 1762. On the other hand, the testimony he gives as to the part of Louisiana in bringing to pass the Family Compact is quite interesting. It is hard to say who the author was; either Laborde or O'Dun would have been much better informed as to the situation in September of 1762.

Je n'entrerais point ici en détail sur l'importance de la Louisiane pour la France, l'utilité qu'on auroit pû en retirer, et le peu d'usage qu'on a fait de ces grands moyens, ce sont des vérités si notoires qu'elles ne sont plus matière à discussion. d'ailleurs c'est uniquement par rapport à l'Espagne que nous envisageons ici les conséquences qui résulteroient de l'addition de ce grand continent au vaste empire Britannique dans l'Amérique Septentrionale

Les suites pour l'Espagne en seroient si funestes, et en même tems si inévitables, que ce seul intérêt a vraisemblablement pû engager l'Espagne à se liguier avec nous contre l'Angleterre, dans des circonstances si peu favorables. du moins, dans le voyage que

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je fis à Madrid en 1760, je crus appercevoir cet unique moyen de tirer cette cour de sa léthargie et de l'entraîner enfin dans notre querelle. le peu de penchant qu'avoit le ministère à s'embarquer avec la France dans une guerre jusqu' alors si malheureux; les dispositions de la reine qui gouvernoit; l'ancien préjugé national,

[*Translation*]

I will not enter here in detail as to the importance of Louisiana for France, the use that France may make of it and the little advantage that has been taken of its great resources. These truths are so notorious that they are no longer a subject for discussion. Moreover, it is solely with respect to Spain that we are here considering the consequences which would ensue from the addition of this great continent to the vast British empire in North America.

The results for Spain would be so fatal and at the same time so inevitable that that consideration only was apparently sufficient to induce Spain to ally herself with us against England in such unfavorable circumstances. At least from the journey I made to Madrid in 1760, I thought I could perceive that this was the only means of drawing that court from its lethargy and into our quarrel. The little inclination that the ministry had to join France in a war up to then so unfortunate; the inclinations of the queen who governed; the ancient national prejudice which, in

qui malgré tant de nouveaux liens, entretient toujours contre nous l'aversion des grandes et la haine du peuple; tout nous étoit contraire; et au défaut d'une amitié dont on se flattera toujours en vain, nous n'avions plus rien à espérer que de la crainte

Pour exciter ce sentiment dans les cœurs Espagnols je pro-
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posai, à mon retour, de donner à la cour de Madrid une chaude allarme, c'étoit la *cession de la Louisiane à l'Angleterre*. je ne rappellerai point ici les voyes que j'indiquois pour lui en faire toute la peur et pour induire l'Angleterre elle même dans cette croyance. Je retracerai seulement la substance des observations topographiques dont j'appuyois mon opinion, dans le mémoire que je présentai.

.....
[Translation]

spite of so many new ties, still maintained against us the aversion of the grandes and the hate of the people; everything was against us; and for want of a friendship with which we vainly flattered ourselves we had nothing more to hope except from fear.

To awaken that sentiment in the hearts of the Spaniards I proposed on my return to give the court of Madrid a serious alarm, namely the *cession of Louisiana to England*. I will not recall here the methods which I indicated to arouse their fear and even to induce England to the same belief. I will only retrace the substance of the topographical observations on which I supported my opinion in the memoir which I presented.

.....
HARDWICKE TO NEWCASTLE, October 12, 1760

[Add. MSS., 32,913:67]

WIMPLE Sunday Night Octr 12th 1760

[On capitulation of Montreal] . . . I hope a good use will be made of it for some of the national purposes, which Your Grace suggests. As to Peace, I am sure I have not Ability, nor am enough au fait of the whole circle of affairs abroad, to hint how it should be set about. Perhaps This is not the moment, & that such a Moment cannot arise till after the Campaign is closed.

But I should think it would be worth the while of an English minister, who has the conduct of the War in his hands, to set about The forming of some Plan of the Terms, upon which a Peace might be accepted; &, considering how many acquisitions
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we have on our hands, what it would be necessary for This Country to retain, & what it would be proper to give up in consideration of other Restitutions or advantages to this Kingdom or its allies.

.....

NEWCASTLE MEMORANDA, October 14, 1760

[Add. MSS., 32,913:128]

Mem:ds for The King

Octr 14th 1760

.....

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Alderman Baker's Reasoning.

About keeping Canada, or The Newfoundland Fishery; and Cape Breton or Guadaloupe. Senegal etc.

The Keeping Canada the most necessary for preserving The Peace; which cannot be done, whilst Canada, & Those Parts, are divided between Two Rival Powers, England and France, as the Indians will always be stir'd up one against the other. The keeping the others might be more beneficial in point of Trade: But The other for the Preservation of The Peace.

NEWCASTLE TO HARDWICKE, December 3, 1760

[Add. MSS., 32,915:268]

NEWCASTLE HOUSE. Decr 3d 1760.
at night

.....

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Mr Pitt afterwards enter'd more specifically, than ever, upon what might be The Terms of Our Peace with France.

He laid it down, That We must give up considerably: But

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We must retain a great deal; at the same Time. He divided His Propositions then, either To retain Canada, Cape Breton, & exclude The French from Their Fishery on Newfoundland, and give up Guadaloupe, & Gorée; or retain Guadaloupe and Goree, with The Exclusion of The French Fishery on Newfoundland, & give up some part of Canada, & Confine ourselves To The Limits of The Lakes &c: I told Him, I knew There were different opinions upon these Two Points: Some were for retaining all Canada; as our Northern Colonies would never be quiet without it, & give up Guadaloupe—Others thought the retaining of Guadaloupe, in reality, more advantageous for us: But That I fear'd the insisting upon The French's renouncing Their Right To Their Fishery on Newfoundland would be very difficult To obtain.

Upon the whole, To do him Justice, He seem'd To be in The best Disposition. I press'd Him much to Set Things agoing and

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To come to Some immediate Resolution. I Think He will do it—And Tho' His present Ideas can never be obtain'd, He did not talk of one of Them as *sine quâ nons*

He will come to your Lordship Tomorrow, after Court, If Possible: He wish'd I would inform you of what He had said To me. He enjoine'd The Secret in the strongest manner, out of Regard to The King of Prussia.—He doubted what He should do with regard to My Ld. Holderness: But was determin'd not to shew Him The King of Prussia's Letter. He observed upon The Difficulty of Transacting Business of This Consequence, *in our present Situation*: and said very remarkably. *Formerly, My Lord, If I had not had an opportunity To see The King, If You told Me, That you would answer for The King's consent, That was enough: I was satisfied; where is That Satisfaction To be had now?*

Ever yours

HOLLES NEWCASTLE

HARDWICKE TO NEWCASTLE, December 4, 1760

[Add. MSS., 32,915:300]

GROSVENOR SQ: Thursday Decr 4th 1760

MY DEAR LORD,

When Your Servant came, I was at dinner, & could only send a verbal Message, for which I beg pardon. But it is necessary that I should thank Your Grace for your Letter, & acquaint you that I have had my Visit from the Great Man, who was with me an hour & half, & sent me to dinner late. He said not one word of your *great* news, which surprizes me most extremely. Surely it cannot be done without the privy of both of You! . . .

HARDWICKE TO NEWCASTLE, March 17, 1761

[Add. MSS., 32,920:270]

GROSVENOR SQUARE March 17th, 1761

Tuesday past 11 at night.

MY DEAR LORD,

I am this moment come from Mr Pitt, whom I have been endeavouring to see all day, but could not be admitted till about half an hour past nine. I found him in his easy Chair in his fore Room, full of Complaints of his health, & his very bad sleepless night; but upon the whole in better Spirits, & better humour, than I expected. We soon fell upon the Draught of the Speech,¹ which He much approved & commended in general, & made me some Compliments upon it. He enquir'd how far it had gone amongst the King's Servants. I told Him it was finished but yesterday; that I had carried it to Your Grace last night, & that Your Grace, my Lord Bute, & I had talk'd it over this forenoon at Court: That I had been desired to shew it Him, & therefore called at noon. He did not ask me whether the King had seen it,

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& I own I did not tell Him that His Majesty had seen it; for I knew, if I had, He would have said it was a Thing done &

¹ Hardwicke, who had an excellent literary sense, was employed as the draftsman for the king's speeches from the throne and other documents of the sort. This extract is given to illustrate Pitt's language as to the terms of peace at the outset of the negotiation.

settled, & have said it was not to be reconsidered by Him. He then said, there was one thing, in which the Draught fell short of his Ideas. That *America* was not mention'd in it, upon wch I pointed out to Him the parts, wherein it was included. He then added that what He chiefly meant was, that the words—*manifested your public-Spirited Concern for the Honour of the Nation, & the maintenance of it's undoubted Rights & possessions.* carried an Implication, as if That was the whole of our present Object. That it was true That was the Cause of the War; but we ought not to give out to the world that the *maintenance of our ancient Rights & Possessions* was the Total of our present Object, after so great Success. I will not repeat what I said to shew that this was a strain'd Construction. However, after seeming to aim at some longer & more extensive alteration, He desir'd that I would take down the words, contained in the *separate Paper*, which he dictated, & I writ down from his mouth; for He could not use his hand. I reason'd with Him, that, as it would be improper to say, or to imply, that we would give up all our acquisitions (which I thought the Draught by no means did), so, on the other hand, it was equally improper to declare to the People, or create an expectation in them, that the King would not make

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Peace without retaining all Canada, tho' I wished, as much as He, that it could be. He said He did not mean That, neither did his words import it; That the fact was undoubtedly true—that *the Reduction of all Canada was of the utmost importance to the Security of our Colonies &c.* and yet it might be wise & necessary. (tho' He hoped it would not become so) for the King, under certain circumstances, to give it up by a Treaty, either in whole or in part. Upon those two different Propositions our Reasoning turn'd; & I neither am able nor inclin'd to repeat the whole of it. As He adher'd, I took it *ad referendum*; & now lay it before Your Grace, that You may to morrow morning consider it with my Lord Bute, and take His Majesty's pleasure upon it, if you shall think fit. There is no other word altered or added, except Prince Ferdinand's name; but I believe, that, if *those words*; or some

other of the like import are not inserted, He will disclaim the Speech.

.....
[*Endorsed:*] March 17th 1761 Lord Hardwicke

MEMOIR ON TERMS OF PEACE, April 13, 1761¹

[Add. MSS., 33,030:1]

When the terms of a peace between Great Britain & France come to be discussed a new division of their several claims & possessions will then probably be made in America: It may not therefore be an unprofitable speculation to consider that part of the World that may come under deliberation as it regards the trade & power of Great Britain.

Under the titles of North America & the West Indies will be Comprised everything that can be necessary to be Considered.

The Considerations of North America will be best distinguished under three heads vizt Canada, Louisiana or Mississippi, and the Newfoundland fishery

Canada including the Island of Cap Breton and those in the Gulph and River of St Laurence are now compleatly in our possession the value of that acquisition as a Security to our other dominions in America, and as a means of wealth & power to Great Britain is so universally admitted, nothing need be added thereto, & there can be no doubt but that the whole will be clearly & fully ceded to us, if any part of our conquest are to remain to Great Britain.

Louisiana is less known & seems to have been less attended to, but ought nevertheless to be insisted on to make a part of the British dominions together with all the Rivers that the French possessed or occupied in the Gulph of Mexico. For the following reasons.

First. it will be most difficult and perhaps impossible to define the boundaries to the Northward & Eastward in such a manner

¹ This document is given as an illustration of reasoning as to the relative desirability of retaining various conquests.

as to prevent incroachments of the French, on our settlements or trade.

Secondly. Let the boundaries be never so certainly fixed, the Rivers that must be included in that province will leave the trade with the Six nations & all other the Nations of the Indians to the Northwest of the lakes open to the French who will also navigate the Lakes

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Thirdly. The possession of Louisiana will give the French the same means of encroaching upon our settlements of Georgia, Carolina & Virginia, as they had & exercised before the warr on the provinces of Pensilvania, Newyork, New England & Nova Scotia.

Lastly. The French by their intercourse with the Six nations will keep them disaffected to the English, & will keep our colonies of Georgia & Carolina in a State of continual warr with those Indians who border on them, & with whom they trade, & who are very numerous, warlike & cruel.

To these Reasons nothing can be opposed but French faith & treaties.

The Newfoundland fishery, as a means of wealth & power is of more worth than both the forementioned provinces, and therefore the exclusion of the French is extreamly to be wished.

The objections to Obtaining such exclusion by a formall treaty seem to be these.

First. the interruption of, or incroachment upon our fishery have not been any part of the Object of the present Warr with France.

Secondly. Excluding any nation from fishing in the open ocean by a treaty will have the appearance of an arbitrary use of our superiority at Sea, & give umbrage to other nations who have a right to fish on those banks. It is true the French of all foreign people only have a right to dry their cod, in a particular district of our Island of Newfoundland, this was granted them by the treaty of Utrecht; were this right which they have exercised ever since to be now taken away by treaty. Then

Thirdly The nations who now are our customers for those Fish

will apprehend a design in us to Monopolize the Curing those fish, & consequently putting what price we please on the market. Lastly. It seems as if such a prohibition would not bring so great

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advantage to us as at first sight seems to present. It is admitted that the French have cured immense quantities of Cod-fish, but the greatest part was catcht in the neighborhood & cured on the Island of Cap Breton, the other Islands in the Gulph of St Laurence & about Canso &c., as all these places will become British the French will be excluded from them, and will remain confined to the North & Northwest coast of Newfoundland, restrained from making any other settlements than only Stages for drying their fish. As by this means the Quantity caught & cured by the French will be lessened; so also will their market be lessened. For, notwithstanding the advantages the French have always had over us in the article of Salt we have had the greatest share of the trade in Foreign markets, the reason of which is because we take the produce of foreign markets in return more than the French do; Thus the Cheif trade & consumption for French Fish has been among themselves: no little part of that consumption was in Canada & this will be entirely lost to them. Should the French be prevented Curing Fish for Old France on Newfoundland we should not thereby acquire the trade, For our Fish is prohibited from being imported into France. Under these circumstances

It seems probable that if the French are strictly confined to Curing fish on Newfoundland according to the treaty of Utrecht, that their Fishery will gradually decline, & the rather when it is seen that the Coast assigned them is the least commodious either for the Fishery, or carrying them when Cured to an European Market

However it is well worth while to endeavor at an entire exclusion of them From even a pretence of Navigating in North American seas.

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The parts of the West Indies that can come under discussion

between Great Britain & France are of two kinds. viz. the Conquest we have made of Guadaloupe: & our right to the possession of those Called the Neutrall Islands.

Guadaloupe is well worthy to be retained if possible but not on an equal degree with North America, and if somewhat must be given up this Island seems the fittest.

The Neutrall Islands are very differently circumstanced they are of right belonging to Great Britain, & ought to be ceded as such, and be immediately possest & planted by the English For. First, they have long been the cause of dispute between the two nations, & tho' the English for Sake of peace consented they should remain unsettled, they never parted with their right, & yet the French encroached upon & planted them, & thereby gave one of the occations to the present warr.

Secondly—The English want more sugar land to plant not only to supply foreign markets, but also to encrease the quantity for home consumption, & thereby reduce the price of a commodity now become of general & necessary use, nor could any thing be more respectable to the negotiators of a treaty of peace than such an acquisition.

Thirdly. In order to prevent those Islands being, as occasionally they have been, the Rendezvous of desperate & Idle people, they ought to be immediately settled & put under British government.

13 April 1761.

NEWCASTLE TO HARDWICKE, April 17, 1761¹

[Add. MSS., 32,922:15]

NEWCASTLE HOUSE April 17th 1761

36 Min past Three.

.....
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He [Pitt] then told the King his Scheme of Peace. His Majesty understood Him, as I did, to mean, That we should at first acquaint The French Minister, who is expected here, *That*

¹ A more intransigent statement on Pitt's part of his views on peace.

These are the Terms, from which we will not depart. His Majesty reason'd Strongly with Him, against making any such Declaration, or any Declaration at all, before we heard, what They would propose. But all signified nothing. . . .

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Mr Pitt talked strange Stuff to me: That, If all the King's Ministers did not agree, France wou'd do Nothing: (That ought to be a Lesson for Himself) and concluded, That there were Heads enough able to make, & support a Peace without Him. Upon the whole, I look upon all He said to me, as chiefly designed for a Menace, in which He will be greatly disappointed: But at the same Time, I see what I am to expect *from Him*, and His

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Blood Hounds. I must therefore assert my own Innocence, Fling myself upon My Friends, for their Advice & Assistance; and Mr Pitt shall neither frighten me, nor change me.

.....

BEDFORD¹ TO NEWCASTLE, May 9, 1761

[Add. MSS., 32,922:449]

Private WOBURN ABBEY May. 9th 1761.

MY DEAR LORD

.....
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In the next place, I fear the rock we may split upon, will

¹The Duke of Bedford, leader of a Whig group independent of Newcastle's following, inclined strongly to be pro-French and a Little-Englander. His views contrast sharply with those of Pitt, whom he held in utter detestation. See *ante*, xxiii.

Hardwicke had some sympathy with his views. May 16 he commented to Newcastle on the duke's letter as follows:

"There is one Thing, upon which I have long thought as the Duke of B. does;—I mean that it is possible for England to be overloaded with foreign Colonies. If we are to keep all Canada & Guadaloupe, & as some talk, part of Louisiana to be added to the former: If the French Inhabitants are retain'd there, they will still be french Colonies, & You can never keep them in Subjection but by a great Army. If the French Inhabts should be sent away, whither can You transport such vast numbers? and from whence can You people such extensive Countries? Great Britain & Ireland can by no means spare such numbers; & the Swarms of German Emigrants seem to be at end." Add. MSS., 32,923:123-128v.

be the demanding of terms, which to over sanguine minds our successes may seem to entitle us to, but which will be inadmissible by France, even was she reduced much lower than she really is. These may be of two sorts, the one our demanding to keep all, or a greater share of our Conquests over her, than she can possibly be prevailed on to part with, the other is such monopolies in trade, as she cannot give up.

I will consider them separately, and tho' I will not presume to decide which shou'd be kept, yet I will venture to affirm all cannot be, nor do I think it would be for the advantage of England to be so overloaded with foreign Possessions, should all Canada as well as Guadaloupe be ceded to us, and indeed my Lord, I don't know whether the neighbourhood of the French to our Northern American Colonies, was not the greatest security of their dependance on their Mother Country, who I fear will be slighted by them when their apprehensions of the French are removed. Guadaloupe is a rich Island, but I fear the possession of it will be untenable, whilst inhabited by French Planters, and surrounded by their other Sugar Islands. Senegal and Goree, are of infinite use to our Commerce, but if possessed by a military force, will be the Grave of our People, and an endless source of future quarrels. The state of the Settlements of the two Nations in the East Indies I am totally unacquainted with, and therefore shall say nothing about them. To come to the other point, should England attempt to seclude France entirely from the North American fishery, it would not only be inadmissible by them, but would give umbrage to Spain and all other maritime Powers, as it would be a great step towards gaining the monopoly of a trade, which is the great source of all maritime power, and might be as dangerous for us to grasp at, as it was for Lewis the 14th when he aspired to be the Arbiter of Europe, and might be as likely to produce a grand Alliance against us, as his ambitious views did against him.

The like jealousy of Spain, Holland &c. would show itself, should the whole of our Conquests in North America and the West Indies be ceded to us, and Spain particularly, should General Amherst succeed in his attempt upon Louisiana (which it is

highly probable he will) would think us much too near Neighbours to Mexico.

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Upon the whole, my Lord, let us be firm, as our present situation entitles us to be, to obtain those things for which we went to War, security to our possessions in America and the West Indies, the evacuation of the Neutral Islands these (if possible) a free and secure trade, to the Gum Coasts, and our Settlements in the East Indies, upon the *Uti possidetis*. These things obtained, and our Allies in Germany secured and the publick peace restored there, there seems to be the foundation laid for a firm and lasting peace, which alone can retrieve this Nation from the pressures she now labours under. But at the same time we are firm to ourselves let us be just to others, and not think to impose such terms on France, as we are sure she cannot long acquiesce under; and which, when she has taken breath, she will take the first opportunity of breaking. A Peace of this kind, however advantageous it might appear at first, would be worse for England than even the continuance of the War, and therefore equal and moderate conditions, as it will be for the interest of both Nations to adhere to them, are undoubtedly preferable to more dazzling ones, which could not be of long duration. Excuse my dear Lord, the length of this letter, as I could not bring within a narrower compass my thoughts upon this very important subject. I am with the greatest truth and respect

Your Graces

most faithful

humble Servant

BEDFORD.

P. S. I am obliged to send this letter, blurred and blotted, as I have nobody here to copy it out.

B.

CHAPTER IX

THE NEGOTIATION OF BUSSY AND STANLEY, MAY-JULY, 1761

INSTRUCTIONS FOR BUSSY, May 23, 1761¹

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 443:119]

A MARLY le 23 May 1761.

Memoire pour servir d'instructions au Sr de Bussy
allant en Angleterre en qualite de ministre du roy.

.....
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L'Isle de Minorque sera la compensation de la Guadeloupe, de l'Isle de Gorée et des deux isles en contestation, Ste Lucie et Tobago, ainsi que de la restitution de Marigalande; bien entendu que l'Angleterre en ajustant ses differends avec la couronne

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d'Espagne, procurera au roy l'acquiescement de Sa Mte Cathe à l'entiere et libre possession de ces isles.

[*Translation*]

MARLY, May 23, 1761

Memoir to serve as instructions for the Sieur de Bussy, who goes to England in the capacity of the king's minister

.....
The island of Minorca will be the compensation for Guadeloupe, the island of Goree, and the two disputed islands St. Lucia and Tobago, as well as for the return of Mariegalante, it being well understood that England in adjusting its differences with the Spanish crown shall procure for the king His Catholic Majesty's acquiescence in his full and free possession of these islands.

¹ It is not unlikely that Bussy drew these himself. They employ the expression the "Sieur de," which a fellow clerk considered characteristic of him.

Les Isles de St Vincent et de la Dominique, qui appartiennent aux Caraïbes leur resteront sous la protection de la France, conformément au Traité de 1660.

L'Acadie, en entier, sera rendue aux Anglois. La restitution du Canada, de l'Isle Royale, et nommément de Louisbourg se fera à la France, en compensation de la restitution que le roi effectuera de ce que ses armées ont conquis sur l'Electeur d'hannovre, et sur ses alliés en Allemagne à mesure que le Sr de Bussy rendra

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compte au roi des idées du ministère Britannique sur chacun de ces articles, on lui enverra des memoires séparés qui l'instruiront du degré de facilité qu'il pourra apporter aux différentes cessions et compensations.

Le Sr de Bussy sentira que le Canada ne peut être compensée que par les conquêtes du roi en Allemagne, et que par conséquent il sera peut être nécessaire d'en céder la totalité ou une partie. ainsi il faudra éviter de donner aucunes premières propositions au ministère Anglois par écrit. Mais le Sr de Bussy, ayant dans

[*Translation*]

The islands of St. Vincent and Dominica, which belong to the Caribs, shall remain to them under the protection of France, conformably to the Treaty of 1660.

All Acadia shall be yielded to the English. The restoration of Canada, Isle Royale, and specifically of Louisburg shall be made to France in compensation for the restoration which the king will bring to pass of what his armies have conquered from the Elector of Hanover and from his allies in Germany. As the Sieur de Bussy shall give account to the king of the ideas of the British ministry on each of these articles, separate memoirs will be sent him which will instruct him as to the degree of facility he can offer on the different cessions and compensations.

The Sieur de Bussy will perceive that Canada can be compensated only by the king's conquests in Germany, and that consequently it may be necessary perhaps to cede all or a part of it. Accordingly it will be necessary to avoid giving any first proposals to the English ministry in writing. But the Sieur de Bussy,

la tête le tableau qu'on lui a présenté de ces différents arrangements, et en raisonnant sur tous les objets qui font la matière des restitutions et compensations, doit s'appliquer à se procurer de

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la part de la cour d'Angleterre des propositions cathégoriques et par écrit. Il aura un raisonnement assès simple à faire au Sr Pitt sur cet objet, qui est, que l'Angleterre ayant l'avantage par les conquêtes maritimes, et S. M. Brite ayant commencée la guerre, c'est à elle à donner ses propositions pour faire cesser le mal qu'elle a occasioné.

[*Translation*]

having in his mind the picture that has been set before him of these different arrangements, and reasoning on all the objects which are the material for restitutions and compensations, should endeavor on his part to obtain categorical proposals in writing from the court of England. He will have a sufficiently plain reason to offer to the Sieur Pitt on this point, which is, that as England has the advantage by her maritime conquests, and as His Britannic Majesty began the war, it is for him to offer proposals to put an end to the evil he has occasioned.

BUSSY TO CHOISEUL, June 11, 1761¹

[A E Corr. PoL Angl., 443:164]

No 1er

A LONDRES le 11. Juin 1761.

Rep. le 19. Juin No 3.

MONSEIGNEUR.

.....
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Je crois que, dans l'amerique Séptentrionale, les Anglois ne voudront se désister d'aucune de leurs conquêtes; mais on m'assure qu'ils ne se sont emparés ni de Ste Lucie, ni de Tabago, qui par conséquent pouroient nous rester. Je présume encore, Monseigneur que les limites de la Louïsiane, qui n'est pas entamée,

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pouront se régler par les eaux pendantes sur les côtes de chacune. La restitution de l'Isle Minorque et de ce que nous tenons en allemagne poura nous produire quelque arrangemens dans les Indes orientales et la liberté de la traite des négres en affrique, en y établissant de nouveaux comptoirs.

.....
[Translation]

No. 1

LONDON, June 11, 1761

Answered June 19, by No. 3

MY LORD:

.....
I think the English will desire to give up none of their conquests in North America; but I am assured that they are possessed neither of St. Lucia or of Tobago, which consequently may remain with us. I further presume, My Lord, that the boundaries of Louisiana, which have not been considered, may be determined by the waters flowing to the coasts of either power. The restitution of the island of Minorca and what we have in Germany may insure us some arrangements in the East Indies and freedom of trade in negroes in Africa through the establishment of new depots of trade.
.....

¹ It is probable that this dispatch of Bussy's suggested to the Duc de Choiseul his wording of the Canada boundary in the offer dictated to Stanley.

EARL OF MORTON¹ TO HARDWICKE, June 15, 1761

[Add. MSS., 32,924:104]

EDINBURGH 15 June 1761

MY LORD

I had the honour to receive your Lordships Obliging Letter when I was in the Country and heartily join with your Lordship in my prayers for a Reasonable & solid peace, if it is not reasonable it will neither be solid nor lasting; One way and I believe the only way of making it durable to Great Britain, considered by itself will be to remove the French from our Neighbourhood wherever that can be done; They are a restless people and have been so in all Ages—"Galli novis rebus plerumque student" was an Observation of Caesar's—"ad Bella suscipienda Gallorum alacer ac promptus est animus" "Mobilitate ac levitate animi novis imperiis student"² are other Observations of the same great Author; So that in my poor Opinion one principal Object in our Negotiation should be to remove the Seeds of a future War by removing Frenchmen from our Limits: I don't mean the Individuals but the Government.

I have had some Conversation & Correspondence with Persons who have been in the West Indies and others who have been in North America. And as tis natural to expect each talks for his own place; One writes me "If we dont keep Guadaloupe it will be the greatest Misfortune that ever attended our Sugar Colonys for we have not only shewed the French what a Valuable one it is—but also shewed them the way of making it produce more sugar than all our Islands together" In another Letter the same person writes "For Gods sake dont let us give up Guada-

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loupe as that is the only conquest that will bring Money into

¹ James Douglas, Earl of Morton, 1702-1768. The Earl of Morton, known for his scientific attainments, was a strong advocate of continental possessions. The similarity of sentiments makes it not unlikely that he was the author of the pamphlet published at Edinburgh in the autumn of 1763: *The Expediency of securing our American Colonies by settling The Country adjoining the River Mississippi, and the Country upon the Ohio, Considered*. Reprinted in *The Critical Period, 1763-1765* (I. H. C., 10), 134-161.

² The Gauls always seek novelty. The Gauls are quick and eager in beginning wars. From fickleness and levity their spirits seek after new dominions.

the Nation's pocket; If we do, all our Sugar Trade is undone for tis worth all ours put together and we have shewed the French how valuable it is which they did not know before"

Commodore Douglas near a year ago wrote me from Tobago one of the Neutral Islands which the French took possession of in the last War and which they still retain; He says there are about a dozen French famyls on the Island who subsist by fishing but are otherwise so lazy as totally to neglect the Culture of the Soil which he describes to be extremely fertile; But the great Importance of that Island is from its situation as it lyes to the Windward of all our Islands so that in any future War it will be a terrible Thorn in our Sides if the French were to settle and fortifie it: There certainly must be commodious harbours on that Island because it was the place he pitched upon to station his large Ships during the Hurricane Season.

I copied out that part of the Commodores letter & gave it to Mr Wood Mr Pitt's under Secretary last Winter.

Such is the language of the West Indians but still I should think the peaceable possession of North America a thing of greater consequence.

I dont imagine we should people that immense Tract in Ten Centurys but unless we have the name of the whole we shall never be at rest in those parts that are peopled while the smallest Germ of French Government subsists from the Gulf of Mexico to Hudsons Bay

In the Winter before last by the Duke of Newcastles Order I drew up a paper on this Subject which I had the honour to lay before Your Lordship and I remember at that time Your Lordship thought some of my Notions Chimerical, But as things now stand they may not appear so much out of the Way.

We are now entire Masters nearly from the Mouth of the

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Ohio all the way to the Northward as far as the Continent of America extends—Yet we see what Disturbances a handful of Frenchmen have given us to the Southward by stirring up the Creeks and other Nations in those parts. Therefore I cannot

help wishing that an Expedition had been sent against New Orleans and Mobile. This would have compleated the Conquest of all the French Claims in North America and might yet be done this very year.

I can see but two Objections that carry any Appearance of Weight against such an Attempt. The first is that it might create a Jealousy in the Spaniards but if the Enterprize should Succeed which I think could hardly fail, the Spaniards would in reality be Gainers. Because making the River Mississippi the Boundary between them and us they would get clear of those French who are settled to the westward of that River and who claim a large Tract of Sea Cost from the Mouth of the Mississippi as far west as St Bernards which they have named St Louis's Bay and alledge it was settled for them by Monsr de la Salle in 1685—I have no Books now by me so cannot positively say whether the French at present keep up that Settlement but I beleive they do And it is their western Boundary with the Spaniards upon the Coast But within land the French have proceeded a good way farther and have creeped very near the Silver Mines of St Barbe to the no small uneasiness of the Spaniards in those parts.

But the Spaniards could have no Jealousy of us if the River Mississippi was fixed for the Boundary because it would place us at a great distance from any thing of value in their possession, So that if such a project was once executed and the French fairly driven out of the Southern Colonys, it would be an easy Affair to adjust matters with the Court of Spain who might still retain St Augustine & Pensacola & their claim to the Peninsula of Florida:

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The other Objection is that the Awe of the French keep our Colonys in dependance upon the Mother Country. The Answer to this is obvious: If our Governments are properly circumscribd and Care taken that the new Settlements should be formed into new Governments of small Extent: The mutual Jealousys amongst the several Colonys would always keep them in a State of Dependance and it would save a vast Expence to

Britain in not being obliged to keep up a great number of regular forces which must be maintained if the smallest spot is left with the French upon that Continent.

Upon the whole I think we should listen to no Terms of Accommodation unless the French will agree to make an entire Cession of all their Claims and Possessions upon the Continent of North America from their Southermost to their Northermost limits.

Their Finances are exhausted themselves dispirited and sunk and they must come to our Terms if we persevere a very little longer; Providence has done great things for us if we do not cast away her Gifts. Caesar makes an other Observation equally just "*Mollis ac minime resistens ad Calamitates perferendas mens eorum est.*"¹ And it is remarkable how exactly all his pictures of that Nation resemble the Monsieurs of our Days. They pretend to be come of a different race but the genuine Gauls who remained in the Country since the days of Caesar have transfused their blood and Character into the race of their later Conquerors the Franks.

As to Port mahon the French should be welcome to keep it: It was a vast expence to this Nation whilst we kept it: And the Experience of this War has shewn that we were better without

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it: For if it had continued in our Possession Admiral Boscawen would not have met with the French fleet which he demolished in Lagos Bay; He would have been at Port mahon: The French Ships would have got round to Brest and carried such a Reenforcement to Monsr de Conflans as would have put it out of Sir Edward Hawkes Power to give that ever Memorable Blow to the French Marine.

There is but one thing can be said in Behalf of Port mahon that it was the best Port on the Mediterranean for cleaning our Ships; but when it is considered that the same thing can be done at Gibraltar tho in a less Degree, That Gibraltar is the Key of the Mediterranean: And that it is a short run from thence to

¹ Their minds are soft and of little strength when calamities are to be borne.

England where the Ships must of necessity come if they require to be put into the Dock, I say all these considered shew Port mahon to be of small importance: I once thought otherwise I am now fully satisfied I was in the wrong.

Let the French therefore keep it; And I dont see why we may not keep Guadaloupe and take the remaining Pittance of North America.

We have enough in all reason to give them back & I agree with your Lordship we should give them a reasonable Peace.

Pondicherry in the East Indies which in all probability is in our possession, And a Settlement (not the whole) upon the Coast of Senegal are considerable objects and if we take Belleisle that may go into the Bargain.

We shall get nothing from them of what they have taken They will get a great deal from us of what we have taken: These would be reasonable Terms for them: Generous on our Part.

106v

I have all along considered Great Britain in a great measure as detached from Germany; And tho perhaps we should not altogether neglect Germany (for if it were to be viewed in that light I would give France nothing) Yet the Advantage of Great Britain as an Island ought to be the primary Consideration and I am persuaded will always be so by a monarch Who glories in the name of Briton

I must offer many Apologys for taking up so much of your Lordships time with so long a letter & for employing an Amanuensis to write it, but my eyes are so weak that my hand would scarce have been legible and it would have been unconscionable to have put your Lordship to the trouble of decyphering when I am afraid you may think it sufficiently tedious tho wrote in a fairer Character—The Duke of Newcastle and Secretarys of State are too much Occupied to be interrupted with such (perhaps empty) Speculations. Besides I could with greater freedom impart them to your Lordship and I have done it without reserve as they occur'd to me.

If they can help to suggest any hint for the service of his Majesty or the Kingdom I shall esteem it my great happiness,

If they are improper I trust to your Lordships goodness that you'll cover my Foibles, and let them remain with yourself

I have the honour to be with the highest Respect

My Lord &c.

[*Endorsed:*] Copy of a Letter from The Earl of Morton to Lord Hardwicke Edinburgh June 15th 1761. R. April 4th 1762 from Lord Morton.

OVERTURE OF CHOISEUL, June 17, 1761¹

[S P France, 251]

17 eme Juin 1761.

Monsieur Le Duc De Choiseul propose a Monsieur Stanley: il demande la Restitution de la Guadeloupe et de Marie Galante, ainsi que celle de Gorée pour l'Isle de Minorque, il propose la cession entiere du Canada a l'exception de l'Isle Royale ou il ne sera point etabli de fortification, et pour cette cession la France demande la conservation de la Pêche de morüe telle qu'elle est etablie dans le Traité d'Utrecht: et une fixation des limites du Canada dans la partie de l'Ohio déterminée par les eaux pendantes, et fixée si clairement par le Traité qu'il ne puisse plus y avoir aucune contestation entre les deux nations par raport aux

[*Translation*]

June 17, 1761

Monsieur le Duc de Choiseul makes the following proposals to Monsieur Stanley: he asks the return of Guadeloupe and Mariegalante as well as Goree for the island of Minorca; he proposes the cession of all Canada except Cape Breton Island, where there shall be no fortifications; and for that cession France asks the preservation of the codfishery as provided by the Treaty of Utrecht, and the fixing the boundaries of Canada in the region of the Ohio by the watershed, to be so clearly stated by the treaty that no further dispute may arise between the two nations with

¹ This is on a small double leaf of paper, 4 by 8 inches, in Stanley's hand. It represents an offer dictated to him by the Duc de Choiseul supposedly in the deepest secrecy. See *ante*, ci. For Hans Stanley, see *ante*, xcvi.

dites limites. La France rendra ce que ces armées ont conquises en Allemagne sur les Alliés Britanniques.
[Endorsed:] in Mr Stanley's of 18 June 1761

BUSSY TO CHOISEUL, June 19, 1761
[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 443:231]

No 6. A LONDRES le 19. Juin 1761.
Rep. le 27.

MONSEIGNEUR.

M Pitt m'envoya prier, le mardy 16, de passer chez luy, où m'étant rendu, il me dit qu'il alloit commencer par me donner la réponse du Roy d'Angre sur l'ordre que j'avois eû de demander la restitution de Belle Isle sans compensation;

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On assure que Ste Lucie, Tabago, n'ont point encore eté attaqués; nous pourrions les nommer comme nous appartenants encore, et ne les point mettre en compensations. vous jugerés, Mgr, s'ils convenoient de demander tout le Canada avec l Isle

[Translation]

regard to the boundaries in question. France will give back what her armies have conquered in Germany from the British allies.

No. 6. LONDON, June 19, 1761
Answered the 27th

MY LORD:

M. Pitt sent to me Tuesday, the sixteenth, to ask me to come to him, and on my repairing there he told me he would begin by giving me the King of England's answer on the order I had received to demand the return of Belleisle without compensation....

I am assured that St. Lucia and Tobago have not yet been attacked; we can therefore enumerate them as still belonging to us and need not list them as compensations. You will judge, My Lord, if they see fit to ask all Canada with Isle Royale and Isle

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Royalle et L Isle St Jean, si vous vous restraîndriés à re-
clamer la Guadeloupe, et marie Galante; mais, dans tous les cas,
je crois qu'il ne faut pas omettre de faire un article de la Louisi-
ane, dont il n'est pas parlé dans mon instruction. Les Gazettes de
Londres marquent que le General Ameherst est party de halifax
le 2. d'Avril avec deux mille hommes de troupes de débarquement
et une escâdre de vaisseaux de guerre pour se rendre à la nou-

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velle Yorck qu'il doit y prendre de nouvelles troupes ainsy qu'à
la Caroline méridionale, pour achever la conquête de l'Amérique
Septentrionale par la réduction de la Louisiane sous la domination
Angloise; Delà, je pense Mgr, qu'il faut ou demander l'echange
de l'epoque pour l'amérique, de façon que la Louisiane se trouve
dans le tems où elle n'a point été attaquée; ou demander qu'inde-

249v

pendamment de l'epoque qui sera mise pour l'amerique, la
Louisiane nous soit rendue, si le Général Ameherst avoit eû des
succès dans cette partie; Je pense qu'il faut demander de plus que
les limites de la Louisiane soient réglées par les eaux pendantes
sur les côtes de chacune, et que l'on tire une ligne par des lieux

[*Translation*]

St. John if you will confine yourself to reclaiming Guadeloupe and
Mariegalante. In any case I think we must not omit having an
article on Louisiana, of which nothing is said in my instructions.
The London Gazettes state that General Amherst left Halifax
April 2, with a landing force of 2,000 men and a squadron of war-
ships to go to New York, where, as in South Carolina, he is to
find more troops to finish the conquest of North America by re-
ducing Louisiana under British domination. From this, I infer,
My Lord, that we must ask either a change in the epoch for
America so that Louisiana may be included before it is attacked,
or that independent of the epoch set for America Louisiana may
be returned to us if General Amherst has had success in that
quarter. I think we must further ask that the boundaries of
Louisiana be settled according to the waters that flow to the coasts

dont les noms seront spécifiés pour empêcher les anglois de s'ap-
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procher de l'Ohio et assurer les limites de la Louisiane. Enfin je pense qu'il faut exiger, pour les habitans du Canada, et de tous les établissemens françois occupés actuellement par les Anglois, la liberté de sortir avec leurs familles, et leurs effets et de se transporter à la Louiziane....

[*Translation*]

of either power, and that a line be drawn by places specified by name to prevent the English from approaching the Ohio and to safeguard the boundaries of Louisiana. Finally I think it necessary to require for the inhabitants of Canada and of all the French settlements actually occupied by the English, the freedom of departing with their families and goods and of moving to Louisiana....

PITT TO STANLEY, June 26, 1761

[S P France, 251]

.....
The Note, dictated by the Duc de Choiseul, opens a most interesting scene; and I am, first, to remark, that This little Leaf is so loose, and void of Precision, as to the Objects It does mention; and so defective from its total Silence as to Matters of the highest Importance, which must make essential Parts of a future Peace between the Two Crowns, that This Paper is to be consider'd not as the full Plan of the Duc de Choiseul, but a first Breaking of His Mind, or rather a Mode of feeling what may be His Majesty's fixed and final Intentions as to the Conditions of Our particular Peace: The Manner too of doing This, is, perhaps, rather artificial than confidential, however well personated the anxious Desire of Mystery and Secrecy, even towards M. de Bussy, may have been, in the Course of the Duc de Choiseul's Conversation as it may, Your Conclusion is certainly just, that This Transaction seems, at least to shew, that France is serious.
.....

Next, the Idea of a just Compensation implies a reasonable Proportion of value in the Objects to be compensated And above all, It is essential and indispensable on the highest Reasons, and even in order to give Solidity and Duration to the Peace, when made, that whatever Objects may be stated by France, as matter of Cession, the same be ceded total and entire, not mutilated, or dismember'd; That, on this unalterable Principle, the Fixation of new Limits to Canada towards the Ohio, or elsewhere, or an Exception of the least Part of That Province, or of the Island of Cape Breton, can never on any Consideration whatever be admissible. As to the Fixation of new limits to Canada towards the Ohio, It is captious and insidious, thrown out in hopes, if agreed to, to shorten thereby the Extent of Canada, and to lengthen the Boundaries of Louisiana, and in the View to establish, what must not be admitted, namely, that all, which is not Canada, is Louisiana; whereby, all the intermediate Nations and Countries, the true Barrier to each Province, would be given up to France.

In addition to Acadia, belonging to the Crown of England by antecedent Right, entire Canada and It's Dependencies, the whole Coasts and all the Islands of the Gulph and River of St Lawrence, and all Streights and Passages leading thereto, together with the Fishery invariably appendant to such Possession, are, by the *Uti possidetis*, already vested in the King: That to admit either the Fixation of new Limits, or any Exception of Territory or of that Right of Fishery inherent in the same, would be, in effect, to stipulate a Restitution under the Name of a Cession:

.....
 Tho' the above Observations, as far as They go, may convey to you, with sufficient Clearness, the King's Intentions with regard to the particular Peace of the Two Crowns, I will, nevertheless, for greater Precision, and for your further Ease in a Negotiation of so much Delicacy, briefly sum up the whole matter; and expressly distinguish to you what are the Points fixed and unalterable in His Majesty's Mind, without which He will consent to no Peace with France, from Those which may be treatable and are refer'd to future Decision.

First, then, the King will never depart from the total and en-

tire Cession, on the part of France, without new Limits, or any Exception whatever, of all Canada and It's Dependencies; Neither will His Majesty ever relax as to the full Cession, on the part of France, of the Island of Cape Breton, and of all other Islands in the Gulph and River of St Lawrence together with that Right of Fishery inherent in the possession of all the Coasts of the Same, and of the Streights and Passages leading thereto.

.....

BUSSY TO CHOISEUL, June 26, 1761

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 443:274]

No. 9.

Reçu le 30.

A LONDRES le 26. Juin 1761.

Rep le 4. Juillet

MONSEIGNEUR.

J'ai reçu, le 22. au matin, par le retour du courier, La Fond, les 3. lettres que vous m'avés fait l'honneur de m'ecrire les 18. et 19. de ce mois, avec toutes les pièces qui les accompagnoient.

.....

284v....

M. Pitt me demanda encore, Monseigneur, si je n'avois point ordre de luy faire des propositions, et je luy répondis, comme la

[*Translation*]

No. 9

Received the 30th

LONDON, June 26, 1761

Answered July 4

MY LORD:

I received on the morning of the twenty-second by the return of the courier La Fond, the three letters you did me the honor to write me the eighteenth and nineteenth of this month with all the accompanying pieces.

.....

M. Pitt again asked me, My Lord, if I had no order to make proposals to him, and I answered, as before, in the negative, con-

première fois, par la négative, conformément à l'ordre que vous m'en avies donné; de sorte que je ne crois pas qu'il me soupçonne d'avoir connoissance de celles que vous luy aves envoyées par M. Stanley.....

.....
286....

Quant aux propositions que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de me confier, monseigneur, permettez moy de soumettre à votre jugement les idées que le zèle m'a fait naître. Il me paroist impossible d'espérer que les Anglois se portent à nous restituer le Canada, puis que c'étoit l'objet de la guerre, et que sa possession a esté le

286v

but des vûes de la nation et des dépenses qu'elle a faites pour le conquérir, mais il semble que nous retirerions plus d'utilité réelle que nous n'en pourrions retirer du Canada et de Louisbourg, si, en y renonçant, nous pouvions obtenir des Anglois la possession de la peninsule de l'Acadie en entier, avec la petite Isle de Campceaux que les Anglois nous ont ravie en pleine paix. Elle

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a deux ports excellents et ouverts en tout tems, Port Royal et

[*Translation*]

formably to the order you had given me, in such fashion that I do not think he suspects me of knowing of those you sent by M. Stanley.....

.....
As to the proposals you did me the honor to intrust to me, My Lord, permit me to submit to your judgment the ideas which zeal has awakened in me. It seems to me impossible to hope that the English will bring themselves to restore Canada to us, since it was the object of the war, and since its possession has been the goal of the nation's desires, and of the expenses incurred for its conquest; but it seems to me that we would draw more real utility than we can draw from Canada and from Louisburg, if in giving it up, we can obtain from the English the possession of the whole peninsula of Acadia with the little island of Canso, that the English took away from us in time of peace. It offers two excel-

halifax, des pêches sédentaires, abondantes, et des côtes propres aux sécheries, des bois abondant pour la construction, des terres propres à la culture du bled et du chanvre, à position convenable pour faire des entreprises au centre des colonies Angloises, des forces plus réunies, la facilité d'attirer un grand nombre des habitans du Canada; Enfin il faudroit des dépenses infiniment

287v

moindres, que pour soutenir le Canada.

Il me paroist que pour favoriser le succès de cette demande ainsy que des autres restitutions que nous avons à solliciter, nous pourrions présenter pour nouvel objet de compensation la cession de la Guyane et de la Cayenne, qui, à ce que je crois, ne sont pas encore entièrement établis, et qui, se trouvant entre les établissemens des hollandois et des Portugais, exciteroient leur jalousie contre les Anglois. Nous pourrions y joindre la cession de l'Isle

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St. Barthelemy qui nous appartient en entier, et de la partie de l'isle de St. Martin que nous possédons en commun avec les hollandois. Ces dernières cessions ne manqueroient pas de donner de

[*Translation*]

lent ports that are always open, Port Royal and Halifax, abundant local fisheries, coasts fit for drying grounds, abundant lumber, lands fit for the cultivation of wheat and hemp, a convenient situation for attacks on the heart of the English colonies, more closely united resources, the opportunity to attract a great number of the inhabitants of Canada. Finally it will cost infinitely less than the maintenance of Canada.

It seems to me that to favor the success of this demand as well as that of the other restitutions we have to solicit, we might offer as a new object of compensation the cession of Guiana and Cayenne, which, as I think, are not fully settled, and which, being among the settlements of the Dutch and the Portuguese, would arouse their jealousy against the English. We might add the cession of the isle of St. Barthélemy, which all belongs to us, and that of the part of the isle of St. Martin which we possess in common with the Dutch. These last cessions would not fail to

la jalousie au Dannemark et d'augmenter celle des hollandois pour leurs Isles de St. Thomas et de St. Eustache, qui sont à la vûe de St. Martin et de St. Barthelemi.

Si ces idées, Mgr, ne vous paroissent pas praticables et que
288v

vous jugiés devoir vous en tenir à la demande de l'Isle Royale et de la liberté de la pêche, ne croiries vous pas nécessaire de stipuler qu'elle s'étendra sur la côte de terre-neuve, ainsi qu'elle étoit exercée ci devant, et d'exiger une sécherie sur les bords de l'Acadie depuis le Cap Campçeau jusques au Cap Sable, celles de l'isle Royale passant pour n'être pas bonne?

Vous penserez peutêtre encore, Mgr, devoir demander, pour
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les habitans du Canada et des autres établissemens françois qui passeront sous la domination Angloise, la liberté d'en sortir avec leurs familles et effets, et de se transporter à tels autres établissemens de la France qui leur conviendront le mieux, ainsi que cela a toujours été usité dans tous les traités de cessions.

A l'égard des limites de la Louisianne, je pense que l'on ne

[*Translation*]

give jealousy to Denmark and to increase that of the Dutch for their islands of St. Thomas and St. Eustatius, which are in sight of St. Martin and St. Barthélemy.

If these ideas, My Lord, do not appear practicable to you, and if you think you should hold to your demand for Isle Royale and the freedom of the fishery, do you not think it necessary to stipulate that it shall extend to the coast of Newfoundland as it was formerly enjoyed, and to demand a drying ground on the borders of Acadia from Cape Canso to Cape Sable, since those on Isle Royale are not thought to be good?

You may perhaps, also decide, My Lord, to ask for the inhabitants of Canada and the other French settlements which are to pass under English dominion, the freedom of leaving with their families and goods, and of repairing to such other French settlements as they please, as has always been stipulated in cession treaties.

With respect to the boundaries of Louisiana, I think we can-

peut s'expliquer avec trop de précision et de netteté. La règle la
289v

plus usitée, la plus équitable et la plus convenable est de déterminer les limites de la Louisiane par la pente des eaux, en sorte que toutes les terres dont les eaux se rendent à la mer par les possessions, lui apartiendroient comme pareillement, toutes les terres dont les eaux tombent à la mer par les possessions des Anglois, apartiendroient pareillement à la Gde Bretagne. C'est ainsi qu'on en a usé pour fixer les limites du Roussillon, entre la
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France et l'Espagne, entre la France, et la Savoye; et c'étoit le projet de M de la Galissonnière. Mais comme les limites de la Louisiane avec le Canada n'ont jamais été bien distinguées, et que l'on a prétendu, dans des écrits François, que l'Ohio étoit une dépendance du Canada, l'on croit qu'il faut stipuler explicitement que l'on regarde l'Ohio et l'Ouabache comme étant dépendants de la Louisiane; qu'il faut ajouter que le terrain entre l'Ohio et les
290v

montagnes qui bornent la Virginie, demeurera neutre, et que tout commerce et passage y sera interdit tant aux François, qu'aux

[Translation]

not express ourselves with too much precision and clearness. The most usual, equitable, and convenient rule is to determine the boundaries of Louisiana by the watershed, so that all the lands whose waters flow to the sea by our possessions shall belong to us, as similarly all the lands whose waters fall to the sea by the English possessions shall similarly belong to Great Britain. It was so done in fixing the boundaries of Roussillon between France and Spain, between France and Savoy; and it was the proposal of M. de la Galissonnière. But as the boundaries between Louisiana and Canada have never been well distinguished, and as in French books it has been claimed that the Ohio was a dependency of Canada, it is thought necessary to stipulate explicitly that the Ohio and Wabash are to be regarded as dependencies of Louisiana; it is necessary to add that the lands between the Ohio and the mountains which border Virginia remain neutral, and that all trade and passage be prohibited to French and English alike; but that the

Anglois; mais que les sauvages auront la liberté de faire la traverse chez les uns et les autres, comme cela est usité. Il conviendra encore de stipuler que les établissemens, habitations et tous les forts qui ont été construits en quelque tems que ce soit, sur le territoire de l'ohio [*in margin*: Na. la fin de cette phrase est omise dans le chiffre ainsi on ne sait si M. de Bussy croit que les habitations forts &c. doivent être détruits ou conservés]

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Il faudra encore spécifier les limites de la Louisiane du coté de la Caroline et de la Georgie. Enfin, Mgr, comme ces limites de la Louisiane, surtout du côté du Canada, ont toujours été l'objet le plus inconnu et le plus obscur, je crois que vous jugerez à propos de tirer de la marine un mémoire très exact pour établir celles qu'il sera nécessaire d'adopter pour procurer à cette colonie toutes les sûretés possibles, du coté des possessions Angloises; et je vous

291v

supplierai de vouloir bien m'en envoyer une copie.

.....

[*Translation*]

Indians may have the freedom to cross to the one or the other people as is customary. It will also be advisable to stipulate that the settlements, dwellings, and all forts which have at any time been built on the territory of the Ohio [*in margin*: Note that the end of this phrase is omitted in the cipher so it is not known if M. de Bussy thinks the fortified houses, etc., should be destroyed or kept.]

It will also be necessary to specify the boundaries of Louisiana on the side of Carolina and Georgia. Finally, My Lord, as these boundaries of Louisiana, especially on the side of Canada have always been a most unknown and obscure subject I think you should judge it proper to obtain from the marine a very exact memoir to establish the boundaries that must be adopted to procure the colony all possible security on the side of the English possessions; and I entreat you to be pleased to send me a copy.

.....

STANLEY TO PITT, June 29, 1761

[S P France, 251]

.....
I had forgot to say that the Southern bounds of Canada are to be so settled as to give that province entire and unmutilated to Great Britain such as france in short holds it in all respects. The Duke has not engaged his word as a Minister not having seen the King, but these are my own thoughts upon the Conference. I add that I believe as to the East Indies we shall be satisfied If His Majesty thought it consistent with his interest and dignity to part with Minorca it might perhaps be greatly disposed of. I have mentioned Ostend and Newport very naturally
.....

STANLEY TO PITT, July 1, 1761

[S P France, 251]

.....
I gave the fullest force to my instructions as to the Limits of Canada, and Acadia, my former letter assured you, that no difficulty would occur with regard to the boundary towards Louisiana; it is agreed, That Canada, as that province is determined by their Geographers, and Historians, as well as by the respective civil, and military departments, shall be ceded undismember'd and entire to Great Britain. The Duc himself was the first to say, that the country uninhabited, or possessed by savages, was to remain in *statu quo* for those reasons which you have assigned.
.....

BUSSY TO CHOISEUL, July 3, 1761

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 443:318]

No 12.

Recue le 6.

A LONDRES le 3. Juillet 1761

Rep. le 12

MONSEIGNEUR.

.....
321....M. de Newcastle et le Lord Grenville que j'ai vûs, m'ont dit
321v

la même chose que Mrs Pitt et de Butte¹ Le dernier paroist toujours d'avis que l'angleterre doit nous rendre Belleisle sans compensation; que les isles de Sainte Lucie et Tabago, prises ou non, doivent rester neutres; que la Guadeloupe doit nous être rendüe. Ses discours me confirment dans l'idée que j'ay eüe des difficultez qu'on nous feroit pour les limites de la Louisianne Il prétend que nous ne pouvons avancer avec justice que tout ce qui

[Translation]

No. 12

Received the 6th

LONDON, July 3, 1761

Answered the 12th

MY LORD:

.....
M. de Newcastle and Lord Granville, whom I have seen, have told me the same thing as Messieurs Pitt and de Bute.¹ The latter seems still of the opinion that England should give us back Belleisle without compensation; that the islands of St. Lucia and Tobago, whether taken or not, should remain neutral; that Guadeloupe should be returned to us. His discourse confirms me in the idea that I have had of the difficulties that will be made us on the boundaries of Louisiana. He claims that we cannot with justice allege that all that is not Canada is Louisiana; that we do

¹ Earl of Bute, see *ante*, cxxiv *et seq.*

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n'est pas Canada est Louisiane; que nous n'avons pas la propriété de l'Ohio; que ce fleuve appartient à la Virginie; mais que l'on conviendra que la distance entre l'ohio et les Apalaches sera deserte, en réservant cependant à la Virginie la propriété de l'Ohio....

GRIMALDI¹ TO WALL, July 14, 1761

[A G Simancas, 4543]

.....
Debo decir á V. E. como assunto coincidente á ella, que ya estaban aqui resueltos á abandonar á los Ingleses la Luisiana en cambio de alguna otra cosa que pudiese ser mas util á la Francia. Tambien hé sabido por varias partes el poco aprecio que merece á muchos aquella Colonia. Considerando yo, pues, que seria el mayor perjuicio á la España el que los Ingleses estendiessen sus dominios por aquella parte, y que con aquella Provincia tubiessen un establecimiento, puertos, y abrigo en el Golfo Mejicano, me

[*Translation*]

not own the Ohio, which belongs to Virginia; but that they will agree that the territory between the Ohio and the Appalachians shall be left desert, reserving none the less to Virginia the propriety of the Ohio....

.....
I ought to tell Your Excellency as a point coincidental with it, that they were already resolved here to give up Louisiana to the English instead of something which might be more useful to France. I have also learned from various sources the small valuation which many people put on that colony. Considering, then, that it would be the greatest detriment to Spain for the English to extend their domain in that region, and that, with that province, they might have an establishment, ports, and a haven in the Gulf

¹ For Grimaldi, see *ante*, xci.

hé dado todo el movimiento possible, paraque no se haga tal proposicion á la Inglaterra, y hé vensido al Duque de Choiseul á que se abandone tal proyecto, con el argumento sacado de el Pacto de Familia, pues si en vista de él debe considerar la Francia como propios los intereses de la Espana, y adgotar en adelante sus querellas, ora claro que ó no la convenía pensar en esta union, ó la seria mui perjudicial, siendolo á la España, si los Ingleses se estableciessen en aquel Golfo. Hizole fuerza esta razon, y há quedado sin efecto la proposicion de tal cession ó trueque como lo vira V. E. por los que se hacen en dicha Memoria. Me parece que no es con el menor beneficio que se há sacado de haver enablado esta Negociacion.

.....

[*Translation*]

of Mexico, I have done everything possible in order that such a proposition may not be made to England; and I have prevailed upon the Duc de Choiseul to abandon the project, by argument derived from the Family Compact, since in view of it France ought to consider as her own the interests of Spain and settle beforehand her disputes, since it is evident now that either it was not convenient for her to think of this alliance, or that it would be very hurtful to her, since it is so to Spain, were the English to establish themselves on that gulf. This reason has prevailed and the proposal of such a transfer or exchange has been abandoned as Your Excellency will see from what is in the memoir I mentioned. It seems to me that this is not the least benefit that has been derived from our having undertaken this negotiation.

.....

MEMOIR ON DELIMITATION OF LOUISIANA AND CANADA,
July, 1761¹

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 443:358]

Envoyé copié à M. de Bussy le 15. Juillet 1761.

La Louisianne.

Dans le cas ou le Canada sera cédé aux Anglois il est essentiel de fixer les bornes de la Louïisianne d'une maniere à ne laisser aucun pretexte aux Anglois de les confondre avec celles du Canada.

Le gouvernement de la Louïisianne a ses limites circonscrites et independantes du Canada, quoique subordonné au gouverneur general de la Nlle france; Cela est si vray que, dans l'origine, la Compagnie du Mississipy jouïssoit de ses possessions independamment du gouverneur general du Canada.

Ce principe convenu, on ne sauroit contester que les lieux où le gouverneur de la Louïisianne envoie garnison ne soient du gouvernement de cette colonie.

Or, en suivant la partie de la Louïisianne qui confine les Anglois, et en parcourant les forts et garnisons qui y sont etablis

[*Translation*]

Copy sent to M. de Bussy, July 15, 1761

Louisiana

In the event that Canada is ceded to the English it is essential to settle the boundaries of Louisiana in such a way as to leave no pretext to the English to confuse them with those of Canada.

The government of Louisiana has its boundaries fixed and independent of Canada, even though it is subordinate to the governor-general of New France. This is so true that originally the Mississippi Company enjoyed its possessions independently of the governor-general of Canada.

This principle established, it cannot be contested that the places to which the governor of Louisiana sends garrisons are under the government of that colony. Now, following the part of Louisiana which borders the English, and running over the forts

¹The first among several essays at a boundary between Louisiana and Canada sent Bussy.

par les françois, on trouve en commençant par le sud les forts de la Mobile et de Tombeckbé qui assûrent au gouvernement de la Louïsianne l'entrée de la baye et la riviere de la Mobile en remontant vèrs les Chicachas

Plus près de la Georgie, derriere la floride, se trouve la riviere des Alibamous où se jette la Riviere Cousa sur laquelle est le fort Toulouse.

Plus haut, en remontant vèrs le fleuve du Mississipy où St. Louïs, on trouve la riviere des Cherakis qui se divise en trois branches derriere les Apalaches. Cette riviere borne nos possessions de la Louïsianne avec celles des Anglois; et elle ne nous a

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jamais été disputée dans toute son étendue.

La seule qui soit contentieuse, et encore ne l'a-t-elle été jusqu'icy que dans la partie contigüe au Canada, est la Belle Riviere ou l'Oyo. Le confluent ne sauroit être disputé aux françois: elle se jette dans le fleuve St. Louïs: Nous avons le fort Massiac a huit lieües en dedans de cette riviere, à l'ouvert de celle des Cherakis. [*in margin*: Na Il a été établi deux forts sur

[*Translation*]

and garrisons established there by the French, you find, beginning with the south, the forts of Mobile and Tombigbee, which assure the government of Louisiana the entrance of the bay and river of Mobile ascending toward the Chickasaw. Nearer Georgia, behind Florida, is the Alabama River, into which flows the Coosa River, on which is Fort Toulouse.

Higher up ascending toward the Mississippi or St. Louis River, you come to the Tennessee River, which behind the Appalachians divides into three branches. That river divides our possessions in Louisiana from those of the English; and in all its extent it has never been disputed to us.

The only part in dispute, and it has been so up to now only in the region next to Canada, is the Ohio or Beautiful River; its outlet cannot be disputed to the French; it flows into the Mississippi River. We have Fort Massac eight leagues above that river at the outlet of the Tennessee. [*in margin*: Note—Two forts

la Belle Riviere pendant cette guerre: le fort Joncaire et le fort Duquesne. Le fort de la Necessité est sur la Riviere Malengueulée qui se jette dans la Belle Riviere.]

En remontant, on trouve la Riviere Oüabache ou St. Jerosme qui est également dependante de la Louïsiannie ainsi que toute la partie des terres entre la Belle Riviere et l'Oüabache jusqu'aux Miamis. Nous avons, dans le cours de l'Oüabache, les forts Ste. Anne et l'ancien fort des Ouatanons.

Enfin, dans la partie superieure entre le Fleuve St. Louïs et le Canada, les deux colonies ont toujours été bornées par les lacs à commencer par Alepimigon le Lac Superieur, le Lac Michigan, y compris la baye des Puants et les autres dont les eaux tombent dans le fleuve St. Laurent.

On ne parle point des parties du sud et de l'ouëst du fleuve St. Louïs qui sont contigües aux Espagnols et sur les bornes desquelles il y a quelque litige avec cette nation; Mais, en resumant ce qu'on vient de dire de nos possessions de la Louïsiannie distinctes et séparées du gouvernement du Canada, la Louïsiannie

[*Translation*]

have been built on the Ohio River during this war; Fort Joncaire and Fort Duquesne. Fort Necessity is on the Monongahela River, which flows into the Ohio River.]

Ascending you find the river Wabash, or St. Jerome, which is also a dependency of Louisiana as well as all the lands between the Ohio and Wabash rivers as far as the Maumee. We have on the course of the Wabash, Fort St. Anne, and the old fort at Ouïatanon.

Finally in the upper part between the Mississippi and Canada, the two colonies have always been bounded by the lakes beginning with Nipigon, Lake Superior, Lake Michigan with Green Bay, and the others whose waters flow into the St. Lawrence River.

Nothing is said of the regions south and east of the Mississippi River which border the Spaniards and over the boundaries of which there is some dispute with that nation. But continuing with what was just said of our possession of Louisiana as distinct and separate from the government of Canada, Louisiana includes

comprend depuis le fleuve St. Louïs jusques dans les paÿs d'en haut les plus reculés toutes les terres qui sont bornées par les lacs

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jusqu'aux Miamis, et en descendant jusqu'à la Riviere Oÿo dont le confluent en depend toutes les terres des Chaouanons et des Cherakis avec la riviere de ce nom jusqu'aux monts Apalaches, y compris les Alibamous.

FRENCH PROPOSALS OF July 15, 1761

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 444:8]

Envoyé le 15. juillet 1761 a M. de Bussy

Memoire des propositions de paix de la part de la France.

Les négociations de paix entamées entre la france et l'Angle-terre ont fait connoitre le désir véritable des souverains de rétablir l'union et l'amitié si désirables pour l'humanité entre les deux couronnes. Et la resolution où est le roy, conjointement avec Sa Majesté Britanique, de terminer par un traité aussi clair que durable, les differends qui ont occasionné la présente guerre, a

{Translation}

all from the Mississippi River to the most distant parts of the up-country, with all the lands bordered by the lakes as far as the Maumee; and on the other side it extends as far as the Ohio River, whose mouth is its dependence; it includes also all the lands of the Shawnee and the Cherokee with the river of their name [the Tennessee] as far as the Appalachians including the Alabamas.

Sent to M. de Bussy July 15, 1761

Memoir of proposals for peace by France

The peace negotiations undertaken between France and England have made apparent the real desire of the sovereigns to reëstablish the concert and friendship of the two crowns, so desirable for the sake of humanity. And the resolution in which the king is, together with His Britannic Majesty, to end by a treaty that shall be as clear as it is lasting the differences that

déterminé Sa Maj en conservant l'esprit et la lettre de la déclaration du 26. Mars dernier relativement aux moyens de procurer la paix, d'expliquer plus expressément par ce mémoire les conditions qui lui paroissent les plus propres pour parvenir au but désirable qui l'anime ainsi que le Roy d'Angleterre.

8v

Mais le roy déclare, en confiant ce projet au Roy de la grande Bretagne que s'il n'étoit pas accepté par Sa Mté Britanique, ou qu'il ne servît pas de fondement à la negociation de la future paix, la cour de Londres, dans aucune position, ne pourroit en tirer avantage, le dit projet, confié au Roy de la grande Bretagne, n'ayant pour objet que d'accélérer une négociation qui interesse autant les deux couronnes

.....
9....

Ce sont donc les compensations qui détermineront les époques et la paix; et c'est pour y parvenir que le roy propose au Roy de la grande Bretagne les articles ci joints.

[*Translation*]

have occasioned the present war, has determined His Majesty, keeping to the spirit and the letter of his declaration of March 26 last, as to the means of procuring peace, to set forth more expressly by this memoir the conditions which seem to him most proper to arrive at this desirable aim, which inspires him as well as the King of England.

But the king declares, on confiding this proposal to the King of Great Britain, that if it is not accepted by His Britannic Majesty, or if it is not the basis of the future peace, the court of London in no point can derive any advantage from it, the project in question having no other end than to hasten a negotiation so interesting to both crowns.

.....
Accordingly it is now the compensations that will determine the epochs of the peace, and it is to arrive at them that the king proposes to the King of Great Britain the annexed articles.

Article 1er

9v

Le roy cède et garantit au Roy d'angleterre le Canada tel qu'il a été possédé ou dû l'être par la france sans restriction, et sans qu'il soit libre de revenir, sous aucun prétexte, contre cette cession ou garantie, ni de troubler la couronne d'Angleterre dans la possession entière du Canada.

Article 2.

Le roy, en transportant son plein droit de souveraineté au Roy d'Angleterre sur le Canada, y met quatre conditions: La première, que la liberté de la religion Catholique Romaine y sera conservée, et que le Roy d'Angleterre donnera les ordres les plus précis et les plus effectifs pour que ses nouveaux sujets catholiques Romains puissent comme ci devant, professer publiquement le culte de leur religion selon le rit de l'église Romaine.

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La seconde, que les habitans françois ou autres qui auroient été sujets du roy en Canada, puissent se retirer dans les colonies

[Translation]

Article 1

The king cedes and guarantees to the King of England Canada as it has been or should have been possessed by France without restriction, and without the right to return under any pretext contrary to this cession or guaranty, or to molest the crown of England in the full possession of Canada.

Article 2

The king in transferring his full right of sovereignty over Canada to the crown of England annexes four conditions. First, that the freedom of the Roman Catholic faith shall be preserved there, and that the King of England shall give most precise and effective orders that his new Roman Catholic subjects may as heretofore publicly enjoy the practice of their religion according to the rites of the Roman church.

Second, that the inhabitants, French or others who have been subjects of the king in Canada, shall be allowed to withdraw to

françoises avec toute sûreté et liberté; qu'il leur sera permis de vendre leurs biens et de transporter leurs effets ainsi que leurs personnes, sans être gênés dans leur émigration, sous quelque pretexte que ce soit (hors celui de dettes) Le gouvernement d'Angleterre s'engagera à lui procurer les moyens de transport au moins de fraix possibles.

La troisième, que les limites du Canada relativement à la Louisiane soient fixées immuablement et clairement ainsi que celles de la Louisiane et de la Virginie, de manière qu'après la confection du traité de paix, il ne puisse plus y avoir de difficultés entre les deux nations sur l'interprétation des limites relativement

10v

à la Louisiane soit par rapport au Canada, soit par rapport aux autres possessions angloises

Nota bene. M. de Bussy a un mémoire sur l'objet des limites de la Louisiane, qui le met en état de traiter définitivement cet article avec le ministère de sa Majté Britanique.

[*Translation*]

the French colonies in all safety and freedom; that they shall be permitted to sell their goods and to remove their effects as well as their persons, without being hindered in their migration under any pretext whatever (except that of debt). The government of England will agree to procure them the means of transportation at as small expense as possible.

Third, that the boundaries of Canada relative to Louisiana shall be fixed invariably and clearly as well as those of Louisiana and Virginia, in such fashion that after the making of the treaty of peace, there can be no further difficulties between the two nations on the interpretation of the boundaries of Louisiana, whether it be with respect to Canada, or with respect to the other English possessions.

N. B. M. de Bussy has a memoir on the subject of the boundaries of Louisiana which puts him in a condition to treat definitively on this article with the ministry of His Britannic Majesty.

La quatrième condition enfin, est que la liberté de la pesche et de la sécherie de la morüe sur le banc de Terre neuve soit assurée aux françois comme ci devant: Et comme cette assurance seroit illusoire, si les bâtimens françois n'avoient pas un abri appartenant à leur nation dans ces contrées, le Roy de la grande Bretagne en considération de la garantie de sa nouvelle conquête, restituera l'Isle Royale ou Cap Breton pour être possédée par la france en toute souveraineté. On conviendra que pour mettre un prix à cette restitution, la france, sous aucune dénomination,

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n'élèvera dans l'Isle de fortifications, et se bornera à y entretenir les établissemens civils et le port pour la commodité des bâtimens pescheurs qui y aborderont.

Article 3.

.....

[*Translation*]

The fourth condition, finally, is that freedom of fishing, and of drying codfish on the banks of Newfoundland shall be assured to the French as formerly. And inasmuch as this assurance would be illusory if French ships had no shelter belonging to their nation in those regions, the King of Great Britain in consideration of the guaranty of his new conquest, will restore Isle Royale, or Cape Breton to be possessed by France in full sovereignty. It will be agreed that, to set a price on this restitution, France under no pretext will raise fortifications on the island and will confine herself to maintaining a civil establishment and a port for the convenience of fishing vessels that come there.

Article 3

.....

CHAPTER X

THE NEGOTIATION PASSES ITS CLIMAX, JULY–AUGUST, 1761

OSSUN TO CHOISEUL, July 16, 1761

[A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 533:122]

reçue le 29
No 194.

A MADRID le 16. Juillet 1761.
Rep. le 30. par 85.

MONSIEUR,

.....
123....

M. Wall, Monsieur, m'a parlé ensuite de la Louisianne.¹ Il m'a dit que l'envie extrême qu'il avoit d'éloigner toutes les choses qui pourroient altérer le système d'union qui alloit s'établir entre les deux couronnes, luy faisoit regarder comme très néces-

[*Translation*]

Received the 29th
No. 194

MADRID, July 16, 1761
Answered the 30th by 85

MONSIEUR:

.....
M. Wall, Monsieur, next spoke to me of Louisiana.¹ He told me that his extreme desire to dispose of everything that might alter the policy of accord that was about to be established between the two crowns, made him think it very necessary that

¹ France and Spain were virtually at the climax of the negotiation of their offensive and defensive alliance in the Family Compact and the accompanying convention. The question of Louisiana and its boundaries remained to be settled.

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saire que, du côté de l'Espagne, on reconnût la légitime propriété de la France sur cette colonie; Que Sa Mté Cathé y étoit même déterminée, mais qu'il pensoit que la France, de son côté, devoit se prêter au réglemeut des limites de la Louisiane, et qu'il conviendrait de les fixer de manière à dissiper les craintes que

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l'Espagne avoit toujours conservées que les françois ne voulussent pénétrer un jour dans le Mexique. M. Wall a ajouté qu'il avoit sollicité plusieurs fois M. de Grimaldi de proposer cet ajustement, pour être inséré dans les traités qu'il est chargé de faire, et que cet ambassadeur ne lui avoit jamais répondu sur cette matière. J'ai représenté à M. Wall qu'elle exigeroit peut-être une

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discussion et des éclaircissemens qui pourroient employer plusieurs mois, et qu'ainsy il ne me paroissoit pas qu'on dût l'agiter à présent, d'autant mieux qu'il seroit facile de la régler après la signature du traité, si cela convenoit également aux deux monarques. M. Wall m'a répliqué qu'on pourroit au moins insérer

[*Translation*]

on the side of Spain the legitimate propriety of France over that colony should be recognized. His Catholic Majesty had even decided on it, but he thought that France on her side should lend herself to the regulation of the boundaries of Louisiana; and that it was proper to settle them in a manner calculated to dispel the fears that Spain had always had lest the French might one day wish to penetrate into Mexico. M. Wall added that he had several times urged M. de Grimaldi to propose such an adjustment to be inserted in the treaties he is charged to make; and that the ambassador had never answered him on the subject. I represented to M. Wall that it might occasion a discussion and explanations which might require several months, and that accordingly it did not seem best to me to agitate the matter at present, all the more since it would be easy to settle the boundaries after the signature of the treaty if that suited both monarchs equally. M. Wall replied to me that at least it might be inserted in the treaty

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dans le traité que Sa Mté Cathe cède à la France tous les droits qu'elle peut avoir sur la Louisiane, à condition qu'il sera procédé, dans un terme indiqué et par des commissaires respectifs, au règlement des limites de cette colonie. Il résulte de là, Monsieur, que si vous trouvez que ce règlement puisse convenir à la France, la chose s'arrangera tout de suite.

BUSSY TO CHOISEUL, July 26, 1761

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 444:59]

1e Lettre

No 22.

Reçu le 29.

repondu?

A LONDRES le 26. Juillet 1761

Rep. le 5. Aoust.

MONSEIGNEUR.

.....
65v....

Je passai ensuite, Monseigneur, aux articles du mémoire des

[*Translation*]

that His Catholic Majesty cedes France all the rights he may have over Louisiana on condition that they proceed within a specified time and by commissaries to the regulation of the boundaries of that colony. Accordingly, Monsieur, if you find that this regulation may be agreeable to France, the thing will be arranged forthwith.....

First letter

No. 22

Received the 29th

Answered?

LONDON, July 26, 1761

Answered August 5

MY LORD:

.....
I then went on, My Lord, to the articles of the memoir of

propositions.¹ Je dis, sur le premier, que le roi ne pouvoit mieux marquer sa bonne foi que dans la façon absolüe dont il faisoit ce sacrifice, et surtout dans la garantie qu'il en donnoit, dont la valeur réelle demandoit des compensations; qu'au reste, si l'Angre exigeoit des termes plus forts pour assûrer cette possession, le roi les accorderoit très volontiers. M. Pitt répondit que la renoncia-tion de la France au Canada étoit bien exprimée, et que l'angle-terre en étoit contente; que pour la garantie, il nioit qu'elle valût des compensations; que c'étoit une clause d'usage de se garantir les pays réciproquement cédés; que la France ne pouvoit prétendre

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aucune compensation pour cette cession, puisque l'Angleterre avoit la possession du Canada par le droit de la guerre; que la France n'étoit pas en état de la lui ôter, et qu'elle le lui avoit cédé par la proposition de *l'uti possidetis*; que par conséquent il devoit paroître fort étrange au ministère Britannique que cette puissance

[Translation]

propositions.¹ I said, as to the first, that the king could not better demonstrate his good faith, than by the absolute fashion in which he made this sacrifice, and especially by the guaranty which he gave, the real value of which called for compensation; that further if England demanded stronger terms to assure that possession, the king would very willingly accord them. M. Pitt replied that France's renunciation of Canada was well expressed and that England was satisfied with it. As for the guaranty he denied that it called for compensations; it was a customary clause to guarantee countries reciprocally ceded. France could claim no compensation for that cession, since England had possession of Canada by the right of war; France was in no condition to take it from her, and she had ceded it by the proposition of *uti possidetis*. Consequently it would appear very strange to the British ministry that that power should seek to make her cession a right

¹ At this point of the negotiation Pitt was thoroughly aroused by the French attempt to include a settlement of Spain's differences with England in the Anglo-French treaty. The discussion of course is on the French propositions of July 15, see *ante*, 324. For a general discussion of the situation, see *ante*, civ-cviii.

voulût se faire un droit de cette cession pour demander, dans le second article des propositions, la pêche de la morüe et l'Isle de Louïsbourg. Je deffendis la thèse du mieux qu'il me fut possible, et j'ajoutai que Mr Stanley n'avoit pas fait difficulté de promettre la pêche sur le banc de Terre neuve. M. Pitt répliqua que son sentiment en particulier, ainsi qu'il me l'avoit déclaré, étoit que nous fussions entièrement exclus de la pêche de la morüe, mais que l'article avoit été laissé en suspens dans le conseil du Roi de la Grande Bretagne, et que si l'on se portoit de sa part à 66v

l'accorder, ce ne pourroit être qu'en considération de la démolition de DunKerque dont nous ne faisons aucune mention dans le mémoire, et d'autres avantages considérables; qu'à l'égard de l'Isle Royale ou de l'Isle St Jean, fortifiées ou non l'Angre n'en accorderoit aucune. Je parlai alors de l'Isle Campçeaux comme d'une isle sans conséquence, qui, n'ayant point de grands ports, ne pouvoit servir qu'à une sécherie. Il répliqua qu'il suffisoit que ce fût un etablissement quelconque, que cette isle etoit à l'entrée du Golphe St Laurent, en face de l'Acadie, et que le projet des

[*Translation*]

to demand in the second article of the propositions, the codfishery and the island of Louisburg. I defended our thesis as strongly as possible, and added that M. Stanley had made no difficulty of promising the fishery on the bank of Newfoundland. M. Pitt replied that his private opinion, as he had told me, was that we should be entirely excluded from the codfishery, but that the article had been left unsettled in the council of the King of Great Britain; if it were accorded on their part it could be only in consideration of the demolition of Dunkirk of which we said nothing in our memoir, and of other considerable advantages; that as to Cape Breton or Isle St. John, fortified or not, England would give up neither. I spoke then of the island of Canso as without consequence; having no large harbors it could serve only as a drying ground. He replied that it was enough that it was a foothold; that island was at the entrance of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, in front of Acadia, and the English intention was to give us no

Anglois étoit de ne nous donner aucune communication dans le golfe, par la terre, ni par les isles.

Il me parla ensuite du règlement des limites de la Louisiane, disant qu'il étoit aisé de le faire, si nous ne prétendions pas que tout ce qui étoit Louisiane étoit Canada. Je lui opposai que la possession de la Louisiane, distincte du Canada, comprenoit,

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depuis le Fleuve St Louïs jusques dans les pays d'en haut les plus reculés, toutes les terres qui sont bornées par les lacs jusqu'aux Miamis, et, en descendant jusqu'à la Riviere Oyo dont le confluent en dependoit, toutes les terres des Chouanons et des Cherakis, avec la rivière de ce nom, jusqu'aux Apalaches, y compris les Alibamous.

Il répondit que la Rivière Oyo leur appartenoit, et qu'ils ne s'en désisteroient pas, puisqu'outre le droit, ils en avoient la possession ; mais qu'il falloit remettre le règlement de ces limites à des commres Je répartis que l'on avoit vû l'abus des commissions ; qu'il n'y auroit qu'à avoir une carte commune dont on conviendrait, y marquer avec des lignes tirées par des endroits connus,

[*Translation*]

communication with the gulf, by the mainland or by the islands.

He next spoke of the settlement of the boundaries of Louisiana, saying it was easily done, if we did not claim that all that was not Louisiana was Canada. I answered that the possession of Louisiana, separate from Canada, included all from the Mississippi River to the most distant parts of the upcountry, all the lands bordered by the lakes as far as the Maumee, and, on the other side, it extended as far as the Ohio River, whose mouth was in its dependence ; it included also all the lands of the Shawnee and Cherokee, with the river of that name, as far as the Appalachians, including the Alabamas.

He replied that the Ohio River belonged to them, and they would never give it up, since besides the right they had the possession ; but that the regulation of its boundaries would have to be left to commissaries. I replied we had seen the abuses of commissaries ; all that was necessary was to have a common agreed map on which the boundaries of the two territories should be

les bornes des deux territoires, et laisser un terrain neutre entre l'oyo et les Apalaches, en interdisant le passage tant aux Anglois qu'aux François. Sur quoi, M. Pitt renvoya l'examen de cette affaire à un autre tems.

.....

[*Translation*]

marked with lines drawn by known points, leaving a neutral zone between the Ohio and the Appalachians with passage prohibited to both English and French. On this M. Pitt postponed the examination of the affair to another time.

.....

PITT'S ULTIMATUM, July 29, 1761¹

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 444:87]

A VERSAILLES le 29. Juillet 1761.

Paper of Points, to be delivered by Mr Stanley to the Duc de Choiseul, as containing the Ultimatum of the Court of Great Britain.

1st—His Britannick Majesty will never depart from the total and entire Cession, on the part of France, without new Limits, or any Exception whatever, of all Canada, and it's Dependencies;—Neither will His Majesty ever relax as to the full Cession, on the part of France, of the Island of Cap Breton, and of all other Islands in the Gulph and River of St. Lawrence, together with that Right of Fishery, inherent in the possession of all the Coasts of the same, and of the Streights and Passages leading thereto.

2dly—With regard to fixing the Boundaries of Louisiana, whether with respect to Canada, or to the English Possessions lying towards the Ohio, or on the Side of Virginia, It can never be admitted, that All, which is not Canada, is Louisiana, nor that the Boundaries of the last mentioned Province do extend to the

¹ These proposals were drawn by Pitt in the height of his wrath at the French attempt to include the Anglo-Spanish disputes in the peace treaty. He dispatched them in English, directing Stanley to translate and present them. Stanley protested at being saddled with the responsibility of finding the exact French equivalents for Pitt's explosive English.

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Confines of Virginia, or of the British Possessions in the Parts of the Ohio; Nor can the intermediate Nations and Countries, the true Barrier between the said Provinces, be, on any Account directly or virtually, given up to France, by suffering Them to be brought within the Description of the Boundaries of Louisiana.

90....

A VERSAILLES le 29eme Juillet 1761

J'ai livré ce cahier a Son Excellence Monsieur Le Duc De Choiseul,

H. STANLEY.¹CHOISEUL'S SPEECH TO THE COUNCIL, August 1, 1761²

[A G Simancas, 4544:85]

SIRE

Je crois que l'on ne peut pas nier que la consideration due à votre couronne est blessé par la forme de l'Angleterre dans la negociation actuelle ainsi que l'usage le plus ordinaire des egards

[*Translation*]

SIRE:

I think it undeniable that the consideration due to your crown is infringed by the tone which England adopts in the present negotiation, inasmuch as the most ordinary respect such as

¹

VERSAILLES, July 29, 1761

I delivered this memorandum to His Excellency, Monsieur le Duc de Choiseul.

H. STANLEY

²This is a copy of Choiseul's speech to the council August 1 [?] on the subject of the foregoing English ultimatum. Choiseul was in part acting to an audience. He had to convince the members of the council who clung to peace at any price; and since he gave Grimaldi a copy he was playing with an eye on Spain. However it fits in with his other expositions of policy, and probably gives his real estimate of the value of the interior of the American Continent. Notice the sarcastic comment on La Galissonière's argument that Canada was the outwork of Louisiana.

que les puissances se doivent entre elles lorsqu'elles negocient a ete negligé.

Le contraste du memoire de propositions qui a ete remis de la part de V. Mte à Londres avec la reponse d'Angleterre est frappant, et l'on ne peut pas se dissimuler que les articles Anglois par le fonds et par la forme semblent etre plustôt des loix dictés par un vainqueur, que des articles à negocier entre puissances egales.

.....
La pêche, Sire, est la vraië pe[rte] [?] du Canada. Je ne cacherai pas à V. Mte que ceux qui ont ete chargés de la negociation des limites du Canada, et qui ont elevé des questions tres facheuses par leur suite sur le plus ou le moins detenduë des possessions des deux nations dans le continent du Canada, se sont trompés selon moy absolument. Le Canada n'est rien sans la pêche; la richesse de ce pays consiste dans l'utilité du Golphe St Laurent, ce golphe

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produit par la pêche une branche de commerce de la plus grande etenduë; Le Canada ne produit presque rien par lui même, et ce

[Translation]

powers owe each other in diplomatic exchanges has been disregarded.

The contrast between the memoir of propositions dispatched to London on Your Majesty's part and the reply of England is a striking one; it cannot be concealed that the English articles in matter and form seem rather to be laws dictated by a conqueror than articles for negotiation between equal powers.

.....
The fishery, Sire, is the real loss in Canada. I will not conceal from Your Majesty that the persons charged with the negotiation of the boundaries of Canada, who raised questions most unfortunate in their consequences, as to the greater or less extent of the possessions of the two nations in the continent of Canada, have been to my mind, absolutely mistaken. Without the fishery, Canada is nothing; the wealth of the country rests in the usefulness of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, which in the fishery supplied a branch of commerce of very great extent. Canada in itself produces almost nothing; and it was understanding the matter ill to

n'étoit point entendre la matiere que de risquer de perdre des millions de commerce, et l'employ de 160 000 hommes, pour augmenter une colonie dont le commerce en pelleteries ne rapporte pas 150 000 francs par an. Quand même l'on admettoit, ce que je n'admets pas, que le Canada fût le boulevard de la Louisianne qui ne rapporte rien à la France; et que l'on pût admettre qu'un boulevard ait 800 lieues de large, et qu'une puissance maritime telle que l'Angleterre attaquera la Louisianne par les terres et par [fit] traverser à ses troupes ces huit cents lieues, j'aparerais toujours que la pêche de la morue dans le Golphe St. Laurent vaut infiniment mieux pour le royaume de France que le Canada et la Louisianne.

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Je crois donc Sire, avoir fait connoitre à V. Mté l'étenduë de la cession demandée par l'Angleterre, qu'il auroit été à desirer, de diminuer selon le memoire des propositions que j'avois envoyé à Londres de la part de V. Mté et je pensois que l'avantage de l'Angleterre auroit encore été assés considerable; mais la concurrence auroit subsisté, et l'activité ainsi que l'intelligence des Fran-

[Translation]

risk the loss of millions in commerce, and the employment of 160,000 men to enlarge a colony whose peltry trade does not produce 150,000 *francs* a year. Even were one to admit, what I do not admit, that Canada was the outwork of Louisiana, which also brings in nothing to France; or to admit further that an outwork should be eight hundred leagues long, and that a maritime power like England will attack Louisiana by land, sending her troops across these eight hundred leagues, I will still insist that the cod-fishery in the Gulf of St. Lawrence is worth infinitely more to the kingdom of France than Canada and Louisiana.

I think then, Sire, having thus acquainted Your Majesty with the extent of the cession demanded by England, that it would have been desirable to diminish it according to the memoir of proposals that I had sent to London on behalf of Your Majesty; I thought then that England's advantage over us would have been great enough; but still our chance of competition would have remained, and the activity and intelligence of the French in that

cois p[] ce genre de commerce auroient supplées au peu de moyens qui le[] restoient.

Les limites de la Louisianne proposées par l'Angleterre sont très desavantageuses à la France. Elles sont contraires aux traités precedents, mais pe pense que pour le bien de la paix cet article peut etre accordé.

.....
Ainsi, Sire, je pense que V. Mté ne peut pas admettre les propositions qui peuvent nuire à ses allies, telles que celles de l'evacuation de Wesel, et de Gueldres.

Je pense aussi, Sire, que V. Mté ne doit pas sacrifier une
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branche de commerce aussi pretieuse que la pêche, et qu'il ne peut pas arriver par la continuation de la guerre une perte plus considerable au royaume. Et quand bien même les ennemis s'empareroient des deux ou trois colonies qui nous restent, l'on ne peut pas croire que l'Europe ne se liguât en entier pour les forcer de les restituer, et il faut tenter le sort des armes, et la jonction de l'Espagne à la France pour n'avoir rien à se reprocher sur une

[*Translation*]

branch of commerce would have supplemented the small facilities left them.

The boundaries of Louisiana proposed by England are very disadvantageous to France. They are contrary to preceding treaties but I think for the blessing of peace that article might be accorded.

.....
Accordingly, Sire, I think Your Majesty cannot admit proposals which may harm your allies, such as those for the evacuation of Wesel and of Guelders.

I think, also, Sire, that Your Majesty should not sacrifice so precious a branch of trade as the fishery, and that no more serious loss to the realm can come through a continuation of the war. Even if our enemies got possession of the two or three colonies which remain to us, it cannot be believed that all Europe will not league together to force their restitution to us. We must try the chance of arms, and joining Spain to France, rather than reproach

cession aussi considerable.

Mon avis est donc, Sire, de ne point admettre les propositions de l'Angleterre, d'y faire une réponse douce pour gagner du tems, que je communiquerai à son conseil Dimanche. D'envoyer en Espagne les reponses d'Angleterre; et de relever le procedé relativement au memoire qui concerne cette couronne; de proposer au Roy d'Espagne de prendre en depôt Minorque pour que nous puissions nous servir des troupes qui y sont et menager cette depense, de demander au Roi d'Espagne s'il veut acheter la Louisianne, et si ce marché lui convient, de faire un arrangement

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de banquier sur cet objet qui sera necessaire au soutien des fonds pour la campagne prochaine et la suivante; il faut aussi proposer au Roy d'Espagne de se declarer cette année plustôt que l'année prochaine; pendant que ces propositions iront à Madrid, notre memoire sera remis en Angleterre, et nous en verrons le succès.

Je pense en outre qu'il faut informer les deux imperatrices de la fidelité et de la fermeté de V. Mté pour ses engagemens. Enfin

[*Translation*]

ourselves with having made such a cession.

My advice, then, Sire, is, in no wise to admit the English proposals, but to make a soft reply to gain time, which I will communicate to your council Sunday; to send the English answer to Spain, and to stress the proceeding on the memorial concerning that crown; to propose to the King of Spain to garrison Minorca that we may use the troops there and economize on that expense; to ask the King of Spain if he wishes to buy Louisiana, and if the purchase appeals to him to make a banking arrangement to that end, such as will be necessary for the support of the public credit for the next campaign and for the one to follow it. We should also propose to the King of Spain to declare himself this year rather than next. While these proposals go to Madrid, our memoir will be sent to England, and we will see what success it has.

I further think it necessary to inform the two empresses of Your Majesty's fidelity to your engagements. Finally, Sire, I

je crois, Sire, qu'il faut continuer la guerre plustôt que d'acquiescer à des conditions aussi insoutenables pour le fonds que pour la forme, et que quand la negociation sera rompuë, il est important d'imprimer et de publier les propositions de V. Mté à l'Angleterre, et les reponses imperieuses et atroces [?] de cette puissance.

ULTIMATUM OF FRANCE, August 5, 1761¹

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 444:118]

Envoyé a M. de Bussy le 5. Aoust 1761.

No 22.

Ultimatum de la cour de france, qui servira de réplique à l'ultimatum de la cour d'angleterre, remis au Duc de Choiseul par M. de Stanley.

Le roi renouvelle la déclaration qu'il a faite à S. M. B. dans le mémoire de propositions de paix qui a été remis à M. de Stanley, et à laquelle la cour d'ange n'a répondu, ni par écrit, ni

[*Translation*]

think it necessary to continue the war rather than acquiesce in such unbearable conditions both in matter and form; when the negotiation is broken off it will be important to print and publish Your Majesty's proposals to England, and the imperious and outrageous replies of that power.

Sent to M. de Bussy

August 5, 1761

No. 22

Ultimatum of the French court, which will serve as reply to the ultimatum of the court of England communicated to the Duc de Choiseul by M. de Stanley

The king renews the declaration he made to His Britannic Majesty in the memoir of proposals of peace communicated to M. de Stanley, to which declaration the court of England has replied

¹ At this point Choiseul was for the moment uncertain whether the Spanish alliance, on which he had relied as an alternative to an English peace, might not fall through. See *ante*, cviii-cix.

verbalement. Sa Mté déclare donc de nouveau que si la négociation entamée à Paris et à Londres pour le rétablissement de la paix entre les deux couronnes n'a pas le succès désiré, tous les points accordés dans cette négociation par la France ne pourront estre représentés, dans aucun cas, comme des points convenus, non plus que le mémoire du mois de mars dernier relativement à *l'uti possidetis*.

1. Le roi consent de céder le Canada à l'Angleterre dans la
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forme la plus étendue énoncée dans le mémoire de propositions ; mais S. M. ne se départira pas des conditions quelle a mises dans ledit mémoire relativement à la religion Catholique et à la faculté, facilité, et liberté pour l'émigration des anciens sujets du roi. Quant à la pêche dans le golfe St Laurent, le roi entend maintenir le droit immémorial qu'ont ses sujets de pêcher dans le dit golfe et la liberté de sécher sur les costes de l'Isle de Terre neuve, telle quelle est convenüe par le Traité d'Utrecht. Comme ce droit seroit illusoire, si les vaisseaux François n'avoient pas un abri apparte-

[Translation]

neither in writing nor verbally. His Majesty therefore once more declares that if the negotiation undertaken at Paris and London for the reestablishment of peace between the two crowns has not the desired success, none of the points conceded in this negotiation by France can ever in any case be represented as points agreed on, any more than the memoir of March last relating to the *uti possidetis*.

1. The king consents to cede Canada to England in the most extended form, as set forth in the memoir of proposals ; but His Majesty will not depart from the conditions inserted in the memoir in question regarding the Catholic religion and the opportunity, facility, and freedom for the emigration of the former subjects of the king. As to the fishery in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the king intends to maintain the immemorial right of his subjects to fish in the said gulf, and the freedom of drying on the coasts of Newfoundland, as is allowed by the Treaty of Utrecht. As this right would be illusory if French vessels had no shelter belonging

nant à la france dans le golfe. Le roi avoit proposé au Roi de la grande Brete la restitution de l'Isle du Cap Breton, il propose de nouveau ou cette isle, ou celle de St Jean ou tel autre port sans fortification dans le golfe ou a portée du golfe qui puisse servir

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d'abri aux vaisseaux françois, et conserver à la france la liberté de la pêche dont S M n'a pas intention de se départir

2 Le roi n'a dit, nulle part dans son memoire de propositions, que tout ce qui n'étoit pas Canada étoit Louisiane. on n'imagine pas même comment pareille assertion auroit pu être avancée. La france demande, au contraire, que les nations intermédiaires entre le Canada et la Louisiane, ainsi qu'entre la Virginie et la Louisiane, soient regardées comme des nations neutres, indépendantes de la domination des deux courones, et servent de barrière entre elles. Si le ministère anglois avoit voulu écouter les instructions de Mr de Bussy sur cet objet, il auroit vu que la france convenoit de la propoñ de l'Angleterre.

.....

[*Translation*]

to France in the gulf, the king had proposed to the King of Great Britain the restitution of the island of Cape Breton. He once more proposes that island or that of St. John or some other port without fortification in or near the gulf which may serve as a shelter to French vessels, and as a means of retaining for France the right to the fishery, which His Majesty has no intention of abandoning.

2. The king has nowhere said in his memoir of proposals that all that was not Canada was Louisiana. It is hard to see how such an assertion could have been made. France demands, on the contrary, that the tribes between Canada and Louisiana like those between Virginia and Louisiana may be considered neutral tribes, independent of the domination of either crown, and may serve as a buffer between them. If the English ministry had been willing to listen to M. de Bussy's instructions on that point, it would have seen that France was in accord with the English proposal.

.....

MEMOIR ON THE BOUNDARIES OF LOUISIANA, August 10, 1761¹

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 444:150]

Envoyé copie à M de Bussy

le 10. Aoust 1761.

Mémoire sur les limites à donner à la Louïsiane
du côté des colonies Angloises du côté du
Canada en cas de cession de ce dernier pays

Dans l'incertitude où est la France que la position des affaires ne la décide à céder le Canada à l'Angleterre, la véritable manière de raisonner au plan général de limites pour la Louïsiane tant du côté des colonies angloises que du côté du Canada; est de commencer par se tracer un tableau des avantages naturels de la Louïsiane et du Canada. Le but de cette marche est d'avoir un résultat qui serve de guide dans l'opération:

[*Translation*]

Copy sent to M. de Bussy,

August 10, 1761

Memoir on the limits to assign to Louisiana on
the side of the English colonies and on the side
of Canada, in the event of the cession of the
last named country

In the uncertainty in which France is whether the posture of affairs may not decide her to cede Canada to England, the proper manner of reasoning on a general plan of boundaries for Louisiana, both on the side of the English colonies and on the side of Canada, is to begin by drawing a picture of the natural advantages of Louisiana and Canada. The purpose of this is to obtain a result which may serve as a guide in the delimitation.

¹ This memoir is a most interesting piece of work. It reveals much of the policy behind the French proffers of cessions to England in the interior of North America. Its proposal of switching the fur trade of the Great Lakes from Montreal to New Orleans was actually achieved by the French of the Illinois during Pontiac's conspiracy. It is an interesting testimony to the importance of the Chicago Portage in the later French period. The Chicago Portage was called by the French the Portage of the Oaks, from the Point of Oaks—the oak grove still existing that was the landmark of the Desplaines River end of the portage.

Car les parties belligerantes en Amerique n'ont point pour
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objet dans la guerre actuelle l'étendue de terrain mais seulement les fruits qui se tirent des païs contentieux entre elles

Sous ce point de vûe l'esprit dans lequel on doit travailler à l'établissement des limites de la Louïsiane est de les régler de maniere qu'elles n'enlèvent aucun des avantages qui rendent cette colonie et celle du Canada de quelque prix pour la France ou qu'elles n'en fassent perdre que le moins possible.

C'est le point principal et même unique dès que ce point ne souffrira pas d'atteinte quelque étendue que soit la cession de terrain, elle devient indifférente. Peut être même est elle utile. Des avantages rassemblés dans un espace moindre paroissent préférables aux mêmes avantages dispersés dans un plus grand espace

Ce principe n'est ni nouveau ni dicté par les circonstances:
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Le ministere a plus d'une fois été tenté de l'appliquer à la

[*Translation*]

For the object of the belligerents in America in the present war is in no wise mere extent of territory but rather the fruits which may be enjoyed from the lands over which they contend.

With this point of view, the principle on which we should work in establishing the boundaries of Louisiana is to arrange them in such fashion that they may take away none of the advantages which render that colony and Canada of any value to France, or rather that they may entail the loss of as few as possible.

This is the most important and indeed the only consideration. If it is taken into proper account, the extent of the territory ceded, however great, becomes a matter of indifference. Possibly it may even be beneficial. Advantages concentrated in a small area seem preferable to the same advantages dispersed over a larger area.

This principle is neither new, nor dictated by present circumstances. The ministry has more than once been tempted to apply it

Louïsiane en resserant ses établissemens. Des mémoires faits de bonne main prouvent que par ce système les progrès de la colonie auroient été plus prompts, sa consistance plus solide, et les dépenses du roi pour elle moins fortes

Avant donc de présenter aucunes idées sur les limites de la Louïsiane, il convient d'exposer en quoi consistent les avantages naturels, de cette colonie et du Canada; et en quoi ils intéressent la France.

Ces deux colonies embrassent de vastes païs remplis de contrées fertiles et dont le climat est sain quoique la température en soit fort différente dans les parties situées sous les parallèles les plus éloignés.

Le Canada fournit des grains, des légumes, du chanvre, des
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bestiaux, des cuirs, des pelleteries, parmi les quelles est l'article du castor, des bois de charpente et de bordage, du gaudron, du gen-sing, du fer, de l'huile de poisson. Il a des mines de plomb.

La Louïsiane donne du coton, de l'huile, du bled, des légumes, de l'indigo, de la cire végétale, du ris, du tabac, du suif, du vin, des bois de charpente, des pelleteries, des cuirs, des chairs salées,

[*Translation*]

to Louisiana by concentrating its settlements. Memoirs drawn by good hands prove that by such a policy the progress of the colony would have been more rapid, its solidity greater, and the king's expenses for it much less.

Therefore, before setting forth any ideas on the boundaries of Louisiana, it seems best to demonstrate in what the natural advantages of that colony and of Canada consist, and in what respect they are of importance for France. These two colonies include vast territories full of fertile lands, with healthful climates, though with temperatures varying widely in regions on the parallels of latitude that are farthest apart. Canada supplies grain, vegetables, hemp, cattle, leather, peltry, especially beaver, lumber and planking, moldings, ginseng, iron, fish-oil. There are lead mines. Louisiana furnishes cotton, oil, wheat, vegetables, indigo, vegetable wax, rice, tobacco, fats, wine, lumber, peltry,

du gaudron etc Ses montagnes enferment des mines de cuivre et d'autres métaux.

Les pelleteries singulièrement le castor, les cuirs, les bois de construction et le gaudron sont la partie la plus intéressante des productions du Canada en ce que la vieille France ne peut y suppléer par son sol.

La Louïisiane offre plus d'objets qui manquent à la france,
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tels que le coton, l'indigo, le ris, le tabac, les pelleteries, les bois de charpente, le gaudron Eca. Cette colonie nous importe encore par quelques unes de ses productions qui lui sont communes avec la métropole; telles que l'huile et le vin non pour y recueillir ces denrées mais pour empêcher les Anglois qui en manquent d'en profiter.

Au reste tous ces objets dans la Louïisiane sont plus en possibilité qu'en réalité. Son commerce ne va pas à douze cens mille livres par an. L'indigo en fait la très grande partie. Les récoltes de cette denrée alloient avant la guerre a plus de 800 mille francs. Les autres retours sont principalement en peaux de chevreuil et en bois de charpente à l'usage des isles. Mais enfin, en possédant ces

[Translation]

leathers, salt meat, moldings, etc. The mountains contain mines of copper and other metals. Peltry, especially beaver, leathers, timber, and moldings are the most important of the productions of Canada which old France cannot supply from her own soil. Louisiana supplies articles lacking in France such as cotton, indigo, rice, tobacco, and peltry, lumber, moldings, etc. The colony is also worthy consideration from some of its products which are the same as those of the mother country, such as oil and wine, not for the products themselves but for preventing the English from profiting by them.

For the rest, all these products in Louisiana are more possibilities than realities. Its commerce is not worth 1,200,000 *livres* a year. Indigo is the greater part of it. The crops of that article before the war amounted to more than 800,000 *francs*. The other exports are principally deerskins and lumber for the islands. But,

differentes sources de produit on peut se flatter que dans un temps plus ou moins éloigné, on en tirera le parti qu'elles offrent. Au moins est il bien certain qu'entre les mains des Anglois ces sources

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ne seroient pas négligées.

Il y a près de quatre vingts ans que le premier établissement a été fait à la Louïsiane. Cependant dans les différens postes de cette colonie depuis la mer jusqu'aux ilinois, c'est-à-dire, dans une étendue de cinq cens lieües d'excellentes terres tant sur le Mississipi que sur la mobile et aux alibamous, on ne compte pas six mille habitans dont il y en a quatre mille à la Nouvelle Orléans. Si les anglois étoient maîtres de cette contrée fertile coupée de tant de rivières et où l'air est parfaitement sain en moins de cinquante ans elle seroit couverte d'habitations et le produit en seroit immense.

De ce court exposé, il résulte deux points. L'un que la conservation du Canada n'intéressant la France que par rapport à quelques productions, si en cédant le Canada l'on se ménage des

[*Translation*]

possessing these various sources of commodities, we can always flatter ourselves that in a more or less distant future we shall take advantage of them. At least it is very certain that these sources in the hands of the English will not be neglected.

It is almost eighty years since the first settlement was made in Louisiana. However in the different posts of that colony from the sea up to the Illinois, that is in an extent of five hundred leagues of excellent lands both on the Mississippi, the Mobile, and the Alabama, there are not six thousand inhabitants, four thousand of whom are at New Orleans. If the English were masters of that fertile country, drained by so many rivers, and in which the air is perfectly healthful, in less than fifty years it would be covered with dwellings and its production would be very great.

From this short exposition two points result. One is that since the preservation of Canada concerns France only with reference to its products, if Canada were ceded with boundaries so manipulated as to preserve those products to France, the cession

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limites qui conservent à la France ces mêmes productions, la cession de cette colonie n'est point une perte.

L'autre est que quelque partie que l'on cède de la Louisiane, si les limites fixées par le traité de paix sont combinées de manière qu'elles mettent les Anglois hors d'état de tirer parti du terrain qui leur sera cédé; et qu'elles ni nous empêchent point de faire valoir celui qui nous restera, cette cession n'a rien qui doive affecter.

Il faut observer que les pelleteries et le castor surtout sont épuisés aux environs de Québec, et qu'à cent lieues autour de cette ville on n'en ramasse plus depuis longtemps. Les pelleteries et les castors que les Canadiens commercent (article montant à 1800 mille livres par an) leur viennent de très loin du côté de l'ouest et du

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nord. Ces marchandises parviennent entre leurs mains de deux manières: Par les Outouais et par d'autres sauvages voisins des bords occidentaux du Lac Supérieur qui descendent les lacs jusqu'à Mont-real; ou par les coureurs de bois c'est à dire, par les colons qui font la traite des pelleteries dans les bois. Ceux-ci

[Translation]

of the colony could in no sense be considered a loss. The other is, that whatever part of Louisiana you cede, if the boundaries arranged by the treaty of peace put it out of the power of the English to derive any advantage from what is ceded them, and do not bar us from using what remains to us, the cession is nothing which should grieve us.

It must be observed that the peltry, and especially the beaver, is exhausted in the vicinity of Québec, and that for a hundred leagues around that city none has been obtained for a long time. The peltry and beaver for which the Canadian trade (an article amounting to 1,800,000 *livres* a year) come to them from very far off to the west and north. These goods reach their hands in two ways; from the Ottawa and other Indians of the western shores of Lake Superior who come down the lakes to Montreal, and from the *coureurs de bois* or colonists who carry on the fur trade in

remontent les lacs, et vont trafiquer dans le païs des sauvages dont on vient de parler, ou bien ils se rendent à l'extrémité méridionale du Lac Michigan, d'où au moyen d'un portage fort court, que l'on nomme le portage aux chênes, ils descendent par la rivière des Illinois dans le Mississippi. Ils remontent ensuite ce fleuve et quelquefois aussi le Missouri et traitent avec les Panis, les sioux et d'autres nations nombreuses qui habitent dans le nord de la Louisiane.

Ces coureurs de bois vont ainsi à huit cent lieües de Quebec chercher les peaux qu'ils y rapportent. Il est aisé de voir en jet-

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tant les yeux sur la carte qu'ils auroient un voyage moins long et moins pénible pour se rendre à la nouvelle Orléans qu'à Quebec; et que les sauvages qui vont porter leur chasse à Montreal auroient moins de chemin et un chemin moins dangereux en ce qu'il les exposerait moins aux embuscades des sauvages leurs ennemis pour l'apporter sur les bords méridionaux du Lac Michigan près des quels est le poste des Illinois un des mieux établis de la Louisiane. Il n'y a qu'à vouloir attirer ce commerce

[Translation]

the forests. These last ascend the lakes and trade in the country of the Indians just mentioned; or rather they repair to the southern end of Lake Michigan from which, by means of a very short portage, called the Portage of the Oaks, they descend the Illinois River to the Mississippi. They then ascend that last river and sometimes the Missouri and trade with the Pawnee, the Sioux, and other numerous tribes dwelling in northern Louisiana.

These *coureurs de bois* go eight hundred leagues from Quebec in search of the furs they bring back. It is easy to see by casting your eye on a map, that they would have a shorter and less toilsome journey by going to New Orleans rather than to Quebec; and that the Indians who carry their catch to Montreal would have a shorter and less dangerous trail, in that it would expose them less to the ambuscades of hostile Indians, if they carried it to the southern shores of Lake Michigan near which is the post of the Illinois, one of the best settled in Louisiana. It is enough to wish

du côté du Mississipi pour lui faire abandonner le fleuve de St. Laurent.

A cette observation concernant les pelleteries, il faut ajouter, au sujet des cuirs, du gaudron et des bois de construction que l'on tire du Canada 1 qu'une grande partie de ces cuirs vient des mêmes contreés ou les coureurs de bois vont chercher les pelle-
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teries: 2 que les forests dont sont couverts les païs arrosés par le Missouri par le Mississipi et par les rivières sans nombre, qui se déchargent dans ces deux fleuves fourniront, quand on voudra prendre pour cela les soins nécessaires autant de gaudron et de bois de bordage ou de charpente que l'on pourra avoir besoin.

En sorte que pour ne rien perdre des produits du Canada, en cédant cette province, la seule attention qu'il y ait à faire dans l'établissement des limites de la Louïsiane de ce côté, paroît être de se conserver la navigation exclusive du Lac Michigan, du Lac Huron et du Lac Supérieur, afin que les sauvages du nord et du nordouest aient un accès facile et sûr au poste des Illinois

[Translation]

to draw the trade off to the Mississippi, to have it leave the St. Lawrence River.

To this observation on peltries, must be added one on the leather, moldings, and timber which comes from Canada. 1. A large part of the leather comes from the same lands where the *coureurs de bois* go in search of peltry. 2. The forests which cover the countries watered by the Missouri, by the Mississipi, and by numberless rivers which flow into the two named will supply, if you take the necessary pains, as much molding, planking, or lumber as will be needed.

Accordingly, to lose none of the products of Canada when that province is ceded, the only care necessary in settling the boundaries of Louisiana on that side would seem to be to secure the exclusive navigation of Lake Michigan, Lake Huron, and Lake Superior, in order that the Indians of the north and north-west may have an easy and sure access to the Illinois post.

Il n'est plus question que de voir jusqu'à quel point en cas
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que l'on soit obligé de resserrer la louïsiane du côté des colonies anglaises, on peut la reserrer sans diminuer le produit actuel et espéré de cette possession et sans augmenter les ressources que la nation anglaise tire du continent de l'Amérique septentrionale.

La partie de la Louïsiane addossée aux Apalaches est sans contredit, comme le reste de cette province, une contrée favorisée de la nature. Le sol y est excellent, le climat sain, le pays uni et arrosé de beaucoup de rivières la plus part grandes et navigables qui tombent dans le Mississipi et ouvrent par là jusqu'à la mer un débouché facile. Mais sans cette dernière circonstance tous les autres avantages seroient stériles. Les productions de la terre étant en nature, forment des masses d'un grand encombrement. Lorsque le viable n'est pas aisé, comme il dévient alors dispendieux, on les néglige.

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Il suit de là que sans le Mississipi ce pays si fécond n'auroit aucune utilité pour l'Europe, et qu'il suffit, en le cédant aux anglais, de les éloigner de ce fleuve pour qu'ils n'aient d'autre

[*Translation*]

It is only a question of seeing how far, in case Louisiana has to be restricted on the side of the English colonies, it can be restricted without diminishing the present and future production of that possession, and without increasing the resources which the English nation draws from the North American Continent.

The part of Louisiana behind the Appalachians is beyond dispute like the rest of the province, a country favored by nature. The soil is excellent, the climate healthful, the country united and watered by many large and navigable rivers which empty into the Mississippi and open thence an easy outlet to the sea. But without that last circumstance all the other advantages would be barren. The products of the land being primary are bulky. When transportation is not easy, they become costly and are neglected. As a result, without the Mississippi this fertile land would be of no use to Europe; in ceding it to the English it suffices to keep them away from that river to make sure that they will have no

fruit de cette cession que la possession vaine d'un terrain sans valeur.

La position de cette partie est heureusement telle qu'elle ne peut avoir de communication utile avec les possessions angloises aux quelles elle est cependant contigue. Aucunes des eaux qui l'arrosent ne coulent de leur côté et les montagnes des Apalaches rendent tout portage sinon impossible au moins d'une difficulté qui, en fait de commerce équivaut à l'impossibilité.

D'après ces réflexions, on croit pouvoir proposer pour limites de la Louïsiane du côté des colonies Angloises et du Canada supposé cédé à l'Angleterre, une ligne qui s'étendrait à peu près du

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sud au nord et qui commençant à l'embouchûre de Rio perdido entre la baye de la mobile et celle de Pensacola, iroit obliquement, en passant par le fort Toulouse qui est chez les Alibamous par la pointe occidentale du Lac Errié en enfermant la rivière des Miamis, et par l'extrémité orientale du lac Huron, aboutir à la hauteur des terres du côté de la Baye de Hudson vers le Lac des Abitibis.

[*Translation*]

other fruit from the cession than the vain possession of a worthless land.

The position of that section happily is such that it can have no useful communication with the English possessions even with those adjacent to it. None of the streams that water it come from their side, and the Appalachian mountains make any portage, if not impossible, at least so difficult as to make trade almost impossible.

After all these considerations, it is thought that a boundary may be proposed for Louisiana on the side of the English colonies and of Canada, supposing it ceded to England, namely a line extending nearly north and south beginning at the mouth of Rio Perdido between the Bays of Mobile and Pensacola, passing obliquely by Fort Toulouse among the Alabama, to the westernmost point of Lake Erie, including the Maumee, and, by the eastern end of Lake Huron, attaining the height of land toward Hudson Bay near Lake Abitibi. It is easy to rest this line on a

Il est aisé de faire reposer cette ligne sur un plus grand nombre d'endroits et peut être cela seroit-il nécessaire dans le traité pour éviter les incertitudes et obvier aux empiétemens de part et d'autre. On s'en est dispensé dans ce mémoire par l'amour de la brièveté et par la considération que ce détail n'étoit pas nécessaire pour l'intelligence sommaire de l'idée.

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On n'a fait aucun usage dans le plan de limites qu'on vient de tracer du système trivial qui prend la pente des eaux ou plutôt la hauteur des terres pour règle dans le cas où les conventions n'ont pas encore formé de droits. Deux raisons en ont détourné.

1 Les Anglois ont poussé différens postes au-delà des Apalaches tant sur l'ohio que sur la rivière des cheraquis ou chiroquois. On n'a pas dû se flatter qu'ils consentiroient à s'en détacher pour rentrer dans leurs montagnes.

2 Les Apalaches s'étendent d'une manière très irrégulière. Les prendre pour bornes indéfiniment dans un si grand espace, ce seroit jeter le germe de litiges sans fin. Ces montagnes que les cartes ordinaires représentent fort mal, pourroient être des

[*Translation*]

greater number of points and perhaps it will be necessary to do so in the treaty to avoid uncertainties and obviate hindrances on either side. In this memoir it is dispensed with for love of brevity and because detail is unnecessary for a summary understanding of the idea.

No use has been made in the boundary plan just outlined, of the trivial scheme of taking the watershed, or rather the height of land as a rule where rights are not yet established. Two reasons have prevented.

1. The English have pushed various posts beyond the Appalachians both on the Ohio and on the Tennessee. We must not flatter ourselves that they will consent to abandon them and to retire into their mountains.

2. The Appalachians extend in a very irregular manner. To take them generally for limits in so great a region would be to sow the seed of endless controversies. These mountains, which are ill represented on ordinary maps, might be natural boundaries

bornes naturelles entre les possessions respectives des deux nations

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du côté des sources de l'ohio dans l'endroit où les Anglois leur donnent le nom d'Alleghanes. Mais derriere la Virginie elles prennent une largeur qui occupe plus de cent vingt cinq lieues d'étendüe, et derrière la Caroline elles font une point du côté de l'ouëst qui vient aboutir au Mississipi vis-à-vis l'endroit que l'on nomme Kappas.¹

Les Apalaches ne présentent donc point un moyen uniforme et simple de fixer les limites entre les possessions des deux couronnes de france et d'Angleterre. On a pris l'idée de les faire servir à cet usage sur des cartes inexactes qui donnoient ces montagnes autrement qu'elles ne sont. Si l'on ne vouloit pas quitter ce systême, il suivroit de la direction de leur chaîne qu'il faudroit abandonner aux anglois tout le païs depuis Kappas le long de la rive orientale du Mississipi jusqu'à la mer. puis que telle est

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la pente des eaux. De cette façon ils seroient les maistres de toute la Louïsiane

[*Translation*]

between the respective possessions of the two nations on the side of the sources of the Ohio, in the region where the English call them the Alleghenies. But behind Virginia they acquire a depth of more than 125 leagues and behind Carolina they form a point to the west which abuts on the Mississippi near the place called Kappas.¹

The Appalachians then do not offer a uniform and simple means of establishing boundaries between the possessions of the two crowns of France and England. The idea of making them answer that purpose has been gained from inexact maps which show these mountains other than they are. If that plan were not abandoned, the direction of their chain would necessitate abandoning to the English all the country from Kappas to the sea along the east bank of the Mississippi, for that is the watershed. Thus they would be masters of Louisiana.

¹ Kappas was located at the mouth of the St. Francis River.

Le parti de prendre une ligne imaginaire pour bornes des établissemens respectifs des deux nations paroît devoir s'exécuter aisément et nettement. On a eû déjà recours à un semblable expédient dans des occasions à peu près pareilles. L'histoire de la découverte du nouveau monde en fournit un exemple dans la ligne de marcation donnée par Alexandre VI en 1493 et dans celle de démarcation dont les Portugais et les Espagnols convinrent entre eux.

La ligne conventionnelle que l'on propose ici ne laisseroit pour la suite une fois qu'elle seroit consentie, aucun sujet de contestation fondé sur des incertitudes de bonne foi. De plus les points par lesquels l'on fait passer cette ligne accordent aux anglois tout ce qu'ils peuvent demander avec quelque ombre de justice ou par quelque motif d'intérêt présent. Ils ne perdent

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aucun de leurs postes avancés. Ils ont Les sources et une grande partie du cours de l'Ohio, le Lac Errie et le Lac Ontario avec tout le terrain où les six nations iroquoises ont coûtume de faire leurs chasses et un très vaste et excellent païs où la riviere

[*Translation*]

The decision to take an imaginary line to divide the settlements of the two nations would seem capable of easy and clear execution. Similar expedients have already been used on almost similar occasions. The history of the discovery of the New World affords an example in the line of demarcation given by Alexander VI in 1493, and in the line on which the Spaniards and Portuguese agreed between themselves.

The conventional line proposed would, once agreed to, leave no subjects for controversy based on uncertainties existing in good faith. Moreover the points by which the line is made to pass leave the English all they can demand with any shade of justice or by any motive of present interest. They lose none of their advanced posts. They have the sources and much of the course of the Ohio, Lakes Erie and Ontario, with all the lands where the Iroquois Six Nations are accustomed to hunt, and to vast and excellent countries where the Tennessee and several other

des chiroquois et plusieurs autres prennent leur source.

Cependant la France en leur faisant des avantages si capables de les contenter ne perd réellement qu'un terrain de nul prix pour elle. Quelques réflexions qui serviront de résumé en convaincront.

1 L'Ohio qui lui étoit si nécessaire pour maintenir la communication du Canada avec la Louïisiane n'a plus d'utilité pour elle dès qu'elle abandonne ses établissemens sur le fleuve St Laurent. D'ailleurs si l'on avoit à coeur cette communication pour des vûes de conquête dans l'avenir, ce qui ne paroît pas devoir être fort
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prochain, la ligne proposée réserve tout le cours de l'Ouabache et la riviere des Miamis qui forment par les lacs une communication entre le fleuve de St Laurent et le Mississipi aussi facile que l'Ohio quoiqu'elle fasse faire un peu plus de chemin.

2 Elle retrouve dans les différentes parties de la Louïisiane les mêmes retours dont la cession du Canada peut la priver d'où il suit que l'interieur du Canada n'a plus rien qui l'attache puisque

[*Translation*]

rivers have their sources.

However France in affording them advantages so apt to content them really loses only a land of no value for her. Some reflections by way of summary will demonstrate it.

1. The Ohio, which was so necessary for maintaining the communication of Canada with Louisiana, is useless to France when she abandons her settlements on the St. Lawrence River. Moreover if you had that communication at heart for plans of conquest in a future which does not seem very near, the line proposed includes the whole course of the Wabash and the Maumee, which form with the lakes a communication from the St. Lawrence River to the Mississippi as easy as the Ohio, even if a little longer.

2. France finds in the various parts of Louisiana the same advantages of which the cession of Canada would deprive her; from which it follows that the interior of Canada no longer has anything to attract her, once she can give it up without losing

elle peut y renoncer sans perdre le commerce des pelleteries et du castor. Or ce sont les fruits de la terre et non l'étendue de terrain que peuvent, aux yeux de la raison fonder l'amour de la propriété.

3 En cedant beaucoup de terrain de cette manière dans la Louïsiane même la France en conserve encore assez pour recevoir autant de productions de ce pays qu'elle en peut désirer ; et par ses

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cessions elle ne donne en effet à ses rivaux rien dont ils puissent tirer de profit à cause des difficultés que la nature du terrain oppose pour eux au transport des denrées dès qu'ils ne peuvent approcher du Mississipi.

[*Translation*]

the peltry and beaver trade. The produce of the land and not its extent induces a desire for its possession to the eyes of the wise.

3. In ceding much territory in this fashion even in Louisiana France keeps enough to procure as much of the produce of the country as she can desire ; and by her cessions she gives to her rivals nothing from which they can make a profit inasmuch as the difficulties imposed on them by the nature of the terrain prevents them from moving their produce once they are prevented from approaching the Mississippi.

CHAPTER XI

THE BOUNDARY OF LOUISIANA AND CANADA, AUGUST-SEPTEMBER, 1761: THE VAUDREUIL MAP

BUSSY TO CHOISEUL, August 18, 1761

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 444:164]

No 29.

Reçu le 22.

A LONDRES le 18. août 1761

MONSEIGNEUR.

.....
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Le règlement des limites de la Louisiane fut le second objet de discussion. M. Pitt prétendit que l'Angre avoit la souveraineté du cours de l'oyo, et que l'espace du terrain qui est entre cette rivière et les colonies Angloises, leur appartenoit, par la cession que les sauvages leur en avoient faite. Je lui opposai les raisons que les commissaires du roy ont alléguées, dans le tems, contre cette pretention: je parlai ensuite de la façon de régler les

[*Translation*]

No. 29

Received the 22nd

LONDON, August 18, 1761

MY LORD:

.....
The settlement of the boundaries of Louisiana was the second object of discussion. M. Pitt claimed that England had the sovereignty of the course of the Ohio, and that the stretch of territory between that river and the English colonies belonged to them by the cession of it their Indians had made them. I countered with the reasons that the king's commissaries formerly alleged against this claim; I then spoke of the manner of arrang-

limites de la Louisiane; mais comme je n'avois pas sur moi le
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mémoire que contenoit votre dépêche du 10, je n'ai pû envoyer que ce matin à M. Pitt l'idée sommaire de cet arrangement tel qu'il est dans led. memoire;¹ et comme M. Pitt m'a prié d'aller conférer là dessus avec lui demain matin, je n'entrerais pas dans une plus long discours sur cet objet. Je me bornerai à vous prier de m'envoyer un détail très circonstancié des lieux par où la ligne de démarcation doit passer, surtout depuis le Fort Toulouse, d'où l'on passe tout d'un coup à la partie occidentale du Lac Erié, quoiqu'il y ait un espace immense de terrain depuis ce fort jusqu'au dit lac.

.....

[*Translation*]

ing the boundaries of Louisiana, but as I did not have with me the memoir included in your dispatch of the tenth, I could only send to M. Pitt this morning the summary idea of the arrangement as it is set forth in that memoir;¹ as M. Pitt has asked me to go and confer with him on it tomorrow morning, I will not enter into a longer discourse on the subject. I will only ask you to send me a quite minute detail of the places by which the line of demarcation should go, especially beyond Fort Toulouse, from which it jumps to the western end of Lake Erie, although there is a vast extent of territory between the fort and the lake.

.....

¹ See the next document.

BUSSY TO PITT, August 18, 1761

[Add. MSS., 32,927:98]

*Copie*A LONDRES le 18^e Août 1761

MONSIEUR

Comme Vre Exce m'a paru hier apprehender que la Memoire ne lui fournit pas exactement ce qui s'étoit passé entre Elle & moi sur le reglement des Limites de la Louisiane, & que je pourrois moi même avoir manqué à quelque circonstance essentielle en m'exprimant de memoire sur cette affaire, j'ai crû qu'il convenoit au bien de la chose de vous donner par écrit l'intention de ma Cour. En consequence, Monsieur, je joins ici une Notte copiée d'après la description que mes instructions contiennent des Limites de la Louisiane¹

J'ai l'honneur d'être avec le plus respectueux attachement

Monsieur De Vre Exce

très humble & très obeissant Serviteur

DE BUSSY.

[Endorsed:] Aug 18. 1761 Mor de Bussy (Copie)

[Translation]

Copy

LONDON, August 18, 1761

MONSIEUR:

As Your Excellency yesterday seemed to apprehend that the memoir did not exactly state what passed between us as to the settlement of the boundaries of Louisiana, and as I may myself have missed some essential circumstance in expressing myself by the memoir on the affair, I have thought it best to give you the intention of my court in writing. In consequence, Monsieur, I annex a note copied from a description contained in my instructions as to the boundaries of Louisiana.¹

I have the honor to be with the most respectful attachment,

Monsieur, of Your Excellency

the very humble and very obedient servant,

DE BUSSY

[Endorsed:] August 18, 1761, M. de Bussy (copy)

¹ The notes alluded to in the previous document.

MEMORANDUM OF LOUISIANA BOUNDARY, August 18, 1761

[Add. MSS., 32,927:100]

Sur les Limites de la Louisiane

Pour fixer les Limites de la Louisiane du côté des Colonies Angloises & du Canada; on tirera une Ligne qui s'étendra depuis Rio Perdido entre la Baye de la Mobille & celle de Pensacola, en passant par le Fort Toulouse chez les Alibamous, & qui se prolongeant par la pointe Occidentale du Lac Erié, enfermera la riviere des Miamis, & par l'extremité Orientale du Lac Huron, ira aboutir à la hauteur des Terres du côté de la Baye d'Hudson vers le Lac des Abitibis, d'où la Ligne sera continuée de l Est a l'Ouest jusques & compris le Lac Superieur.

[*Endorsed:*] Notte de M. de Bussy sur les Limites de la Louisiane (Copie)

[*Translation*]

On the boundaries of Louisiana

To establish the boundaries of Louisiana on the side of the English colonies and Canada: a line is to be drawn, which will extend from Rio Perdido between the Bays of Mobile and Pensacola, passing by Fort Toulouse of the Alabamas, and which, extending by the westernmost point of Lake Erie, will include the Maumee, and by the eastern end of Lake Huron will extend to the Height of Land toward Hudson Bay by Lake Abitibi, whence the line will continue from east to west as far as and including Lake Superior.

[*Endorsed:*] Note of M. de Bussy on the boundaries of Louisiana (copy)

DRAFT PROPOSALS FOR THE LOUISIANA BOUNDARY¹

[A E Etats Unis, Suppl., 6:117,118—L. C.]

No 20

18. Août. 1761.

Sur les limites de la Louisiane.

Pour fixer les limites de la Louisiane, on tirera une ligne qui s'étendra depuis Rio Perdido, entre la Baye de la Mobile, et celle de Pensacola, jusqu'au Fort Toulouse, puis en remontant la Rivière des Alibamous jusqu'à sa source, la ligne ira joindre le confluent des trois branches de la Rivière des Cheraquis. De là en continuant la ligne du sud au nord on rencontrera l'Ohio ou la Belle Rivière, vis à vis l'endroit où elle reçoit le grande Rivière des Miamis, autrement dite la Rivière à la Roche; on suivra celle cy jusqu'à sa source, et l'on ira par le portage à celle de la Rivière des Miamis qu'on descendra jusqu'à la pointe occidentale du Lac Erié, on suivra la côte de ce lac du sud sudouest au nord nord est, jusqu'au detroit, dont la ligne suivra la côte orientale jusqu'au

[Translation]

No. 20

August 18, 1761

On the boundaries of Louisiana

To fix the boundaries of Louisiana a line will be drawn extending from the Perdido River, which is between the Bays of Mobile and Pensacola, to Fort Toulouse; thence ascending the Alabama River to its source the line will go to the junction of the three branches of the Tennessee River. Thence, the line, extending from south to north, will reach the Ohio or Beautiful River at the point where it is joined by the Great Miami or Rock River; it will follow that river to its source, and thence will go by the portage to the Maumee River, and will follow it down to the westernmost point of Lake Erie. The line will follow the shore of that lake from south southwest to north northeast as far as

¹ These two drafts of a boundary manifestly fit in the negotiation about August 18, 1761. With them is a third version in sense the same as the one Bussy submitted, but with some verbal variations from it. It is impossible to tell whether they are more than trial drafts made by some one in Affaires Étrangères or Marine. The series in which they are is a catchall.

Lac huron, lequel on côtoiera du sud à l'est, et de l'est au nord, jusqu'à la Riviere des François, qu'on remontera en traversant le Lac Nepissing, jusqu'à Matalouem, sur la Riviere des outaouais, Enfin en traversant le Lac des Temiscamings la ligne passera jusqu'à la hauteur des Terres, pour joindre ensuite le Lac des abitibis, d'où la ligne se prolongera de l'est a l'ouest jusques et compris le Lac Superieur, et le lac alempigon, et de là jusqu'à la chaine des montagnes, apellée hauteur des Terres qui bordent le fleuve Mississipi.

No 21

Projet de limites de la Louisiane avec le Canada.

Tirer une ligne de Rio Perdido au Fort Toulouse qui remontera la riviere des Alibamous ou Cousa pour aller joindre la chute de la Riviere des Cheraquis, d'où en suivant les monts ouasioto, la ligne prendra la Riviere des anciens chouanaous (apellée dans la carte de Mitchell, Riviere de Cumberland) qu'elle descendra jusqu'à l'Ohio: d'où en remontant jusqu'à l'endroit où l'Ouabache ou Riviere St Jerome se jette dans la belle Riviere, la ligne suivra

[*Translation*]

Detroit. Thence the line will follow the east bank to Lake Huron, and will skirt that lake from south to east and east to north to French River, which it will ascend, crossing Lake Nipissing, as far as Mattawan on the Ottawa River. Finally crossing Lake Temiscaming the line will go to the Height of Land, and then to Lake Abitibi, whence the line will extend from east to west as far as Lake Superior and Lake Nipigon and thence to the mountain chain called the Height of Land which borders the Mississippi River.

No. 21

Project of a boundary between Louisiana and Canada

Draw a line from Rio Perdido to Fort Toulouse, ascending the Alabama or Coosa River and going thence to the falls of the Tennessee River. Thence, following the Washita Mountains the line will reach the Old Shawnee River (called on Mitchell's map the Cumberland) and will descend it to the Ohio. Thence, ascending that river as far as the mouth of the Wabash or St. Jerome,

toute la rive occidentale du dit Ouabache jusqu'à sa source, et de là en tirant vers le nord ouest, ira joindre la côte meridionale du Lac Michigan qu'elle suivra en prenant par l'ouest, remontant vers le nord, et faisant le tour de la Baye des Puants, jusqu'à Michilimakinac, d'où en côtoyant la rive occidentale du detroit de Ste Marie, et prenant toute la côte meridionale du lac Superieur, jusqu'à l'extremité occidentale du dit lac, la ligne sera prolongée sur la hauteur des Terres, et autant qu'elle pourra s'étendre au nord ouest, pour terminer les limites des possessions Françaises, et les séparer d'avec celles des Anglois du côté de la Baye d'hudson.

[*Translation*]

the line will follow the west bank of the Wabash as far as its source. Thence, extending northwest it will join the south shore of Lake Michigan, which it will follow to the west and to the north, passing around Green Bay as far as Mackinac. Thence, skirting the west side of the strait of St. Mary and the whole southern shore of Lake Superior as far as the west end of the said lake, the line will extend on the Height of Land, and as far as it can go to the northwest, terminating the French possessions and dividing them from those of the English which are towards Hudson Bay.

NEWCASTLE MEMORANDA, August 19, 1761¹

[Add. MSS., 32,927:109]

Mr Bussy demands	All the course of The <i>Ohio</i> . And
	from the East part of the Lakes
Abri	Absolutely <i>Canso</i> , If not <i>Cape Breton</i> or <i>St Jeans</i> .
Neutral Islands	Point out Their own Partition
Senegal & Gorée	What We had to propose.
The King of Prussia's dominions	He adher'd Absolutely.

¹ A typical memorandum by the Duke of Newcastle. At the end it cites French memoirs, etc., which made the Ohio River a part of Canada. For the Vaudreuil boundary, see *post*, 398 *et seq.*

The Succour	He insisted upon It. In proportion to <i>Ours</i> .
	Either <i>Money</i> , or <i>Troops</i> .
The East Indies	A Cessation of Hostilities.
The Prizes.	The Restitution of Them
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Ostend & Nieuport.	We are <i>good People</i> . La France n'est pas dans l'Intention de garder ces Places.
Cessation of Arms.	It must be in all Places, The same Day.
Mr. Bussy's Letter and Note.	Upon The Limits of Louisiana.
His visit this mornng.	
Three Questions put to Him	Whether These were the Antient Limits of Louisiana
	The Antient ones more Extensive.
The Right Side of This Line	To fix new Intermediate Nations There.
	Genl Amherst
	The Line drawn by Mor Vaudreuil.
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Mirepoix' Meml Sur le Cours, et le Territoire, de l'Ohio.	They claim'd it as part of Canada—and now They claim it as Louisiana. Les Francois ont Toujours regardé cette Riviere comme une Dependance de Canada.
	Les Gouverneurs de Canada.
[Endorsed:] Mem relating	To The French Negotiation. August 19th 1761.

BUSSY TO CHOISEUL, August 25, 1761

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 444:202]

2e Lettre
No 32.

A LONDRES le 25. Août 1761
Rep. le 9. 7bre

MONSEIGNEUR

J'ai eû l'honneur de vous informer, par le courier du Prince Gallitzin, de la discussion préliminaire que j'avois faite avec M. Pitt des articles de l'ultimatum de la France.

Comme la sûreté de la Louisiane depend du règlement de ses limites, et que le plan contenu dans le memoire joint à vôtre dépêche du 14., et approuvé par vous, Monseigneur, me paroissoit remplir cet objet, je crus que je devois tenter l'entreprise de le faire
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adopter, espérant qu'au moins ce seroit un moyen de sonder les véritables dispositions de la cour de Londres. Dans ce dessein, j'envoyai à M. Pitt une notte qui comprenoit l'idée sommaire de cet arrangement tel qu'il est dans le dit mémoire, et j'allai, le 19,

[*Translation*]

2nd letter
No. 32

LONDON, August 25, 1761
Answered September 9

MY LORD:

I had the honor to inform you by the courier of Prince Galitzin of the preliminary discussion that I had with M. Pitt on the articles of the ultimatum of France.

As the safety of Louisiana depends on the arrangement of its boundaries, and as the plan contained in the memoir annexed to your dispatch of the fourteenth and approved by you, My Lord, seemed to me to answer that object, I thought I should try to get it adopted, hoping that at the least it would be a means of sounding the real intentions of the court of London. With this in view, I sent M. Pitt a note which included the summary idea of that arrangement as in the memoir in question, and I went on the

conferer avec lui là dessus d'après l'invitation qu'il m'en fit. Il me dit que cette idée détruisoit l'engagement du 1er article des propositions de la France, confirmé par son ultimatum, et en vertu duquel le roi cède et garantit au Roi d'Angleterre le Canada, tel qu'il a été possédé, ou dû l'être par la France, sans restriction; puisque la note que je lui avois envoyée ôtoit à l'Angre une principale partie du Canada, mais qu'il ne pourroit s'expliquer nettement là dessus que quand le Roi d'Angleterre lui auroit donné ses ordres, d'après les conseils qui devoient être tenus sur cette

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matière. Il y a eû, en effet, conseil les 19. 20. 24. et 25. de ce mois. On prétend même que l'on doit encore en tenir un demain 26., et que la dernière résolution de l'Angleterre émanera de ce conseil; qu'aussitôt après, l'on dépêchera un courrier à M. Stanley, avec ordre de vous présenter le nouvel ultimatum de l'Angleterre et de demander un oïï ou un non; la cour Britannique ne pouvant rester plus long tems dans l'incertitude de la paix ou de la continuation de la guerre. On croit que l'on me communiquera cette pièce après demain; mais comme cela est incertain, et que ce

[*Translation*]

nineteenth to confer with him on it in accord with his invitation. He told me that this idea nullified the undertaking of the first article of the French proposals, as confirmed by her ultimatum, in virtue of which the king cedes and guarantees to the King of England Canada as it has been or should have been possessed by France without restriction; the note I had sent him took away from England a principal part of Canada; but he could not explain himself clearly on that until the King of England should give him his orders after the councils to be held on the matter. There have in truth been councils the 19th, 20th, 24th, and 25th of this month. They say even that another is to be held tomorrow the 26th, and that from it will come the final decision of England; that immediately thereafter a courier will be dispatched to M. Stanley with orders to present to you the new ultimatum of England and to demand a yes or a no, since the British court cannot longer remain in uncertainty as to peace or the continuation of the war. It is thought this document will be communicated to me day after

seroit vous faire trop long tems attendre des nouvelles tant de l'arrivée de vôtre expedition du 21., que de ce qui se passe ici ou sujet de la négociation de la France avec l'Angleterre, je n'ai pas voulu différer a vous renvoyer vôtre courier avec les connoissances

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que j'ai pû acquérir sur les intentions de cette cour, et les réflexions qu'elles m'ont occasionnées. Il m'est revenu, Monseigneur, 1. que le Lord Grantham, ci devant Chevalier Robinson, a été employé à discuter le réglemeut des limites du Canada et de la Louisiane; qu'il a rapporté un mémoire du mois de May 1755, signé par M. de Mirepoix et par lui remis au ministère Anglois, et un écrit imprimé de Mr de Silhouette, qui, non seulement comprennent dans les dépendances du Canada les Lacs Ontario, Erié, huron, Michigan et Supérieur, mais même les étendent au delà; qu'il y est surtout porté très expressément, par rapport à l'Ohio, que les François ont toujours regardé cette rivière comme une dépendance du Canada, et qu'elle leur est essentielle pour la communication du Canada avec la Louisiane; qu'ils l'ont fréquentée

[Translation]

tomorrow. But as that is uncertain, and as it would make you wait too long for news, both of the arrival of your dispatch of the twenty-first, and of what is passing here on the negotiation of France and England, I have not wished to delay sending back your courier with what I have been able to gather as to the intentions of this court, and with my reflections on it.

It has come to me My Lord: 1. That Lord Grantham, the former Chevalier Robinson, has been employed to consider the settlement of the boundaries of Canada and Louisiana; that he has brought forward a memoir of May, 1755, signed by M. de Mirepoix and communicated by him to the English ministry, and a printed book of M. de Silhouette, which not only include in the dependencies of Canada, Lakes Ontario, Erie, Huron, Michigan, and Superior, but even extend them further; that it is stated expressly with respect to the Ohio that the French have always regarded that river as a dependency of Canada, and that it is essential to them for the communication of Canada with Louisiana; that they have always frequented it, and in force; that it

dans tous les tems et en forces ; que c'est par cette rivière que l'on fit passer le détachement de troupes qui fut envoyé à la Louisiane
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en 1739, à l'occasion de la guerre des Chicachas.¹

On assure, Monseigneur, que les Anglois prétendent tout le cours de l'Ohio, en vertu de ces actes et de la cession du Canada, sans restriction exprimée dans les propositions de la France.

Quant au territoire des deux côtés de l'ohio, l'on ajoute que la cour d'Angleterre soutient qu'il est à elle, sous le pretexte que les sauvages des Six Nations, à qui il appartenoit, lui en ont fait la vente en bonne forme. On prétend que le ministère Anglois soutient de même que le pays des Cheraquis a été vendu aux Anglois par les dites nations en 1729. ; que les Chicacas sont sujets de l'Angleterre ; qu'il y a des etablissemens Anglois dans leur pays ; que les Anglois ont des factories et des etablissements chez les Indiens Creeks, excepté le Fort Toulouze ou Albama, qu'ils
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disent avoir été usurpé par les François sur les Anglois qui

[*Translation*]

was by that river that was sent the detachment of troops sent to Louisiana in 1739, on the occasion of the Chickasaw war.¹

I am assured, My Lord, that the English claim the whole course of the Ohio in virtue of these documents, and of the cession of Canada without restriction as set forth in the proposals of France.

As to the territory on either side of the Ohio, they add that the court of England maintains it is theirs, on the pretext that the Indians of the Six Nations to whom it belonged, sold it to them in correct form. They say that the English ministry also claims that the Cherokee country was sold to the English by the said tribes in 1729 ; that the Chickasaw are subjects of England ; that there are English settlements in their country ; that the English have trading houses and settlements among the Creek Indians except for Fort Toulouse or Alabama, which they say was usurped by the French from the English, who had been established there

¹ This phrasing follows closely that of the memoir of May 9, 1755.

l'avoient établi 28. ans auparavant; enfin l'on pretend que le ministere Anglois assure que les Six Nations ont étendu leurs possessions jusques dans le pays des Miamis et des Illinois, après les avoir subjugués, et qu'elles en ont fait la vente aux Anglois, et que par conséquent tous ces pays appartiennent à ces derniers.

La citation des actes François dont j'ai eû l'honneur de vous prévenir dans ma lettre du 26. Juin, me paroît difficile à combattre.

Pour les autres moyens sur les quels l'Angleterre appuye ses prétentions, il y a de bonnes raisons à y opposer; mais si cette cour ne veut pas s'y rendre, il en résultera evidemment que son dessein est de réduire la Louisiane à des bornes très étroites, en s'approchant du Mississipi, et de préparer les moyens de s'en emparer dès que l'envie lui en prendra.

.....

[*Translation*]

twenty-eight years before. Finally they say that the English ministry is assured that the Six Nations have extended their possessions as far as the country of the Miami and the Illinois, after subjugating those tribes, and that they have sold it to the English and that to them consequently all this land belongs.

The citation of the French authorities, of which I had the honor to forewarn you in my letter of June 28, seems to me difficult to contest.

To the other reasons on which England rests her claims there are good reasons to oppose; but if this court will not yield to them, it will be evident that its plan is to reduce Louisiana to very narrow limits, while they approach the Mississippi and prepare the means of getting possession when the desire takes them.

.....

PITT TO STANLEY, August 27, 1761

[S P France, 252]

.....

After a Series of Facts, which have much shaken all Confidence here in the Sincerity of France: namely the Superadding of Demands, and Retracting of Offers, ever since the little Leaf:

The Tergiversation about restoring the King of Prussia's Territories—The Contesting His Majesty's Right to fulfill, as an Auxiliary, His Engagements to That Monarch, while France would amplify Her own towards the Court of Vienna; The Confounding of the Negotiation and That with Menaces, by blending with it the Foreign Matter of Spanish Disputes; and lastly The Claiming as Louisiane, with an *Effrontery unparalleled*, vast Regions, which the Marquis de Vaudreuil¹ has surrender'd to General Amherst, as Canada and defined, Himself, with his own Hand, as comprehended in the Government of That Province where He commanded; And, as far as concerns the whole course of the Ohio, and the Countries in That Part, you will see by the inclosed Memorial transmitted to you *for this purpose*, that the Duke de Mirepoix did solemnly declare here, in the Name of His Court, that France had constantly regarded the said River Ohio, as a *Dependance of Canada*, and, instead of making part of Louisiane, as being essential to the Communication of Canada with That first named Province.

After such a series of Facts, I say, I will not conceal from You, that little more is expected here from the Facility, great and essential as It is, with regard to the Liberty of Fishing in the Gulph, and the Abri there, offer'd to France, than to put That Court more in the wrong, in case It shall reject these so favourable Conditions of Peace; I use the Word *reject*, because It will no longer be left in the Power of France to *elude*. His Majesty has now taken His Resolution. And, in case the Court of France shall, after due Consideration, not think fit to accept the Terms, offer'd in the inclosed Answer—which you are to deliver to the Duc de Choiseul; that is to say, with regard to the Main Points, more particularly, the Fishery, and Abri, as offer'd: The entire Cession of all Canada and the Islands in the Gulph and River of St Laurence; The British Limits, as asserted, on the Side of the Carolinas; All the Restitutions, as demanded in Germany; and the Liberty to Each Crown, after the Peace, to succour, as an Auxiliary, Their respective Allies, according to the Engagements

¹On the subject of the Vaudreuil boundary, see *post*, 398 *et seq.*

They have taken ; I am expressly to signify to You, that It is the Kings Pleasure, that, in This Case, you are not to wait for further Orders, but are to return Home without taking Leave ; And It will, of course, be expected, that M de Bussy should immediately leave England.....

Having mentioned, in the Answer to the French Ultimatum, the Line traced by the Hand of the Marquis de Vaudreuil, defining the Limits of the Government of Canada, to which I allude in this Letter : I send you inclosed, for your Information and Use, an imperfect, but I trust intelligible, Sketch of the same ; copied from the Original, transmitted to me by General Amherst, together with an Extract of the General's Letter on That subject.

.....

BUSSY TO CHOISEUL, August 30, 1761

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 444:216]

1ere Lettre.

No 34.

A LONDRES le 30. août 1761.

Rep. le 9. 7bre.

MONSEIGNEUR.

J'avois passé, le mardi 25, chès Mr Pitt pour lui communiquer le motif de vôtre expedition du 21, et lui donner occasion de me parler sur la résolution que les Anglois nous ont préparée par tant de conseils réitérés : mais je ne le trouvai point. Le lendemain 26,

[*Translation*]

First letter

No. 34

LONDON, August 30, 1761

Answered September 9

MY LORD:

I had gone on Tuesday the twenty-fifth to M. Pitt's to communicate to him the reason of your dispatch of the twenty-first, and to give him an opportunity of speaking to me on the decision the English have reached in so many successive councils ; but I did not find him at home. Next day, the twenty-sixth, he sent to

il m'envoya prier de passer chès lui sur les onze heures du matin. Je m'y rendis et lui dis, que l'expédition du courrier que vous m'aviés dépêché, avoit pour objet 1. de parler tant sur la réci-

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procité nécessaire à l'égard des alliés de toutes les puissances belligérantes, que sur l'admission des plénipotentiaires de l'empereur au congrès; 2. de me gronder sur ce que je n'avois point encore envoyé la réponse à l'ultimatum que la France m'avoit ordonné de lui remettre, et que je lui avois remis en effet, dès le 10. de ce mois.....

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Quant à la réponse sur l'ultimatum que je lui avois envoyé, Mr Pitt me dit: "Monsieur, on ne doit pas vous savoir mauvais gré de ce que vous n'en avez pas parlé, puisque je ne suis pas même encore en état de vous la donner. Vous connoissés l'im-

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portance et la difficulté de la matière par elle même, et la constitution de ce pays. Il a fallu plusieurs conseils pour prendre une décision; nous en allons tenir encore un aujourd'hui, qui, j'espère,

[*Translation*]

ask me to come to him at eleven in the morning. I went, and told him that the dispatch by the courier you had sent was designed: 1. To treat both of the reciprocity necessary for the allies of all the warring powers, and the admission of the emperor's plenipotentiaries to the congress. 2. To scold me for not having sent the answer to the ultimatum that France had ordered me to communicate, and which I had in effect communicated the tenth of the month.....

As to the answer to the ultimatum I had sent, M. Pitt said to me, "Monsieur, they should not blame you for what you have not told them, since I am not even yet able to give you the answer. You know the importance and difficulty of the matter itself, and the constitution of the country. Several councils were needed to arrive at a decision; we are going to hold still another today

sera le dernier ; après quoi nous enverrons un réponse cathégorique à vôtre cour ; mais cela ne m'empêchera pas de m'ouvrir préalablement à vous en toute franchise.

"Nous sommes tellement éloignés les uns des autres sur les points principaux de la négociation, continua-t'il, que nous ne croyons pas l'heureux moment de la paix arrivé.

"L'article 1er des propositions du 15. Juillet nous cède le Canada tel qu'il a été possédé ou dû l'être par la France sans restriction. Elle renouvelle et confirme cette cession par son ultimatum, ajoutant qu'elle se fera dans la forme la plus étendue ; et la note que vous m'avez envoyée sur les limites à donner à la Louisiane, nous ôte la principale partie du Canada".

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lui répartis je, notre but est de faire une paix solide et durable, et vous convenés que c'est en même tems le vôtre. Pour arriver à ce but, il faut que la France assure la possession des pays qui lui resteront, par tous les arrangemens qui pourront en écarter les sujets de dispute et la mettre au moins à l'abri d'une invasion

[*Translation*]

which I hope will be the last, after which we will send a categorical reply to your court ; but that will not hinder my opening myself to you immediately in all frankness."

"We are so far from each other on the principal points of the negotiation," he continued, "that we do not think the happy hour for peace has come.

"Article 1 of the proposals of July 15 cedes us Canada as it has been or should have been possessed by France without restriction. France renews and confirms that cession by her ultimatum, adding that it will be made in the most extended form ; and the note which you sent me on the boundaries to be assigned to Louisiana takes away from us the principal part of Canada."

"Monsieur," I replied, "our aim is to make a solid and durable peace, and you agree that it is also yours. To attain that end, France must secure her possession of the country that will remain to her by all arrangements that may remove subjects of dispute, and at least shelter her against an easy and swift in-

facile et prompte. C'est à quoi l'on a voulu pourvoir dans la notte que je vous ai envoyée, et, au reste, ce n'est qu'une proposition, ce n'est point une résolution.

"Partout ce que je vois, poursuivit-il, le réglément des limites de la Louisiane est sujet à de grandes difficultés. Vous prétendés le cours de l'ohio, et, en nous cédant le Canada, vous nous avès cédé cette Rivière en entier, puisque, dans un mémoire autentique de Mr le Duc de Mirepoix, il est expressément porté que l'ohio a toujourns été de la dépendance du Canada; que, dans un ecrit
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imprimé de M. de Silhouette, la même assertion est répétée, et que M. le Mis de Vaudreüil, en remettant le Canada au Général Anglois Amherst, lui a donné une carte qui contient le Canada et ses dépendances, le tout marquée par une ligne qui embrasse tout le cours de l'Ohio."

Je ne suis point au fait de ces circonstances, lui répartis je, mais si elles existent, voici ce que j'en pense: ce ne peut être, à l'égard du mémoire de Mr le Duc de Mirepoix et de l'imprimé de Mr de Silhouette, qu'une fausse énonciation qui s'est glissée par

[*Translation*]

vasion. It is for that end that we wished to provide in the note that I sent you, and in any case it is only a proposal, it is not a determination."

"Everywhere I look," he continued, "the regulation of the boundaries of Louisiana is subject to great difficulties. You claim the course of the Ohio, and by ceding us Canada you have ceded us the whole of that river; for in an authentic memoir of M. le Duc de Mirepoix it is expressly stated that the Ohio has always been a dependency of Canada; in a printed work by M. de Silhouette the same statement is repeated; and M. le Marquis de Vaudreuil, in surrendering Canada to the English General Amherst, gave him a map of Canada and its dependencies, marked by a line which includes the whole course of the Ohio."

"I am not acquainted with these circumstances," I retorted, "but if they exist, this is what I think: as to the memoir of M. le Duc de Mirepoix, and the publication of M. de Silhouette, it may be only a misstatement which has slipped in through error in

méprise dans des écrits où il ne s'agissoit pas de séparer les limites entre le Canada et la Louisiane, et qui n'a pas été dans le cas d'être relevé, parceque personne n'avoit intérêt de le faire; les deux provinces du Canada et de la Louisiane étant alors sous la domination d'une seule et même puissance. que par conséquent l'on ne pouvoit en tirer aucun avantage, puisque c'étoit les actes de decouverte, les prises de possession, les concessions accordées,

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enfin la possession constante, qui décidoient des limites d'une province; et que tous ces actes mettoient l'ohio dans la province de la Louisiane.

Que le Sr de la Salle fit la découverte de cette riviere en 1683. et en prit possession au nom du roi; que ses successeurs y établirent des forts; que les lettres patentes de 1712, données à Mr Crozat pour le commerce exclusif de la Louisiane, mettent l'ohio dans cette province; que tous les géographes François et même tous les anciens géographes Anglois font de même; que nous y avons eû des forts, que nous y en avons encore; que nous sommes en état de produire une possession constante pendant soixante et dix ans, et que les Anglois n'ont jamais pensé à y

[Translation]

writings in which there was no question of bounding Canada with Louisiana, and which was not corrected because no one had any interest in doing so, since the two provinces of Canada and Louisiana were then under the domination of one and the same power. Consequently no advantage may be drawn from it, since it is acts of discovery, acts of taking possessions, grants, and finally constant possession which decide the boundaries of a province; and all these tests put Ohio in the province of Louisiana.

"The Sieur de la Salle discovered that river in 1683 and took possession of it in the name of the king. His successors established forts there; letters patent of 1712 granted to M. Crozat for the exclusive trade of Louisiana, put the Ohio in that province; all the French geographers and all the old English geographers do the same; we have had forts there and still have them; we are in a position to produce a constant possession of seventy

former des pretentions que depuis 1750-, que la beauté du pays a été connue par les traiteurs de leur nation que l'intérêt y a conduits.

Quant à la ligne tracée par Mr le Mis de Vaudreuil sur la carte remise en rendant le Canada, j'avois lieu de croire que
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c'étoit bien moins les limites du Canada qu'il avoit marquées par là, que celles du gouvernement général du Canada, qui s'est toujours étendu sur la partie de la province de la Louisiane qui s'approchoit des lacs, et que toutes ces énonciations ne pouvoient faire un titre pour les Anglois, ni affaiblir l'autorité de ceux que je lui avois rapportés.

M. Pitt répondit que la dernière façon d'enoncer les limites devoit être la plus digne de foi, et que la cour d'Angleterre prétendrait tout le cours de l'Ohio.

Je répliquai que c'étoit mettre le plus grand obstacle à la paix; que l'Ohio portant ses eaux dans le Mississipi, porteroit la guerre dans la Louisiane, quand il plairoit aux Anglois, et que

[*Translation*]

years, while the English have never thought to make claims to the region before 1750, when the beauty of the country became known to traders of their nation led thither by their interests.

"As to the line drawn by M. le Marquis de Vaudreuil on the map turned over in surrendering Canada, I have reason to think that it was not so much the boundaries of Canada that he marked, as those of the general government of Canada, which has always extended over the part of the province of Louisiana which approaches the lakes; and all these statements can give no title to the English, or weaken the authority of those I have set forth."

M. Pitt replied that the last manner of indicating the boundaries should be most worthy belief, and that the court of England would claim the whole course of the Ohio.

I replied that that was to put the greatest obstacle in the path of peace; the Ohio, carrying its waters to the Mississippi, would carry war into Louisiana whenever the English pleased;

l'éloignement servant à cacher leurs préparatifs, et la rapidité des eaux à précipiter leur expédition, cette province seroit envahie, avant qu'on eût pû avoir la moindre connoissance du dessein de l'envahir.

Il opposa à ce raisonnement que cela n'étoit point à craindre ;
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que les Anglois avoient plus de terrain en Amérique qu'il ne leur en falloit ; qu'ils avoient assés marqué leur modération en n'attaquant point la Louisiane, dont ils pouvoient très facilement faire la conquête ; que la propriété de la rivière ohio avoit fait le sujet de la guerre, et que si le ministère Anglois abandonnoit cet objet, il s'exposeroit aux plus grands dangers de la part de la nation.

Je voulut répliquer ; mais il ne m'en laissa pas le tems, disant tout de suite que, dans la ligne tracée pour les limites de la Louïisiane, nous enfermions la rivière des Cheraquis, des Illinois, des Miamis et autres, tandis que tous ces pays étoient aux Anglois ou à leurs sauvages, et que l'Angleterre ne nous les abandonneroit jamais. Enfin il me fit sentir que la cour Britannique

[*Translation*]

since the remoteness would serve to hide their preparations and the rapidity of the current would hurry on their expedition, that province might be invaded before we had the least knowledge of a design to invade it.

He opposed to this reasoning the argument that there was nothing to fear. The English had more land in America than they needed ; they had sufficiently shown their moderation by not attacking Louisiana, which they could easily conquer. The propriety of the Ohio River had been the cause of the war, and if the English ministry abandoned that object they would expose themselves to great dangers from the nation.

I wished to reply ; but he did not give me time, saying immediately that by the line drawn for the boundary of Louisiana we included the Tennessee, Illinois, Maumee, and other rivers, though all this country belonged to the English or to their Indians ; and that England would never abandon it. Finally he let me see

vouloit se rendre maîtresse de toutes les terres et rivières jusqu'au Mississipi, et que ce fleuve fût nôtre barrière pour le continent de l'amérique Septentrionale, comme le Rhin l'étoit pour l'Allemagne.

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Je répliquai qu'il n'y avoit point de comparaison à faire entre ces deux sortes de limites; que les pays entre les lacs et le Mississipi étoient incontestablement ou à la France ou aux sauvages amis de la France, et formoient la province de la Louisiane; que si l'Angleterre vouloit sérieusement reculer les bornes de la Louisiane jusqu'au Mississipi, et se mettre en possession du cours de l'Ohio, c'étoit afficher le dessein, non seulement de s'emparer de la Louisiane, mais encore du Mexique et d'accomplir enfin le vaste projet de la monarchie des mers. Il reprit que c'étoit, au contraire la sûreté de la possession du Canada de la part des Anglois, qui exigeoit cette précaution; que comme le pays intermédiaire entre les lacs et le Mississipi étoit beau et fertile en tout genre, nous le peuplerions bientôt de Canadiens, et qu'en peu de

[*Translation*]

that the British court wished to gain possession of all the lands and rivers as far as the Mississippi, and that that river was to be our barrier for the Continent of North America, as the Rhine was for Germany.

I replied that there was no sort of comparison to be made between these two kinds of boundaries. The country between the lakes and the Mississippi indisputably belonged to France or to the Indian allies of France, and formed the province of Louisiana. If England seriously wished to push back the boundaries of Louisiana as far as the Mississippi, and gain possession of the course of the Ohio, it proclaimed her design, not only to seize on Louisiana, but Mexico also, and finally to achieve the great aim of the monarchy of the seas. He replied, that on the contrary, it was the safety of the possession of Canada by the English which required this precaution. Since the country between the lakes and the Mississippi was fine and fertile in every way, we would soon people it with Canadians, and in a short time we

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tems, nous serions en état d'accabler les Anglois Je répondis que la supposition étoit impossible, puisque le Canada étoit entouré de lacs munis de forts qui en deffendoient l'entrée; que les colonies Angloises étoient peuplées de façon qu'il y a dans l'Amerique Septentrionale dix ou douze Anglois au moins contre un François, et que d'ailleurs, vous présentâtes une sûreté infaillible à l'Angleterre dans vôtre ultimatum, en marquant dans l'arte 2d que la France demande que les nations intermediaires entre le Canada et la Louisiane soient regardées comme des nations neutres indépendantes de la domination des 2. couronnes et servent de barrière entre elles; mais que pour nous, nous nous trouvions dans une circonstance bien différente; que nous connoissions toute l'importance de la cession du Canada reünî à l'acadie et aux isles du Golphe St Laurent, et qu'une pareille cession devoit nous remplir de craintes dans tous les points de l'Amerique où nous

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avons, des possessions.....

.....

[Translation]

would be ready to overwhelm the English. I replied that the supposition was impossible, since Canada was surrounded with lakes guarded by forts which prevented entering it. The English colonies were populated in such a fashion that in North America there were ten or twelve English at least to one Frenchman, and that furthermore you presented an unfailing surety to England in your ultimatum, by noting in article 2, that France demanded that the tribes between Canada and Louisiana be regarded as neutral tribes independent of the domination of the two crowns and serving as a barrier between them. As to ourselves we were in a very different situation. We knew the full importance of the cession of Canada along with Acadia and the islands of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and that such a cession should fill us with fear in all the parts of America where we had possessions.....

.....

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Pour développer un peu plus le système de M. Pitt, je dirai
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qu'il paroît consister à nous forcer à faire avec l'Angre non une paix solide et durable, mais une trêve mal assurée, qui nous empêche de réparer nos pertes et de remonter nôtre marine à aucun degré qui puisse causer le moindre ombrage à l'Angleterre. A cet effet, ce ministre veut que nous ne tenions la Louisiane que d'une façon précaire et sur le point de nous être enlevée à la première brouillerie. Il veut aussy, en joignant Ste Lucie à la
229v

Dominique, nous inquiéter pour nos Isles du Vent et achever de nous tenir en brassière par les tracasseries que causera la démolition de Dunkerque, si l'on se soumet à la faire conformément aux Traités d'Utrecht et de la haye.

Dans cette situation, le parti à prendre semble être dépendant de ce que l'Espagne fera en notre faveur, et de ce que nous pourrions faire nous-mêmes, pour rendre notre union préjudiciable aux Anglois. On suppose que, non seulement les établissemens Espagnols sont en état de deffense, mais que l'Espagne a des troupes

[Translation]

To enlarge a little on M. Pitt's policy, I will say that it seems to consist in forcing us to make with England, not a solid and durable peace, but an uncertain truce, which will prevent us from repairing our losses and reconstituting our navy in any degree that may give the slightest umbrage to England. To this end, this minister wishes us to hold Louisiana in precarious fashion, continually exposed to being taken from us at the first disagreement. He wishes also by joining St. Lucia and Dominica to make us uneasy as to our Windward Islands, and finally to keep us in check by the squabbles which the demolition of Dunkirk will occasion, if we agree to doing it conformably to the treaties of Utrecht and The Hague.

In this situation, the course to be taken seems to depend on what Spain will do in our favor, and on what we can do ourselves to make our alliance with her harmful to the English. It is to be supposed, not merely that the Spanish settlements are in

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soit à la floride pour se joindre aux habitans de la Louisiane, soit à la havane pour envoyer au secours de la Louisiane et pour donner de la crainte aux Anglois sur la Jamaïque.....

BRITISH ANSWER TO FRENCH ULTIMATUM, August 30, 1761

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 444:233]

à joindre à la lettre de M. de Bussy
du 30 aoust 1761. No. 34.
No. 28
Remise par M.
Stanley le 1er 7bre
1761.

Reponse de la cour Britannique à l'ultimatum de la cour de France, remis le 10e d'Août, par M. de Bussy, ministre plenipotentiaire du Roi très Chretien, au secretaire d'etat de Sa Majesté Britannique du departement du sud.

Le Roi très Chretien ayant déclaré réitérativement dans l'ultimatum de la cour de France, remis à Mor Pitt par M.

[*Translation*]

a state of defense, but also that Spain has troops either in Florida to unite with the inhabitants of Louisiana, or at Havana to send help to Louisiana and to alarm the English for the safety of Jamaica.....

Annexed to M. de Bussy's letter of
August 30, 1761 No. 34
No. 28

Communicated by M.
Stanley, September 1, 1761

Reply of the British court to the ultimatum of the court of France communicated August 10 by M. de Bussy, minister plenipotentary of the Most Christian King to His Britannic Majesty's secretary of state for the southern department

The Most Christian King having again declared in the ultimatum of the court of France communicated to M. Pitt by M.

de Bussy, ainsi que dans le memoire de propositions de paix, qui a été remis par M. le Duc de Choiseul à M. Stanley, que si la négociation entamée entre les deux couronnes, n'a pas le succès désiré, tous les points, accordés dans cette négociation par la France, ne pourront être représentés dans aucun cas comme des points convenus, non plus que le memoire du mois de Mars

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dernier relativement à l'*uti possidetis*; Le roi déclare en réponse, de son côté, que si les facilités que Sa Majesté a bien voulu apporter à la paix, n'étoient pas acceptées par Sa Majesté très Chretienne les restitutions importantes offertes à la France, ainsi que les autres arrangemens indiqués ci-apres, de la part de la Grande Bretagne, ne pourront plus dans la suite, être représentés comme accordés.

Article 1er

Le roi ne cessera d'insister sur la cession entière & totale, sans nouvelles limites ou exceptions quelconques, du Canada & de ses dependances, ainsi que sur la pleine cession de l'Isle du

[Translation]

de Bussy, as well as in the memoir of proposals of peace, communicated by M. le Duc de Choiseul to M. Stanley, that if the negotiation undertaken between the two crowns did not have the desired success, none of the points accorded in the negotiation by France, could in any case be represented as points agreed upon, any more than the memoir of March last with relation to the *uti possidetis*: The king declares in reply, on his side, that if the complaisances which His Majesty has been pleased to accord for the sake of peace should not be accepted by His Most Christian Majesty, the important restitutions offered to France as well as the other arrangements indicated hereafter on the part of Great Britain, cannot in the future be represented as definitely accorded.

Article 1

The king will not cease to insist on the entire and total cession, without new boundaries or any exceptions whatsoever, of Canada and its dependencies, as well as on the full cession of

Cap Breton, & de toutes les autres isles dans le Golphe & Fleuve St Laurent.

Le Canada, selon la ligne de ses limites, tracée par le Marquis de Vaudreuil lui même, quand ce gouverneur général a rendu, par

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capitulation, la dite province au general Britannique le Chevalier Amherst, comprend, d'un côté, les Lacs Huron, Michigan, & Supérieur; & la dite ligne, tirée depuis Lac Rouge, embrasse, par un cours tortueux, la Riviere Ouabache jusqu'à sa jonction avec l'Ohio, & delà se prolonge le long de cette dernière rivière inclusivement, jusques à son confluent dans le Mississippi.

C'est conformément à cette definition de limites du gouverneur françois, que le roi réclame la cession du Canada; province que la cour de France a, en dernier lieu, offert de nouveau, par son ultimatum, de céder à Sa Majesté Britannique dans la forme la plus étendue énoncée dans le memoire de propositions de paix du 13 Juillet.

accordé entre
les deux
cours

Pour ce qui regarde la profession publique, & l'exercice de la

[*Translation*]

Cape Breton Island, and of all other islands in the Gulf and River of St. Lawrence.

Canada, according to the line of its boundaries traced by the Marquis de Vaudreuil himself when that governor general by capitulation gave up the said province to the British General Chevalier Amherst, includes on one side Lakes Huron, Michigan, and Superior; and the said line, drawn from Red Lake, includes in a tortuous course the Wabash River as far as its junction with the Ohio, and thence extends along and includes the latter river, as far as its junction with the Mississippi.

It is conformably to this definition of boundaries by the French governor that the king claims the cession of Canada, a province which the court of France in last resort has again offered by its ultimatum to cede to His Britannic Majesty in the most extended form announced in the memoir of proposals of peace of July 13.

Agreed
between the
two courts

As to what regards the public profession and exercise of the

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3. mois

religion Catholique Romaine en Canada, les nouveaux sujets de Sa Majesté Britannique seront conservés dans cette liberté sans interruption ni molestation ; et les habitans françois ou autres, qui auroient été sujets du roi très Chretien en Canada, auront toute liberté & faculté de vendre leurs biens, pourvû que ce soit à des sujets de Sa Majesté Britannique, & de transporter leurs effets, ainsi que leurs personnes sans être gênés dans leur émigration sous quelque prétexte que ce soit, hors le cas de dettes, & d'infraction des loix criminelles ; bien entendu toujours, que le tems accordé pour la dite émigration, soit limité à l'espace d'un an, à compter du jour de la ratification du traité définitif.

Arte 2d

Pour ce qui est de la ligne à tirer depuis Rio Perdido, comme contenue dans la notte remise par M. de Bussy le 18 de ce mois,

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sur les limites de la Louisiane ; Sa Majesté ne peut que rejeter une proposition si inattendüe, comme nullement admissible à deux égards :

[Translation]

8 months

Roman Catholic religion in Canada, His Britannic Majesty's new subjects shall be preserved in that liberty without interruption or hindrance. And the French or other inhabitants who have been subjects of the Most Christian King in Canada shall have full liberty and opportunity to sell their goods, provided that it be to subjects of His Britannic Majesty, and to withdraw their possessions as well as their persons, without their migration being in any way hindered under any pretext whatever save in case of debts or infractions of the criminal law ; it being well understood that the time allowed for the said emigration shall be limited to a year counting from the day of ratification of the definitive treaty.

Article 2

As to the line to be drawn from Rio Perdido, as contained in the note communicated by M. de Bussy the eighteenth of this month on the boundaries of Louisiana, His Majesty can only reject a proposal so unexpected as in no wise admissible for two

1. En ce que la dite ligne, sous couleur de fixer les limites de la Louisiane, attribue maintenant à cette province de vastes pays, lesquels avec les postes & forts qui les commandent, le Marquis de Vaudreuil a, par une capitulation la plus solennelle, remis incontestablement à la possession de Sa Majesté Britannique sous la définition du Canada; Et que, par conséquent, quelques contentieuses qu'aient été avant la guerre les prétentions respectives des deux couronnes, & particulièrement par rapport au cours de l'Ohio, & aux territoires dans cette partie, depuis la reddition du Canada, & la ligne de ses limites tracée comme dessus par le Marquis de Vaudreuil, tous les titres opposés se réunissent & deviennent, sans contredit, valables pour assurer à la Grande

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Bretagne, avec tout le reste du Canada, la possession de ces pays dans la partie de l'Ohio ci-devant contestés.

2. La ligne proposée pour fixer les limites de la Louisiane, ne sauroit être admise en ce qu'elle comprendroit, dans une autre partie, du côté des Carolinas, des régions très étendues, & de

[Translation]

reasons: 1. Since the line in question under color of establishing the boundaries of Louisiana now ascribes to that province vast territories which, with the posts and forts commanding them, the Marquis de Vaudreuil has, by a most solemn capitulation beyond dispute, surrendered to his Britannic Majesty under the name of Canada. And, by consequence, however controversial before the war the respective claims of the two crowns may have been, especially with respect to the course of the Ohio and to the territory in that region, since the surrender of Canada with the line of its boundaries traced by the Marquis de Vaudreuil, as stated above, all the contrary titles unite and become valid past dispute to assure to Great Britain along with all the rest of Canada the possession of these territories hitherto contested in the region of the Ohio.

The line proposed to settle the boundary of Louisiana could not be allowed since it includes in another region, on the side of the Carolinas, extensive territories and numerous tribes which

nations nombreuses, qui ont toujours été censées être sous la protection du roi, à laquelle Sa Majesté n'est pas dans l'intention de renoncer, & dont le roi, pour le bien de la paix, pourroit consentir de laisser les pays intermediaires sous la protection de la Grande Bretagne, & plus particulièrement ceux des Cherokées, des Creeks, des Chicasaws, des Chactaws, & d'autres nations situées entre les etablissemens Britanniques & le Mississippi.

Arte 3.

.....

[*Translation*]

have always been regarded as being under the king's protection, which His Majesty has no intention of withdrawing. For the sake of peace the king might consent to leaving the intermediate regions under the protection of Great Britain, more especially those of the Cherokee, Creek, Chickasaw, Choctaw, and other tribes located between the British settlements and the Mississippi.

Article 3

.....

STANLEY TO PITT, September 4, 1761¹

[S P France, 252]

PARIS Sept 4, 1761.

.....

Article 1st

The Duc de Choiseul complained that the bounds of Canada were laid down very unfavourably to France in the description which your memorial contains, alledging, "that there had been disputes between the Marquis de Vaudreuil, and the Governor of Louisiana, with regard to the limits of their two Provinces, wherein the former being the more able and the more active had greatly enlarged his jurisdiction" he added however "that tho' many such objections might be made, it had been the intention of the King his Master, to make the most full, and compleat cession of Canada," and "that he consented in his name to those

¹ Minute of Stanley's conference with Choiseul, September 2.

limits." I then produced the map you sent me, and it was agreed, that this Province should remain to Great Britain, as it is there delineated.

The terms of toleration so graciously granted by His Majesty with the humanity which is ever the attendant of true religion, were gratefully accepted.

.....
Article 2d.

The first condition of this article being settled by the preceding stipulation according to the map above mentioned, it is unnecessary to enlarge upon it.

To the second proposition, The Duc de Choiseul objected "that it had been an early convention between the two Crowns, to leave the Indian nations bordering upon those Provinces, which now come under different dominations in a state of neutrality, as a natural barrier between our respective territories" I strongly urged "that the existence of certain nations allowed to come under that description, and intended to remain so, did not contradict His Majesty's claim to others who had long lived under his immediate protection" and I asserted "that this pretention would never be yielded". His Excellency was of opinion "that future disputes would be best avoided by drawing a line on the map, which should distinguish those Indians dependent on Great Britain from those allowed to be totally neutral." he promised every facility on the part of France in fixing it to His Majesty's satisfaction.

.....

MEMOIR OF CHOISEUL, September 6, 1761

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 444:255]

Memoire pour le conseil du 6. 7bre 1761

La 1ere minute est de la main de M. de Choiseul.

Afin de mettre le roy en etat de donner ses ordres définitifs au Sr de Bussy sur la réponse d'Angleterre qui a été remise au Duc de Choiseul par M. Stanley, le Duc de Choiseul a mis de nouveau sous les yeux de Sa Mté, articles par articles, la dite réponse.

Il luy a rendu compte des conversations qu'il a eues avec le ministre Britannique sur cette pièce, et il a eû l'honneur d'expliquer à S. Mté les facilités ainsy que les oppositions qui lui paroissent se rencontrer dans la négociation de la paix et dans la conclusion de cet ouvrage désirable.

.....
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1er Article

Le Duc de Choiseul fit observer à Mr de Stanley, dans le premier
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article, que sa cour ajoutoit à la cession du Canada dans toute

[Translation]

Memoir for the council of September 6, 1761

The first draft is in M. de Choiseul's hand.

To put the king in a position to give his final orders to the Sieur de Bussy on the reply of England communicated to the Duc de Choiseul by M. Stanley, the Duc de Choiseul has again laid before His Majesty, article against article, the reply in question.

He has given him an account of his conversations with the British minister respecting this document, and has had the honor to set forth to His Majesty both the favorable and the unfavorable circumstances which seem to him to appear in the negotiation of the peace and in the conclusion of so desirable a task.

.....

First Article

The Duc de Choiseul made M. de Stanley observe in the first article that his court added to the cession of Canada in its full

son étendue, telle qu'elle est proposée par la France, le mot *de dépendances* qui emportoit une cession indéfinie dont il falloit que la France fût instruite pour l'accorder. Après une discussion assez inutile sur la cession du fonds qui emporte celle de la dépendance, Mr de Stanley presenta au Duc de Choiseul une carte à la main donnée par Mr de Vaudreuil au général Anglois, dont les limites sont marquées telles qu'elles sont spécifiées dans l'article 1er de la

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réponse Angloise. Après quelques débats sur l'authenticité de la carte et sur le peu de poids du sentiment particulier de Mr de Vaudreuil, le Duc de Choiseul a accordé l'article tel qu'il est demandé par l'Angleterre, avec la seule restriction que le terme d'un an pour l'émigration et la vente des effets français étant trop court, il sera spécifié que ce terme sera de deux ans ou au moins de 18 mois.

Article 2.

Le Duc de Choiseul a accordé la première partie de cet article en faisant sentir avec quelle complaisance le roy se prêtoit aux

[Translation]

extent, as was proposed by France, the word "dependencies" which implied an indefinite cession on which France must be informed in order to accord it. After a sufficiently useless discussion as to the cession of the whole implying that of the parts, M. de Stanley presented to the Duc de Choiseul a map given by M. de Vaudreuil to the English general, on which the boundaries are marked as specified in article 1 of the English reply. After some discussion of the authenticity of the map and on how little weight the private opinion of M. de Vaudreuil should have, the Duc de Choiseul accorded the article as demanded by England, with the sole reservation that the term of one year for the migration and the sale of the goods of the French being too short, it should be specified that the term be two years or at least eighteen months.

Article 2

The Duc de Choiseul accorded the first part of this article, pointing out the complaisance with which the king lent himself

demandes de l'Angleterre, même dans des points où les armes Angloises ne s'étoient pas portées. Quant à la seconde, comme il étoit nécessaire d'établir des pays neutres entre les possessions des deux nations pour leur sûreté réciproque et pour la solidité de la paix, le Duc de Choiseul ne l'a point accordé, et il a été pris dans la conférence *ad referendum*; et le Duc de Choiseul croit, si Sa Mte l'approuve, qu'il faut qu'il soit libellé de cette sorte.

"Que les nations sauvages intermediaries qui sont entre les lacs et le Mississipi en dedans de la ligne tracée, seront neutres

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et indépendantes sous la protection du roy et celles qui seroient hors de la ligne du côté des Anglois seroient de même neutres et indépendantes sous la protection du Roy d'Angleterre; qu'il sera également interdit aux traiteurs Anglois¹ d'aller chez les nations sauvages au delà de la ligne de part et d'autre; mais les dites nations ne seront point gênées dans la liberté de commercer avec

[Translation]

to the wishes of England even in places to which the English arms had not penetrated. As to the second part, as it was necessary to establish neutral regions between the possessions of the two nations for their mutual security and for the solidity of the peace, the Duc de Choiseul would not accord it, and in the conference it was set aside for reference. The Duc de Choiseul thinks, if His Majesty approves, it should be worded as follows.

"That the intermediate Indian tribes who are between the lakes and the Mississippi within the line shall be neutral and independent under the king's protection, and those who are outside the line on the English side shall similarly be neutral and independent under the protection of the King of England; that the English traders¹ shall also be forbidden to go among the Indian tribes beyond the line on either side; but that the said tribes shall not be hindered in freedom of trade with the French

¹ It is quite likely that the words "as well as the French" are omitted.

les françois et les Anglois, comme elles l'ont exercé jusques à présent."

Article 3.

.....
FRENCH MEMOIR ON THE ENGLISH ANSWER, September 9, 1761

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 444:266]

9. 7bre 1761.

Envoyé à M. de Bussy Le 9.

7bre 1761.

Memoire de la France sur la reponse de l'Angre remise au Duc de Choiseul le 1er 7bre par Mr de Stanley ministre de Sa Majté Britanique

Le roi accepte la déclaration du Roi d'Angre contenue dans le préambule de la réponse, et renouvelle la précédente qu'il a faite à Sa Mte Brite sur le meme objet ; de sorte qu'il est arrêté définitivement et sans ambiguïté entre les deux cours que si la paix n'est pas une suite de la négociation actuelle, tout ce qui a été dit, écrit et négocié entre les deux couronnes depuis le mémoire du 26.

[Translation]

and English as carried on at present."

Article 3

.....
September 9, 1761

Sent to M. de Bussy

September 9, 1761

Memoir of France on the reply of England communicated to the Duc de Choiseul September 1 by M. de Stanley, minister of His Britannic Majesty

The king accepts the declaration of the King of England contained in the preamble of his reply, and renews the precedent declaration he had made to His Britannic Majesty on the same object: in such manner that it is definitely and without ambiguity agreed between the two courts that if peace does not result from the present negotiation, all that has been said, written, or negotiated between the two crowns since the memoir of March 26,

Mars inclusivement jusqu'au moment de la rupture, sera nul et de nul effet, et ne pourra pas servir d'argument en faveur d'aucune
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des deux parties dans les négociations futures de la paix.

Article 1er

Le roi a dit, dans son premier mémoire de propositions et dans son ultimatum, qu'il céderoit et garantiroit à l'Angre la possession du Canada dans la forme la plus étendue. Sa Majesté persiste dans cette offre, et sans discuter sur la ligne des limites tracée dans une carte, présentée par M Stanley, comme cette ligne demandée par l'Angleterre est sans doute la forme la plus étendue que l'on puisse donner a la cession, le roi veut bien l'accorder.

Sa Majesté avoit oppose quatre conditions a sa garantie; il paroît que l'Angre ne s'y refuse pas. Le roi trouve simplement que le terme d'un an pour la vente des effets François et pour
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l'emigration est trop court, et Sa Majesté demande qu'il soit convenu que ce terme soit de deux ans ou de 18 mois tout au

[Translation]

inclusively up to the moment of breaking off negotiations, shall be null and void, and may not serve as an argument in favor of either party in future peace negotiations.

Article 1

The king said in his first memoir of proposals and in his ultimatum that he would cede and guarantee to England the possession of Canada in the most extensive form. His Majesty persists in this offer, and without entering into discussion on the boundary line drawn on a map presented by M. Stanley, since that line now demanded by England is without doubt the most extensive form that can be given to that cession, the king is pleased to accord it.

His Majesty had added four conditions to his guaranty; it appears England does not refuse them. The king merely finds that the term of one year for the sale of French possessions and for the emigration is too short, and His Majesty asks that it be agreed that this term be two years or at the least eighteen months.

moins. Comme la cour d'Angre a joint dans l'Arte 1er de sa reponse a la cession entiere et totale du Canada, telle qu'elle est convenue entre les deux cours, le mot de *dependances*, il est necessaire qu'elle s'explique specifiquement pour que cette cession ne produise pas dans la suite de difficultés entre les deux cours, ce qu'elle entend par ce mot de *dependances*

Arte 2.

Le paragraphe 1er sur les limites de la Louisiane contenu dans l'Arte 2 de la reponse de l'Angre est accordé par la France; Le paragraphe second n'est ni clair ni juste et l'on propose definitivement qu'il soit libellé dans la forme suivante.

"Les nations sauvages intermediaires qui sont entre les lacs

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et le Mississipi en dedans de la ligne tracée seront neutres et independantes sous la protection du roi, et celles qui seroient hors de la ligne du cote des Anglois seroient de meme neutres et independantes sous la protection du Roi d'Angre Il sera egalement interdit aux traiteurs Anglois d'aller chez les nations sauvages au

[Translation]

As the court of England has added to article 1 of its reply as to the entire and total cession of Canada as it is agreed to between the two courts, the word "dependencies," that court should explain specifically, lest the cession may in the future give rise to disputes between the two courts, what it understands by the word "dependencies."

Article 2

The first paragraph on the boundaries of Louisiana contained in article 2 of the English reply is accorded by France. The second paragraph is neither clear nor exact, and in last resort it is proposed that it be worded as follows:

The intermediate Indian tribes between the lakes and the Mississippi within the line shall be neutral and independent under the king's protection; and those outside the line on the English side shall likewise be neutral and independent under the protection of the King of England. The English traders shall also be forbidden to go among the Indian tribes beyond the line on either

delà de la ligne de part et d'autre ; mais les dites nations ne seront point gênées dans la liberté du commerce avec les François et les Anglois, comme elles l'ont exercée jusqu'a present."

Arte 3.

.....

Bussy to CHOISEUL, September 19, 1761

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 444:311]

No 37.

A LONDRES le 19 Septembre 1761.

MONSEIGNEUR:

.....

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Le ministre Britannique lut le mémoire en ma présence, et
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s'arrêta d'abord au passage du 2d article, qui commence par ces mots *Le paragraphe 2d n'est ni clair ni juste.* &c. et il me dit qu'il n'y avoit point de nations sauvages intermédiaires entre le Mississipi et la ligne tracée sur la carte que M. Stanley vous avoit remise ; que par consequent il ne savoit pas sur quoi portoit vôtre

[Translation]

side ; but the said tribes shall not be hindered in freedom of trade with the French and English as carried on at present.

Article 3

.....

No. 37

LONDON, September 19, 1761

MY LORD:

.....

The British minister read the memoir in my presence and stopped at first at the passage of the second article which begins with these words: "The second paragraph is neither clear nor exact," etc., and he told me that there were no Indian tribes between the Mississipi and the line drawn on the map which M. Stanley had communicated to you. Accordingly, he did not understand the bearing of your remark, or what might be signi-

remarque et ce que pouvoit signifier l'enonciation de l'indépendance des nations sauvages entre les lacs et le Mississipi; et qu'il me prioit de lui faire connoître si vous entendiez parler de la ligne tracée dans la notte que j'avois remise moi même, et qui prend depuis le Rio Perdido jusqu'aux lacs. Je répondis, Monseigneur, que vous ne me donniez aucune instruction que le mémoire même que je venois de lui remettre, et que je n'étois pas dans le cas de lui donner aucune interprétation; que si j'y étois, mon zèle pour les intérêts de ma patrie devoit me faire pencher pour la ligne tracée dans ma notte, en tant qu'elle s'étendoit depuis

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le Rio Perdido jusqu'à la pointe occidentale du Lac Erié; mais que je lui déclarois expressément que j'avois ordre de m'en tenir littéralement au contenu du memoire; qu'au reste, comme il avoit le détail des conferences que M. Stanley avoit eûes avec vous, Monseigneur, et dont je n'avois aucune connoissance, c'étoit à lui seul à combiner ce 2d article avec ce que la France accordoit dans le premier, et que je ne pouvois ni ne devois y entrer pour rien.

[*Translation*]

fied by stipulating the independence of the Indian tribes between the lakes and the Mississippi. He asked me to inform him if you meant to speak of the line traced in the note that I had myself communicated which led from the Rio Perdido as far as the lakes. I replied, My Lord, that you had given me no further instructions than the memoir which I had just communicated to him and that I was not prepared to give him any interpretation; if I were, my zeal for the interests of my country would make me favor the line drawn in my note so far as it extended from the Rio Perdido to the western end of Lake Erie; but that I had declared to him expressly that I had orders to keep literally to the contents of the memoir. Moreover, since he had the details of M. Stanley's conference with you, My Lord, of which I knew nothing, it was for him alone to combine that second article with what France accorded in the first and that I could not and should not go into it in any way.

VAUDREUIL TO THE DUC DE CHOISEUL, October 30, 1761

[A E Mém. et Doc. Amér., 21:96]

A VERSAILLES le
30 8bre 1761M de Bussy
pour m'en reparler

MONSEIGNEUR

J ai lu avec surpris dans le memoire historique des negociations de la france et de l'angleterre sur l'objet de la paix, l'imputation qui m'est faite par les anglois à l'occasion des limites du Canada, et comme il n'y a rien de plus faux et de plus chimerique que cette assertion, je dois, Monseigneur, vous rendre compte de ce qui s'est passé à cet egard entre M. Amherst & moi

Premierement je n'ai tracé aucunes limites quelconques lorsque j'ai capitulé & ne me suis jamais expliqué dans mes pourparlers avec ce général que par les termes simples de Canada 7
il m'envoya un officier pour me
à 8 jours apres la reddition du pays il me demanda des cartes
demander des cartes instructives
~~instructives~~ sur l'étendue de cette colonie que je lui refusai sous

[Translation]

VERSAILLES, October 30, 1761

M. de Bussy
To speak to me about it again
MY LORD:

I have read with surprise in the historical memoir of the negotiations of France and England for peace, the imputation put upon me by the English respecting the boundaries of Canada. As nothing can be more false and chimerical than such an assertion, I must, My Lord, give you an account of all that passed between M. Amherst and myself.

First of all I drew no boundary whatever when I capitulated, and only expressed myself in my conferences with that general by the simple term, Canada. A week after the surrender of the country, he sent me an officer to ask informatory maps of me regarding the extent of the colony, which I refused on the

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pretexte qu'elles avoient été pillées avec mes effets à quebec contre la foi de la capitulation de cette place et cet officier m'ayant alors montré une carte qu'il avoit par devers lui, je niai les limites qu'elle indiquoit et leur en substituai verbalement d'autres qui donnoient cent lieües de plus à la Louïsiane sur le Canada en étendant cette premiere colonie d'un coté jusqu'au portage des miamis qui est la hauteur des terres dont les eaux se dechargent dans la Riviere Ouabache et de l'autre jusqu'au haut de la Riviere des Illinois.¹

Ce qui j'ai l'honneur de vous marquer monseigneur est incontestable, je ne crains pas que les anglois produire aucune preuve du contraire parcequ'en outre il n'y a ni acte de passé ni ligne de tiree a ce sujet; je suis charmé de vous en prevenir afin qu'ils n'en imposent pas d'avantage à cet egard.

Je suis avec un très profond respect, Monseigneur votre très humble & très obeissant serviteur

VAUDREUIL

[Translation]

pretext that they had been plundered with my baggage at Quebec contrary to the capitulation of that place; and that officer having shown me a map he had about him, I rejected the boundaries it indicated and verbally substituted others which added a hundred leagues to Louisiana at the expense of Canada, by extending the colony first named as far as the portage of the Maumee, which is the Height of Land the waters from which flow to the Wabash; and on the other side as far as the headwaters of the Illinois River.¹

What I have the honor to tell you, My Lord, is indisputable. I do not fear the English producing any proof to the contrary, because there was no document framed or line drawn on the subject at issue. I am delighted to inform you of this that they may not again impose on you in this respect.

I am with most profound respect, My Lord,
Your very humble and very obedient servant,

VAUDREUIL

¹ The following documents give the full history of the Vaudreuil map.

ARTICLE TO BE INSERTED IN GAZETTE OF FRANCE,
November 22, 1761

[A E Mém. et Doc. Amér., 21:97]

Article a mettre dans la Gazette de France 22 9bre 1761

Comme le public a vû avec etonnement que dans les articles 1er et 2 de la reponse de la cour Bque à l'ultimatum de la cour de france remis par M. de Bussy à M. Pitt le 17 août dernier, l'on assuroit que l extension donneé au Canada etoit conformé a la ligne de ses limites tracée par M. le Mis de Vaudreuil lui même, lors de la reddition de cette province au general Anglois, l'on s'est cru obligé de mettre la verité dans tout son jour en faisant imprimer la lettre que M. le Mis de Vaudreuil a ecrit à ce sujet à M. le Duc de Choiseul On y verra le peu de fondement de l'assurance avec laquelle le secretaire d état de Sa Majesté Britque ayant alors le departement du sud, a avancé que la ligne

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des limites de la Louisiane qu'il donnât dans ce paragraphe avait été tracé par le Mis de Vaudreuil même On laisse au public à juger de la validité de cette assertion et à tirer les consequences

[*Translation*]

Article to be inserted in the Gazette of France, November 22, 1761

As the public has seen with astonishment that in articles 1 and 2 of the answer of the British court to the ultimatum of the court of France communicated by M. de Bussy to M. Pitt August 17 last, it was asserted that the extension of the boundaries of Canada conformed to the line of its boundary drawn by M. le Marquis de Vaudreuil himself, at the surrender of that province to the English general, it has been thought necessary to put the matter in its true light by printing the letter that M. le Marquis de Vaudreuil has written on the subject to M. le Duc de Choiseul. It will be apparent on how slight a foundation His Britannic Majesty's then secretary of state for the southern department affirmed that the line of the boundary of Louisiana that he set forth in that paragraph had been drawn by the Marquis de Vaudreuil himself. The public is left to judge the validity of the assertion and to infer the natural conclusion as to such a manner

naturelles d'une pareille façon de negociier. En consequence l'on joint en le contenu des artes 1er et 2e de la reponse de la cour Britannique relativement aux limites du Canada et de la Louisiane avec la copie de la lettre du Mis de Vaudreuil a M. le Duc de Choiseul.

.....

[*Translation*]

of negotiating. Consequently we have added the contents of articles 1 and 2 of the answer of the British court respecting the boundaries of Canada, and Louisiana, with the copy of the letter of the Marquis de Vaudreuil to M. le Duc de Choiseul.

.....

AMHERST TO HALDIMAND, November 1, 1762

[Add. MSS., 21,661:244]

NEW YORK 1st November, 1762

DEAR SIR

I have been twenty times at the Point of writing to you on a Subject, which tho' of no consequence, I should be glad to know the exact Transactions that passed. When I made a report of Canada to the Secretary of State I transmitted a Copy of the Part of the Map, where the Limits between Canada & Louisianne were marked, which you delivered to me, and which I acquainted the Secretary of State were done by Monsieur de Vaudreuil, whether by him or done in his presence by his direction, comes

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to the same thing, and the thing itself is of no sort of consequence, as the Letters and orders he (Monsieur de Vaudreuil) sent to the officers comanding at Michillimakanach, the bay, Ouiatanon, Miamis, &ca. mark out the Boundaries and expressly include those Posts in Canada, so that there can be no dispute about it; yet as I see some Altercation has passed in England and France about Monsr de Vaudreuil's giving the Boundaries, I should be glad to know of you whether he marked the map himself or whether it was done in his presence and what passed

on that Subject, that I may hereafter be able to say all that was done regarding the whole Affair.

I am with great truth Dear Sir

Your most Obedient

Humble Servant

JEFF: AMHERST

HALDIMAND TO AMHERST, December 10, 1762

[Add. MSS., 21,661:257]

TROIS RIVIERES le 10e Xre 1762

fait partir le 16e

MONSIEUR

J'ay reçu avec plaisir la lettre que V: Excellence ma fait l'honneur de m'écrire du 1r 9re a l'égard de ce qui s'est passé entre Monsr de Vaudreuil & Moy au Sujet des Limittes du Canada; je m'étois proposé plusieurs fois de la prévenir: mais j'ay crû devoir attendre Ces Ordres, Auxquels je vais obéir avec toute l'exactitude possible:

Environ 5 ou 6 jours après que je fus entré dans Mt Real, Je demanday à Mr de Vaudreuil, s'il n'auroit point quelques Plans, Mémoires, ou Cartes instructives Concernant le Canada; que je le priois de Vouloir me les remettre, afin que Je pusse les faire tenir

[*Translation*]

THREE RIVERS, December 10, 1762

Sent off the 16th

MONSIEUR:

I received with pleasure the letter Your Excellency did me the honor to write me, November 1, respecting what passed between Monsieur de Vaudreuil and myself on the subject of the boundary of Canada. Several times I considered anticipating you, but decided I should await your orders, which I shall obey as accurately as possible.

About five or six days after I entered Montreal, I asked M. de Vaudreuil if he had any plans, memoirs, or informative maps concerning Canada, begging him to be good enough to turn them over to me that I might put them in Your Excellency's

à V: Exc;; il me repondit qu'il n'en avoit point les ayant toutes perdues à Quebec; (& pour éviter d'entendre l'enumeration qu'il vouloit me faire de Ces Autres pertes); je me Contentay pour lors de Cette réponce; mais ayant eû occasion de lui en reparler quelques jours après, il me dit qu'il avoit retrouvé une Couple de Cartes, & passant dans une Autre Chambre; il fit apporter une grande Carte de l'Amerique Seprle faite à la main & ployée dans le Couvert d'un Atlas, il y avoit Aussi quelques mauvais plans de forts, dans Un rouleau detaché; ne trouvant rien d'Instructif dans Cette Carte, & me rappelant que je l'avois vue imprimée; J'appellay le Lt Herring de Nôtre Batt: qui etoit dans

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la Salle & je la lui remis avec les autres papiers qu'il porta chez moy: Enfin le matin du jour que Monsr de Vaudreuil partit cette Carte me tombant Sans la Main me rappella les tentatives inutiles que j'avois faittes auprès de lui & differentes personnes pour Connoître l'Etendue de ce Pays, & me fit naitre l'idée de l'examiner avec Mr de Vaudreuil, je me rendit sur le Champ

[*Translation*]

hands. He replied that he had none, having lost them all at Quebec; and to avoid the enumeration of his other losses, which he wished to make me, I contented myself for the time with this answer.

But having had occasion to speak to him about it again some days after, he told me he had found a couple of maps; and going into another room he brought a large map of North America drawn by hand and folded into an atlas cover, as also some bad plans of forts in a separate roll. Finding nothing enlightening in the map, and recollecting that I had seen it in print, I called Lieutenant Herring of our battalion, who was in the room, and gave it to him along with the other papers, which he carried to my quarters. Finally the morning of the day on which M. de Vaudreuil left, the map coming to hand, recalled the useless attempts I had made with him and other persons to learn the extent of the colony, and suggested the idea of examining the map with M. de Vaudreuil.

Chez lui en y faisant porter la Carte par Enseigne Monin; ayant trouvé Mr de Vaudreuil dans Son Cabinet qui donne Sur la rue avec quelques personnes de sa Maison, Je le priay, Sans Autre préambulle de Vouloir bien me Montrér qu'elles étoient les Limittes du Canada, & le Conduisant vers la table qui étoit au fond du Cabinet j'ouvris la Carte & après l'avoir un peu examinée je reitery Ma demande; il Me parut fort surpris; & Come il ne me répondit point, je posais le doigt sur la rivière des Illinois en lui disant Voicy les Illinois, alors il me repondit que les Illinois avoient été en Conteste entre les deux Gouverneurs, Mais qu'il avoit été décidé qu'ils dependroient de Celui de la Louysiane Surquoy Sortant un Crayon de ma poche, & M'accoudant Sur la Carte, Mr de Vaudreuil se tenant debout auprès de Moy, je lui demanday en lui Montrant le nord du Micissipy si la ligne passoit par la, & m'ayant repondu que oui je marquay des point depuis la source des Illinois en remontant le Micissipy, & lui ayant

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demandé encore une fois, si je marquois bien il me repondit

[*Translation*]

I went to his quarters at once having Ensign Monin carry the map. Finding M. de Vaudreuil in his office, which opened on the street, with some persons of his household, I requested him without any preamble to be good enough to show me the boundaries of Canada. Leading him to a table at the end of the office, I opened the map and after examining it a little, repeated my request. He seemed much surprised. As he made no reply, I put my finger on the Illinois River, saying, "Here is the Illinois." He then replied that the Illinois had been disputed between the two governors, but that it had been decided to be a dependency of Louisiana.

Upon that, taking a pencil from my pocket, and resting on my elbows on the map, with M. de Vaudreuil standing up beside me, I asked him, showing him the northern part of the Mississippi, if the line went thither. On his answering, yes, I marked points from the source of the Illinois, ascending the Mississippi, and having again asked him if I was marking it correctly he—

ces propres paroles, (lui Monsr le Marquis de Vaudreuil ayant les yeux fixes sur la Carte) prenés tout le nord, prenés tout le nord alors je pointay jusques au Lac Rouge qui me parut la borne la plus naturelle; sans qu'il y eût la moindre objection de sa part; ensuite revenant de l'autre Cotté des Illinois; & ne me figurant pas que Loio put seulement être mise en Conteste, Je lui dis, icy nous prenons sans doute par l'ambouchure du Wabache, & posant mon Crayon au Confluent de Loio avec le Micissipy, je traçay une ligne en remontant Cette première rivière & l Wabache qui alloit joindre les points que j avois comencé à la Source des Illinois et en formay une ligne jusques au Lac Rouge Mr de Vaudreuil, toujours à Cotté de Moy, & regardant sur la Carte, Sans qu'il fit Aucune Objection Cette ligne par Ces differents Contours ne pouvant pas se faire à la dérobee lui en donnoit Cependant bien le temps; Mais Soit qu' Occupé de Son départ, il eut prononcé Ces oui indifferement & sans y pretté toute l'atten-

[*Translation*]

M. le Marquis de Vaudreuil, then having his eyes fixed on the map—answered in these very words, "Take all the north, take all the north." Then I carried the line to Red Lake which seemed to me the most likely limit, without the faintest objection from him.

Then, returning to the other side of the Illinois, and not imagining that the Ohio itself could be disputed, I said to him, "Here we go doubtless by the mouth of the Wabash;" and placing my pencil at the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi, I drew a line ascending that first river and the Wabash, joining it to the points I had begun to mark at the source of the Illinois.

Thus I formed a line as far as Red Lake. M. de Vaudreuil continued to stand beside me, looking at the map, without making any objection; the line drawn by these various contours could not be done in an instant, and would nevertheless have given him the time to do so.

But whether engrossed by his departure he had pronounced these yeses indifferently and without giving the matter the atten-

tion qu'il auroit dû ou qu'en donnant une approbation tascitte il Chercha à M induire en erreur, le recit que je viens de Vous faire Monsr n'en est pas moins dans la plus exacte veritté; Mr de Vaudreuil & tout ce qu'il restoit de françois à Mt Real devant partir ce jour la; les Compagnies de Milices étant assemblées pour délivrer leurs Armes & pretter le sermt de fidellité; je n'avois pas de temps à donner à l'examen de Cette Carte, & des que je Crus Comprendre Ce qu'on entendoit sous le nom de Canada, & 258v

que la ligne fut bien marquée je refermay la Carte & la renvoyay Chez moy par l'Enseigne Monin—; Enfin Monsr vous pouvés etre persuadé que la Carte que vous avés entre les mains, est la même qui me fut remise par Monsr de Vaudreuil 8. ou 10. jours après la prise de Mt Real, & que le Lt Herring (qui je Crois est à N: yorck) porta Chez Moy; que C'est Cette même Carte qui fut reportée par l'Enseigne Monin Ches Mr de Vaudreuil le Matin de Son départ, que lorsque je l'ouvris dans son Cabinet il n'y avoit, ny lignes, ni points, ou rien qui peut désigner

[*Translation*]

tion he should, or whether by evidencing a tacit approval, he sought to lead me into error, the account I have just given you, Monsieur, is neither more nor less than the most exact truth. M. de Vaudreuil and all the rest of the French at Montreal were to depart that day. The militia companies had mustered to give up their arms and take the oath of fidelity; I had not time to give to an examination of the map, and as soon as I could gather what was included under the name of Canada, and that the line was clearly marked, I folded up the map and sent it to my quarters by Ensign Monin.

In a word, Monsieur, you may be sure that the map you have in your hands was turned over to me by M. de Vaudreuil eight or ten days after the capture of Montreal, and that Lieutenant Herring, who I believe is at New York, carried it to my quarters. You may be sure that it is the same map which was carried to M. de Vaudreuil's quarters the morning of his departure, by Ensign Monin; that when I opened the map in the office there

des Limittes; Que la ligne qui les marque Aujourd'huy à été tracée par moy même, entieremt Sous les yeux de Mr de Vaudreuil, a qui Seul je me suis adressé, & que par tout ce qu'il m a dit je n'ay jamais pû douter un instant qu'il ne Me donnât cette ligne pour les Vrayes limittes du Canada; & que du Moment que je fermy cette Carte dans son Cabinet jusques à Celui ou je l'ay remis entre Vos mains il n'y à eû Aucune alteration faite à Cette ligne de qu'elle nature que ce puisse être; Cecy Monsr est Sur Ma parole la pure veritté de Cette transaction:

Je dois vous avouér aussi Monsr que me persuadant que Vous demandiez plustot des Intelligences (sur l'étendue d'un Pays que je Crois n'a jamais eû de Limittes fixes) qu'un acte autentique fait en vertu de la Capitulation; je ne Crus pas qu'il Convint de faire signer la Carte par Monsr de Vaudreuil, Ce qui m'eût été facile, de même que de me faire donner des limittes du Canada par escrit, ce qu'il n auroit pû me refuser en vertu de la Capitula-

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tion & auroit rendu Cet Acte incontestable; au lieu que n'ayant

[*Translation*]

were no lines or points nor anything to mark the boundaries. You may be sure that the line which today marks the boundary was drawn by myself, entirely under the eyes of M. de Vaudreuil, to whom only I addressed myself; and that by all that he said I could not doubt for an instant that he was giving me that line as the true boundary of Canada; that from the moment I folded up the map in his office until the moment I put it in your hands no alteration of any nature was made in this line. This, Monsieur, on my honor, is the pure truth as to the transaction.

I should also say, Monsieur, that I thought you would prefer information on the extent of a colony which I think has never had definite boundaries, than a formal document made in accord with the capitulation. Accordingly I did not think it fitting to have M. de Vaudreuil sign the map, which I could easily have had done, as well as to make him give me the boundaries of Canada in writing, which in consequence of the capitulation he could not have refused to do, and which would have made the record indis-

pas de Signature à Montrer, il pourra toujours faire Croire à Son party, qu'on a cherché à le surprendre.

Si J'ay mal compris V. Ex: j'en suis très fâché & lui en fait Mes excuses; & lorsqu'en vous remettant la Carte je vous dis que les Limites étoient tirées par Mr de Vaudreuil, J'entendais qu'elles avoient été tirées Sous Ces propres yeux; & avoient eu Son approbation Ce qui est vray à la lettre;

Je suis au reste bien Charmé que Cette vilaine chicaine de Mr de Vaud: ne porte aucun prejudice aux affaires, elle me Servira d'une bonne leçon dont je me Souviendray si j ay le bonheur de pouvoir la mettre un jour en pratique.

J'ay l honneur d etre
Avec un profond respect

Monsieur
de votre Excellence
Le très humble & très

du 10e Xre

Obeissant Serviteur
FRED: HALDIMAND

[*Translation*]

putable. As it is, having no signature to show, he can always make his people believe that we tried to overreach him.

If I have ill understood Your Excellency, I am very sorry and apologize. When I gave you the map I told you the boundaries were drawn by M. de Vaudreuil, meaning that they had been drawn under his own eyes and had been approved by him. This is literally true.

For the rest I am delighted that this ugly trick of M. de Vaudreuil's does not prejudice affairs. It will serve as a good lesson to me which I shall remember, if I one day am fortunate enough to be able to put it to use.

I have the honor to be

With profound respect, Monsieur,

Your Excellency's very humble and very obedient servant,

FRED: HALDIMAND

December 10

CHAPTER XII

THE VIRY-SOLAR NEGOTIATION, MARCH-JUNE, 1762: THE MISSISSIPPI BOUNDARY

NEWCASTLE TO HARDWICKE, March 8, 1762

[Add. MSS., 32,935:249]

NEWCASTLE HOUSE March 8th 1762

Very Secret

MY DEAR LORD.

Count Viry¹ is now here; And has acquainted me, That Lord Bute had, yesterday Trusted Him with His Notions upon The Terms of Peace;² Which, in Every Point but one, (In which Lord B. does not seem determin'd,) are exactly the Same with Mine; and must result from His Lordps Resolution to make Peace, Finding The Impossibility to continue The War.

Lord. B. would yield to the Limits propos'd by the French, for Canada, & Louisiana, as no Inconvenience can arise, since We must always be the Strongest in That Part.

He would also admit of The *Cunette*, propos'd to be allow'd at Dunkirk, for the Preservation of

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The Health of The Town, & the little Trade of the Place.

He would also be contented with either Senegal or Gorée.

He would agree with the French as to Miquelon; and the Visit of The English Admiral at St Peter's; and allow The Fifty Men, desir'd by France for the Garrison of St. Peter's.

As to The Garrisons of Wesel, & Gueldres, He would propose Neutral Garrisons; But in a Manner, not To make it an Article *sine quâ non*.

So That Your Lordship sees, That, with regard to all our Points with France, Lord B. is as reasonable, as I can wish Him.

¹ For Comte de Viry, see *ante*, cxxiii-cxxiv.

² For the beginning of the negotiation, see *ante*, cxxvi-cxxxi.

He told My Friend, That Lord Egremont was more difficult ; And
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That He (Lord. B.) had offer'd His Lordship, to sign, with
Him, The Letter propos'd to be wrote to Count Viry, containing
These Conditions.

The only Point of Difficulty, now remaining, is the Manner
of treating Our Disputes with Spain. Lord B. has some Difficulty
in negotiating Them, Thro' France. C. V. told Him, There
would be an End of Every Thing, If We Totally excluded The
Court of France ; And shew'd Him His, (C. V.s) Letter to Solar ;
Wherein C. V. had actually propos'd That Method to Solar. Lord
B. *seem'd* to give Way ; But Lord Egremont is very *Fiers* [?] *[?]*
upon it. Lord B. said, George Grenville would be against Us ;
But That He could not help it : We must do what was right, Not-
withstanding That.

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As to our Disputes with Spain, I have propos'd a Method
to C. V. which He approves Vizt

That C. V. should say, in His Letter to Solar, That our Dis-
putes with Spain were Such, as might be very easily adjusted.

That, as to the Logwood, We were ready to accept The Pro-
posal of Spain ; To send immediate Orders for the Demolishing
our Settlements, provided The King of Spain would give us an
Assurance valable, That We should continue to cut Logwood, Till
an Expedient could be agreed upon, to the Satisfaction of Both
Parties.

That The Spanish Demand of Fishing in Newfoundland had
been given up by Them ; and was not for The Interest of France,
Which had a Right founded upon The Treaty of Utrecht.

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That, as to the Prizes, We thought, it was contrary to all
Precedent in all Countries, That The Jurisdiction, and Determina-
tion, of the respective Courts of Justice, should not be held final,
& conclusive. That, however, We should be ready to hear what
They had to say upon This Head.

And to add to Monsr Solar,

That, If The Court of Spain was willing to Treat upon That

Foot, The Man of Confidence, Who was to go to France, might be authoris'd To Treat with The Spanish Ambassador at Paris.— Or, that Gen'l Yorke might be instructed, & authoris'd, To Treat with The Spanish Ambassr at The Hague.

For God's Sake, My Dear Lord, when Things are brought so
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near, Dont let us lose this Great Object for a mere Formality. If my Friend is not mistaken, Lord B. acts like a Man, and is determin'd to conclude forthwith.

I find, by C. V. That The Communication of Mor Solar's Third Letter, had made a great Impression upon My Lord Bute; and Had remov'd any doubt, His Lordp might have had, of Monr de Choiseul's Sincerity. * We must keep up My Lord B. Lord Egremont, & George Grenville, will do all They can against Us. But Your Lordship, The Duke of Devonshire, & I, can keep Him right, If We all Three agree; and are strong, & Firm.

I am &c

HOLLES NEWCASTLE.

HARDWICKE TO NEWCASTLE, April 2, 1762¹

[Add. MSS., 32,936:310]

GROSVENOR-SQUARE Friday Evening
April 2d 1762

MY DEAR LORD,

I have perus'd deliberately the Account of the Taking of Martinico, Sta Lucia &c, together with Admiral Rodney's private Letter to Your Grace, of which You did me the honour to send me a Copy. Mr. Pitt us'd to affect to call Belleisle *that important Conquest*; This is really important in the superlative degree; for if Admiral Rodney is right, It gives the King the Key of the West-Indies, as much as Gibraltar does that of the Mediterranean; & it certainly might give England, in effect, the whole Sugar-Trade of the World, except what remains in St Domingo. This seems to me to suggest something material as to the Consideration of To-morrow, & makes me extremely glad that it has

¹ This and the succeeding letter are significant of how little attention the Whig leaders had accorded the Canada-Guadeloupe pamphlet controversy.

been agreed at present to make no particular Specific offers: & that the words *Subject to such Variations as may naturally & reasonably arise from any Alteration of circumstances on either* 310v

Side (or to that effect) were admitted into the Minute. For it strikes me, whether some material parts of the last Plan of Peace may not deserve to be reconsider'd? As to the Restoration of Conquests, Mr Pitt made North America entirely his object. Some of his Enemies objected to Him that He did This out of partiality to his Friend Beckford, & out of Condescension to the particular Interests of our Sugar Colonies; but in That I suppose They did him wrong; tho' I allways suspected that one Reason why he contended so much for the Totality of the Fishery, impracticable to be obtain'd, was that He Saw the Country of Canada was not greatly worth keeping. Your Grace knows what has been debated in Pamphlets, whether We should keep Canada or Guadeloupe. It will come now to be a more grave Question Whether You should restore to France all her Sugar-Colonies, or great part of Canada. The most material Argumt for retaining Canada has been the delivering your Northern Colonies from such bad Neighbours, & from the danger of french Encroachmts for the future; but some persons have thought That could never be securely attain'd witht conquering Louisiana also; & that for this purpose some parts of Canada might serve as well as the whole. The Question now may come between Canada, or a great part of Canada, and all The French Sugar Colonies, except St Domingo. 311

Canada is a cold northern Climate, unfruitful; furnishes no Trade to Europe, that I know of, but the Fur-Trade, the most inconsiderable of all Trades; & therefore never compensated to France the Expense of maintaining & defending it. It's Products are nearly of the same kind with Those of Great Britain, & consequently will take off not much of our's. Besides, if you remove the French Inhabitants, This Kingdom & Ireland cannot furnish, or procure, People enough to settle & inhabit it, in Centuries to come; And, if you dont remove the French Inhabitants, they will

never become half Subjects, & this Country must maintain an Army there to keep them in Subjection.

It will be said that none of these Objections occur against The *French Sugar Colonies*. They are fertile Countries; may be easily peopled, &, being Islands, be easily defended, particularly by your Squadrons now in use to be sent annually. They must take all the Necessaries of Life from the Mother Country, as your own Islands now do. The Sugar-Trade is a most profitable one, & You may engross almost the whole of it, & serve all the European Markets. To defend Them, You will not want Troops, or at the most, a very few.

A great deal of this Reasoning has been already retailed in the Pamphlets; but, when it was confin'd to Guadaloupe only, it did not carry so great weight, For France still remain'd in possession of the greater part. But it will come with redoubled

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Force, now You have acquir'd the possession of *all* the Caribbee Islands, especially if what is said be true *that they are the Key of the whole West Indies*. I am very glad that Rodney did not put this into his public Letter.

I have seen no body but my horse all this day, so have not talked to, or heard, any body upon the Subject. Nor will I raise one word about it to morrow, nor at all without communication with Your Grace & our Friends; for I see the Delays & difficulties that may arise from your being to form, in some measure, a new Plan of Peace. And yet the National Interest must be attended to in so important & decisive a Conjuncture, in which new Circumstances will give Rise to new Ways of Thinking. I have scribbled This very hastily, that Your Grace may turn it in your serious Thoughts, & perhaps You may get some Lights by talking, *at a proper Time*, to your Friend Sir William Baker upon the Subject. If these Caribbee Islands could be kept, it might possibly be worth The while of this Country to restore almost any Thing, except a greater proportion of the Fishery than was yielded in our last Ultimatum.

Dont take this as an opinion, for I have form'd none.

I have not yet received any Sumons for to morrow but let it come at any time, or for what time it will, I shall be ready to attend your Grace.

I am, my dearest Lord, Ever Your's.

HARDWICKE

NEWCASTLE TO HARDWICKE, April 2, 1762

[Add. MSS., 32,936:312]

NEWCASTLE HOUSE Friday night
past ten o'clock.

MY DEAR LORD,

I have, this moment, read over, with The greatest attention, your Lordship's most wise, and material, Letter: It certainly contains matter of the highest importance, and deserves most serious attention

I own It startles me, who never was startled, as to The Sugar Islands before.

I have; upon It, sent for Sir William Baker, to be with me, To morrow.

Luckily we shall have no meeting, They are not yet ready.

Ld Egremont had a Return of His Headach, this morning; and Ld Bute Told me, He knew nothing of Him, or when We should have Our meeting.

I beg you would dine with me, & we will talk the matter fully over.

Portugal puzzles me extremely. I feel all you say, upon that subject

I am &c

HOLLES NEWCASTLE

DUC DE CHOISEUL TO SOLAR, April 15, 1762

[Shelburne MSS., 9:118]

Copie de la lettre de M. le Duc de Choiseul à M le
Bailli Solar de Breille le 15. Avril 1762.

Le Comte de Choiseul repondra, mon cher Ambassadeur, de la part du roi directement à la déclaration que Milord Egremont m'a adressé. Je me contenterai de mon côté d'exprimer aux ministres de S. M. B. l'estime et la consideration que nous avons pour eux, ainsi que la verité des sentimens du roy et de son
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ministère pour le rétablissement d'une paix solide. Je croirois qu'il seroit à propos entre deux grandes cours et d'aussi bonne foi que les notres, d'abreger les préambules des négociations, qui renferment ordinairement plus de finesse que de solidité; aussi je n'ai nulle difficulté de vous expliquer tout naturellement, comme moi-même, mon cher Ambassadeur, notre situation actuelle et notre façon de penser, pour que d'après cette base vous puissiez instruire M. de Viry de mettre à portée de repondre à la cour de Londres de notre bonne foi; mettre en etat cette cour de former

[Translation]

Copy of the letter of M. le Duc de Choiseul to M.
le Bailli Solar de Breille, April 15, 1762

The Comte de Choiseul will reply, my dear Ambassador, on the king's behalf directly to the declaration that My Lord Egremont addressed to me. I will content myself for my part by expressing to the ministers of His Britannic Majesty the esteem and regard we have for them, as well as the sincerity of the wishes of the king and his ministry for the reestablishment of a solid peace. I should think it fitting between two courts so great, and of such good faith as ours, to cut short the preliminaries of negotiation, which usually have in them more finesse than solidity. Accordingly, I make no difficulty, my dear Ambassador, of explaining to you, quite naturally like myself, our actual situation and our way of thinking, in order that on it as a foundation you can so instruct M. de Viry that he can answer to the court of London for our good faith; and further that you may enable that court to form its plan of pacification so that it may suit both crowns, and

son plan de pacification, qui convienne aux deux couronnes; et de co-operer par des moiens et des facilités à celles qui seront apportées de la part du roy pour cet objet salutaire. Vous sentez, cependant, mon cher Ambr, que le détail, dans lequel je vais entrer demande, quelque soit l'évenement de la négociation, le secret le plus inviolable. Je m'en rapporte à la probité du Comte de Viry,

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et à celle des Milords Egremont et Bute pour etre certain que, quelque chose qui arrive, ce qui j'ai l'honneur de vous ecrire ne sera cité dans aucun tems, ni à aucun allié.

.....
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Quant à ce qui regarde la France en Amerique, Afrique et Asie, et ce qui s'appelle la guerre maritime entre les deux couronnes, rien n'est plus sage que de prendre nos derniers ultimatums pour base de notre négociation. Je hazarderai franchement de dire sur cet objet mon sentiment: Le Canada a été l'objet d'un grand procès; il doit etre le prix et l'avantage de celui qui l'a gagné: je ne crois donc pas qu'il y ait de difficulté sur la cession

[*Translation*]

to coöperate in expedients and in favorable terms with those that the king will afford for that salutary object. You perceive, however, my dear Ambassador, that the detail into which I am about to go, demands, whatever the outcome of the negotiation the most inviolable secrecy. I rely on the probity of Comte de Viry and of My Lords Egremont and Bute in order to feel assured that, whatever may happen, what I have the honor to write you will never at any time or to any ally be cited against us.

.....
As to what concerns France in America, Africa, and Asia and what is termed the maritime war between the two crowns, nothing is wiser than to take our last ultimatums as the basis of the negotiation. I will hazard speaking my mind frankly on that head. Canada has been the object of a great contest; it should be the prize and advantage of the winner. I do not think then that there will be any difficulty about the cession of all Canada to England

entière du Canada à l'Ange, même avec les limites, de la détermination desquels il sera aisé de convenir relativement à la Louisiane.

....

[Translation]

even with boundaries the fixation of which relative to Louisiana it will be easy to agree on.....

.....

NEWCASTLE TO HARDWICKE, April 25, 1762

[Add. MSS., 32,937:349]

CLAREMONT Apl 25th 1762

MY DEAR LORD,

I desired The Duke of Devonshire, To send your Lordship The Copies of all which I had Then received; I have since had, from Viry, Copies of the rest: which I will send, or communicate, to your Lordship Tomorrow.

I have received This Evening at seven o'clock, Lord Egremont's Answer to The several points in The Duc de Choiseul's Letter to M. de Solar; It is exactly conformable to what was proposed, at The Meeting, on Friday—I own, I had, & have, My doubts, as to our Demanding either *Guadeloupe*, or *Louisiana*: We shall have neither: and, I hope, shall not finally insist upon Them. We have once lost The Peace, by asking too much, & not departing from it, soon enough: I hope, That will not be our Case a second Time: if It is, Nothing but Destruction can follow.
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I cannot say, I was much edified with what passed Yesterday. Lord Bute, after all The Satisfaction, which He had shew'd to Me, the Day before, began in The Pitt Stile, To treat the Demands of M. de Choiseul as proper to come from a Conqueror, & not from a Power, That had suffer'd so much, since The Breaking off The last Negotiation. He then hung down his Head, & said little, 'till he insisted upon some Considerable Equivalent for Martinico. My own private Opinion is, To ask The Four Neutral Islands, and finally to take St Lucia, & One of The Other Three.

Consider, My Dear Lord, what Confusion We shall be in, If This Negotiation breaks off. You see The King of Prussia already treated by My Lord President, The Duke of Bedford, & My Lord Bute, rather as an Enemy, then an ally....

350....

What are we to do, about The Prussian Subsidy? It is high Time, it should be determined; & be brought for That Purpose before The Lords. I doubt, our secret transpires & how could any Body imagine, It would not, after a Solemn Meeting, *at My Lord President's*.

.....

EGREMONT TO VIRY, April 30, 1762

[Shelburne MSS., 9:158]

Copie d'un billet écrit par Milord
Egremont à M. le Comte de Viry.

LONDRES du Vendredi au
soir, 30 Avril 1762

Depuis que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous voir, mon cher Comte, nous avons augmenté encore de complaisance et de concession
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pour la cour de France, comme vous verrez par la copie que j'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer, de la lettre qui est à la fin, comme elle doit être envoyée; on a été d'avis pour abrêger les choses de dire le dernière mot d'abord. J'ai ordonné les lettres pour signer à demain. Quand vous serez prêt, nous pourrons le faire partir.

[*Translation*]

Copy of a note written by My Lord Egremont to
M. le Comte de Viry

LONDON, Friday evening, April 30, 1762

Since I had the honor of seeing you, my dear Count, we have increased our complaisance and concessions for the court of France, as you will see by the copy I have the honor to send you of the letter, which is, at last, the way it should be sent off. It has been decided to cut matters short by saying the last word first. I have ordered the letters to be ready to be signed tomorrow. When you are ready we can send them off. I will have the honor

J'aurai l'honneur de passer chez vous demain et j'ai l'honneur d'être avec tout le respect possible.

[*Translation*]

of calling on you tomorrow, and I have the honor to be with all possible respect.

HARDWICKE TO NEWCASTLE, May 1, 1762

[Add. MSS., 32,938:10]

GROSVENOR SQUARE Saturday Morn.

May 1st 1762.

.....
 I thought it very plain yesterday, that the pretence of summoning this second Meeting, *because Lords had been silent, & avoided giving their opinions before*, was but a Colour, & not the true Reason. Before Your Grace came in it appear'd by what Lord Egremont said, that His Lordship had had his difficulties & misgivings upon the new proposition of the part of Louisiana on the left side of the Mississippi: & that the noble Lord, who made it, had not *Then* consider'd how it was mix'd & implicated with certain Spanish settlements.

.....
 I return Joe's Letter.

You see the *Secret Chanel* has transpir'd from Paris to the Hague, & consequently all over Europe.

EGREMONT TO VIRY, May 1, 1762

[Shelburne MSS., 9:159]

Copie de la lettre confidentielle, écrite par Milord
Egremont à M. le Comte de Viry

DE WHITEHALL le 1er May 1762

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et pour mettre nôtre procedé dans tout son jour, permettez moi de vous rappeler, mon cher Comte, qu'outre la cession des deux grosses Isles de la Martinique et de Guadeloupe, dont la fertilité l'opulence et l'importance estoient très bien connües, sans compter celle de Mariegalante, dans tous les articles qui avoient été laissés induis à la rupture de la dernière négociation, je me suis presque entièrement conformé aux idées de la France dans ma lettre d'aujourd'hui. La cession de l'Isle de Gorée en Affrique: les restitutions que nous avons a faire sur la côte de Coromandel: et l'article de Dunkerque sont des preuves peu équivoques que je n'ai cherché qu'a applanir le chemin; et les petites isles que j'ai demandées, aussi bien que la fixation de nos limites en Amerique

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à la rive orientale du Mississippi sont des compensations si

[*Translation*]Copy of the confidential letter written by My Lord
Egremont to M. le Comte de Viry

WHITEHALL, May 1, 1762

...and to put our proceedings in their proper light, let me recall to you, my dear count, that besides the cession of the two large islands of Martinique, and Guadeloupe, the fertility, opulence, and importance of which are very well known, not counting Mariegalante, I have, in all the articles left unsettled at the rupture of the last negotiation, conformed myself almost entirely to the ideas of France in my letter of this day. The cession of the island of Goree in Africa, the restitutions we are to make on the coast of Coromandel, and the article on Dunkirk are unequivocal proofs that I have sought to smooth the way. The little islands I have asked, as well as the setting of our boundaries in North America at the east bank of the Mississippi, are such modest compensations

modiques pour les restitutions offertes, que vous verrez bien que j'ai suivis vôtre idée en disant tout d'un coup l'étendue de nos pensées, pour éviter les longueurs, et pour conclure sans délai.

.....

EGREMONT TO VIRY, May 1, 1762

[Shelburne MSS., 9:169]

Copie de la lettre de Milord Egremont, à M. le Comte de Viry, qui contient les propositions faites aux deux couronnes de France et d'Espagne par L'Angleterre.

Je vous avoüe naturellement que je suis persuadé que les ministres de France et d'Espagne pensent ainsi que nous sur la

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manière de négocier, qui convient à trois grandes cours d'aussi bonne foy que les nôtres; et je ne puis donner une preuve moins equivoque du sentiment de S. M. B. à cet égard, qu'en entrant d'abord en matière sans m'arreter au préambule des négociations qui renferme ordinairement plus de finesse que de solidité.

[*Translation*]

for the proffered restitutions that you will easily see I have followed your idea in telling at once the full extent of our thought to avoid protractions and to conclude without delay.

.....

Copy of the letter of My Lord Egremont to M. le Comte de Viry which contains the proposals made to the two crowns of France and Spain by England

I avow to you quite simply that I am persuaded that the ministers of France and Spain think as we do on the fashion of negotiating which befits three great courts of such good faith as ours; and I cannot give a less equivocal proof of the sentiments of His Britannic Majesty in that respect than by entering at the start into the matter, without hesitating over the preambles of negotiation which ordinarily have in them more finesse than solidity.

Pour remplir ce grand objet avec toute la clarté, aussi bien qu'avec toute la franchise possibles, et pour écarter l'ambiguïté, l'obscurité et la confusion qui pourroient se glisser faute de methode, dans un exposé simple et sincère des sentimens des ministres de S. M. sur cette importante matière; je vais exposer article par article nos sentimens sur ce grand objet.

.....
172....

Quant à la guerre entre la Grande Bretagne et la France nous pensons que la meilleure idée est de prendre pour bâte de la négociation les deux derniers ultimatums de nos cours. Par rapport au Canada il n'y aura aucune difficulté et nous consentirons au terme des 18. mois pour l'emigration; et pour ce qui est de la pêche de la morrue, nous accorderons à la France la liberté de pêcher sur les bancs de la Terre Neuve, et de les secher sur terre, comme il est stipulé dans le Traité d'Utrecht, comme aussi sur les côtes des Isles de St Pierre, et de Miquelon, et que les sujets de la France pourront aussi pêcher dans le Golphe de St Laurent, sans pourtant empiéter sur les droits des côtes de nos territoires, et la

[*Translation*]

To fulfil this great object, with all the clarity and freedom possible, and to eliminate the ambiguity, obscurity, and confusion which might slip in for want of method in a simple and sincere exposition of the sentiments of His Majesty on this important matter, I am going to set forth article by article our sentiments on this great object.

.....
As to the war between Great Britain and France we think the best idea is to take as the basis of the negotiation the two last ultimatums of our courts. With respect to Canada there will be no difficulty, and we will consent to the term of eighteen months for the emigration. As to the codfishery we will accord France the freedom of fishing on the banks of Newfoundland, and of drying fish on land, as is stipulated in the Treaty of Utrecht; as also on the coasts of St. Pierre and Miquelon. We will allow the subjects of France also to fish in the Gulf of St. Lawrence without, however, infringing on the rights of the coasts of our terri-

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France ayant demandé l'année passée que l'Isle de Miquelon fut ajoutée à celle de St Pierre en qualité d'abry, nous nous prêtons à cette demande comme à celle de la garde de 50. hommes pour prêter main forte à la police nécessaire et au lieu de la visite du commandant de l'escadre Brite à Terre neuve, nous nous contenterons du commissaires accordé par la France pour etre temoin de l'exactitude avec laquelle on observera les articles du traité.

Pour ce qui est de la partie meridionale de l'Amerique, nous étions dès l'année passée en possession actuelle des Isles de la Guadeloupe, de Mariegalante, et de la Dominique, une de celles appellées les Isles neutres, aux quelles nous venons d'ajouter la très importante acquisition de l'Isle de la Martinique avec celle de Ste Lucie; et pendant que j'écris un officier arrive, qui nous annonce la reddition de l'Isle de Grenade avec les Grenadines, et qu'on alloit prendre possession de St Vincent et de Tobago qui

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etoient sans defence. Après ce detail que je viens de vous faire, vous rendrez justice sans doute à la sincérete des disposi-

[*Translation*]

tories. France having last year asked that the island of Miquelon be added to that of St. Pierre as a shelter, we yield to that demand, as to the one for a guard of fifty men to supply force to the necessary police; and instead of visitation by the commander of the British squadron stationed at Newfoundland, we will be content with the commissaries allowed by France to be witness to the exactitude with which the articles of the treaty are observed.

As to the southern part of America we were last year in actual possession of the islands of Guadeloupe, Mariegalante, and Dominica, the last, one of those called Neutral; we have just added the very important acquisition of the island of Martinique with St. Lucia; and while I am writing an officer has arrived to announce to us the surrender of the Isle of Grenada with the Grenadines, as well as the fact that they were about to take possession of St. Vincent and Tobago, which were defenseless. After my informing you of this detail you will doubtless do justice to the sincere disposition of the king to make sacrifices

tions du roi à faire des sacrifices même au delà de ce qu'on pourroit s'attendre afin de parvenir sans délai à un objet aussi desirable que celui d'un prompt retablisement de la tranquillité publique; et dans la juste attente qu'est S. M. de voir tous nos differends definitivement ajustés par la reponse de la cour de France. Quand j'ai l'honneur de vous informer que S. M. se porte à accorder non seulement la restitution des Isles de la Guadeloupe et de Mariegalante, mais aussi celle de la Martinique dont le prix et l'importance lui sont si parfaitement connus, comme de tout le monde, à condition néanmoins que la possession des 4. isles ci-devant appellées neutres avec la Grenade et les Grenadines fassent partie de la compensation pour de si grands sacrifices en restant absolument à la couronne de la Grande Bretge; mais S. M. sensible à ce qu'elle doit à l'interêt de ses peuples et pour que la ditte compensation se trouve tant soit peu proportionnée aux res-

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titutions offertes, aussi bien que pour remettre la paix sur des fondemens solides et durables, et d'écarter pour toujours tous

[*Translation*]

even beyond what may be expected of him in order to arrive without delay at an object so desirable as a prompt reëstablishment of the public quiet, and in the just expectation in which he is of seeing all our differences finally adjusted by the answer of the court of France. I have the honor to inform you that His Majesty is disposed to allow not only the restoration of the Isles of Guadeloupe and Mariegalante, but also Martinique, the value and importance of which are perfectly well known to him as to all the world, on condition nevertheless that the possession of the four islands formerly called Neutral with Grenada and the Grenadines form a part of the compensation of such great sacrifices by remaining absolutely to the crown of Great Britain; but I must add that His Majesty, sensible of what he owes to the interest of his peoples and in order that some compensation may exist, however ill proportioned to the restitutions offered, demands, both to put the peace on solid and durable foundations and to remove forever all subjects of dispute that may arise with

sujets de dispute qui pourroient naître par rapport aux limites des deux nations sur le Continent de l'Amerique, S. M. demande que le cours de la rivieré de Mississippi fasse pour l'avenir les limites entre les deux nations.

.....

VIRY TO SOLAR, May 4, 1762

[Shelburne MSS., 9:181]

Copie de la lettre de M. le Comte de Viry à M. le
Bailli Solar de Breille.

LONDRES. 4. May 1762

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Lorsque Milord Egremont me remit ses lettres pour M. le Comte de Choiseul et celle qu'il m'écrivoit, je lui dis tout naturellement que je n'entendois pas bien ce qu'il vouloit me dire dans sa lettre, lorsque'il demandoit *que le cours de la Riviere du Mississippi fasse pour l'avenir les limites des deux nations* pour le continent de l'Amerique; Et m'ayant repondu, après un discours assez long sur cette matière, qui ne me donnoit aucun eclaircis-

[Translation]

respect to the boundaries of the two nations on the Continent of America, that the course of the Mississippi River form for the future the boundary between the two nations.

.....

Copy of the letter of M. le Comte de Viry to M. le
Bailli Solar de Breille

LONDON, May 4, 1762

When My Lord Egremont communicated to me his letters for M. le Comte de Choiseul and the one which he wrote me, I told him quite naturally that I did not well understand what he wished to tell me in his letter when he asked "that the course of the Mississippi river form for the future the boundary between the two nations" for the Continent of America. As he answered me, after a sufficiently long discourse on the subject, that he could give me no enlightenment; that the question I asked was so deli-

sement, que la question que je lui faisois étoit si délicate qu'il ne pouvoit pas m'en donner la solution, parceque sa lettre avoit été lûe dans le conseil sans que personne eut trouvé que ces expressions pouvoient faire naître des doutes, j'ai pris le parti: Quoique je sois très persuadé que Milord Egremont ne s'en étoit pas servi pour les expliquer ainsi qu'on le trouveroit plus à propos d'écrire

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confidemment à une personne de credit pour le prier de me dire ce qu'on vouloit dire par ces expressions; et j'ai reçu en réponse la note dont je joins ici copie.

Milord Bute m'a dit mille choses obligantes pour V. E. Il la prie d'agréer ses complimens, et d'assurer M. le Duc et M. le Comte de Choiseul que personne ne les considère plus que lui. Il espère qu'ils seront contens de la lettre que Milord Egremont m'écrit. J'ai l'honneur d'être &c.

Copie de la note au sujet de la limite du cours du Mississippi entre les deux nations.¹

[*Translation*]

cate that he could not give me the answer, inasmuch as his letter had been read in council without any one's finding the expression could occasion doubt, I made my decision. Since I was quite convinced that My Lord Egremont would not serve to explain the expression, I thought it better to write confidentially to a certain person of credit to beg him to tell me what was meant by it; and I received in reply the note a copy of which I annex.

My Lord Bute told me a thousand obliging things for Your Excellency. He begs you to accept his compliments and to assure M. le Duc and M. le Comte de Choiseul that no one has a higher regard for them than himself. He hopes they will be satisfied with the letter My Lord Egremont has written me. I have the honor to be, etc.

Copie of the note on the subject of the boundary of the course of the Mississippi between the two nations¹

¹This document marks the appearance in the negotiation of the Iberville-Lakes boundary which was to have so far-reaching effects in the next forty years of western history.

La ligne des limites du Canada vers l'occident tracée par M. de Vaudreuil finit au confluent de l'Ohio et du Mississippi. Depuis ce confluent jusqu'à la mer, le cours du Mississippi servira de limites entre les deux nations; mais comme le Mississippi a plusieurs embouchures, on entend celle qui est le plus vers l'orient; c'est à dire celle qui passe par la petite Rivière Iberville, les Lacs Maurepas, et Pontchartrain, et de là se communique à la mer.

DUC DE CHOISEUL TO SOLAR, May 12, 1762

[Shelburne MSS., 9:307]

Ce billet et joint à la
lettre de M le Bailli de Solar
à M. le Comte de Viry
du 12. May 1762

Billet de M. le Duc de Choiseul à M. le Bailli de
Solar, du 12. May 1762.

Je vous envoie, mon cher Ambr, les pièces que vous m'avez
confié avec les copies de celles que nous communiquerons à

[*Translation*]

The line of the boundary of Canada to the west drawn by M. de Vaudreuil ends at the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi. From that junction to the sea, the course of the Mississippi shall serve as the boundary between the two nations; but as the Mississippi has several outlets that one is understood which is farthest to the east; that is to say the one which passes by the little river Iberville, Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain, and thence communicates with the sea.

This note is annexed to the
letter of M. le Bailli de Solar
to M. le Comte de Viry, May 12,
1762

Note of M. le Duc de Choiseul to M. le Bailli de
Solar, May 12, 1762

I send you, my dear Ambassador, the papers you left with me
with the copies of those which we shall communicate to Spain and

l'Espagne et à Vienne; j'espere que vous trouverez que le tout est ajusté sans inconvenient. Le roy a été, on ne peut pas plus content, de la franchise et de la noblesse de la cour de Londres; nous
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avons regretté bien sincérement ensemble de n'avoir pas eu affaire l'année passée à Milord Egremont. Que de malheurs on auroit évité! et qu'elle difference de traiter avec Milord Egremont ou avec M. Pitt, qui peut être un grand homme d'ailleurs, parceque nous avons faite la guerre comme des imbécilles; mais qui à coup sur c'est le plus mauvais politique de l'Europe. Le resultat de mon travail avec le roy a été que si S. M. étoit la maitresse la paix seroit faite d'ici à 15. jours; mais l'Ange nous a engagé dans des liaisons qui demandent un ensemble; nous ne perdrons pas une minute pour faire consentir l'Espagne à nos vûes, et outre le

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bonheur de la paix, de très bonne foy, je vous assure que le procédé du Roy d'Ange et de son ministère a touché sensiblement le roy, et que notre intérêt, notre confiance et notre estime concourent à la réunion des deux couronnes.

[*Translation*]

to Vienna: I hope you will find the whole affair properly adjusted: the king could not be more satisfied with the frankness and nobleness of the court of London. We have both sincerely regretted that we did not have My Lord Egremont to deal with last year. What misfortunes would we not have avoided! and how great the difference between negotiating with My Lord Egremont and with M. Pitt, who may be a great man inasmuch as we have made war like simpletons, but who of a surety is the worst statesman in Europe. The result of my labors with the king has been that if His Majesty were master, the peace would be made in two weeks. But England has forced us into alliances that exact joint action. We shall lose not a minute in engaging Spain to agree to our ideas. Quite apart from the blessing of peace, on the best of faith I assure you that the proceedings of the King of England and of his ministry have sensibly affected the king, and that our interest, our confidence, and our esteem unite in a renewal of good understanding between the crowns.

J'ai chanté toute la nuit les airs de la petotes chamoïuelle;¹ J'aime bien mieux penser à cela qu'aux limites Mississippi et à la difficulté des Isles neutres. C'est à mon cousin ministre des affaires étrangères à applanir ces differends. Je pense que l'on doit accorder les limites de la Louisiane comme elles sont de-

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mandées par l'Ange, que nous pouvons céder les Grenadines; mais que Ste Lucie nous est indispensablement necessaire. Ne dites pas mon avis ni au Comte de Choiseul, ni en Angleterre, parceque ce n'est plus mon affaire; Je me mêle simplement de mon Espagne pour procurer une prompte conclusion; et cette besogne me suffit. Adieu, à ce soir; n'oubliez pas que vous soupez chez moi.

[Translation]

I sang all night the airs from the *Petite Demoiselle*.¹ I would rather think of that than of Mississippi boundaries and the difficulty of the Neutral Islands. It is for my cousin as minister of foreign affairs to smooth away these difficulties. I think we can accord the boundaries of Louisiana as England asks them; I think we can cede the Grenadines; but St. Lucia is absolutely necessary to us. Tell my opinion neither to the Comte de Choiseul nor in England, because it is no longer my affair. I concern myself solely with my dear Spain to secure a prompt ending, and that task is enough for me. Adieu till this evening. Don't forget that you sup with me.

¹ This expression, an absolutely meaningless shot at an illegible phrase in the French, is a strong demonstration that the copying was done for Shelburne in part at least by English copyists unacquainted with French. The copyist of the transcript at Ottawa has emended this to read as it is in the English translation. I think his guess is a good one.

DUC DE CHOISEUL TO SOLAR, May 28, 1762

[Shelburne MSS., 9:284]

VERSAILLES le 28. May 1762

Voila le memoire de nos propositions, mon cher Ambassadeur, dont l'arrivée de vôtre dernier courier de Londres avoit retardé l'expedition. ce que ce courier a apporté ne change rien a nos demandes; mais nous calculons qu'il ne faut pas perdre du tems à les envoyer en Angleterre, par ceque en même tems que nous recevrons la reponse de Londres, si les Espagnols se presentent, nous aurons celle de Madrid.....

.....
288....

Jamais nous n'aurions consenti l'année passée à la cession de la Mobille et a l'arrêté des limites de la Louisianne, tel que nous l'offrons: c'est presque ceder la Louisianne entière, qui d'apres
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ces limites n'a plus de communication avec la Floride; nous sentons le prix de cette cession, qui entraine la perte de nôtre colonie; mais nous sentons en même tems qu'il faut que nous perdions; L'Espagne fera peut-etre des difficultés sur cet article à

[Translation]

VERSAILLES, May 28, 1762

Here, my dear Ambassador, is our memoir of propositions. The arrival of your last courier from London had delayed the dispatch. What that courier brought, changes nothing in our demands; but we calculate that no time should be lost in sending them to England, because at the same time at which we receive the answer from London, we shall, if the Spaniards make haste, have an answer from Madrid.....

.....
Never would we have agreed last year to the cession of Mobile and to setting of the boundaries of Louisiana as we offer them; it is almost ceding all Louisiana, which with such boundaries has no communication with Florida. We feel the cost of this cession, which entails the loss of our colony; but at the same time we feel we must submit to its loss. Spain perhaps will make

cause de sa colonie de la Floride; mais nous lui ferons entendre raison; et si elle marque de l'humeur nous lui proposerons d'échanger la Floride dont j'ignore ce que nous pourrons faire avec ce qui nous restera de la Louisianne. Il ne nous est pas possible de ceder Ste Lucie, et je vous déclare franchement, mon cher Ambr si l'Ange persiste à la vouloir, que mon avis dans le conseil sera de rompre la négociation: Je crois que sans Ste Lucie la France n'aura pas ses possessions de première nécessité qui lui sont indispensables en Amerique, et que ce qui lui resteroit sous le joug et par consequent insoutenable relativement au militaire, à la politique et au commerce; Je ne pense pas comme l'on a pensé

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ici autrefois, qu'il faut avoir beaucoup de colonies; Je suis l'ennemi juré du système de l'Amerique, parceque je le crois pernicieux pour la France, et que j'estime qu'il est plus essentiel de cultiver le grain, les vignes du royaume et de soutenir ses manufactures que de rendre aux étrangers de sucre, du café et de l'indigo; mais en même tems comme le café, le sucre et l'indigo

[*Translation*]

difficulties on that point on account of her colony of Florida; but we will make her listen to reason. If she shows ill humor we will offer to exchange Florida, though I don't know what we could do with it, for the part of Louisiana that remains to us. It is impossible for us to cede St. Lucia, and I tell you frankly, my dear Ambassador, if England persists in wanting it, my advice in the council will be to break off the negotiation. I think that without St. Lucia France will not have the possessions of prime necessity that are indispensable to her in America; those remaining to her would be under the yoke and therefore unwarrantable in military, political, and commercial aspects alike. I do not think as they formerly used here that it is necessary to have many colonies. I am the sworn enemy of the American policy because I think it pernicious to France, and because I think it more essential to cultivate the wheat and vines of the kingdom and to sustain its manufactures, than to supply foreign nations with sugar, coffee, and indigo. At the same time, since coffee, sugar, and indigo

sont nécessaires en France, je pense qu'une grande puissance ne doit pas pour ces denrées devenus nécessaires, faire sortir l'argent de son royaume, et par conséquent, qu'il entre dans la perfection de sa constitution d'avoir assez de possessions Américaines pour ses besoins en ce genre; mais de n'en avoir pas plus que ses besoins, en même tems que les dites possessions seroient solides et que le commerce de la metropole s'en fera sans crainte d'un

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événement imprévu, ou les effets de la mauvaise humeur d'un gouverneur, ou d'un capitain de vaisseau d'une isle voisine: en même tems que mon avis sera de continuer la guerre, et les risques de perdre toutes nos colonies, plutôt que de ne pas avoir Ste Lucie, Je conviendrai avec vous que je ne serai pas aussi attaché à la Grenade, et aux Grenadines, quoique la Grenade soit une isle commode et utile, et qui par sa position unie à St Vincent, la Barbade et Tobago forment un établissement formidable au vent des Isles de Ste Lucie, la Martinique et la Guadeloupe.

.....
[Translation]

are necessities in France, I think that a great power should not let its money leave the kingdom in payment for these commodities that have become necessities; consequently it pertains to the perfection of the constitution of the kingdom to have enough American possessions to supply its needs in that sort. But it should have no more than suffices for its needs, while at the same time the possessions in question should be secure, and the commerce of the mother country should go on without fear of an unforeseen happening, whether the effect of a governor's bad humor, or a ship's captain's from a neighboring island. At the same time my advice would be to continue the war and to risk losing all our colonies rather than not have St. Lucia. I will agree with you that I am not so much attached to Grenada and the Grenadines, although Grenada is a commodious and useful island, which by its nearness to St. Vincent, Barbados, and Tobago makes a formidable establishment to windward of the islands of St. Lucia, Martinique, and Guadeloupe.

.....

FRENCH MEMOIR OF May 29, 1762¹

[Shelburne MSS., 9:261]

Memoire.

.....
 272....

La Guadeloupe, Mariegalante, la Martinique, Ste Lucie sont indispensables pour le soutien du commerce des François. La restitution de la Grenade peut-etre jointe à celle de la Martinique comme ancienne possession Française et par compensation de ces restitutions l'Ange conservera la Dominique, St Vincent, Tobago, et le roy cederà à l'Ange le port de la Mobile entre la

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Floride et le Mississippi et conviendra que le Fleuve du Mississippi serve de bornes aux deux états, depuis sa naissance jusqu'au confluent de ce fleuve avec la belle Riviere: l'Ange étant souveraine de la rive gauche et la France de la rive droite, et depuis le confluent jusqu'à la mer, la principale habitation de la Louisianne étant sur le fleuve, le roy sera souverain des deux rives, à une lieu de long de la rive gauche, la ligne de demarcation passant entre

[*Translation*]

Memoir

.....
 Guadeloupe, Mariegalante, Martinique, St. Lucia are all indispensable for the support of French commerce. The restoration of Grenada may be joined to that of Martinique as an old French possession. In compensation England will retain Dominica, St. Vincent, Tobago, and the king will cede to England the port of Mobile between Florida and the Mississippi and will agree that the Mississippi River serve as boundary to the two states from its source as far as its junction with the Ohio, England being sovereign over the left, and France over the right bank. From the junction to the sea, since the chief settlement of Louisiana is on the river, the king shall be sovereign over both banks for a league's distance from the left bank, the line of demarcation

¹ See *ante*, cxxxvi.

les Lacs Maurepas et Pontchartrain; la France en cédant ces limites avec le Canada, cède plus de 1400 lieux à l'Ange; elle met la Louisianne et la Floride dans la dépendance absolue des colonies Angloises, et s'il est vrai comme l'on le pense en France, que le possesseur de l'Amerique septentrionale le soit aussi de l'Amerique meridionale, la France doit se borner à avoir dans cette dernière partie des isles suffisantes à ses besoins; mais exempter du moins par le local de la crainte d'être envahies d'un moment à l'autre;

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c'est d'après ce principe que le roy, pour la restitution de la Guadeloupe, de Mariegalante, de la Martinique, de Ste. Lucie, et de la Grenade, consent à la perte precieuse de la meilleure partie de la Louisianne, et S. M. espère que pour le bien qui résultera pour la continuation de la paix, de la distinction nette des possessions des deux couronnes en Amerique; le Roy de la grande Bretagne voudroit bien acquiescer aux restitutions demandées par la France dans cette partie.

.....

[*Translation*]

passing between Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain. France ceding Canada with such boundaries cedes more than fourteen hundred leagues to England. She puts Louisiana and Florida in absolute subjection to the English colonies; and if it is true, as it is thought in France, that the possessor of North America is master also of South America, France must confine herself to having in that region islands to suffice her needs. But at least they must be free by location from the fear of being invaded from one moment to the next; and it is on that principle that the king, for the restitution of Guadeloupe, Mariegalante, St. Lucia, and Grenada consents to the costly loss of the best part of Louisiana. His Majesty hopes that for the advantage which will result for the permanence of peace from a clear division between the possessions of the two crowns in America, the King of Great Britain will be pleased to acquiesce in the restitutions demanded by France in those parts.

.....

EGREMONT'S MEMOIR OF June 26, 1762

[Shelburne MSS., 10:44]

Memoire de Milord Egremont

.....
50....

La compensation que nous avons demandée pour la Martinique, la Guadeloupe et Marie Galante, nous a paru des plus modiques, et en nous cedant pour toujours la possession où nous

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sommes actuellement des quatre Isles Neutres avec celle de Grenade et les Grenadines on ne nous cederait par rapport aux premieres que des pretentions très douteuses de la part de la France. Mais quel équivalent nous propose-t-on à présent; lorsqu'on pretend que nous désaïssissant des grandes et opulentes acquisitions de la Martinique et de la Guadeloupe, et que renoncant à tous nos droits sur St Lucie, nous nous contentions des Isles de la Dominique, ou bien de la Grenade; de Tobago, de St Vincent, qui ne vaut absolument rien; des plaines désertes et inutiles au dessus du confluence de la belle Riviere avec le Mississipp; que, si elles ont jamais appartenu à la France, font

[Translation]

Memoir of My Lord Egremont

.....
The compensation we asked for Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Mariegalante, appeared to us a most moderate one; and by ceding us the permanent possession of what we actually have in the four Neutral Islands with Grenada and the Grenadines, nothing would be ceded us with regard to the first except the very doubtful claims of France. But what an equivalent is now proposed to us; when it is claimed that after giving up the great and rich acquisitions of Martinique and Guadeloupe and renouncing all our rights to St. Lucia, we should content ourselves with the islands of Dominica, or rather Grenada; with Tobago; with St. Vincent, which last is worth absolutely nothing; with desert and useless plains above the junction of the Ohio River with the Mississippi—plains which if they ever belonged to France were

partie de la cessation du Canada, et enfin de la Mobile, petit établissement enclavé entre ceux de la France et de l'Espagne. St Lucie est dit on si nécessaire à la France, que le vaste pays de St Dominique, la Martinique, et la Guadeloupe ne suffisent pas

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sans elle. Pour son commerce en sucre, en café, et en indigo; que sera ce donc de celui de la Grande Bretagne privée à jamais de cette isle; cet argument ne fera pas certainement contre elle, qui ne se trouve peutêtre pas maitresse de la dixième partie de ce que la France occupe aux Indes Occidentales.

.....
54....

Par rapport à l'article qui regarde le fleuve du Mississipi, ce n'étoit pas pour étendre notre territoire dans un pays, dont une grande partie est inutile, et que vraisemblablement nous ne défricherons, ni ne peuplerons jamais, que nous avons demandé que les deux rives de cette rivière servissent d'orénavant de bornes aux deux nations; mais principalement pour établir la paix sur des fondemens solides & durables, et pour prévenir toutes disputes

[*Translation*]

part of the cession of Canada; and finally with Mobile, a little settlement hemmed in by those of France and Spain. St. Lucia, it is said, is so necessary to France that the vast regions of San Domingo, Martinique, and Guadeloupe do not suffice without it for France's commerce in sugar, coffee, and indigo. What will then become of Great Britain, deprived forever of that island? The argument surely will not apply against her, who is mistress of not a tenth of what France holds in the West Indies.

.....
With respect to the article concerning the Mississippi River, it was not to extend our possessions into a country a great part of which is useless, and which probably we shall never clear or people, that we had asked that the two banks of that river serve thenceforth as boundaries to the two nations. It was chiefly to establish peace on solid and lasting foundations, and to forestall

par rapport aux limites des deux nations sur le Continent de l'Amérique; au lieu que la demande que fait la France de la

55

souveraineté des deux rives à une lieüe de long de la rive gauche depuis le confluent avec la Belle Rivière jusqu'à la mer, détruit l'idée sur laquelle notre proposition étoit fondée, et nous interdit totalement la navigation du Mississipi, laquelle nous avons entendu devoir être en commun pour le commerce des deux nations; Et comme on ne veut pas douter que l'intention du ministère de Versailles ne soit ainsi que le notre, de faire une paix qui puisse durer, et que ce n'étoit absolument que pour cêt effet si désirable que nous avons proposé que le Mississipi servant de bornes, et chaque nation se contenant de son coté de la rivière, elles n'eussent à l'avenir rien à démêler ensemble; on se flate que la France n'insistera pas sur cette lisière, dont pourroient tant naitre de disputes et d'inconvéniens, et qui pour cette raison est absolument inadmissible de notre part.

.....

[Translation]

all disputes regarding the boundaries of the two nations on the American Continent. On the contrary, France's demand for the sovereignty of both banks for a league beyond the left bank from the junction with the Ohio River to the sea, invalidates the idea on which our proposal was based, and absolutely forbids us the navigation of the Mississippi which we had expected to be common to the trade of the two nations. And as we do not wish to think that the intention of the ministry of Versailles is not the same as ours, namely to make a peace that may last; and as it was absolutely only for that desirable end that we had proposed that the Mississippi serve as boundary, since with each nation keeping to its side of the river they would have in the future nothing to adjust with each other; we therefore flatter ourselves that France will not insist on that lisière from which so many disputes and embarrassments may arise, and which for that reason is absolutely inadmissible on our part.

.....

FRENCH ARTICLES OF June 28, 1762¹

[Shelburne MSS., 10:108]

Projet des articles de paix dressés par la France

.....
109....

Article Premier.

Le roi cède & garantit au Roi d'Angre le Canada tel qu'il a été possédé, ou dû l'être par la France sans restitution & sans qu'il soit libre de revenir, sous aucun prétexte contre cette cession ou garantie, ni de troubler la couronne d'Angre dans la possession

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entière du Canada; S. M. y mêt seulement deux conditions: la 1re, que la liberté de la religion Cathol. Romne y sera conservée & que le Roi d'Angre donnera les ordres les plus précis & les plus effectifs, pour que ses nouveaux sujets Cath: Romains, puissent, comme ci devant professor publiquement le culte de leur religion, selon le rit de l'église Romaine. La seconde, que les

[Translation]

Project of articles of peace drawn up by France

.....

Article 1

The king cedes and guarantees to the King of England, Canada as it has been or should be possessed by France without restitution or freedom to return, under any pretext contrary to this cession and guarantee, nor to molest the crown of England in the full possession of Canada. His Majesty sets only two conditions on his cession. First, that the freedom of the Roman Catholic religion shall be preserved, and that the King of England shall give the most precise and effectual orders that his new Roman Catholic subjects may as formerly publicly practice the worship of their religion according to the rite of the Roman

¹ Before a reply to the memoir of May 29 was received by the French ministry, the arrival of Spain's assent to the negotiation made it necessary for them to go through the form of dispatching proposals to England: for they had concealed from Spain their offer of May 29. They therefore threw the May 29 offer into the form of articles, in deference to Spain introducing an ambiguity as to the Mississippi boundary. See succeeding documents.

habitans François ou autres qui auroient été sujets du roi en Canada, puissent se retirer dans les colonies Françaises ou en Europe, avec toute sûreté & liberté; qu'il leur sera permis de vendre leurs biens et de transporter leurs effets, ainsi que leur personne sans être gênés dans leur émigration, sous quelque prétexte que ce soit, hors celui de dettes, le gouvernement d'Angle s'engageant à leur procurer les moiens de transport au moins de fraix possible. Le terme limité pour cette émigration

111

étant fixé à l'espace de 18. mois, à compter du jour de la ratification du traité définitif.

113....

Art: 5.

La France accordera la fixation des limites du Canada avec la plus grande extension, bien entendu qu'elles ne dépasseront pas le fleuve de Mississipi, et n'empiéteront pas le long de la mer sur les dépendances de la Louisiane; L'on fera la démarcation de ces limites sur une carte jointe aux préliminaires.

[Translation]

church. Second, that the French or other inhabitants who have been the king's subjects in Canada, may withdraw to the French colonies or to Europe with all security and freedom; that they be allowed to sell their goods and withdraw their effects, as well as their persons without being annoyed in their migration under any pretext whatever except that of debt. The English government undertakes to procure them means of transport at the lowest possible cost. The term for this migration is to be fixed at eighteen months counting from the day of ratification of the definitive treaty.

Article 5

France will accord the fixation of the boundaries of Canada at their greatest extent, it being well understood that they shall not cross the Mississippi River, or encroach along the sea on the dependencies of Louisiana. The demarcation of these boundaries shall be made on a map annexed to the preliminaries.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE FRENCH ARTICLES OF June 28, 1762

[Shelburne MSS., 10:121]

Observations sur les différens articles du memoire
qui contient les conditions de paix proposées par
la France

.....
Article 5.

127

L'on n'a jamais consenti dans la dernière négociation à fixer
les limites de la Louisiane comme elles sont proposées ici, et
l'Angle n'avoit pas demandé qu'elles fussent ainsi réservées. La
cour de Londres sentira tout le prix d'une cession aussi étendue,
dont elle connoit sans doute l'importance.

.....
[Translation]

Observations on the different articles of the memoir
containing the conditions of peace proposed by
France

.....
Article 5

Never would it have been agreed in the last negotiation to limit
the boundaries of Louisiana as here proposed; and England did
not then demand that they be so limited. The court of London
will feel the value of so extensive a cession, the importance of
which it doubtless knows.

DUC DE CHOISEUL TO SOLAR, June 29, 1762

[Shelburne MSS., 10:132]

Copie de lettre de M. le Duc de Choiseul a M. le
Bailli Solar de Breille.

A PARIS le 29. Juin 1762

.....
134....

Je dois vous observer qu'il y a quelque difference fort legere
dans l'arte 5. des limites de la Louisianne. L'ambassadeur d'Es-

135

pagne après une discussion très longue et très inutile, nous a
forcé à libeller ainsi cet article, qui d'ailleurs n'arretera rien:
puisqu'en tout et partout nous nous en tenons à nôtre memoire
sans les changemens que le ministère Brite y apportera.

.....
[Translation]

Copy of the letter of M. le Duc de Choiseul to M.
le Bailli Solar de Breille

PARIS, June 29, 1762

.....
I should observe to you that there is a very slight difference in
article 5 concerning the boundaries of Louisiana. The ambassador
of Spain, after a very long and very useless discussion, forced us
to word the article thus, which however will not matter, since in
the whole and in every part we hold to our memoir without the
changes the British ministry will make in it.
.....

DUC DE CHOISEUL TO OSSUN, June 29, 1762

[A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 536:380]

Copie d'une dépêche de Mr le Duc de Choiseul à
Mr Le Mis d'Ossun

A PARIS le 29. juin 1762.

.....
380v....Le Cte de choiseul a lu, devant moi, au Mis de Grimaldi le
mémoire de la france, qui contient la réponse du roi à la déclara-

381

tion de l'angleterre, et les propositions spécifiques en réponse
aux propositions angloises dont vous avés connoissance. Mr de
choiseul avoit pris directement les ordres du roi sur ce mémoire;
ainsi je n'avois aucune observation à y faire quant au fond:
quant à la forme, j'aurois désiré traiter, dans ces commencemens,
par un mémoire plutôt que par des articles, afin de moins effrayer,
par des restitutions multipliées et énoncées coup sur coup, le désir
que montre le ministère Anglois de faire la paix. Mr de choiseul
a pensé, de son côté, qu'il y avoit de l'avantage à donner des

[Translation]

Copy of a dispatch of M. le Duc de Choiseul to M.
le Marquis d'Ossun

PARIS, June 29, 1762

.....
The Comte de Choiseul in my presence read to the Marquis
de Grimaldi the memoir of France which contains the answer of
the king to the declaration of England, with specific proposals in
reply to the English proposals with which you are acquainted.
M. de Choiseul had taken the king's orders directly on that
memoir; accordingly I had no observation to make on its sub-
stance. As to its form, I would have desired to treat at the be-
ginning by a memoir rather than by articles, in order the less by
multiplied restitutions announced one after the other to damp the
desire which the English ministry shows for making peace. M.
de Choiseul thought for his part that there was an advantage in

articles: C'est un problème que Sa Mté a décidé en faveur de la forme adoptée. Vous trouverez ci joint ce mémoire. [*in margin: placé, par erreur, à la suite d'une dépêche du Duc de choiseul du 13. Juin 1762.*] Il y a eu, de la part de Mr l'ambassadeur d'Espagne, une opposition a l'article 5. qui étoit construit différemment qu'il ne se trouve dans l'instrument que l'on doit envoyer en Angleterre; cet article disoit *que le cours du Mississipi, les deux rives appartenantes à la france, depuis le confluent de la belle*

381v

Rivière jusqu'à la mer, serviroit de limites entre la Louïisianne et le Canada. j'avouë qu'après avoir consulté des gens du païs et nos navigateurs, nous n'avions pas trouvé que cette cession de limites eût des inconvéniens, d'autant moins qu'il est bien prouvé que sur cette côte, il est impossible de faire un établissement de port qui puisse recevoir une frégate. malgré nos raisons, Mr de Grimaldi a persisté dans son opposition et nous avons changé l'article ainsi que vous le verrés.

.....

[Translation]

articles. It is a problem which His Majesty has decided in favor of the form adopted. You will find the memoir annexed. [*in margin: Placed by mistake after a dispatch of the Duc de Choiseul of June 13, 1762.*] There was opposition to article 5 from M. the ambassador of Spain; it was differently constructed than in the document which is to be sent to England. That article said "that the course of the Mississippi, with both banks belonging to France, from the junction of the Ohio to the sea, would serve as boundary between Louisiana and Canada." I profess that after having consulted people from the region and our navigators, we had not found that that cession of boundaries had any inconvenience, the less that it is clearly proved that on that coast it is impossible to make a harbor which can receive a frigate. Despite our reasons M. de Grimaldi persisted in his opposition, and we have changed the article as you see.

.....

SOLAR TO VIRY, June 30, 1762

[Shelburne MSS., 10:139]

Lettre de M. le Bailli de Solar à M. le Comte de Viry.

A PARIS le 30 Juin 1762

.....
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et par consequent les reponses d'Espagne étant arrivées, et devant les faire passer à Londres, il a fallut que cette cour ci unit pour la forme ses propositions à celles de l'Espagne, et qu'elles les ait communiquées à M. Grimaldi: c'est ce qui occasionne la variation, qu'il paroitra y avoir à l'article qui traite des limites de la Louisiane par rapport à la Mobille; M. Grimaldi s'étant fort recrié sur cette article comme préjudiciable aux etablissemens de l'Espagne; il a exigé qu'il ne seroit point parlé du port de la Mobille. M. le Duc de Choiseul qui ne paroît pas informer cet ambassadeur, qu'il avoit deja réglé ces limites dans un autre mémoire envoyé à Londres, a du paroître ceder aux représentations de M. Grimaldi; mais il déclare que son intention n'est point

[Translation]

Letter of M. the Bailli de Solar to M. the Comte de Viry

PARIS, June 30, 1762

.....
Consequently, the Spanish answer having arrived, it was necessary before sending it to London that this court for form's sake should unite its proposals with those of Spain, and communicate them to M. Grimaldi. This has occasioned the variation in the article which treats of the boundary of Louisiana with respect to Mobile. M. Grimaldi, protesting loudly against this article as prejudicial to the Spanish establishments, required that nothing be said of the port of Mobile. M. le Duc de Choiseul, who apparently had not informed that ambassador that he had already settled the boundary in another memoir sent to London, had to seem to yield to M. Grimaldi's representations; but he declares that his intention is not to vary from the offers he has made, and that

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de varier dans les offres qu'il a faites, et que l'Angleterre n'aura qu'à insister sur le susdit article en consequence de ce qui a été offert dans le mémoire precedent :

.....

[*Translation*]

England will only have to insist on the article in question on the basis of what was offered in the previous memoir.

.....

CHAPTER XIII

THE BARGAIN IS MADE, JULY 4-21, 1762

SOLAR TO VIRY, July 4, 1762

[Shelburne MSS., 10:204]

Lettre de M. le Bailli de Solar à M. le Comte de Viry.

A PARIS le 4. Juillet 1762.

Etant chez moi sans rien faire, en attendant le courier de Versailles qui doit m'apporter les paquets de Messrs de Choiseul, et que je me prévois que trop qu'il ne pourra partir que demain pour Calais, je m'amuse, mon cher Comte, à vous faire cette lettre qui accompagne la copie que j'ai faite, moi-même d'un billet

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que j'ai reçu ce matin de M. le Duc de Choiseul,¹ et je ne crois pas pouvoir vous donner une plus grande preuve de ma confiance qu'en vous le communiquant, parceque son contenu est très curieux, et il prouve bien les sentimens de ce ministre, et le cas

[*Translation*]

Letter of M. le Bailli de Solar to M. le Comte de Viry

PARIS, July 4, 1762

Being at home with nothing to do, while awaiting the courier from Versailles who is to bring me the packets from Messieurs de Choiseul, and foreseeing that he won't be able to leave for Calais before tomorrow, I amuse myself, my dear Count, by writing you this letter which accompanies the copy I have made myself of a note I received this morning from M. le Duc de Choiseul.¹ I think I can give you no greater proof of my confidence than communicating it to you, since its contents are very curious, and since it clearly proves the opinions of this minister, and his private

¹ The note of the Duc de Choiseul has disappeared.

qu'il fait de la probité et de la générosité de Milord Bute
privatement....

.....
208....

a l'égard des limites de la Louisiane, on s'est réglé ici selon la
209

note que vous aviez envoyé. Et l'on a été fort surpris que
l'Angleterre n'ayant jamais demandé la Louisiane en totalité, ni en
partie, elle persiste à présent à faire abstractive de votre susdite
note, et insiste sur la totalité du Fleuve Mississippi, sans faire at-
tention que la nouvelle Orleans, capitale de la Louisiane, seroit
comprise dans cette cession; Il y a donc eu quelques equivoques,
ou quelque méprise sur cet article. Comme on accorde ici tout
ce qui est spécifié dans votre note, je crains que cela ne vous fasse
quelque tracasserie; mais je crois que le canal par lequel vous vous
l'êtes procurée est très sûr et que par-consequent cet article ne
sauroit souffrir aucune difficulté, et à toute bonne fin je vous
renvois ici la copie de votre susdite note.—

.....
[Translation]

esteem of the probity and generosity of My Lord Bute....

.....
With regard to the boundaries of Louisiana, they have been
arranged in accord with the note you sent. Here they are much
surprised that England, never having asked for all Louisiana or
even for part of it, should persist at present in disregarding your
note, and should insist on the whole of the Mississippi River with-
out noticing that New Orleans, capital of Louisiana, would be in-
cluded in that cession. There is then some ambiguity or some
misunderstanding on that article. Since here they accord all that
is specified in your note, I fear lest it may occasion you some
bickering. However I believe the channel by which you procured
the note is a very sure one, and that in consequence that article
will suffer no difficulty. At all events, I return you the copy of
your note.

.....

SOLAR TO VIRY, July 5, 1762

[Shelburne MSS., 10:216]

Lettre de M. le Bailli de Solar à M le Comte de Viry.

A PARIS 5e. Juillet 1762.

.....
219....

Vous trouverés donc joint à cette lettre po la reponse de M. le Comte de Choiseul à Milord Egremont avec un mémoire par articles, qui repond à celui de ce lord touchant les propositions avec une carte qui explique les limites que l'on accorde et qui sont les plus étendües que l'Ange puisse exiger, à moins qu'elle ne veuille aussi avoir la nouvelle Orleans et toute la Louisiane, dont il n'a jamais été question dans la négociation précédente de M. Stanley et de Bussi, ni dans celle-ci: ainsi Mrs de Choiseul, qui sont très persuadés de la bonne foy, de la candeur, et de la sin-

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cerité du ministère Bque croient qu'il y a eu quelques méprises sur cet article; vous trouverés en outre trois billets de M. le Duc de Choiseul, qui me sont adressés, et dont le contenu est très important pour la conduite et la marche que l'on doit tenir pour

[Translation]

Letter of M. le Bailli de Solar to M. le Comte de Viry

PARIS, July 5, 1762

.....
You will find then annexed to that letter, first, M. le Comte de Choiseul's answer to My Lord Egremont with a memoir in articles, which corresponds to the one sent by that lord regarding the proposals, together with a map which illustrates the boundary accorded, which is the most extensive England could exact, at least unless she wished to have New Orleans and all Louisiana, of which there was never any question in the preceding negotiation of Messieurs Stanley and de Bussy, or in this. Accordingly Messieurs de Choiseul, who are quite persuaded of the good faith, candor, and sincerity of the British ministry, believe there are some mistakes as to that article. You will also find three notes of M. le Duc de Choiseul addressed to me, the contents of which are most important for the course and conduct to be followed to

terminer au plus vite cette important négociation. Il vous recommande surtout de n'en point donner de copie.

FRENCH OBSERVATIONS, July 4, 1762¹

[Shelburne MSS., 10:155]

Observations sur la mémoire de proposition envoyé
le 28. Juin 1762. à Londres.

.....
157....

Arte 5.

Il est à presumer que le ministère d'Angleterre en exigeant tout le cours de la rive gauche du Mississippi, n'a pas fait attention que la nouvelle Orleans étoit située sur la rive gauche de ce fleuve, la France cederoit la totalité de cette ville et son port; ce qui seroit céder la Louisiane que l'Angleterre ne demande pas;

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mais elle a demandé que la ligne de demarcation passat par les

[*Translation*]

terminate this important negotiation as quickly as possible. He directs you, above all, to give no copies.

Observations on the memoir of proposals sent June
28, 1762 to London

.....

Article 5

It is to be presumed that the ministry of England in exacting the whole extent of the left bank of the Mississippi has not paid attention to the fact that since New Orleans is situated on the left bank of the river, France would cede all that city and its port. That would be to cede Louisiana, which England does not ask; but she has asked that the line of demarcation pass by Lakes

¹ This was a running commentary on the articles of June 28, in the light of the English answer to the memoir of May 29. It was dispatched to London, July 5.

Lacs Maurepas et Pontchartrain, ce que le roi accorde. Pour s'entendre clairement sur cet article, on joint ici la carte.

.....

EGREMONT TO COMTE DE CHOISEUL, July 10, 1762¹

[Shelburne MSS., 10:249]

Lettre de Milord Egremont à M. le Comte de Choiseul.
DE WHITEHALL 10 Juillet 1762.

.....

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et sa resolution de faire une paix qui dure est tellement prise, que dans les articles qui sont plus calculés pour cet effet, que pour aucun avantage qu'il pourroit en retirer, surtout celui de l'acquisition du Mobile et les limites fixées aux deux rives du Mississippi; S. M. préféreroit, quoique son grand règrét la continuation de la guerre, plutôt que de ne pas ôter par la paix tout ce qui pourroit, par rapport à des limites, ou autrement, devenir l'occasion de

[*Translation*]

Maurepas and Pontchartrain; and the king accords it. For a clear understanding on this article a map is annexed.

.....

Letter of My Lord Egremont to M. le Comte de Choiseul
WHITEHALL, July 10, 1762

.....

His resolution to make a lasting peace is so strongly taken that in the articles most calculated to that end, rather than for any possible advantage to be gained, especially that of the acquisition of Mobile and of the settling of the boundaries at the two banks of the Mississippi, His Majesty would prefer, though to his great regret, to continue the war, rather than not remove by the peace everything that might, with respect to boundaries or otherwise,

¹ This represents Egremont's reply, made before Viry had conferred with him and Bute, as set forth in Viry's letter of July 12, *post*, 455.

nouvelles disputes entre les deux couronnes.

EGREMONT TO VIRY, July 10, 1762

[Shelburne MSS., 10:254]

Lettre de Milord Egremont à M. le Comte de Viry
 DE WHITEHALL le 10 Juillet 1762.

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Observations

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Art. 5.

La France accordera la fixation des limites du Canada avec la plus grande extention, bien entendu qu'elles ne dépasseront pas le Fleuve du Mississippi; et pour rétablir la paix sur des fondemens solides et durables, et écarter pour jamais tout sujet de dispute qui pourroit naître par rapport aux limites des deux nations sur le Continent de l'Amérique S. M. demande que le cours du dit fleuve serve de bornes entre les deux nations depuis la naissance

[*Translation*]

become the occasion of new disputes between the two crowns.

Letter of My Lord Egremont to M. le Comte de Viry
 WHITEHALL, July 10, 1762

Observations

Article 5

France will accord the fixation of the boundaries of Canada with the greatest extent, it being well understood that they shall not cross the Mississippi River. And to reëstablish peace on solid and lasting foundations, and to take away forever any subject of dispute which might arise with respect to the boundaries of the two nations on the American Continent, His Majesty asks that the course of the said river serve as boundary between the two

jusqu'à la mer, la Grande Bretagne étant souveraine de la rive gauche, et la France de la rive droite de ce fleuve, dont la navigation sera désormais en commun entre les deux nations.

.....
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A WHITEHALL le 10. Juillet 1762.
EGREMONT.

EGREMONT'S OBSERVATIONS OF July 10, 1762

[Shelburne MSS., 10:271]

Observations sur les différens articles du memoire qui contient les conditions de paix proposées par la Grande Bretagne.

.....
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Art. 5.

Ce que nous avons proposé dans cet article n'avoit pas pour motif de retirer aucun avantage de l'extention de nôtre territoire dans un pais, dont une grande partie est inculte, que vraisemblable-

[*Translation*]

nations from its source to the sea, Great Britain being sovereign of the left bank, and France of the right bank of the river, the navigation of which shall be henceforth common to the two nations.

.....
WHITEHALL, July 10, 1762
EGREMONT

Observations on the different articles of the memoir containing the conditions of peace proposed by Great Britain

.....
Article 5

What we have proposed in this article was not to draw any advantage from the extension of our territory into a country a great part of which is waste, and which we shall probably never

ment nous ne diffricherons, ni ne peuplerons jamais; mais pour retablir la paix sur des fondemens solides et durables et pour prévenir toutes disputes par rapport aux limites des deux nations sur le Continent de l'Amerique; et comme on ne veut pas douter
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que l'intention du ministère de Versailles ne soit ainsi que le nôtre de faire une paix qui puisse durer, et ce que n'est absolument que pour cet effet que nous demandons que les deux rives du Mississippi servent de bornes aux deux nations et que chacune se contente de son côté de la rivière, elles n'aient à l'avenir rien à démêler ensemble; on se flatte de ne rencontrer aucune difficulté sur un article calculé autant pour le bien de la France que pour le nôtre.

.....
[Translation]

clear nor people. It was to reestablish peace on solid and lasting foundations and to forestall all disputes respecting the boundaries of the two nations on the American Continent. We do not wish to believe that the intention of the ministers of Versailles is not the same as ours, namely to make a peace that may endure; and since it is absolutely only to this end that we ask that the two banks of the Mississippi serve as boundaries to the two nations, and that each content itself with its own side of the river in order that they may have nothing to adjust in the future, we flatter ourselves that we shall encounter no difficulty on an article calculated as much for the welfare of France as for our own.

.....

VIRY TO SOLAR, July 12, 1762

[Shelburne MSS., 10:290]

Lettre de M. le Comte de Viry, à M. le Bailli de Solar.

A LONDRES. 12. Juillet 1762

De sa propre Main

.....
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et jugés par là combien il faudra ensuite argumenter pour la nouvelle Orleans, d'autant plus que Milord Egremont chérit aussi ce petit coin de la Louisiane, et qu'il souhaiteroit fort que les François n'eussent pas un pouce de terre de ce côté là, et que le

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cours du Fleuve du Mississippi seroit dès sa naissance jusqu'à la mer de limite entre les deux nations, et sur le pied que l'on le demande dans son mémoire; vous voyez par là, mon cher Ambassadeur, ce que c'est que d'avoir des affaires avec ces gens ci; mais il faut prendre patience.

.....
[Translation]

Letter of M. le Comte de Viry to M. le Bailli de Solar

LONDON, July 12, 1762

In his own hand

.....
Judge from that how much more argument New Orleans will take, especially as My Lord Egremont also cherishes that little corner of Louisiana, and would much desire that the French should not have an inch of land on that side, and that the course of the Mississippi River from its source to the sea should be the boundary of the two nations, and on the footing asked in his memoir. You may see from that, my dear Ambassador, what it is to have business with these people; but we must be patient.
.....

VIRY TO SOLAR, July 12, 1762¹

[Shelburne MSS., 10:302]

Autre lettre du meme Jour. [July 12, 1762]

J'ai reçu le sept du courant au soir par Jean Brun les huit lettres que V. E. m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire du 4. et du 5. même mois,—et toutes les pieces et copies dont il y est fait mention.

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J'eudis le lendemain matin une longue conférence avec milord Bute, que je commencai par tacher d'engager à faire en sorte qu'on cedât encore la Dominique à la France; mais voiant que ce seroit renverser l'affaire que d'insister d'avantage la dessus, je pris le parti de lui faire la lecture de tout ce que V. E. m'avoit envoyé et de lui communiquer la carte que vous m'avez fait parvenir. Je vous avouerai, M. qu'il fut surpris de l'article qui concerne le Mississippi, après que M. le Duc de Choiseul avoit fixé dans son memoire du 29. May, dernier, que la limite entre les deux nations commenceroit de la naissance de ce fleuve; du quel

[Translation]

Another letter of the same date [July 12, 1762]

I received by Jean Brun the evening of the seventh of this month the eight letters Your Excellency did me the honor to write me the fourth and fifth of this same month, together with all the documents and copies mentioned.

Next morning I had a long conference with My Lord Bute, that I began by trying to engage his consent to cede Dominica to France; but seeing that would be to turn affairs backward, rather than gain anything on the point, I decided to read him all Your Excellency sent me and to show him the map you had forwarded. I assure you, M., that he was surprised at the article which concerns the Mississippi, after M. le Duc de Choiseul had indicated in his memoir of May 29 last, that the boundary between the nations should begin at the source of the river. Of that memoir

¹ This letter is reproduced in full inasmuch as it represents the secret accord of the French and English ministries.

memoire le conseil a eut pleine connoissance, ainsi que V. E. pourra le remarquer par ce que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui ecrire par mon expedition pour Calais du 28. du mois passé, et de ce qu'on s'attendoit que le ministère d'Angleterre pourroit offrir Ste Lucie à la France après la lettre tres confidentielle que j'eue l'honneur d'écrire à ce sujet à V. E. n'y aiant que lui seul, milord Bute, des ministres d'Ange qui ait connoissance de la note que j'ai envoyée confidenment à V. E. le 4. May dernier touchant le Mississipi, ni que milord Egremont et lui qui soient du fait de ma lettre à V. E. sur Ste Lucie, du 28 du mois échu, ainsi qu'il en conste

assez par mes dites lettres. Je ne dois pas omettre ici à V. E. que Milord Bute me dit encore dans cet entretient, après avoir examiné cette carte, que la note que j'avois envoyée avoit été faite sur la carte de la Louisiane par Dauville, en m'observant d'ailleurs d'un air un peu fâché que la ligne jaune de la carte que vous m'avez envoyée, M. indiquant la possession Angloise n'alloit point jusqu'à la mer, et ne passoit pas la Rivière des Perles, tandis que

[*Translation*]

the council were fully aware as Your Excellency may take note, from what I had the honor to write by my dispatch to Calais the twenty-eighth of last month, which indicated that the English ministry might offer St. Lucia to France according to the very confidential letter I had the honor to write Your Excellency on this subject. Only My Lord Bute of the English ministers knew the note I sent Your Excellency confidentially May 4 last touching the Mississipi, and only he and My Lord Egremont were aware of my letter to Your Excellency on St. Lucia the twenty-eighth of last month, as is sufficiently apparent from my letters. I must not omit here to tell Your Excellency that My Lord Bute also said to me in this conversation, after having examined the map, that the note I had sent had been made on the map of Louisiana by D'Anville, further observing to me with an air that was a little vexed, that the yellow line of the map you sent me, Monsieur, indicating the English possessions, did not go to the sea, or pass Pearl River, although by the letter and spirit of my

suivant la lettre de l'esprit de ma note, elle devoit s'étendre jusqu'à la mer; m'ajoutant que c'étoit là un article dont on ne se départiroit jamais; quoiqu'au fond peu essentiel; mais indispensable pour soutenir la paix contre le parti qui y est opposé, qui

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enflamme de plus en plus la nation. Enfin après avoir cherché inutilement quelque expedient pour voir s'il y auroit moïen de faire prendre à cette affaire la tournure que l'on souhaitoit, nous convinmes que je ferois voir à Milord Egremont la lettre de M. le Comte de Choiseul avant de la cachetter pour la lui remettre, et que je lui lirois confidemment les trois lettres de M. le Duc de Choiseul à V. E. du 4 de ce mois: les observations y jointes sur le memoire de la France du 28. Juin échu en substituant à l'article de ces derniers et au paragraphe de la grande lettre de M. le Duc de Choiseul, qui commence par ces mots: *nous avons entendu*, et qui finit par ces expressions: *nous n'avons pas peu de*

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peine a appaiser. Les deux articles que vous verrez, M. dans les deux feüilles ci-jointes pour amener insensiblement milord Egremont à ce qui est porté par ma note à l'égard du Mississippî;

[Translation]

note, it should extend to the sea. He added that it was a point which they would never give up; though fundamentally inessential, it was indispensable to sustain the peace against the party opposed to it, which is inflaming the nation more and more. Finally after having vainly sought some expedient to give the desired turn to the affair, we decided that I should let My Lord Egremont see M. le Comte de Choiseul's letter before sealing it to return to him, and that I should read him confidentially the three letters of M. le Duc de Choiseul to Your Excellency of the fourth of this month, together with the observations annexed on the memoir of France of the twenty-eighth of June last substituting for the article of these last and for the paragraph of the long letter of M. le Duc de Choiseul which begins with these words, "we have understood," and ends with the expression, "we have not a little trouble to appease," the two articles that you will see, Monsieur, in the two leaves annexed; to bring My Lord Egremont

donc je ne saurois assez répéter à V. E. qu'aucun ministre d'Ange en a connoissance que milord Bute; et que cette affaire seroit capable de le perdre, si jamais, elle venoit à se savoir; ce qui arriveroit aussi et pour lui et pour milord Egremont, si on avoit jamais connoissance de ma lettre sur Ste Lucie. Je fis donc voir à ce dernier Lord la lettre de M. le Comte de Choiseul, et lui fis en même tems lecture confidentielle de ces quatre pieces de la

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maniere dont je viens de le dire; il me dit d'abord que si je ne lui avois pas lû ces pieces en lui communiquant la lettre de M. le Comte de Choiseul, il auroit cru la paix faite; mais qu'il voïoit à régrét qu'il y avoit bien des choses à régler; qu'il parleroit avec milord Bute sur cette affaire, et qu'ensuite il verroit le parti qu'il y auroit à prendre. Ils resolurent que lui, milord Egremont, me mettroit en état de vous expedier vôtre courier avec les réponses deja projetées à ce qu'il avoit apporté, et que V. E. trouvera jointes à mon autre grande lettre d'aujourd'hui. Et me prioit de vouloir bien renvoyer à V. E. la lettre a cachet volant de M. le

[*Translation*]

mont insensibly to what is implied by my note regarding the Mississippi; concerning which I cannot too often repeat to Your Excellency that no English minister knows of it but My Lord Bute, and that this affair might well ruin him, if ever it came to light; that would happen also to him and to My Lord Egremont if my letter on St. Lucia were ever known. I therefore let this latter lord see the letter of M. le Comte de Choiseul, and at the same time, read him confidentially the four pieces as I just told you.

He told me first of all that if I had not read him these pieces and communicated the letter of M. le Comte de Choiseul, he would have thought the peace as good as made. Now he saw with regret that there was much to arrange. He would talk with My Lord Bute on the affair and then see what they would do.

They decided that My Lord Egremont should enable me to send off your courier with the answers already arranged to what he had brought, which Your Excellency will find annexed to my other large letter of today. He begged me to send back to Your

Comte de Choiseul à ce lord en date du 4. du courant, esperant de la probité de Messieurs de Choiseul et de celle de V. E. qu'on n'aura jamais connoissance que cette letre lui ait été écrite; ce dont milord Egremont me pria avant hier en me prévenant qu'il m'enverroit hier de grand matin, ainsi qu'il l'a fait, le paquet que je vous faits tenir, M. joint à ma dite autre grande lettre d'aujourd'hui. Milord Egremont me dit a cette occasion que je pouvais mander à V. E. que s'il s'explique, ainsi qu'il le fait dans le commencement de son memoire, au sujet des alliés de l'Ange c'est non seulement à cause de ce que la France avoit dit dans le sien à

l'egard de l'Espagne, mais aussi parceque ces deux pieces peuvent être communiquées dans la suite au Parlement soit que la paix aît lieu ou non, et venir par consequent à la connoissance des alliés de l'Ange Il m'ajouta que la lettre que je lui avois faite confidemment du memoire des observations de la France et des trois lettres de M. le Duc de Choiseul à V. E. du 4. de ce mois,

[*Translation*]

Excellency the letter of M. le Comte de Choiseul addressed to him under flying seal dated the fourth instant, relying on the probity of Messieurs de Choiseul and of Your Excellency that no one would ever know that letter had been written. My Lord Egremont asked this of me day before yesterday, giving me notice that he would send to me yesterday early in the morning the packet which I send you, Monsieur, annexed to my other long letter of today; and this he has done. My Lord Egremont told me on that occasion that I could inform Your Excellency that if he expresses himself as he does at the beginning of his memoir on the subject of England's allies, it is not only on account of what France had said in hers respecting Spain, but also because the two documents may eventually be communicated to Parliament whether the peace is made or not, and consequently become known to England's allies. He added that my confidential reading to him of the French memoir of observations, and of the three letters from M. le Duc de Choiseul to Your Excellency of the fourth of this month, had induced him to make many changes

l'avoit engagé à faire bien des changemens favorables a la France dans ce qu'il envoit à M. le Comte de Choiseul; et qu'il s'appliquoit au sujet du Mississippi dans sa lettre à ce ministre d'une maniere à mettre la France dans le cas de dire a l'Espagne, que

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la paix ne sauroit se faire sans accorder à l'Ange ce qu'elle demande sur cet article; en m'insinuant que cette même lecture lui faisoit espérer que sa replique de la France seroit telle que le conseil de cabinet du roy son maître en pourroit être content, et que les deux cours pourroient d'abord convenir de s'envoyer incessamment des ministres plenipotentiaires avec caractere d'ambassadeurs; et qu'il me confioit même pour le dire à V. E. et à Messieurs de Choiseul qu'il avoit proposé dés la veille au Roy de la Grande Bretagne pour cette importante commission un des premiers seigneurs de ce païs, qu'il ne me nommoit pas, par ce que le roy ne lui avoit pas encore dit s'il agréeroit ce sujet; je ne

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doutai point que ce ne fût le Duc de Bedford dont il vouloit me parler, mais je me gardai bien de lui laisser connoitre ce que j'en savois d'ailleurs. J'ai donc l'honneur de renvoyer ici à V. E.

[*Translation*]

favorable to France in what he is sending to M. le Comte de Choiseul. He would deal with the subject of the Mississippi in his letter to that minister in a way to enable France to tell Spain that the peace could not be made without according England what she asks on that article. He insinuated to me that that same reading made him hope that the reply of France might be such as might satisfy the cabinet council of the king his master, and that the two courts might at once agree to send ministers plenipotentiary with the character of ambassadors immediately. He would even confide in me to tell Your Excellency and Messieurs de Choiseul, that the evening before he had proposed to the King of Great Britain for that important commission one of the first lords of this country, but he would not tell me his name, because the king had not yet told him if he approved. I did not doubt it was the Duc de Bedford whom he meant, but I was careful not to let him see what I knew from other sources.

la lettre à cachet volant de Monsr le Comte de Choiseul pour ce lord; et si je ne renvoie pas les trois lettres de Monsr le Duc de Choiseul à V. E. c'est que je m'attends que milord Bute me mettra plus d'une fois dans le cas de lui parler de leur contenu; je renvoie aussi la carte touchant la limite du Mississipi. J'eue aussi le meme jour un très long entretien avec milord Bute: il me dit de vous écrire, M. en confiance de dire à Messrs de Choiseul

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que s'ils veulent faire la paix: comme il n'en doute pas, étant persuadé de leur bonne foy et candeur, il faut que la France envoie un memoire en réponse à celui de Milord Egremont, conçu d'une façon à pouvoir être d'abord communiqué au conseil de cabinet, dans le quel on doit par consequent ne point donner a connoître, ni meme à soupçonner en la moindre manière les avis secrets que V. E. et Messieurs de Choiseul ont eus touchant le Mississipi, St Lucie et meme l'Allemagne; par le quel la France accordera toutes les demandes qu'elle est definitivement déterminée d'accorder, en insistant sur la cession de St Lucie comme un

[*Translation*]

I have then the honor to return herewith to Your Excellency the letter under flying seal from M. le Comte de Choiseul to Lord Egremont. If I do not send back the three letters of M. le Duc de Choiseul to Your Excellency, it is because I expect that My Lord Bute will more than once give me the opportunity of speaking to him again on their contents. I also send back the map regarding the Mississipi boundary. I had the same day a very long conversation with My Lord Bute. He told me to write you, Monsieur, in confidence, to say to Messieurs de Choiseul that if they wish to make peace, as being persuaded of their good faith and candor he does not doubt, France must send a memoir in reply to that of My Lord Egremont, expressed so it can be shown to the cabinet council; in it consequently there must be no chance of knowing or even suspecting in the least the secret understandings Your Excellency and Messieurs de Choiseul have had regarding the Mississipi, St. Lucia, and even Germany. By it France will allow everything she has definitely decided to allow, insisting on the cession of St. Lucia as an article and condition

article et une condition *sine qua non*. Quant aux limites du Mississippi il faut les proposer a l'Ange suivant ma note, sans parler en aucune façon de cette note; et bien entendu que la ligne de demarcation par la Rivière Iberville et les Lacs de Maurepas et Pontchartrain ira jusqu'à la mer; et que la navigation sera commune aux deux nations.

A l'égard des Isles de St Pierre et de Miquelon pour abry aux pecheurs François et sans fortifications; il ne faudra faire mention que de cette condition et que des etablissemens et garde de 40 hommes pour la police sans dire un mot ni du commissaire ni meme de sujétion à une inspection raisonnable. Pour ce qui

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est de Gorée et du Sénégal, on proposera à l'Ange de restituer Gorée à la France, et l'on conviendra de laisser le Sénégal à l'Ange sans parler et rien dire des comptoirs.

Au sujet de l'Allemagne, la France proposera que les armées soudoiées par les deux couronnes retourneront chacune dans leurs propres païs et la France demandera qu'aucune partie de

[Translation]

sine qua non. As to the Mississippi boundary, it must be proposed to England according to my note without speaking in any way of that note, it being well understood that the line of demarcation by the river Iberville, and Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain goes to the sea, and that the navigation is to be common to the two nations.

With respect to the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon as a shelter for French fishermen, and without fortifications, it will be necessary to mention only this condition and the established guard of forty men for police without saying a word of the commissary or even of subjection to reasonable inspection. As to Goree and Senegal, you will propose to England that she restore Goree to France, and agree to leave Senegal to England without saying anything about trading houses.

On the subject of Germany, France will propose that the armies subsidized by the two crowns shall return into their own countries; France will ask that no part of the army in the pay

l'armée à la solde de S. M. B. ne puisse assister le Roy de Prusse, offrant en meme tems de donner de son côté des suretés reciproques, et que Wesel et Gueldres seront gardées jusqu'à la paix générale par des troupes en partie Francoises et Angloises, ou soudoiées par la Grande Bretagne. Je dois observer sur ce dernier

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article qu'il faudra que l'Ange ait pour cela le consentement du Roy de Prusse; mais je dois dire en meme tems que cela ne retardera pas la signature des preliminaires.

Et quant aux Indes Orientales, la France n'a qu'à demander les comptoirs sur la côte de Coromandel et sur celle de Malabar, et faire quelque proposition pour l'equivalent de Chandernagor, et des trois loges sur la côte du Bengal que l'Angleterre veut garder ou bien demander que l'on renvoie l'arrangement des affaires de Bengal au traité définitif. Voila, M. les articles sur les quels notre entretien a principalement roulé.

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Il m'a dit à l'égard de l'Espagne qu'il entroit dans toutes les idées de M. le Duc de Choiseul, et qu'il en approuvoit ex-

[*Translation*]

of His Britannic Majesty shall assist the King of Prussia, offering at the same time on her side to give reciprocal guaranties, and that Wesel and Guelders shall be guarded until the general peace by troops partly French, partly English, or troops subsidized by Great Britain. I should observe as to this last article that England will have to have for it the consent of the King of Prussia; but I may say at the same time that that will not delay the signature of the preliminaries.

And as to the East Indies, France has only to demand the trading houses on the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar, and make some proposal of an equivalent for Chandernagore, and the three stations on the coast of Bengal which England wishes to keep, or rather ask that the arrangement of the affairs of Bengal be postponed until the definitive treaty. Those, Monsieur, are the articles on which our conference chiefly turned.

With respect to Spain he told me he would enter into all the plans of M. le Duc de Choiseul, and that he approved the plan

trémément le plan en me faisant connoître bien clairement qu'il seroit bien si toutes ces affaires ne se traitoient pas et meme ne se finissoient pas à Paris, au moins jusqu'aux préliminaires faits et signés. Enfin il m'a répété diverses fois qu'on ne sauroit trop se dépêcher pour fixer les affaires de la France et de l'Ange dans une situation à pouvoir nommer et faire partir les ministres plenipotentiaires ambassadeurs. Il m'a ajouté sur ce sujet qu'il convenoit que la France en envoiant sa replique, dit que ses ministres-

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la signeront d'abord qu'elle aura été mise en forme de preliminaires, en invitant l'Angleterre de nommer et envoier aussitôt un ministre plenipotentiare ambassadeur, offrant de correspondre et de déclarer et faire partir son ambassadeur les jours que l'Ange choisira avec l'insinuation que la France compte de donner cette commission à un seigneur du premier ordre, persuadé que l'Ange agira de meme; non seulement, m'at-il dit, le prompt envoi des ambassadeurs de France et d'Ange est necessaire pour les affaires des deux couronnes, mais aussi pour accellerer et assurer

[*Translation*]

very much, letting me see very clearly that it would be well if all these affairs were not treated, and even not concluded at Paris, at least until preliminaries were completed and signed. Finally he repeated to me several times that we could not make too much haste in putting the affairs of France and England on such a foot that ministers plenipotentiary and ambassadors could be named and sent off. He added on this subject that it would be best if France in sending her reply said that her ministers would sign it as soon as it was put in the form of preliminaries, at the same time inviting England to name and to send off a minister plenipotentiary and ambassador immediately, offering on her side to declare and send off her ambassador on the days fixed by England, hinting that France expects to give this commission to a lord of the highest rank, being persuaded that England will do the same. He told me that not only the prompt dispatch of the ambassadors of France and England was necessary for the affairs of the two crowns but also to hasten and to assure peace with

la paix avec l'Espagne, ne me cachant pas que si l'Ange prend l'Isle de Cuba; cette conquête mettra de grandes entraves à la

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paix avec l'Espagne; y aiant des personnes ici, qui ne manqueront pas d'insinuer à la nation qu'il voudroit mieux laisser pour un tems le Portugal à l'Espagne, si tant est-qu'elle le puisse conquérir, et s'assurer pour toujours l'Isle de Cuba; en faisant des autres conquêtes sur l'Espagne, qui la mettroit bien dans le cas d'offrir la restitution du Portugal pour pouvoir les réavoir en abandonnant même Cuba; il ne me reste plus, M. qu'à prier V. E. de vouloir bien faire agréer à Messieurs de Choiseul mes très humbles respects: Je suis confus de tout ce qu'ils me font la grace de me dire, et je le considere comme un effet de leurs bontés

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pour moi que l'amitié dont V. E. m'honore m'a procuré. Je remets encore ici à V. E. la copie d'un billet que je reçu hier au soir de Milord Bute au sujet des complimens qu'il m'avoit chargé de vous faire M. de sa part, et de la nouvelle ulterieure qu'il eüe

[*Translation*]

Spain; he did not conceal from me that if England took the island of Cuba the conquest would put great obstacles in the way of peace with Spain. There are people here who will not fail to insinuate to the nation that it would be better for the time to abandon Portugal to Spain, if she can conquer it, while England makes sure forever of the island of Cuba, and makes other conquests from Spain which could be offered in return for the restitution of Portugal.

It only remains, Monsieur, for me to beg Your Excellency to present my humble respects to Messieurs de Choiseul. I am confused by all they are so good as to tell me, and I regard it as a result of their kindness for me, which I owe to the friendship with which Your Excellency honors me. I also send Your Excellency the copy of a note which I received yesterday evening from My Lord Bute on the subject of the compliments he had charged me to make to you, Monsieur, on his behalf, as well as of the later news he had received regarding the loss of the French in

à l'égard de la perte des François dans l'affaire du 24. Juin dernier en Allemagne.

J'ai l'honneur d'être &c.

SUBSTITUTE OBSERVATIONS ON ARTICLE 5, July, 1762¹

[Shelburne MSS., 10:287]

Article 5e du mémoire des observations tel qu'il a été jugé à propos de le rediger pour en faire la lecture aux ministres.

Il est à presumer que le ministere d'Angleterre en exigeant tout le cours de la rive du Mississippi n'a pas fait attention que la nouvelle Orleans etant situé sur la rive gauche de ce fleuve, la
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France cederait la totalité de cette ville et son port; ce qui seroit céder toute la Louisiane, que l'Angleterre ne demande pas; mais pour sentendre clairement sur cette article on joint ici la carte.

[*Translation*]

the affair in Germany of June 24 last.

I have the honor to be, etc.

Article 5 of the memoir of observations as it was thought best to reword it to be read to the ministers

It is to be presumed that the English ministry in exacting the whole extent of the bank of the Mississippi has not paid attention to the fact that as New Orleans is situated on the left bank of the river, France would cede that whole city and its harbor, which would be to cede all Louisiana, which England does not ask. But for a clear understanding on that article the map is annexed.

¹This is a version of the document on p. 449, prepared for the consumption of the council.

SUBSTITUTE PARAGRAPH OF THE DUC DE CHOISEUL'S LETTER OF
July 4, 1762¹

[Shelburne MSS., 10:288]

Article substitué à celui de la lettre de M. le Duc de Choiseul à M. le Bailli de Solar de Breille, en date de Versailles du 4. Juillet 1762. qui traite de la limite du cours du Mississippi comencant par ces mots: *Nous avons entendus*, et finit par ces expressions: *Nous n'aurons pas peu de peine à les appaiser.*

Quant à la limite du cours du Mississippi entre les deux
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nations, je soupçonne que nous ne nous soïons pas bien entendus; mais pour trancher court sur cet article, si l'idée de l'Angleterre est telle que ci-après nous en conviendrons; c'est à dire, que la ligne des limites du Canada vers l'occident finissant au confluent de l'Ohio et du Mississippi, soit continuée depuis ce confluent jusqu'à la mer; le cours du Mississippi servant de limites entre

[Translation]

Paragraph substituted for the one in the letter of M. le Duc de Choiseul to M. le Bailli de Solar de Breille, dated at Versailles, July 4, 1762, which treats of the boundary by the course of the Mississippi, beginning at these words, "we have understood," and ending at the phrases, "we shall have no little trouble to appease them."

As to the boundary by the course of the Mississippi between the two nations, I suspect that we do not fully understand each other; but to come to the point on this article, if the idea of England is as follows, we are in agreement: that is to say that the line of the boundary of Canada to the west, ending at the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi, is to be continued from this junction to the sea, the course of the Mississippi serving as

¹ This is the paragraph mentioned in Viry's letter of July 12. The original letter has disappeared.

les deux nations; mais comme le Mississippi a plusieurs embouchures, on entend celle qui est le plus vers l'orient, c'est à dire celle qui passe par la Rivière Iberville, les Lacs Maurepas et Pontchartrain, et de là se communique à la mer; en consequence

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de cette idée nous avons fait faire cette nuit la carte jointe au mémoire des observations. La ligne gauche marque la ligne Angloise, et la ligne bleue la limite Française. On s'imaginera qu'on n'a jamais voulu demander d'avantage en Angleterre, plus, ce seroit exiger toute la colonie; Il faut observer que M. Pitt même n'a jamais porté ses intentions aussi loin sur cet article; les Espagnols nous feront des reproches; nous n'aurons pas peu de peine à les apaiser.

[*Translation*]

boundary between the two nations. But as the Mississippi has several outlets, that one is understood which is farthest to the east, that is to say the one passing by the river Iberville, Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain and thence communicating with the sea. Pursuant to this idea we have had made tonight the map annexed to the memoir of observations. The line to the left marks the English line, and the blue line the French boundary. It is thought that they have never wished to ask more than this in England, as that would be to exact the whole colony. It must be observed that even M. Pitt never carried his intentions that far in the article. The Spaniards will reproach us; we shall have no little trouble to appease them.

OSSUN TO CHOISEUL, July 12, 1762

[A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 536:448]

No 290.

A MADRID le 12. Juillet 1762.

MONSIEUR,

.....
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J'aurai l'honneur de vous dire, monsieur, que sans traiter ministerialement ces differens objets, j'ai cru devoir en raisonner confidamment avec M. Wall. Je l'ai trouvé si oposé à ce que les possessions des Anglois s'étendissent jusqu'au Golphe du Mexique, par la crainte qu'ils n'en profitassent pour faire la contrebande avec des barques, si le local ne permettoit pas l'établissement d'un port capable de recevoir des bâtimens plus considérables, qu'il y a lieu de présumer que si le ministere Britannique, conduit par les vuës que l'Espagne lui suppose, insiste sur la premiere fixa-

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tion de ces limites, ce ne soit une très grande difficulté à surmonter pour la conclusion de la paix.

.....
[Translation]

No. 290

MADRID, July 12, 1762

MONSIEUR:

.....
I shall have the honor to tell you, Monsieur, that without treating ministerially on these different subjects, I have thought it best to reason on them confidentially with M. Wall. I have found him so opposed to the English possessions extending to the Gulf of Mexico, from the fear that they will take advantage of it to carry on contraband trade in small vessels, if the locality does not permit the establishment of a port capable of receiving larger ships, that there is ground to think that if the British ministry, inspired by the intentions which Spain suspects, should insist on the first fixation of boundaries, it could not but be a great difficulty to surmount in the conclusion of peace.

.....

GRIMALDI TO THE DUC DE CHOISEUL, July 20, 1762¹

[A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 536:521]

Joint à la dep de la cour
du 22 Juillet. 1762.

Copie de la lettre de M. le Mis de Grimaldi à Mr le
Duc de Choiseul

A VERSAILLES le 20 Juillet. 1762.

MONSIEUR.

j ai exposé a V Exce toutes les raisons qui feroient juger à ma cour que la cession de la partie de la Louisianne qui leur donneroit un pied quelconque dans la mer du Golphe du Mexique, étoit d'une si grande conséquence pour l'intérêt de l'Espagne et pour ceux de la France, sans compter des motifs d'union, que le roi mon maître ne consentiroit jamais à faire sa paix si cet article avoit lieu.

V. Exce a eu la bonté de me répondre que le sens dans lequel l'article est couché, nous mettoit à couvert de ce danger, et qui

[Translation]

Annexed to the dispatch from
the court, July 22, 1762

Copy of the letter of M. le Marquis de Grimaldi to
M. le Duc de Choiseul

VERSAILLES, July 20, 1762

MONSIEUR:

I have set forth to Your Excellency all the reasons which make my court judge that the cession of a part of Louisiana which would give the English any foothold on the Gulf of Mexico, was of such great consequence for the interests of Spain and of France, without taking into account the motives suggested by the union of the crowns, that the king my master would never consent to make peace if that article were adopted.

Your Excellency had the goodness to answer me that the sense in which the article is couched protected us from any such danger, and that surely by the boundary set forth in the English

¹ This and the succeeding five documents are to be taken together.

sûrement par les limites marquées dans l'article anglois n'avoient aucune communication à la mer, ni non plus par les rivières et que la carte qu'on formeroit dans le traité définitif le constateroit clairement

521v

Comme il n'est pas possible que je puisse juger de cette vérité d'après la description des limites marquées dans l'article sans une carte plus exacte et détaillé que celles qu'on a ordinairement : je supplie V. Exce de me faire une réponse qui constate ce qu'elle m'a fait l'honneur de me dire, pour que je puisse l'envoyer à mon cour et rassurer les justes appréhensions du roi mon maitre.
j ai l'honneur d'être etc

[*Translation*]

article they would have no communication with the sea, even by the rivers, and that the map to be made in the definitive negotiation would show it clearly.

As it is impossible for me to judge of the truth of this from the description of the boundaries set forth in the article without a map more exact and detailed than ordinary, I ask Your Excellency to make me a reply stating what you have done me the honor to tell me that I may send it to my court and quiet the just apprehensions of the king my master.

I have the honor to be, etc.

DUC DE CHOISEUL TO GRIMALDI, July 21, 1762

[A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 536:522]

Joint à la dep. de la cour du

22 Juillet 1762

No 11.

Copie de la lettre écrite à S. Exce Mr le Mis de Grimaldi
par Mr Le Duc de choiseul le 21. juillet 1762.

MONSIEUR,

En réponse à la lettre que V. Exce m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire hier relativement aux limites du Canada, spécifiées d'ans l'article 6. des préliminaires de la France que le Cte de choiseul envoie à Londrès, le roi m'a ordonne de mander à V. Exce que Sa Mté entend par le dit article que les limites accordées à l'Angleterre iront jusques à la rivière Iberville et les Lacs Maurepas et Pontchartrain; mais que lesdites limites qui ne vont que jusques là, laissent la rivière d'Iberville et les lacs dans la possession de la France, et par conséquent n'accordent pas aux Anglois un débouché jusqu'à la mer. Le roi attendra, sur ce point, la

[Translation]

Annexed to the dispatch from

the court, July 22, 1762

No. 11

Copy of the letter written to His Excellency M. le Marquis
de Grimaldi by M. le Duc de Choiseul, July 21, 1762

MONSIEUR:

In reply to the letter which Your Excellency did me the honor to write me yesterday with regard to the boundaries of Canada specified in article 6 of the preliminaries of France which the Comte de Choiseul is sending to London, the king has ordered me to inform Your Excellency that His Majesty understands by the article in question that the boundaries accorded to England shall extend as far as the river Iberville and Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain; but that the boundaries in-question, which go only so far, leave the Iberville River and the lakes in the possession of France, and consequently do not afford the English an outlet to the sea. The king on that point will await the reply of the Eng-

réponse de la cour d'angleterre, et si elle est différente de l'explication que je suis autorisé de donner par cette lettre à V. Exce, alors, quand même les autres articles qui regardent la france et

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l'Espagne seroient convenus entre les 3. cours, il ne seroit pas procédé à la confection de l'article des limites du Canada relativement à la Louïsianne, sans un concert préalable entre Sa Mté et le roi son cousin.

J'ai l'honneur d'être &c.

DUC DE CHOISEUL TO SOLAR, July 21, 1762

[Shelburne MSS., 10:361]

Copie de lettre de M. le Duc de Choiseul à M. le Bailli de Solar

21. Juillet 1762 A VERSAILLES.

Vous aurez vû, mon cher Ambassadeur, par ce que je vous ai dit hier, et par ce que je vous mande dans une autre lettre la peine que j'ai eüe d'arranger les préliminaires d'Espagne, au point qu'il fut possible à l'Ange de nommer un plenipotentiare pour

[*Translation*]

lish court; and if it differs from the explanation I am authorized to give Your Excellency by this letter, even if the other articles which concern France and Spain were agreed on between the three courts, nothing would be done toward the framing of the article of the boundary of Canada and Louisiana without the previous agreement of His Majesty and the king his cousin.

I have the honor to be, etc.

Copy of the letter of M. le Duc de Choiseul to M. le Bailli de Solar

July 21, 1762, VERSAILLES

You will have seen, my dear Ambassador, by what I told you yesterday and by what I communicate to you in my other letter, the difficulty that I have had in arranging the preliminaries of Spain to the point at which it was possible for England to name

signer avec cette couronne. Cette peine n'a rien été en comparaison de la discussion que j'ai eue à essüier avec le Marquis de Grimaldi relativement aux limites du Canada ; elle a été si vive de

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fait, que pour éviter une esclandre qui auroit produit le plus mauvais effet, le roy s'est déterminé pour ne point retarder le courier d Ange de mettre l'article 6. des preliminaires sous une forme qui pût n'être pas protestée et arretée par l'ambassadeur d'Espagne, tandis qu'il a ordonné au Comte de Choiseul de signer le meme article séparément dans la forme que peut desirer le cour de Londres.

Dans cet état je suis autorisé à vous mander que l'intention du roy invariable est de signer relativement à la France avec le ministre plenipotentiaire d'Ange qui sera nommé, ce que le Comte de Choiseul envoie aujourd'hui à Londres, de sorte que sans entrer sur l'arte 6. dans aucune discussion, il est necessaire

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que l'Ange sur cet objet nous réponde simplement qu'elle adopte ce qui est convenu par la France. Sur les autres articles

[*Translation*]

a plenipotentiary to sign with that crown. This difficulty has been as nothing in comparison with the debate I have had to undertake with the Marquis de Grimaldi with regard to the boundary of Canada. He has indeed been so violent, that to avoid a scandal that would have had the very worst effect, the king has decided in order not to delay the English courier to put article 6 of the preliminaries in a form which cannot be protested or vetoed by the ambassador of Spain, while at the same time the king has ordered the Comte de Choiseul to sign the same article separately in the form the court of London will desire.

In these circumstances I am authorized to announce to you that the king's constant intention is to sign with respect to France, with the minister plenipotentiary who shall be named by England what the Comte de Choiseul is sending to London today, in such fashion, that, without going into any discussion of article 6, it is necessary that England on that point reply to us merely that she adopts what is agreed to by France. On the other

la cour de Londres fera les changemens de diction qu'elle jugera à propos ; et elle nous renverra le tout avec la nomination de son plenipotentiaire ; lequel étant arrivé ici, le paix sera faite, et nous donnons nôtre parole de maintenir à la signature, malgré tous les obstacles, et ce qui est contenu dans les préliminaires et dans l'article 6. tel qu'il est signé séparément par le Comte de Choiseul.

....

COMTE DE CHOISEUL TO SOLAR, July 21, 1762

[Shelburne MSS., 10:369]

Lettre de M. le Comte de Choiseul, à M. le Bailli de Solar

A VERSAILLES le 21. Juillet 1762.

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Je vous prie, mon cher Ambassadeur, dans cette lettre tres confidentielle de mander à M. le Comte de Viry qu'il peut assurer Milord Egremont qu'il ne sera jamais question de la lettre qu'il m'a renvoyée, qu'elle est brulée, que je n'abuserai jamais de la confiance des dignes ministres qui sont à la tête des affaires

[*Translation*]

articles the court of London will make the changes of wording it will think best ; and it will return us the whole along with the nomination of a plenipotentiary. Once he has arrived here the peace will be made, and we give our word to maintain to signature, despite all obstacles, both what is contained in the preliminaries and what is in article 6 as separately signed by the Comte de Choiseul....

Letter of M. le Comte de Choiseul to M. le Bailli de Solar

VERSAILLES, July 21, 1762

I beg you, my dear Ambassador, in this most confidential letter to inform M. le Comte de Viry that he can assure My Lord Egremont that there will never arise any question of the letter which he has sent back to me, and which is burned. I will never abuse the confidence of the worthy ministers who are at the head

d'Ange et qu'ils doivent compter sur notre fidélité ainsi que je compte sur la leur. Je leur donne aujourd'hui une grande preuve de la confiance que j'ai dans leur discretion et dans leur probité en vous adressant une note signée de moi, que je vous prie de faire remettre par le canal de M. le Comte de Viry à Milord Egremont. Cette note contien deux artes que je n'ai pas pu

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inserer dans mon projet de preliminaires, je vous en dirai ingenuement la raison. M. le Marquis de Grimaldi qui sait que sa cour verroit avec peine que les Anglois eussent des etablissemens dans le Golphe du Mexique, n'a pû prendre sur lui de consentir que cet article fût accordé de notre part sans qu'il eût reçu des nouvelles de Madrid. Cette objection de l'ambassadeur d'Espagne, qui nest pas nouvelle, ne vous arrête pas; mais elle doit faire sentir aux ministres Anglois tout le prix de la cession que nous leur faisons. Sur le second article de la note qui est le 12e des preliminaires, M. de Starhemberg n'etoit pas suffisamment

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autorisé par sa cour à y donner son consentement; mais cet

[*Translation*]

of affairs in England, and they may count on our fidelity as we count on theirs. Today I give them a great proof of the confidence I have in their discretion and probity, by addressing you a note signed by me, which I beg you to have transmitted by the Comte de Viry's channel to My Lord Egremont. This note contains two articles that I have not been able to insert in my project of preliminaries. I will frankly tell you the reason. M. le Marquis de Grimaldi, who knows that his court would see with pain the English in possession of settlements on the Gulf of Mexico, has not been able to take it on himself to consent that this article be accorded by us, until he has heard from Madrid. This objection from the ambassador of Spain which is not new, does not halt us; but it should make the English ministers feel the full value of the cession which we are making them. As to the second article of the note, which is the twelfth of the preliminaries, M. de Starhemberg was not sufficiently authorized by his court to give his consent to it; but that ambassador has taken it

ambassadeur a pris sur lui de dresser trois articles différens au choix de l'Ange que j'adresse séparément à Milord Egremont, et nous sommes bien sûrs encore que cet article ne fera point de difficulté.

Vous trouverez ci-joint deux cartes sur lesquelles nous avons fixés les limites telles que nous les entendons, et telles qu'elles doivent satisfaire complètement l'Ange. L'une est la carte de Dauville, qui est entre les mains de tout le monde; l'autre est un relevé d'une carte particulière de la Louisiane beaucoup meilleure que la première.

Il me paroît donc que nôtre affaire est parfaitement éclaircie de tous les points, et si le ministère Anglois en est content, comme

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je ne puis en douter, il faut qu'ils nous renvoie nos préliminaires en apostillant l'article 6. des preliminaires, des seuls mots: *cet article est convenu*; et gardera ma note particulière pour l'interprétation du dt article, ainsi que les deux cartes ci-jointes si le ministère de Londres, mon cher Ambassadeur, admet la marche que je lui propose ainsi que nos propositions, il pourra tout de suite proceder, meme sans attendre notre réponse à la nomination

[Translation]

on himself to draw up three different articles for the English to choose from, which I have addressed to My Lord Egremont; and we are very sure that that article will occasion no difficulty.

You will find annexed the maps on which we have set the boundaries as we understand them, and as they should fully content England. One is the map of D'Anville which is in everybody's hands; the other is an abstract from a particular map of Louisiana, much better than the first.

It seems to me then, that our business is perfectly cleared up on all points, and if the English ministry is satisfied, as I cannot doubt, they must send back our preliminaries annotating article 6 simply with the words, "This article is agreed to." They will keep my private note for the interpretation of the article in question, as well as the two maps. If the English ministry, my dear Ambassador, adopts the course I suggest, as well as our proposals, it can proceed at once, even without awaiting our reply, to nom-

du plenipotentiaire qu'il enverra en France, le notre sera pareillement nommé le jour qui nous sera indiqué.

J'ai l'honneur d'être.

Note. Art. 6.

La France accorde que le Fleuve de Mississippi serve de
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limites aux deux nations entre la Louisiane et le Canada jusqu'au confluent de la Rivière Iberville, et que depuis ce confluent la ligne de démarcation suivant cette même rivière Iberville et passant par les Lacs Maurepas et Pontchartrain, se prolonge jusqu'à la mer suivant cette ligne de démarcation étant commune aux deux nations; et pour constater les limites des deux couronnes d'une manière qui prévienne toutes contestations entre leurs sujets il sera annexé à chaque instrument des préliminaires une carte sur laquelle la ligne de démarcation sera marquée en couleur jaune et l'eüe et cette carte servira à l'avenir pour l'intelligence et l'interprétation du present article.

Signé COMTE DE CHOISEUL.

[*Translation*]

inate the plenipotentiary it will send to France. Ours will be similarly named on the day indicated to us.

I have the honor to be.

Note. Article 6

France accords that the Mississippi River serve as boundary for the two nations between Louisiana and Canada as far as the mouth of the Iberville River, and that from that point the line of demarcation, following that same river Iberville and passing by Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain shall extend to the sea [the navigation] along that line of demarcation being common to the two nations; and to establish the boundaries of the two crowns in a fashion which may forestall all contentions between their subjects, there shall be annexed to each instrument of the preliminaries a map on which the line of demarcation shall be marked in yellow and blue; and this map shall serve in the future for the understanding and interpretation of the present article.

Signed: COMTE DE CHOISEUL

OSTENSIBLE FORM OF ARTICLE 6, July 21, 1762

[Shelburne MSS., 10:376]

Projet d'articles préliminaires arrêtés entre la France
et l'Angleterre.

.....
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Art. 6.

La France accorde que le Fleuve du Mississippi serve aux
deux nations de limites entre la Louisiane et le Canada, de manière
que la rive gauche de ce fleuve appartienne à la G. B. jusqu'à la
Riviere Iberville et les Lacs Maurepas et Pontchartrain, et pour
constater les limites des deux couronnes d'une manière certaine,

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il sera annexé à chaque instrument des préliminaires ou du
traité définitif une carte sur la quelle la ligne de demarcation sera
marquée en couleur, et telle carte servira à l'avenir pour l'intelli-
gence et l'interprétation de cet article.

[Translation]

Project of preliminary articles agreed on between
France and England

Article 6

France accords that the Mississippi River serve the two
nations as boundary between Louisiana and Canada, in such
fashion that the left bank shall belong to Great Britain as far as
the Iberville River and Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain.
And to establish definitely the boundaries of the two crowns there
shall be annexed to each instrument of the preliminaries of the
definitive treaty a map on which the line of demarcation shall be
marked in color, and this map shall serve in the future for the
understanding and interpretation of this article.

COMTE DE CHOISEUL TO SOLAR, July 21, 1762

[Shelburne MSS., 10:449]

Billet de M. le Comte de Choiseul à M. le Bailli de Solar du 21. Juillet 1762.

Je n'ai eû que ce matin, mon cher Ambassadeur, les préliminaires d'Espagne; c'est ce qui m'a empêché de vous envoie^r plutôt cette expedition. Les préliminaires, au reste, nous ont paru de nature à être acceptées sans difficultés par l'Angleterre puisqu'ils ne

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l'engagent à rien, et que les choses restent dans l'état où elles étoient.

Je vous prie de mander à M. le Comte de Viry qu'il seroit à propos qu'en réponse de cette expedition, les ministres Anglois nous fissent dire qu'ils attendent à tout moment la nouvelle de la prise de la Louisiane; cela nous donneroit des armes contre l'Espagne, qui repugne beaucoup à la cession de la Mobile.

.....

[*Translation*]

Note of M. le Comte de Choiseul to M. le Bailli de Solar, July 21, 1762

I only received this morning, my dear Ambassador, the preliminaries of Spain; it is that which has prevented my sooner sending you this dispatch. The preliminaries, further, have seemed to us such as can be accepted without difficulty by England, since they bind her to nothing, things remaining as formerly.

I beg you to tell M. le Comte de Viry that it will be well if in replying to this dispatch, the English ministers tell us they are expecting at any moment the news that Louisiana is taken. It will give us arms against Spain, which is much against the cession of Mobile.

.....

OBSERVATIONS ON PROJECT OF ARTICLES, July 21, 1762

[Shelburne MSS., 10:388]

Observations sur le projet d'articles préliminaires.

.....
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Art. 6

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Il paroît qu'on ne s'est pas bien entendu jusqu'à present sur les limites à fixer pour les deux nations, mais on espère qu'il n'y aura plus de doute sur cet article, et que l'Ange sentira que la France ne peut accepter l'article 5. du memoire dans toute son étendue; puis qu'elle se trouveroit par là ceder la nouvelle Orleans et la Louisiane, qui n'a jamais été demandée—l'Ange obtient aujourd'hui tout ce qu'elle pouvoit desirer, et l'on remplira l'objet qu'ont leurs M. T. C. et B. d'éviter par la suite tous sujets de contestations entre leurs sujets en fixant sur la carte les limites des deux puissances.

.....
400....

Il s'en suit de ces observations, que la difference des prélim-
[Translation]

Observations on the project of preliminary articles

Article 6

It appears that up to now there has not been a clear understanding as to the boundary to be set for the two nations; but it is hoped that there will be no further doubt as to this article, and that England will perceive that France cannot accept article 5 of the memoir in its full extent. For thus she would cede New Orleans and Louisiana which has never been demanded. England obtains today all she can desire, and what will fulfil the object of their Most Christian and Britannic Majesties of avoiding for the future all subjects of controversy between their subjects, by settling on the map the boundaries of their states.

.....
From these observations it follows that the differences between the annexed preliminaries and the memoir of His Excel-

inaires ci-joints au mémoire de S. E. M. le Comte d'Egremont ne roule véritablement que sur 3. articles.

1—La nouvelle Orleans que le roi ne sauroit ceder, et que l'Angleterre probablement n'a jamais voulu demander. On espere que cette couronne sera contente des limites proposées. l'on croit avoir donné des eclaircissemens suffisans pour livrer toutes difficultés à cet egard.

2—L'Isle de Ste Lucie, dont le roi ne peut absolument se desister et qui paroît le seul obstacle réel à la reconciliation.

3—Les places de Wesel et de Gueldres que le roy ne pourroit
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abandonner sans le consentement de l'Impre-Reine.

.....
1—Les limites du Canada beaucoup plus étendûes qu'elles n'étoient demandées dans l'ultimatum de l'Angleterre, et qui n'auroient jamais été accordées l'année dernière.

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2—Les Isles neutres dont le partage devoit être égal, et qui se

[*Translation*]

lency M. le Comte d' Egremont turn in truth on but three articles.

1. New Orleans, which the king cannot cede, and which England probably did not intend to ask. It is hoped that crown will be satisfied with the boundaries proposed. It is thought enough light has been furnished to clear up all difficulties in that respect.

2. The island of St. Lucia, which the king absolutely cannot abandon, and which seems the only real obstacle to a reconciliation.

3. The places in Wesel and Guelders which the king cannot withdraw from without the consent of the Empress-Queen.

.....
1. The boundaries of Canada extended much farther than they were asked in the English ultimatum, and which would never have been accorded last year.

2. The Neutral Islands, the partition of which was to be equal division, now entirely to England's advantage, as she keeps

trouve entièrement à son avantage, puisqu'elle en garde 3. sur 4.
 3—L'acquisition de la Grenade et des Grenadines, qui forment
 une excellente colonie. Après tant de facilités apportées par la
 France, la paix dépend uniquement de l'Angleterre, et l'on croit
 qu'indépendamment des grands avantages qu'elle obtient elle sentira
 la satisfaction de faire le bonheur du public.

Fait A VERSAILLES le 21. Juillet 1762.

SOLAR TO VIRY, July 21, 1762

[Shelburne MSS., 10:336]

Autre lettre du même jour.

.....
 338....

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Au reste je suis trop fâché du moment d'inquiétude, où Milord
 Bute a été touchant la démarcation des limites. Je puis vous
 assurer avec vérité qu'on a toujours compté ici de la meilleure
 foy du monde que les susdites limites commenceroient à la nais-
 sance du Fleuve Mississippi, et que la ligne jaune en passant par

[*Translation*]

three out of four.

3. The acquisition of Grenada and the Grenadines, which
 make an excellent colony. After so many complaisances on the
 part of France, the peace depends solely on England. It is
 thought that independently of the great advantages she obtains,
 she will feel the satisfaction of working for the public welfare.

Done at VERSAILLES, July 21, 1762

Another letter of the same date

.....
 For the rest, I am much ashamed for the moment of inquietude
 in which My Lord Bute was with respect to the demarcation of
 the boundary. I can truthfully assure you that here they have
 always taken it for granted with the best faith in the world, that
 the boundary in question should begin at the source of the Mis-
 sissippi River, and that the yellow line passing by the Iberville

la Riviere Iberville et les Lacs Maurepas et Pontchartrain devoit s'entendre aller jusqu'à la mer, selon que cela avoit été dit dans le memoire de M. le Duc de Choiseul, et ça été la faute de celui qui a dressé cette carte, et qui s'est contenté de designer par ou devoit passer la ligne jaune pour aller jusqu'à la mer. L'on ne

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s'est à present borné a corriger cette carte; mais on envoie en même tems aussi celle de Barville que vous citez, et qui n'est pas même si exacte que la petite. A l'égard de la pretention de Milord Egremont de vouloir chasser les François de toute la Louisiane et de la nouvelle Orleans, elle ne me paroît pas juste; il n'en a jamais été question dans l'ultimatum de la negociation de M. Pitt, qui a été prise pour base de celle-ci; et il auroit fallu par consequent commencer par demander à la France cette colonie qu'elle possede encore: et vous sentez bien tous les motifs qui se seroient ici opposés a cétte cession, non pas pour l'importance de la chose en elle même, mais par rapport à l'Espagne; enfin, mon cher

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Comte, si l Ange ne finit point actuellement vis-à-vis de la

[*Translation*]

River and Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain should extend to the sea, according to what was said in the memoir of M. le Duc de Choiseul. It was the mistake of the person who drew the map, who contented himself by indicating how the yellow line would go to the sea. They have not been content with correcting this map; they are also sending that of D'Anville [?] which you mention, which is not even so exact as the small one. Respecting the aspiration of My Lord Egremont to expel the French from all Louisiana, and from New Orleans, it does not seem right to me. There was never any question of it in the ultimatum of M. Pitt's negotiation which was taken as the basis for this; and it would have been necessary to begin by asking of France that colony which she still possesses. You will easily perceive all the motives against such a cession, not for the intrinsic importance of it, but with respect to Spain.

Finally, my dear Count, if England does not actually come to an agreement with France, I shan't know what more to say; for

France, je ne saurois plus que dire : car vous m'avouerez que nous suivons bien exactement ce que vous nous mandez de la part de Milord Bute et de Milord Egremont ; et ne croiez pas que j'y sois parvenu sans quelque sorte de peines ; car quoique les ministres ici puissent agir plus librement que ceux d'Ange ils ne laissent pas d'être forcés à bien des menagemens vis à vis de la nation, et de leurs ennemis. Je ne suis point etonné de ce que vous me dites de M. Sanseverino.¹ Je l'avois même prévu et je suis très fâché, et je ne le cachai pas à Monsieur le Duc de Choiseul, qu'il

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eut conseille a M. le Marquis de Grimaldi de lui envoyer les declarations ; mais il n'y a qu'à le laisser la avec ces deux pieces, ne lui rien dire du tout, et le traiter avec le mépris qu'il merite, aussi bien que M. Tanucci son principal.

[*Translation*]

you will admit that we follow very exactly what you indicate to us from My Lord Bute and My Lord Egremont. Don't think that I have attained it without some difficulty ; for although the ministers here can act more freely than those of England they are not exempt from being driven to many devices by the nation and by their enemies. I am not at all surprised at what you tell me of M. Sanseverino.¹ I had foreseen it, and am much ashamed at it, and I will not conceal it from M. le Duc de Choiseul, who had advised M. le Marquis de Grimaldi to send Sanseverino the declarations. But there is nothing to do but to leave him with those two documents, tell him nothing at all, and treat him, as well as M. Tanucci, his chief, with the distrust which they deserve.

¹ Albertini Prince Sanseverino was Neapolitan ambassador at the court of London. Tanucci was Neapolitan minister of foreign affairs. Both men had enjoyed the confidence of Charles III of Spain while he was King of the Two Sicilies ; and he had made them the means of various overtures on Spain's behalf to the English court. As they much distrusted the Sardinian envoys' attitude toward Spain and Naples, they as well as Charles himself disliked the commission of the negotiation to their hands. Repeatedly they tried to interfere as here indicated.

CHAPTER XIV

VIRY AND SOLAR FINISH THEIR WORK, JULY-SEPTEMBER, 1762

EGREMONT TO THE COMTE DE CHOISEUL, July 31, 1762¹

[Shelburne MSS., 11:8]

Lettre de Milord Egremont à M. le Comte de
Choiseul du 31. Juillet 1762.

.....
11....

S. M. m'a autorisé de dire à Votre Excellence par rapport aux trois articles, sur lesquels la différence des preliminaires, roule, selon ce qui est dit sur la fin des observations sur le projet de la

12

France, que le roy se relache sur la demande de la Nouvelle Orleans, qu'il se prête, quoiqu'à son grand rēgrēt à ceder l'Isle de Ste Lucie, et sur l'article des places de Wesel et de Gueldres, qu'il fait tout ce qui lui est possible sans manquer de foy à son allié, procedé, dont il est certain que la proposition ne lui sera pas faite

[*Translation*]

Letter of My Lord Egremont to M. le Comte de
Choiseul, July 31, 1762

.....
His Majesty has authorized me to say to Your Excellency with respect to the three articles on which turns the difference of the preliminaries, according to what is said at the end of the observations on the project of France: that the king relaxes his demand for New Orleans: that he brings himself, though to his great regret, to cede the Isle of St. Lucia: and on the article of the places in Wesel and Guelders, that he will do all possible without breaking faith with his ally, which he is sure will never be pro-

¹ This represents the final English decision as to terms with France. For the struggle to approach it see Viry's letter of August 1, *post*, 490.

de la part du Roy T. C. quant aux autres articles la différence entre le projet des préliminaires de V. E. et mon memoire signé est très mediocres; et apres toutes les facilités que le roy a eû dans les articles essentiels, S. M. ne doute pas de rencontrer les memes facilités de la part du Roy T. C. pour l'explication et le

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rapprochement des autres promis aux premières idées de mon memoire.

.....

EGREMONT TO VIRY, July 31, 1762

[Shelburne MSS., 11:32]

Lettre de Milord Egremont à M. le Comte de Viry
du 31 Juillet 1762. A WHITEHALL

.....

37....

Pour ce qui est du Mississippi, il paroît qu'il y a quelques changemens a faire dans cet article des préliminaires de la France, afin d'en écarter toute obscurité. Quoique nous aïons adopté la

[Translation]

posed to him by the Most Christian King. As to the other articles, the difference between Your Excellency's project of preliminaries and my signed memoir is very slight; and after all the complaisances which the king has shown in essential articles, His Majesty does not doubt that he will meet with similar complaisances on the part of the Most Christian King for the explanation and approximation as promised on the others to the first ideas of my memoir.

.....

Letter of My Lord Egremont to M. le Comte de Viry.
July 31, 1762, WHITEHALL

.....

As to the Mississippi, it seems there are some changes to be made in that article of the preliminaries of France to remove all obscurity. Although we have adopted the line of demarcation

ligne de démarcation proposée par la France pour lui assurer de la possession de la Nouvelle Orleans, on a jamais entendu, qu'à l'exception de cette ville et de l'isle ou elle est située, la France pût avoir désormais aucune prétention sur la rive et le côté gauche

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du Mississippi. J'ai encore une remarque à faire sur cet article ; c'est que quand la France nous propose la navigation de la ligne de démarcation suivant la Rivière Iberville et passant pas les Lacs Maurepas et Pontchartrain jusqu'à la mer, on est persuadé qu'elle ne voudroit pas nous proposer une navigation illusoire ; c'est pourquoi, si après avoir pris les informations pour cet effet, on trouve que cette navigation ne soit pas practicable, ou qu'elle ne suffise pas pour le commerce il sera permis aux sujets du roy de se servir de la même branche du Mississippi, dont les François se servent ordinairement, depuis le confluent de la Rivière Iberville jusqu'à la mer.

.....

[*Translation*]

proposed by France to assure her of the possession of New Orleans, it has always been understood that with the exception of that city and of the island on which it is situated, France could thenceforth have no claim on the left bank and side of the Mississippi. I have another remark to make on that article ; it is that when France proposes to us the navigation of the line of demarcation following the Iberville River and passing by Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain, as far as the sea, we are persuaded that she does not wish to propose to us an illusory navigation. For this reason, if, after gathering information on the point, we find that navigation impracticable, or insufficient for commerce, the king's subjects are to be allowed to make use of the same branch of the Mississippi as is ordinarily used by the French from the junction of the river Iberville to the sea.

.....

EGREMONT'S LETTER OF JULY 31, 1762, ARRANGED FOR
SPANISH CONSUMPTION

[Shelburne MSS., 11:16]

Memoire tiré de la lettre de Milord Egremont, à
M le Comte de Viry pour communiquer à M. l'
Ambassadeur d Espagne.

20....

21

Pour ce qui est du Mississippi il paroît qu'il y a quelques
changemens à faire dans cet article des préliminaires de la France,
afin d'en écarter toute obscurité, quoique nous aïons adopté la
ligne de demarcation proposée par la France pour lui assurer la
possession de la Nouvelle Orleans.¹

[*Translation*]

Memoir extracted from the letter of My Lord
Egremont, to M. le Comte de Viry to be commu-
nicated to M. the Ambassador of Spain.

As to what concerns the Mississippi, it seems there are some
changes to make in that article of the preliminaries of France
to remove all obscurities, although we have adopted the line of
demarcation proposed by France to assure her the possession of
New Orleans.¹

¹The French were afraid Spain would take umbrage at Egremont's
ignoring in his proposals of July 31 certain propositions for peace between
England and Spain presented by Grimaldi. Accordingly out of Egremont's
memoir they concocted one to be shown to Grimaldi as an English response
to his overtures. To keep him in ignorance of France's concessions to
England on the Mississippi they reworded the pertinent passage as above.

VIRY TO SOLAR, August 1, 1762

[Shelburne MSS., 11:52]

Lettre de M. le Comte de Viry à M. le Bailli Solar.

A LONDRES le 1^r Aout 1762.

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Le domestique de V. E. Nicolas Lecomte arriva ici le 24 du passé à quatre heures après midi. Il me remit les deux paquets de V. E. dans lesquels je trouvai toutes les lettres et pièces détaillées dans la note datée du 22. même mois à trois heures du matin, avec la Lettre que V. E. m'écrivit à dix heures de la même matinée, et qui contenoit la partie de ces lettres et pièces qui avoient été oubliées. Après avoir lû les lettres et pièces contenues dans le paquet adressé à Milord Egremont, et tout ce que V. E. m'avoit envoyé d'ailleurs ; je portai moi même ce paquet à ce lord dans la prévoiance ou j'étois qu'il se gendarmeroit d'abord sur ce qui concernoit l'Espagne, et pour tâcher de le faire aussi d'abord

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revenir de ses idées sur la Nouvelle Orleans ; je lui remis également la copie de la lettre que M. le Comte de Choiseul avoit écrite à

[*Translation*]

Letter of M. le Comte de Viry to M. le Bailli Solar

LONDON, August 1, 1762

Your Excellency's servant, Nicolas Lecomte, arrived here the twenty-fourth of last month at four in the afternoon. He brought me the two packets from Your Excellency in which I found all the letters and papers listed in your letter dated the twenty-second of the same month at three in the morning, together with the letter Your Excellency wrote me at ten that same morning, which contained that part of the letters and documents that had been forgotten.

After having read the letters and documents in the packet addressed to My Lord Egremont, and all the rest of what Your Excellency had sent, I carried the packet to the lord myself, foreseeing that he would bluster about what related to Spain, and intending to try if I could make him give up his ideas about New Orleans. I further communicated to him the copy of the letter M. le Comte de Choiseul had written Your Excellency with

V. E. en lui envoyant sa note signée pour interpréter les articles 6. et 12. des préliminaires de paix entre la France et l'Ange de même que cette note en original et les deux cartes qui l'accompagnoit. J'envoiai en même tems à Milord Bute, qui se trouvoit à sa campagne, les copies du paquet adressé à Milord Egremont, en le priant de suspendre son jugement sur ce qui concernoit l'Espagne, jusqu'à ce que nous eussions conféré ensemble. Je fus assez content de Milord Egremont pour ce qui regardoit les affaires avec la France; mais il se recria extraordinairement, pour ne rien

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dire de plus, lorsqu'il eût lû ce qui concernoit l'Espagne, et quoique je me servisse de tout ce qui est inseré dans les lettres de Messieurs de Choiseul pour l'engager à se prêter aux desirs de M. le Duc de Choiseul, je n'y gagnai rien. J'eus le lendemain un fort long entretien avec Milord Bute; je lui fis toutes les confiances qu'on avoit souhaité que je lui fisse; il me parut satisfait sur tout ce qui regardoit la France; mais il ne le fut point à l'égard de l'Espagne, quoiqu'il ne me parlat pas sur cet article

[Translation]

his signed note for the interpretation of articles 6 and 12 of the preliminaries of peace between France and England; I did the same with that note in the original and the two maps which accompanied it. At the same time I sent to My Lord Bute, who was in the country, copies of the packet addressed to My Lord Egremont, asking him to suspend judgment on what related to Spain, until we had conferred together.

I was well enough satisfied with My Lord Egremont in what concerned affairs with France; but he exclaimed extraordinarily, to say no more, when he had read what related to Spain; and though I used all that is in the letters of Messieurs de Choiseul to induce him to conform to M. le Duc de Choiseul's wishes I accomplished nothing.

Next day I had a long interview with My Lord Bute; I made him all the confidences it was desired I should. He appeared satisfied with everything concerning France, but he was by no means so with respect to Spain, although he did not talk to me on that subject with such warmth as My Lord Egremont, saying

avec la même chaleur qu'avoit fait Milord Egremont, me disant au contraire qu'il falloit penser à quelque expedient pour aller toujours en avant avec la France, et tâcher de finir aussi, s'il est possible, avec l'Espagne; Milord Egremont lui avoit deja com-

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muniqué le tout avec son sentiment relativement à l'affaire d'Espagne, qui s'il eut été suivi, auroit immaneablement renversé ce grand ouvrage. En sortant de chez Milord Bute, je passai de concert avec lui chez Milord Egremont, pour voir si la réponse que le Lord Bute lui avoit faite, ne l'avoit pas un peu radouée: elle portoit que, quoique les propositions de M. de Grimaldi fussent inadmissibles, il falloit cependant voir s'il n'y auroit pas moiën d'aller en avant dans cette affaire, et que la façon dont la France agissoit engageroit sûrement le roy leur allié à penser ainsi: je trouvai en effet Milord Egremont un peu radouée, et le lendemain encore un peu plus traitable. Le Roy de la Grande

57

Bretagne lui avoit fait connoitre qu'il souhaitoit qu'on mit en usage tout les expediens possibles pour acclereler la conclusion

[*Translation*]

on the contrary that we must think of some expedient to progress continually with France, and to try to finish also, if possible, with Spain. My Lord Egremont had already communicated the whole to him with his opinion regarding the affair of Spain, which if it had been followed would have infallibly overturned this great undertaking.

On leaving My Lord Bute's, I went by arrangement with him to My Lord Egremont's to see if the reply Lord Bute had made him had not softened him a little. It was that although the proposals of M. de Grimaldi were inadmissible it was nevertheless necessary to see if there were not some way of going forward with the affair, and the manner in which France acted would surely induce the king her ally to think similarly. In effect I found My Lord Egremont a little softened, and the next day still more tractable. The King of Great Britain had let him know his desire that all possible expedients be used to hasten the

de ce grand ouvrage, si elle étoit praticable; S. M. B. lui avoit ordonné en même tems de faire assembler le conseil Mardi dernier et d'envoyer des couriers au chancelier et au Duc de Bedford, qui étoient à leurs campagnes. Dans cet intervalle je communiquai à M. George Grenville la lettre de M. le Comte de Choiseul, où il est parlé de lui, et tout ce que vous me disiez, M. à son égard; il y fut fort sensible; mais malgré cela je le trouvai encore bien moins traitable que le Lord Egremont; car non seulement il pensoit comme lui à l'égard de l'Espagne; mais il faisoit encore

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des difficultés sur presque tous les articles des préliminaires de la France, et principalement sur ce qui concerne Ste Lucie, la nouvelle Orleans, le commissaire dans l'Isle de St Pierre et l'article d'Allemagne. Je ne manquai pas d'informer Milord Bute de ce qui s'étoit passé entre ce ministre et moi. Le Duc de Bedford et le chancelier étant arrivés de leurs campagnes le conseil s'assembla: mais comme ils n'arriverent que quelques momens avant le conseil, Milord Bute n'eut pas le tems de les prévenir:

[*Translation*]

end of this great undertaking if it were practicable. At the same time His Britannic Majesty had ordered him to have the council assembled last Tuesday and to send couriers to the chancellor and the Duc de Bedford, who were on their estates.

During that interval I communicated to M. George Grenville the letter of M. le Comte de Choiseul in which he is spoken of, and all that you told me, Monsieur, with regard to him. He was very appreciative; but in spite of it I found him much less tractable than Lord Egremont. For not only did he think like him as to Spain; he also made difficulties on almost all the articles of the preliminaries of France, and especially on what concerns St. Lucia, New Orleans, the commissary in the island of St. Pierre, and the German article. I did not fail to inform My Lord Bute of what had passed between this minister and me.

The Duc de Bedford and the chancellor having arrived from their estates, the council assembled. But as they only arrived a few minutes before the council, My Lord Bute did not have

ce qui le mit dans de grands embarras: car Milord Egremont et M. George Grenville, de concert secretement avec Milord

59

Granville, président du conseil, qui est de retour de Bath, ou il a été fort long tems, et qui est absolument contraire à la cession de Ste Lucie, et à ce que l'on se departe de la Nouvelle Orleans, de même qu'a faire la paix avec la France, sans que celle avec l'Espagne se fasse en meme tems, fit sa relation au conseil d'une façon, que tous auroient été d'avis qu'avant de répondre au projet des préliminaires de la France et de se departir en rien du memoire signé par Milord Egremont du dix du mois dernier, il falloit s'expliquer prealablement avec elle au sujet de l'Espagne, n'y aiant aucune apparence, vù les propositions de M. Grimaldi

60

que cette cour la voulut presentement en venir à un accommodement sur un pied equitable et raisonnable, si Milord Bute n'eut pas fort habilement empeché un pareil résolution en faisant renvoyer la decision de cette affaire à un autre jour. Milord Bute

[*Translation*]

time to forewarn them, which much embarrassed him. For My Lord Egremont and M. George Grenville were in secret agreement with My Lord Granville, president of the council, who has returned from Bath, where he has been for a long time, and who is absolutely opposed to the cession of St. Lucia, to abandoning New Orleans, and to making peace with France unless it is made at the same time with Spain. He made his statement to the council in such fashion that all would have been of the opinion that before answering the French project of preliminaries or departing on any point from the memoir signed by My Lord Egremont the tenth of last month, it was necessary to come to an understanding with France on the subject of Spain, inasmuch as in view of M. Grimaldi's proposals there was no appearance that that court wished for the present to come to an agreement on a just and reasonable footing. My Lord Bute very adroitly prevented such a decision by putting off the determination of the affair to another day.

My Lord Bute then spoke with all the members of the

parla ensuite à tous les membres du conseil, et je sais que le roy en fit demander quelques uns dans son cabinet; si j'avois le tems de vous dire, M, toutes mes operations pendant cet intervalle, V. E. verroit que je ne me suis certainement pas endormi, et que si je n'ai pas porté les choses au point que j'aurois souhaité, ce n'a pas été manque de soins. Enfin après plusieurs conseils, Milord

61

Egremont m'a envoié hier au soir la lettre ci jointe qu'il écrit à M. le Comte de Choiseul en réponse à la sienne du 21. Juillet échu avec une copie que j'avois ici pour V. E. et celle que ce lord m'a écrit en meme tems, que je vous remets en original pour être communiquée à Messrs de Choiseul, et des passeports pour le ministre de France, qui viendra ici, que V. E. aura la bonté de lui remettre lorsqu'il sera nommé, afin de gagner tout le tems possible, si S. M. T. C. se determine pour la nomination et l'envoi des ministres respectifs. Dans ce cas je pense que le plutot qu'on le déclarera et les fera partir ne sera que le mieux.....

[Translation]

council, and I know that the king had some of them called into his cabinet. If I had the time to tell you, Monsieur, all my activities during this interval, Your Excellency would see that I certainly was not asleep, and that if I have not brought things to the point I would have desired, it has not been for want of pains.

Finally after several councils, My Lord Egremont sent me yesterday evening the annexed letter which he wrote to M. le Comte de Choiseul in answer to his of July 21 last, with a copy which I had made here for Your Excellency, as well as the letter that lord wrote me at the same time of which I send you the original to be communicated to Messieurs de Choiseul; also there were passports for the minister of France who is to come here, which Your Excellency will have the goodness to send him when he is named, in order to gain all the time possible, if His Most Christian Majesty decides the respective ministers are to be named and sent. In that event I think the sooner they are declared and sent off the better.....

OSSUN TO CHOISEUL, August 2, 1762

[A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 537:41]

A ST ILDÉPHONSE le 2e Août 1762.

Rep. le 17.

MONSIEUR,

.....
5....

M. Wall, Monsieur, adresse aujourd'hui à M. le Marquis de Grimaldi les dernières instructions pour parvenir à ce grand ouvrage. Le ministre a bien voulu m'en faire la lecture ce matin.....

.....
6v....

5. Le Roy d'Espagne demande d'intervenir, comme partie contractante, à la fixation des limites du pays cédé aux Anglois par la France, sous la dénomination générale du Canada. Mais ce monarque, ainsi qu'il le déclare, paroît absolument déterminé à ne pas consentir que ces limites s'étendent jusqu'à la mer qui

[*Translation*]

SAN ILDEFONSO, August 2, 1762

Answered the 17th

MONSIEUR:

.....

M. Wall, Monsieur, addresses today to M. le Marquis de Grimaldi the final instructions for achieving this great undertaking. The minister was good enough to read them to me this morning.....

.....

5. The King of Spain demands to intervene, as a contracting party, in the settlement of the boundaries of the countries ceded to the English by the French under the general designation of Canada. But this monarch, as he declares, appears absolutely determined not to consent that these boundaries should extend

forme le Golphe du Mexique:¹ Et cette opposition est fondée bien moins sur la crainte que les Anglois ne pussent établir des ports

7

sur la côte dont il s'agit, que pour ne pas leur donner un prétexte légitime de naviguer avec des petits bâtimens dans le golphe, et de faire la contrebande au Mexique. En effet, Monsieur, dans l'état actuel des choses, tout bâtiment Anglois, grand ou petit; qui est recontré par les gardes-côtes Espagnols plus avant dans le golphe que la cap formé par la presqu'isle de la Floride, est arrêté et légitimement confisqué, parceque les Anglois ne peuvent avoir d'autre objet legitime à remplir dans cette partie là que celui d'emboucher le canal de Bahama, mais s'ils possédoient les côtes

7v

de la mobile, l'Espagne ne pouroit plus les empêcher de naviguer dans cette partie du golphe, et par conséquent de faire la contrebande à leur gré. D'ailleurs Sa Majesté Cathe a pensé que l'Angleterre ne pouvoit pas exiger, en se faisant céder le Canada,

[*Translation*]

as far as the sea which forms the Gulf of Mexico.¹ This opposition is based much less upon the fear that the English may establish ports on the coast in question, than upon not giving them a legitimate excuse for navigating with small vessels in the gulf, and carrying on contraband trade with Mexico. In truth, Monsieur, as things actually are, every English vessel great or small caught by the Spanish coast guards farther in the gulf than the cape of the Florida peninsula is seized and rightfully confiscated. For the English can have no other legitimate object in that region except entering the Bahama Channel; but if they possess the coast of Mobile, Spain can no longer prevent them from navigating that part of the gulf and consequently from carrying on contraband trade at their free will.

Moreover His Catholic Majesty has considered that England cannot demand, in exacting the cession of Canada, a country

¹ Spain was still determined to veto any French cession to England that would bring that power near the gulf.

un terrain qui a toujours dependu de la Louisianne. Mais je sais que M. le Mis de Grimaldi est chargé de proposer un arrangement auquel il paroît que les Anglois ne sauroient se refuser s'ils désirent veritablement que la paix soit durable, et qu'ils n'ayent

8

point des vuës cachées nuisibles aux interêts de l'Espagne. Cette couronne n'a jamais reconnu la légitimité de l'établissement des françois à la Louisianne, ni de celui des Anglois dans la Géorgie. Or Sa Majesté Catholique est inclinée à reconnoître la légitimité de ces deux possessions, à condition que les limites en seroit invariablement fixées entre les trois couronnes, et qu'il sera tiré une ligne de démarcation de l'extrémité occidentale de la Géorgie jusqu'au fleuve du Mississipi, laquelle servira de limites au Canada, ensorte que le terrain compris entre cette ligne, la Floride

8v

Espagnole, le fleuve du Mississipi, et la mer, demeurera neutre et au pouvoir des nations sauvages qui l'habitent, sans qu'il soit permis aux françois ni aux Anglois de s'y établir. Il est certain, Monsieur, que si ces derniers n'ont point des vuës cachées, et

[*Translation*]

which has always been a dependency of Louisiana. But I know that M. le Marquis de Grimaldi is entrusted with proposing an arrangement which it seems the English cannot refuse if they really desire the peace to be lasting, and have not hidden designs harmful to the interests of Spain. That crown has never recognized the legitimacy of the French settlement in Louisiana, nor the English settlement in Georgia. Now His Catholic Majesty is inclined to recognize the legitimacy of those two possessions, on condition that the boundaries be definitively settled between the three crowns; a line of demarcation is to be drawn from the western end of Georgia as far as the Mississippi River, which will serve as the boundary of Canada; the lands included between that line, Spanish Florida, the Mississippi River, and the sea are to remain neutral and under the control of the Indian tribes that inhabit them, with the French and English prohibited from settling there. It is certain, Monsieur, that if the English have not hidden purposes, and sincerely think what they say, that

pensent sincèrement ce qu'ils disent, cet arrangement devra leur convenir, puisqu'il éloignera dans cette contrée tout motif de discussion et par conséquent, de rupture entre les trois couronnes. Au reste, je crois entrevoir que l'Espagne ne cédera jamais sur ce point, si elle n'y est contrainte par la force.

.....

VIRY TO SOLAR, August 4, 1762

[Shelburne MSS., 11:31]

Lettre de M le Comte de Viry, à M. le Bailli de Solar.

LONDRES le 4. Aout 1762.

4

J'ai oublié dans ma dernière expédition de vous dire, Monr, qu'il convient d'ordonner au plenipotentiaires de France qui viendra ici d'insinuer aux ministres de ce pais, que si l'Angleterre n'eut pas d'abord accordé la restitution de la Martinique et de la Guadeloupe, cette négociation ne seroit pas allée en avant; mais

5

se seroit rompue. Cela est absolument nécessaire pour Milord Bute et Milord Egremont, le président du conseil et quelques

[*Translation*]

arrangement should suit them, since it will remove from that region every motive for dispute and consequently for rupture between the three crowns. Finally I think I can see that Spain will never yield on the point unless constrained by force.

.....

Letter of M. le Comte de Viry to M. le Bailli de Solar

LONDON, August 4, 1762

I forgot to tell you in my last dispatch, Monsieur, that it will be well to direct the plenipotentiary of France who will come here to hint to the ministers of this country, that if England at the beginning had not accorded the restitution of Martinique and Guadeloupe, the negotiation would not have advanced, but have been broken off. That is absolutely necessary for My Lord Bute and My Lord Egremont. The president of the council and some

autres ministres de cette cour pensent que si l'on ne s'étoit pas au conseil de Milord Bute en ne faisant pas si vite, qu'on l'avoit tous les efforts qu'on avoit d'abord faits, l'on auroit en se relachant ensuite de la Guadeloupe, ou toute la Louisiane, ou tout au moins

6

la nouvelle Orleans, et Sainte Lucie, dont on regréte beaucoup la cession.

J'espère qu'on tiendra aussi le même lengage au Duc de Bedford.

J'ai l'honneur d'être

INSTRUCTIONS OF NIVERNOIS¹

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 447:13]

2. 7bre 1762. A VERSAILLES.

.....
30....

Arte 6.

Cet article est parfaitement éclairci par la notte et la carte envoyées à Londres, et l'on ne comprend pas en quoi consiste l'obscurité que semble y remarquer Myd Egremont dans sa lettre

[*Translation*]

of the other ministers of this court think that if the advice of My Lord Bute had not been followed in going so fast, they would at length by giving up Guadeloupe have had, either all Louisiana, or at least New Orleans and St. Lucia, the cession of which is much regretted.

I hope the same language will be used to the Duc de Bedford.

I have the honor to be

VERSAILLES, September 2, 1762

.....
Article 6

This article is fully clarified by the note and map sent to London; it is not understood in what consists the obscurity which My Lord Egremont seems to perceive in his letter of July 31 to

¹ For Nivernois, see *ante*, cxlix-cl.

du 31. Juillet à M le Cte de Viry, puisqu'il est visible, par cette carte et par la ligne de démarcation, que la France ne conserve aucun territoire sur la rive gauche du Mississipi, à l'exception de la nouvelle Orleans et de l'isle où elle est située.

Quant à l'observation que fait ce ministre sur la navigation abandonnée aux Anglois suivant la ligne de démarcation qui passe
30v

par la Rivière Iberville et les Lacs Maurepas et Pontchartrain, elle est plus raisonnable, et la France n'a jamais prétendu offrir un moyen de navigation qui seroit illusoire; Mais suivant les memoires qu'on a de cette colonie il paroît que cette navigation est praticable, quoique moins commode que celle qui traverse la nouvelle Orleans. L'on pourroit donc convenir avec la cour de Londres que si la navigation proposée se trouvoit impossible, les Anglois auroient la liberté de suivre le cours du Mississipi jusqu'à la mer, mais sans aucune propriété ni possession de territoire et en s'assujettissant à la visite pour éviter la contrebande, et à payer les droits imposés sur les bâtimens et les marchandises.

[*Translation*]

M. le Comte de Viry, inasmuch as it is evident by this map and by the line of demarcation that France retains no territory on the left bank of the Mississippi save New Orleans and the isle on which it is situated.

As to the observation of that minister as to the navigation surrendered to the English along the line of demarcation which passes by the river Iberville and Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain, it is more reasonable; and France has never pretended to offer a means of navigation that would prove illusory. But according to the memoirs from that colony, it appears that the navigation in question is practicable, though less convenient than that by New Orleans. We may then agree with the court of London that if the navigation proposed proves to be impossible, the English may have the liberty of following the course of the Mississippi to the sea, but with no propriety or possession of territory, and being subject to search for avoiding contraband trade, and to paying the set duties on vessels and goods.

Le plenipre du roi fera observer au ministère anglois, pour l'interêt meme de cette nation et pour éviter par la suite tout sujet de contestation, qu'il seroit prudent d'éviter cette navigation com-

31

mune qui ne pourroit manquer tôt ou tard de troubler la paix et la bonne intelligence entre les deux cours.

Il se rencontre, sur cet article un obstacle bien plus difficile à surmonter; c'est l'opposition formelle que met la cour de Madrid à la cession de cette partie de la Louisiane. Elle regarde l'établissement des anglois dans le Golphe du Mexique comme infiniment désavantageux pour elle par la facilité qu'ils auroient de faire la contrebande dans ses possessions. L'Espagne a déclaré qu'elle ne consentiroit jamais que les anglois fissent cette acquisition; Elle fait valoir les droits qu'elle a sur la Louisiane et auxquels elle n'a jamais renoncé; et elle avance que les anglois n'ont jamais eû la liberté de naviguer dans le Golphe du Mexique, et qu'elle est dans la possession d'y confisquer tous leurs batimens.

[*Translation*]

The king's plenipotentiary will make the English ministry observe, that for that nation's own interest, and to avoid for the future all subjects of dispute, it will be prudent to avoid such a common navigation which cannot fail sooner or later to disturb the peace and good understanding between the two courts.

That article meets with an obstacle much more difficult to surmount, namely the explicit opposition which the court of Madrid offers to the cession of that part of Louisiana. That court regards the establishment of the English in the Gulf of Mexico as infinitely disadvantageous for it, in view of the facilities for contraband trade to its possessions which the English would have. Spain has declared that she would never consent to the English acquisition of it. She sets forth the rights which she has over Louisiana and which she has never renounced; and she declares that the English have never had the right of navigating the Gulf of Mexico, and that she is entitled to confiscate all their vessels.

31v

Il ne faut pas se dissimuler la difficulté d'arranger cet article, puisque, d'un coté, les anglois en font dépendre la conclusion de la paix et que, de l'autre, la cour de Madrid y met un opposition formelle.

On peut objecter aux Anglois que la france ne peut céder que ce qui lui appartient, et que sans reconnoître les prétentions de l'Espagne sur la Louisiane, qui ne peuvent jamais etre admises, le roi peut bien abandonner un territoire dont il est en possession, mais qu'il ne sauroit transmettre aux anglois un droit de navigation dans le Golphe du Mexique, qui est contraire aux droits d'un tiers et aux usages observés jusqu'a ce jour. Enfin, que le roi peut bien céder sa souveraineté sur le Continent, mais qu'il ne peut rien innover dans la navigation sans le consentement de l'Espagne; d'ou il s'ensuivroit que les anglois ayant acquis le port de la Mobile et une partie de côte dans le Golphe du Mexique

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ne pourroient y aborder par la mer, ce qui leur rendroit cette possession inutile.

[Translation]

The difficulty of arranging this article cannot be concealed, inasmuch on the one side the English make the conclusion of the peace depend on it, and the other the court of Madrid expressly opposes it.

We may offer the objection to the English that France can only cede what she has; and that, without recognizing the claims of Spain over Louisiana, which we can never admit, the king may well abandon a territory in his possession; but he cannot turn over to the English a right of navigating the Gulf of Mexico which is contrary to the rights of a third party and to the custom observed up to the present time. Finally the king may cede his sovereignty on the Continent, but he can make no change in the navigation without Spain's assent, from which it follows that the English, even having acquired the port of Mobile and a part of the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, could not approach it by sea, which would render that possession useless to them.

Voilà tout ce qu'on peut imaginer pour se tirer d'un pas aussi glissant; Mais on espère que l'évènement de la havane, quelque'il soit, pourra fournir une solution à cet article, la cour de Madrid devant être beaucoup plus facile, si elle a le malheur de perdre une colonie si importante, et les anglois devant être moins impérieux, s'ils échouent dans cette entreprise. [*in margin*: au surplus cet arte devant être traité conjointement avec l'Espe le plénipotentiaire du roy doit en renvoyer la discussion à Vlls et se contente de le traiter par forme de conversation avec les ministres anglois, afin de pénétrer leurs vües et de sonder leur dispositions à cet égard; mais il ne doit pas leur cacher nôtre embarras, les objections et les prétentions de l'Espe.]

Arte 7.

.....

[*Translation*]

That is all that can be devised toward extricating ourselves with sufficient caution. But it is to be hoped that the outcome at Havana, whatever it may be, may afford a solution to the article. The court of Madrid should be much more pliable if it has the misfortune to lose so important a colony; and the English should be less imperious if they fail in the enterprise. [*in margin*: Moreover that article should be treated conjointly with Spain, and the king's plenipotentiary should transfer the discussion of it to Versailles, contenting himself with treating it in conversation with the English ministers, with a view to penetrating their intentions and fathoming their ideas on it; but he should not conceal from them our embarrassment or the objections and claims of Spain.]

Article 7

.....

BEDFORD'S INSTRUCTIONS, September 4, 1762

[S P France, 253]

.....

The clear sense of the sixth Article may be most easily ascertained, by proper explanatory References to the Map proposed to be annexed to the Preliminaries, which will fix the Limits between the Two Crowns, in North America, beyond Dispute; Our Will and Pleasure therefore is, that you be most particularly careful to see, that the Coloured Line, which is to mark the Boundary between the Two Nations, be drawn from the Source of the Mississippi to the Sea, dividing That River longitudinally, in equal Parts from It's Source to the River Iberville, from the branching of which Last from the Mississippi, the said Line of Limits is to be continued, dividing in the same manner, the River Iberville, and the Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain, to the Sea; and the Navigation, as far as the said coloured Line extends, is to be in common to Both Nations; but should that part of the Navigation, which extends from the Separation of the Mississippi and the Iberville thro' the above Lakes to the Sea, prove either impracticable, or insufficient to answer the Ends of Commerce by being navigable only at certain times, or for Vessels of too small size for the purposes of Trade, in That case Our Subjects are to have a Right to use the same Navigation, from the Separation of the Mississippi from the Iberville to the Sea which the subjects of France generally practice. And whereas the great object we propose by the Limits above described, besides the Acquisition of an extended Territory, is the establishing a certain, fixed Boundary between our Dominions in North America, and Those of the Most Christian King, which may ascertain beyond all possibility of doubt, the respective property of the Two Crowns in that part of the World, and which may, by that means, remove forever the source of those unhappy Disputes, which always arise from an equivocal and unsettled Frontier, and from which the Miseries and Calamities of the present war have sprung: Our Will and Pleasure is, that you do exert your utmost Attention with regard to this Article, which is to be treated in such clear and explicit Terms, as shall render it incapable of any Mis-

construction, and as shall for the future, remove even a Pretence, on the part of France, to claim, either as part of Louisiana, or under any other Denomination whatsoever, any Thing in North America, to the East, or on the Left, of the Mississippi, from the source of the said River till the branching of the River Iberville out of the Mississippi, nor from thence to the North, or Left of the River Iberville, thro' the Lakes of Maurepas and Pontchartrain, to the sea, by which Line of Demarcation, New Orleans, and the Island, on which It is situated on the annexed Map,¹ will remain to France.

SOLAR TO VIRY, September 5, 1762

[Shelburne MSS., 11:303]

Lettre de M. le Bailli de Solar, à M. le Comte de Viry.
le 5 Sepr 1762. A PARIS.

306....

Je vous ai déjà mandé que la cour de Vienne a fait et fait encore tous ses efforts pour faire un traité avec l'Espagne et s'associer au Pacte de Famille, ce qui auroit eu lieu, si cette cour-ci y avoit donné les mains; et il n'est pas douteux que les cours de Vienne et de Madrid sont d'intelligence et continuent de négocier ensemble M. Grimaldi et M. de Starhemberg, son très étroitement unis,

[*Translation*]

Letter of M. le Bailli de Solar to M. le Comte de Viry
September 5, 1762, PARIS

I have already informed you that the court of Vienna has made and is still making all possible efforts to make a treaty with Spain and to join the Family Compact, which would have taken place if this court had been assisting to it. It is not doubtful that the courts of Vienna and Madrid have an understanding and continue to negotiate with each other. M. Grimaldi and M. de Starhemberg are closely united, and the latter profits from the

¹ This is a small printed map, 7 by 10 inches: "The Course of Mississippi River from Bayagoulas to the Sea." There are no lines on it.

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et ce dernier fait profiter du caractère intrigant du premier, de son indiscretion et de son bavardage insupportable. Je m'imagine que M. le Duc de Bedford sera prévenu sur cet article pour se tenir sur ses gardes vis-a-vis de ces deux ambassadeurs et ne pas se laisser pénétrer. Je crains au reste qu'il ne s'impatiente avec M. de Grimaldi, qui est un homme insupportable, qui mettra des entraves dans une négociation qui devrait être terminée dans une conférence, à moins que la Havane ne soit prise, et quand elle le seroit, il y auroit aussi moïen de s'arranger dès que l'on voudra s'y prêter des cotés avec honnetété et franchise. Il faut compter qu'un objet qui sera très délicat vis-a-vis de l'Espagne, est celui

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de la Mobile, car M. Grimaldi ne s'en doute point, et il m'a dit que l'Espagne feroit plutôt la guerre toute seule, que de souffrir que les anglois aient cet établissement, de façon que pour moi il me semble qu'il faudroit faciliter les objets peu importans de discussion avec l'Espagne, pour signer les préliminaires, et lorsqu'on sera à l'exécution du traité, la France remettra les

[Translation]

intriguing character of the former, as well as from his indiscretion and his insufferable bluster. I imagine that M. le Duc de Bedford will be forewarned on this point, to be on his guard with the two ambassadors, and not to let them penetrate him. Further I am afraid he will lose his temper with M. de Grimaldi, who is an insufferable man, who will put hindrances in a negotiation that should be ended by one conference, at least if Havana is not taken; and if it were, it would be easy to arrange that matter too if on both sides it were approached with honesty and frankness.

It will be necessary to bear in mind that a very delicate question with respect to Spain, is that of Mobile; for M. Grimaldi does not doubt, and has told me, that Spain would rather continue the war alone than suffer the English to have that establishment; thus it seems to me that it will be necessary to be facile on unimportant matters of dispute with Spain in order to get the preliminaries signed. When it comes to the execution of the

limites selon qu'elles sont convenües, et pourra se tirer d'affaire avec l'Espagne en disant qu'il y a eut de la méprise au sujet des susdtes limites, parce que lorsqu'une fois les Anglois en seront en possession, l'Espagne ne fera plus la guerre pour les en chasser.

NIVERNOIS TO COMTE DE CHOISEUL, September 9, 1762

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 447:69]

No 4.

Repdu le 14

CALAIS de 9 7bre 1762.

Comme j'ai été obligé, Monsieur, de débarquer ce matin, le vent étant tout à fait contraire et menaçant de durer quelques jours, à ce que disent les marins, je prévois que mon arrivée à Londres sera retardée, et j'ai jugé en conséquence qu'il pourroit vous être utile que j'eusse l'honneur de vous envoyer quelques observations d'après les discours que m'a tenus M. le Duc de Bedford¹ sur les points principaux....

[*Translation*]

treaty, France will accord the boundaries as agreed, and can get out of difficulty with Spain by saying there was a mistake on the boundaries in question; for once the English are in possession, Spain will not continue the war to expel them.

No. 4

Answered the 14th

CALAIS, September 9, 1762

As I was obliged, Monsieur, to go on shore again this morning, since the wind was quite contrary, and threatens to continue so for some days according to what the sailors say, I foresee that my arrival at London will be delayed. I have consequently judged it might be useful to you, if I had the honor to send you some observations on the language of M. le Duc de Bedford¹ to me on the chief points in question....

¹ Bedford and Nivernois had met at Calais on their way to their respective posts.

.....
70v

Observations sur les limites de la Louisiane.

1. L'Angleterre a accepté notre ligne de démarcation par la Rivière Iberville et les lacs, supposé que la navigation fut praticable on peut assurer qu'elle l'est quoiqu'un peu moins bonne que celle du fleuve qui elle même ne vaut guères. aujourdui le plénipotentiaire Anglois demande la navigation par le fleuve et passant sous la nouvelle Orléans qui nous restera en propriété. Si on accorderoit ce point n'y auroit-il pas à craindre que la nouvelle Orléans se trouvat quelque jour investie de toutes parts, les Anglois étant maitres de toute la rive gauche du fleuve jusqu'à l'embouchure et pouvant y établir des batteries au dessus et au dessous de la nouvelle Orléans pour empêcher que nous n'y portassions des secours, tandis qu'avec une armée de terre ils l'attaqueroient et la bloqueroient de front d'un autre côté Si les Anglois en recevant de nous la liberté de la navigation entière du fleuve, se départoient de la ligne de démarcation convenue et trouvoient bon qu'il en fut tracée une autre, laquelle laisseroit en notre propriété le port de

[*Translation*]

.....
Observations on the boundaries of Louisiana:

1. England has accepted our line of demarcation by the river Iberville and the lakes supposing the navigation practicable. We may be assured that it is, though a little worse than that of the river which itself is worth little. Today the English pleni-potentiary demands the navigation by the river, past New Orleans, which will remain ours. If this is allowed, would there not be reason to fear that some day New Orleans would be invested from all sides, since the English are masters of the left bank to the mouth, and may set up batteries above and below New Orleans to prevent our reënforcing it, while they attack it with a land force, and blockade it in front from the other side? If the English, receiving from us the freedom of the navigation of the entire river, gave up the line of demarcation agreed on, and assented to another drawn to leave us the possession of the port

[*blank in MS.*] soit pour nous rester, soit pour être cédé à l'Espagne au moyen de quelque équivalent, notre condition ne seroit-elle pas meilleure? C'est un grand problème à resoudre; et même pour l'éclaircir seulement je n'ay ni les lumières ni les matériaux nécessaires et je me contente de l'indiquer.

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2. La libre navigation, soit par le fleuve, soit par les lacs, entraînant la liberté de la navigation dans le golfe ne sera pas aisément consentie par l'Espagne. Si nous sommes obligés de passer par dessus la repugnance de l'Espagne, il faudroit du moins éviter de garantir la cession du port de [*blank in MS.*] Si nous préférons le parti de consentir à la comune navigation du golfe jusqu'à son embouchure, il me semble que nous pourrions dire à l'Espagne avec beaucoup de fondement qu'un tiers ne sauroit prétendre qu'un fleuve dont les rives sont partagées entre deux puissances qu'il sépare ne soit pas également à l'usage des deux riverains, qu'il n'y a à cet égard que deux partis à prendre; l'un de convenir qu'aucune des deux nations riveraines n'auroit l'usage du fleuve, L'autre que les deux nations en jouiront également.

[*Translation*]

of [*blank in MS.*], either to remain ours or to be ceded to Spain for some equivalent, would not our position be better? It is a weighty problem to solve; I have neither the lights or the materials even to clarify it, and I content myself with pointing it out.

2. The free navigation, either by the river or the lakes, implying the freedom of navigation in the gulf, will not be easily accorded by Spain. If we were compelled to override Spain's opposition, at the least it would be necessary to avoid guaranteeing the cession of the Port of [*blank in MS.*]. If we preferred the course of agreeing to a common navigation of the gulf to its mouth, it seems to me that we could tell Spain with much force, that a third power could not claim that a river whose banks were divided between two powers whom it separated was not for the joint use of the two sovereigns; that in this respect there were but two courses to take. One would be to agree that neither of the two nations on the river should have the use of it; the other would be that the two nations should enjoy it equally. Since the

La lere de ces deux propositions n'étant faisable en aucune manière, il en resulte qu'il est indispensable d'accepter la seconde, qui d'ailleurs est conforme à l'usage immémorial et universel chés toutes les nations. Le Rhin et le Pô en Europe en sont des exemples sensibles.

3. L'entreprise de la Havane réussie ou manquée fournira peut-être à la France des armes soit vis-à-vis de l'Espagne, soit vis-à-vis de l'Angleterre par raport à cet article de la navigation du golfe.

.....

SOLAR TO VIRY, September 12, 1762

[Shelburne MSS., 11:361]

Lettre de M. le Bailli de Solar à M. le Comte de Viry du 12 Septembre 1762.

Mon domestique, Nicolas le Comte arriva ici Jeudi 9. à une heure du matin. Il m'a remis le paquet dont vous l'avez chargé. J'ai trouvé toutes les lettres et pieces marquées dans la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 4. pour m'en donner

[*Translation*]

first of these propositions is no ways feasible, the second must consequently be adopted, since furthermore it conforms to immemorial usage among all nations. The Rhine and the Po in Europe are plain examples.

3. The expedition against Havana, whether it has succeeded or failed, will perhaps furnish France with arms against Spain or England respecting the question of the navigation of the gulf.

.....

Letter of M. le Bailli de Solar to M. le Comte de Viry, September 12, 1762

My servant, Nicolas le Comte, arrived here Thursday the ninth at one in the morning. He brought the packet you entrusted to him. I found all the letters and documents indicated in the letter which you did me the honor to write me the fourth to give me an account of them. M. le Duc de

avis et l'état. Monsieur le Duc de Bedford est arrivé aujourd'hui à Paris sur les deux heures de l'après midi. Je compte de l'aller voir à quatre heures et demie. Je dois vous confier, M. que

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l'unique article délicat, que l'on espère cependant de pouvoir arranger avec M. de Bedford, est celui des limites de la Louisiane. Vous savez que la note secrète qui y a rapport, n'a point été communiquée à l'Espagne, qui sur cet article ne seroit point traitable par la raison qu'elle prétend, que même par les traités les Anglois sont exclus de pouvoir naviguer dans le Golphe du Mexique. Or si les limites que la France accorde pouvoient leur fournir un prétexte d'y entrer, ce seroit au détriment de l'Espagne, parce que cela faciliteroit aux Anglois le moyen de faire la contrebande, est c'est ce que la France ne sauroit accorder :

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on veut bien tenir ici exactement ce que l'on a promis sans faire réflexion à cet inconvénient ; mais Messrs de Choiseul disent qu'en accordant l'étendue des limites que l'Angle a désirée, on a toujours entendu de parler du cours du fleuve de Mississippi dès

[*Translation*]

Bedford arrived at Paris today at two in the afternoon. I expect to go to see him at half past four. I should confide to you, Monsieur, that the only delicate article, which it is nevertheless hoped can be arranged with M. de Bedford is that respecting the boundaries of Louisiana. You know that the secret note in reference to it has not been communicated to Spain, who will be untractable on that article because she claims that by the treaties themselves the English are excluded from the right of navigation in the Gulf of Mexico. Now if the boundaries which France accords may give them a pretext for entering the gulf, it would be to Spain's detriment, since it would give the English an easy opportunity of carrying on contraband trade ; and that France could not accord. Here they wish to hold scrupulously to what they have promised without regard to this difficulty. But Messieurs de Choiseul say that when they accorded the extended boundaries that England wished, they always intended the course

sa source jusqu'à la mer, et de la libre navigation de ce fleuve en suivant ses rives, mais non pas d'y venir par le côté de la mer, puisque la France ne pourroit pas céder aux Anglois un droit qu'ils n'ont point, et que l'Espagne a toujours disputé à toutes les nations, et aux François mêmes. Voilà l'unique entrave que je

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vois à la signature des préliminaires et que je vous confie. Il est sûr que si les Anglois sont de bonne foy, et n'ont point eû intention en exigeant ces limites de favoriser à leur contrabande, ce que l'on ne doit pas supposer, cet article pourra être éclairci et réglé d'une façon convenable.

[*Translation*]

of the Mississippi River from its source down to the sea, and the free navigation of the river along its banks; but they did not include the right of approaching it from the sea, since the French could not cede the English a right that they themselves have not, and that Spain has ever disputed to all the nations, even to the French themselves. This is the only hindrance I see to the signature of the preliminaries, and I confide it to you. Certainly if the English are acting in good faith, and had no intention, when they asked these boundaries, of favoring their contraband trade, which ought not to be supposed, the article may be cleared up and settled in proper fashion.

SOLAR TO VIRY, September 14, 1762

[Shelburne MSS., 11:366]

Autre lettre de M. le Bailli de Solar, à M. le Comte de Viry 14. Sepbre 1762.

.....
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Mon voiage à Versailles a été ce jour là plus necessaire que M. de Grimaldi y etoit aussi venu pour conférer avec M. le Duc de Choiseul, qui fut très mécontent des extravagances et des mauvaises dispositions personnelles de cet ambassadeur, et comme j'attendis qu'il fut sorti pour voir Mrs de Choiseul, je leur prouvai évidemment qu'ils devoient dorneavant tabler sur ce que le Roy Cat. leur avoit mandé, sans s'embarrasser de M. de Grimaldi, et

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que lorsque M. de Bedford et eux auroient arrangé convenablement les points qui ont rapport à l'Espagne, le Roy T. C. est en droit d'exiger que le susdit ambr les signe sans faire de difficultés ulterieures et captieuses.

Je les ai convaincu qu'ils n'ont pas d'autre parti à prendre,

[Translation]

Second letter of M. le Bailli de Solar to M. le Comte de Viry, September 14, 1762

.....
My journey to Versailles today was the more necessary, since M. de Grimaldi had come thither to confer with M. le Duc de Choiseul, who was much displeased with the exaggerations and personal spites of that ambassador. I waited until he had left before seeing Messieurs de Choiseul; and I clearly demonstrated to them that they should thereafter base their action on what the Catholic King had told them, without embarrassing themselves with M. de Grimaldi; further that when M. de Bedford and they had come to an agreement on the points regarding Spain, the Most Christian King has the right to require the ambassador in question to sign without raising further captious objections.

I convinced them that they had no other course open to them, if they wished to conclude the business. There is only one article

s ils veulent finir, et il n'y a qu'un article qui les gene, qui est celui des limites et de la navigation dans le Golphe du Mexique. Il faudra voir si avec M. de Bedford ils pourront trouver un moien d'explication qui sauve ici le ministère contre les craintes de l'Espagne, qui, comme vous savez, ignore l'étendue de cet

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article. M. de Duc de Bedford est arrivé ici Dimanche apres midi.

.....

[*Translation*]

which perplexes them, which is that of the boundary and the navigation of the Gulf of Mexico. It will be necessary to see if with M. de Bedford they can find a formula which will put the ministry here out of fear of Spain, which as you know is not informed of the extent of that article. M. le Duc de Bedford arrived here Sunday afternoon.

.....

CHAPTER XV

NEGOTIATION OF BEDFORD AND NIVERNOIS, SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER, 1762

NIVERNOIS TO COMTE DE CHOISEUL, September 16, 1762
[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 447:83]

No 7.

Repdu le 22

A LONDRES le 16. 7bre 1762.

MONSIEUR

Hier, avant que j'allasse à l'audience du roy, M. Bute vint chez moi et me parla avec toutes les marques possibles de confiance sur la situation présente des affaires et des esprits dans ce pays cy; d'où il conclut deux choses: la nécessité de signer promptement et l'impossibilité d'aucune condescendance de ce coté cy sur le 6e article. Le ministère Anglois régarde cet article comme son bouclier vis à vis du Parlement prochain; et, en effet, il est remarquable que dans la foule d'écrits scandaleux contre la paix et ceux qui la font, dont Londres est inondé, et où presque tous

[*Translation*]

No. 7

Answered the 22nd

LONDON, September 16, 1762

MONSIEUR:

Yesterday before I went to my audience with the king, M. Bute came to me, and spoke to me with all possible marks of trust, on the present situation of affairs, and of men's minds in this country. From it all he drew two conclusions, the necessity of signing promptly and the impossibility of any yielding on their side on the sixth article. The English ministry regards that article as its buckler in the next Parliament. Actually it is worthy remark that in the rush of scandalous publications now flooding London against the peace and those who are making it, in

nos articles sont déchirés, celui là seul est passé sous silence. on pourroit croire que c'est qu'il est ignoré, mais vous pouvez compter qu'il est sçu de beaucoup de gens et spécialement des

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chefs du parti factieux. ainsi il est juste de croire que ce qui fait qu'on n'en parle pas, c'est qu'on sçait que cet article plaira à la nation et fera honneur au ministere. c'est même peut être aussi cette considération qui a porté le ministère et ses amis à ne pas faire un secret impénétrable de cet article, quoi qu'à vrai dire la constitution de ce pays-cy suffise pour expliquer comment on n'y peut faire mystère de rien. je répondis à M. Bute qu'à l'égard de la célérité qu'il souhaitoit dans la conclusion, il pouvoit s'assurer que personne ne la désiroit plusque Mrs de Choiseul et moy, et qu'à l'égard de la discussion du 6e article, je n'avois nulle envie de m'en mesler; n'étant, grace à Dieu, chargé que des affaires et des interets de la france, qui n'a nulle envie ni nul intérêt de revenir personnellement sur cet article; qu'il pouvoit se souvenir que quand il m'en avoit parlé dans la conversation

[*Translation*]

which almost all our articles are torn to pieces, that one article is passed by in silence. It might be supposed that this is because the article is not known, but you may be sure it is known to many people, especially to the leaders of the factious party. Accordingly it may fairly be thought that the article is not spoken of, because it is known that it will please the nation and reflect credit on the ministry. It may even be that consideration which has induced the ministry and its friends not to make an impenetrable secret of that article, although the constitution of this country suffices to explain how here nothing can remain a mystery.

I replied to M. Bute that with respect to the speed which he desired in concluding the matter, he might rest assured that no one wished it more than Messieurs de Choiseul and I. As to the discussion of the sixth article, I had no desire to engage in it, being, I thanked God, charged only with the affairs and interests of France, who for herself has no desire or interest to retract on that article. He might remember that when he had spoken of

où nous avions passé tous les objets en revue, je n'avois débattu le pour et le contre de celui là que pour le mettre bien au fait des épines qui peuvent s'y rencontrer de la part de l'Espagne, de l'importance qu'elle y met aussi bien que du peu d'importance

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dont il est en soy pour la France et pour l'Angleterre; et enfin pour le mettre en état d'aviser à quelque expédient là dessus, dans la seule vûe d'opérer cette célérité désirée à Versailles et nécessaire à Londres; qu'ainsi c'étoit à M le Duc de Bedford à discuter ce point avec M le Duc de Choiseul et avec M. de Grimaldi par la direction du Duc de Choiseul, dont il feroit bien de ne pas s'écarter un moment. Il convint que j'avois raison, me dit qu'en écrivant aujourd'hui au Duc de Bedford, on lui parleroit en conformité de mes conseils, et il me quitta après avoir fait un tableau frappant, mais non exagéré de la persecution qu'il éprouve et qu'il attend. je lui offris de charger mon courier de ses dépêches, et je crois qu'on me les enverra.

[Translation]

it to me in the conversation in which we had passed in review the different issues, I had debated the pros and cons of that question, only to let him be aware of the pricks which he must expect from Spain, of the account she made of it, as well as of the unimportance of the matter to France and England; and, finally to enable him to consider of some expedient, with the sole end of securing that rapidity desired at Versailles and necessary at London. It was for M. le Duc de Bedford to discuss the point with M. le Duc de Choiseul and with M. de Grimaldi, under the Duc de Choiseul's guidance, from whom the Duc de Bedford would do well not to separate himself for a moment.

He agreed that I was right, told me that in writing to the Duc de Bedford that day, they directed him in accord with my advice, and he left me after having drawn for me, a moving, but not an exaggerated picture of the persecution which he suffers and yet expects. I offered to entrust his dispatches to my courier, and I think he will send them to me.

COMTE DE CHOISEUL TO NIVERNOIS, September 19, 1762

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 447:92]

1re 1re

No 2.

A VILLES le 19. 7bre 1762

par le courier Kübler

J'ai diféré, M., l'envoy de ce courier pour être en état de vous rendre compte des différentes conferences que nous avons eües avec M. le Duc de Bedford.....

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Enfin il a fallu fondre la cloche sur l'arte 6. nous avons précédement sondé les dispositions de M. le duc de Bedford et nous l'avions trouvé inaccessible à tous moyens de conciliation. il s'étoit cependant occupé d'en trouver, et il croyoit avoir réussi en nous proposant d'insérer quelque clause sur la navigation du Golphe pour tranquilliser l'espe sur la contrebande, à condition que cette clause seroit commune aux deux nations frçoise et angloise. nous lui avons objecté que n'ayant aucune communica-

[Translation]

First letter

No. 2.

VERSAILLES, September 19, 1762

By the courier Kübler

I have, Monsieur, deferred sending you this courier in order to be in a position to give you an account of the various conferences we have had with M. le Duc de Bedford.....

At length it was necessary to cast article 6. We had previously sounded the disposition of M. le Duc de Bedford and had found him unreceptive as to any means of compromise. However, he had endeavored to find one and thought he had succeeded by the proposal that we insert some clause on the navigation of the gulf to quiet Spain as to contraband trade, on condition that the clause apply to both the French and English nations. We objected that since we had no communication with Louisiana by

tion par terre avec la Louisiane et ne pouvant absolument y aborder que par mer, il nous étoit impossible d'accepter cet expédient nous avons donc pris courageusement le parti de discuter cet arte en présence de M. de Grimaldy qui a déclaré qu'il avoit les mains liées par ses instructions et qu'il ne pouvoit y donner son consentement

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tels sont, M., les artes sur lesquels nous nous sommes disputés sans pouvoir nous accorder et en convenant réciproquement d'envoyer des courriers à Madrid et à Londres. c'est avec regret que nous nous sommes vus forcés de recourir à ce moyen dangereux dans les circonstances présentes; mais c'est une ressource nécessaire quand on nest pas d'accord.

Nous nous sommes séparés, Vendredy passé, fort mécontents de nôtre travail. Le lendemain, l'ambr de Sardaigne est venu ici, ayant appris par M. de Bedford l'état où étoient les affaires, et désirant de s'en éclaircir par luy même afin de trouver quelques moyens de nous rapprocher. Nous avons discuté longtems ensemble la matière avec le Duc de Choiseul, et nous espérions d'être

[*Translation*]

land, and were absolutely unable to reach it save by the sea, it was impossible for us to accept that expedient. We then courageously decided to discuss the article in the presence of M. de Grimaldi, who declared that his hands were tied by his instructions and that he could not give his consent.

These, Monsieur, are the articles which we have debated without being able to come to an agreement; deciding mutually to send couriers to Madrid and London. It is with regret that we have seen ourselves forced to have recourse to so dangerous an expedient in the present circumstances; but it is a necessary expedient when it is impossible to agree.

We parted Friday last, very ill-content with our work. Next day the ambassador of Sardinia came here, having learned from M. de Bedford the state of affairs, and desiring light on them himself in order to find some means of bringing us to an accord. We discussed the matter together with the Duc de Choiseul at length, and we hoped we had reached the point of being able to

parvenus au point de pouvoir signer sous deux jours ; vous aurés remarqué, M., dans le détail cy dessus, qu'il n'y a que trois articles qui fassent vraiment de la difficulté ; ces difficultés viennent vinquent de l'Espe ; c'est 1. le renouvellement des traités de commerce entre cette couronne et l'angre 2. La restitution de tout ce qui a été pris sur le portugal sans compensation. et 3. Nôtre arte 6.

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Nous propositions de nouveau à M. de Bedford de passer l'arte des traités de commerce tel que nous l'avions rédigé dans notre seconde conférence avec lui, et nous avions dressé un mémoire pour lui prouver que cette stipulation ne pouvoit le compromettre et n'étoit d'aucune conséquence pour l'angre, nos raisonnemens paroissoient sans répliques, et je ne puis croire que cet arte eût été blâmé à Londres

Pour prix de cette condescendance de la part le M. de Bedford, nous promettons de faire signer à M. de Grimaldy l'arte du Portugal tel qu'il est demandé par l'angre à condition que cette couronne consentiroit à restituer sans compensation toutes

[*Translation*]

sign in two days. You will notice, Monsieur, that there are only three articles which really make difficulty. Those difficulties come solely from Spain. They are:

1. The renewal of the treaties of commerce between that crown and England.
2. The restitution without compensation of everything taken from Portugal.
3. Our article 6.

We again proposed to M. de Bedford to acquiesce in the article on the treaties of commerce as we had framed it in our second conference with him ; and we drew up a memoir to prove to him that the stipulation could not compromise him and was of no consequence whatever to England. Our reasons seemed unanswerable, and I cannot think that the article would have been criticized at London.

As an inducement to such a complaisance on M. de Bedford's part, we promised to get the article of Portugal signed by M. de Grimaldi in the form demanded by England on condition that

les conquêtes qu'elle auroit pû faire dans les autres parties du monde sur l'Espe, et pour engager davantage M. de Grimaldi à signer, nous avons imaginé de ne faire qu'un seul instrument pour les trois cours. M. de Bedford avoit paru goûter cette idée, et je crois que nous la suivrons.

Enfin sur l'arte 6. nous propositions de laisser subsister l'ancien arte pour nous donner le tems de ramener la cour de Madrid, et nous offrions de donner une déclaration secrète conforme à la note, au lieu et dans le cas où le plénipotentiaire anglois auroit jugé que l'ancien arte connu n'étoit pas suffisant pour contenter la nation, et pour soutenir le ministère contre le parti opposé,

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nous avons arrangé un autre arte conçu en termes plus généraux, mais qui devoit contenter l'angre et que nous espérions de faire adopter à M. de Grimaldy.

Vous voyès par là, M., que si M. de Bedford avoit voulu passer l'arte du commerce, nous pouvions terminer cette affaire et signer sous deux jours. L'ambr de Sardaigne, chargé de cette

[*Translation*]

that crown would restore without compensation all the conquests it might have made from Spain in other parts of the world; and the better to induce M. de Grimaldi to sign we had thought to have one treaty only for the three crowns. M. de Bedford appeared to like the idea, and I think we shall follow it.

Finally on article 6 we proposed to substitute the former article to gain time to win over the court of Madrid: and we offered to give a secret declaration conformable to the secret note. In case the English plenipotentiary thought the former ostensible article insufficient to content the nation and to sustain the ministry against the opposition, we had arranged still another article conceived in more general terms, which should satisfy England and which we hoped to get M. de Grimaldi to adopt.

You will see from that, Monsieur, that if M. de Bedford had been willing to acquiesce in the article on commerce, we could have finished the affair and signed in two days. The Sardinian ambassador, employed to this end, has uselessly exerted all his

négociation, a employé inutilement tous ses soins à persuader M. de Bedford, qui a persisté dans son refus, ne se trouvant pas suffisant autorisé par ses instructions, et qui a dit qu'il se croyoit obligé d'envoyer un courier à Londres. vous sentés que, dès lors, M. de Grimaldi ne peut se dispenser d'en envoyer pareillement un à sa cour pour se faire autoriser, non seulement sur les artes en contestation, mais encore sur ceux qu'il avoit pris sur lui.

Voilà, M., où nous en sommes. Votre courier arrive au moment que je finis cette dépêche; je répondray à votre expédition dans une autre lettre, et je vous expliquerai plus en détail les démarches que nous allons faire à Madrid et ce que le service du roy exige de vous à Londres.

[*Translation*]

pains to persuade M. de Bedford, who has persisted in his refusal, thinking himself not being sufficiently authorized by his instructions, and as he said, obliged to send a courier to London. You will perceive that M. de Grimaldi had thereupon similarly to send one to his court for authorization, not only on the articles in dispute but also on those for which he had assumed responsibility.

That, Monsieur, is our situation. Your courier has arrived at the moment I am concluding this dispatch: I will reply to yours in another letter, and will explain in greater detail the steps that we are going to take at Madrid, and those which the king's service requires from you in London.

VIRY TO SOLAR, September 20, 1762

[Shelburne MSS., 11:372]

Lettre de M. le Comte de Viry, à M. le Bailli de Solar,
du 20. Septe 1762. A LONDRES

.....
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Je supplée par des billets à ce que je ne puis aller insinuer en personne, et je profite des visites de mes amis, qui m'obligent de les recevoir pour leur faire toutes les insinuations convenables au bien de l'affaire. Quoique je ne puisse pas espérer seulement de pouvoir faire naître l'idée d'admettre quelque expédient à l'égard de la Mobile, je n'ai pas laissé que de sonder à ce sujet Milord Bute et Milord Egremont, en m'expliquant avec le premier sur le pied que l'amitié qu'il a pour moi me le permet; mais tout ce que j'ai dit et insinué a été, et est inutile, étant impossible au ministère de cacher cet article au Parlement, lors qu'on lui communiquera les préliminaires.

.....

[*Translation*]

Letter from M. le Comte de Viry to M. le Bailli de Solar

September 20, 1762, LONDON

.....
I supply by notes the lack of what I cannot go to insinuate in person, and I profit by the visits of friends who compel me to receive them, to make them all the hints needful for the good of the undertaking. Although I cannot hope to suggest to them the idea of admitting some expedient on Mobile, I have not ceased to sound My Lord Bute and My Lord Egremont on that point, dealing with the former on the footing which his friendship for me permits. But all that I have said and hinted has been and is useless, inasmuch as it is impossible for the ministry to conceal that article from Parliament when the preliminaries are laid before it.

.....

DUC DE CHOISEUL TO OSSUN, September 20, 1762

[A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 537:160]

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L'article 6 qui concerne les limites supposées entre le Canada et la Louïsianna avoit été proposé de notre part ainsi que vous le verrés dans la copie No 2. L'Angleterre dans la négociation n'avoit pas répondu nettement sur cet article, et le Duc de Bedford nous a produit un nouvel article 6 que vous trouveriez sous le No 3. nous lui avons dit que de notre part, nous n'aurions pas de difficulté à passer cet article, parce que certainement, quoi que l'on puisse dire à Madrid, il ne pouvoit arriver aucun tort à l'Espagne de la liberté que la France donneroit de la navigation du Mississippi depuis sa source jusqu' à son embouchure, car, si nous avons bien entendu la vraie difficulté de l'Espagne, c'est que les Anglois viennent du Golphe du Mexique dans la riviere du Mississippi, mais non pas qu'ils viennent du Lac Erié à la nouvelle Orleans, car je doute que l'on puisse faire la contrebande en partant des sources du Mississippi, et quand même les Anglois

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formeroient un des etablissements à la rive gauche de ce fleuve,

[Translation]

Article six concerning the supposed boundary between Canada and Louisiana we offered as you will see in copy No. 2. England in the negotiation did not reply specifically on this article, and the Duke of Bedford has brought out a new article which you will find under No. 3. We told him that on our part we would have no difficulty in allowing that article, for certainly, whatever they may say at Madrid, no harm can be done Spain by France according the freedom of the navigation of the Mississippi from its source to its mouth; for if we have well understood the real difficulty for Spain, it consists in the English coming from the Gulf of Mexico into the Mississippi River, not in their coming from Lake Erie to New Orleans. I doubt if you can carry on contraband trade beginning at the sources of the Mississippi; and even if the English made settlements on the left bank of the

ils ne pourroient tout au plus retirer de cette partie que des pelleteries qui ne nuïroient certainement à personne. Quant à la sureté militaire, dèsque les Lacs Supérieurs lui appartiennent, s'ils ont la fantasie et la possibilité d'attaquer la Louisianne par les sources du Mississipi, je doute que l'on puisse les en empêcher: il faudroit même ne pas les en empêcher, car ils se détruïroient par la difficulté et la peine de l'operation même. Si c'est la crainte de la floride qui détermine l'opposition de l'Espagne à cette limite, mais il paroît plus facile d'attaquer la floride par la Géorgie que par le fleuve du Mississipi, et l'on remarquera en Espagne qu'en n'autorisant point par l'article 6. les sujets Britanniques à remonter le fleuve du mississipi, mais seulement à le descendre, jusqu'à la mer, il ne se trouve rien dans cet article qui puisse blesser les intérêts ou la prétention de l'Espagne relativement au Golphe du

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Mexique; ainsi le roi a pense que l'article d'Angleterre pouvoit être accepté selon les termes même de Milord Bedford, et n'a pas crû qu'une pareille spécification de limites entre les possessions de la france et de l'angleterre pût retarder l'ouvrage de la paix

[*Translation*]

river they could only carry out peltry which certainly would harm no one. As to military security, once the upper lakes belong to them, if they have the fancy and the opportunity of attacking Louisiana by the sources of the Mississipi, I doubt if they could be hindered from doing it; it would even be better not to try, inasmuch as they would inevitably destroy themselves by the very difficulties and hardships of the operation.

If it is fear for Florida which causes Spain's opposition to that boundary, it seems much easier to attack Florida by Georgia than by the Mississipi River. It should be observed in Spain that article 6, by not authorizing British subjects to ascend the Mississipi River but only to descend it to the sea, contains nothing which can harm the interests or claims of Spain with respect to the Gulf of Mexico. Accordingly the king thinks that the English article may be accepted even in My Lord Bedford's terms, and does not believe that such a stipulation of boundaries between French and English possessions should retard the work of peace

ni empêcher la cession à la France de l'île Ste Lucie en toute propriété: Cependant comme Mr de Grimaldi a paru répugner absolument à l'admission de cet article, quoique nous lui ayons bien expliqué que l'Espagne restoit dans tous ses droits par les expressions contenues dans l'article Anglois, nous avons proposé à l'Angleterre une troisième façon que vous trouverez sous le No 4 Mr de Bedford ne m'y a pas fait de réponse, et je ne sçais pas s'il l'admettra: mais dans tous les cas, que ce soit ou le No 3 ou le No 4, le roi a décidé dans son conseil qu'il ordonneroit plutôt aux François d'évacuer la totalité de la Louisiane que de manquer la paix pour la discussion d'une colonie à laquelle nous

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ne pouvons communiquer que par mer, qui n'a et ne peut avoir ni port ni rade où il puisse entrer un chebec de 12 canons, et qui coûte à la France 800 mille francs par an, sans lui rapporter un écu. ces faits sont certains, et, sans la demande qu'a fait l'Espagne de connoître les stipulations que nous arrêterions avec l'Angleterre relativement à la Louisiane nous n'aurions pas imaginé que cet

[Translation]

nor prevent the cession to France of the Isle of St. Lucia in full propriety.

However as M. de Grimaldi seems to oppose absolutely the admission of this article, although we have carefully explained to him that Spain would remain secure in all her rights by the wording of the English article, we have proposed to England a third version which you will find under No. 4. M. de Bedford has made no reply, and I do not know if he will admit it.

But in any case whether it be No. 3 or No. 4 the king has decided in council, that he would rather order the French to evacuate the whole of Louisiana than to miss a peace for a dispute over a colony with which we cannot communicate by sea, which has not and cannot have any port or roadstead that can be entered by a twelve gun sloop, and which costs France 800,000 francs a year without returning a crown.

These facts are certain, and save for the demand Spain has made to know the stipulations on which we should agree with England respecting Louisiana we would not have imagined that

article put entrainer la moindre difficulté. Représentés avec force à Madrid, Monsieur, la liberté où est le roi de ceder ou même de faire évacuer ces possessions. En même tems, si le ministère Espagnol imagine, sans changer le fond de cet article, des modifications à y ajouter qui puissent être utiles à la Monarchie Espagnole, ou pour mieux dire, aux préjugés qu'elle peut avoir sur ce point, pourvû que ces modifications ne soient pas exclusives à la paix et ne servent qu'à ajouter à l'enonciation de l'article, nous concourerons de toutes nos forces à les lier ou à l'article 6.

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des préliminaires, ou à l'article pareil du traité définitif.....

[*Translation*]

that article could entail the slightest difficulty. Represent with force at Madrid, Monsieur, the king's freedom to cede or even to evacuate his possessions. At the same time if the Spanish ministry conceives of modifications, that, without changing the basis of the article, may be added as useful to the Spanish monarchy, or, rather, to the prejudices it may have on that point: provided those modifications do not debar peace and only add to the enunciation of the article we will unite all our forces to include them either in article 6 of the preliminaries or in the similar article of the definitive treaty.....

THREE ALTERNATIVE ARTICLES

[A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 537:181]

No. 2

Article 6. Tel qu'il a été proposé par la France dans les préliminaires

La France accorde que le fleuve de Mississippi serve aux deux nations de limites entre la Louisiane et le Canada de manière que la rive gauche de ce fleuve appartienne à la grande Bretagne jusqu'à la rivière Iberville et les Lacs Maurepas et Pontchartrain, et pour constater les limites des deux couronnes d'une manière certaine, il sera annexé à chaque instrument des préliminaires ou du traité définitif une carte sur laquelle la ligne de démarcation sera marquée en couleur, et cette carte servira à l'avenir pour l'intelligence et l'interprétation de cet article.

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Article 6 (Tel qu'il est proposé par l'Angleterre comme condition *sine qua non*)

No 3

La France accorde que le fleuve de Mississippi serve de limites aux deux nations entre la Louisiane et le Canada,

[Translation]

No. 2

Article 6 as proposed by France in her preliminaries:

France accords that the Mississippi River serve the two nations as boundary between Louisiana and Canada, so that the left bank shall belong to Great Britain as far as the river Iberville and Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain: and to fix the boundaries of the two crowns in a certain manner there shall be annexed to each instrument of the preliminaries or of the definitive treaty a map on which the line of demarcation shall be marked in color: and this map shall serve for the future for the understanding and interpretation of this article.

As it is proposed by England as condition *sine qua non*:

No. 3

France accords that the river Mississippi serve as boundary to the two nations between Louisiana and Canada to its junction

jusqu'au confluent de la Riviere Iberville et que depuis ce confluent la ligne de démarcation suivant cette même rivière Iberville et passant par les lacs Maurepas et Pontchartrain se prolonge jusqu'à la mer. La navigation sur le fleuve de Mississipi, depuis sa source, jusqu'à la mer, suivant cette ligne de démarcation, étant commune aux deux nations: Et pour constater les limites des

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deux couronnes d'une manière qui previenne toutes contestations entre leurs sujets, il sera annexé à chaque instrument du traité définitif une carte sur laquelle la ligne de démarcation sera marquée en couleur jaune et bleue; et cette carte servira à l'avenir pour l'intelligence et l'interpretation du present article.

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Article 6. Tel qu'il est proposé pour moyen de conciliation:

No. 4

La france convient d'étendre les limites du Canada jusques au fleuve du Mississipi qui servira de barrière et sera commun entre les deux couronnes: mais il est arrêté que la possession de la

[*Translation*]

with the Iberville and from that junction the line of demarcation following that same river Iberville and going by Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain shall prolong itself to the sea. The navigation of the Mississipi from its source to the sea, following this line of demarcation, shall be common to the two nations; and to fix the boundary of the two crowns in a certain manner which may forestall all contests between their subjects, there shall be annexed to each instrument of the definitive treaty a map on which the line of demarcation shall be marked in yellow and blue color, and this map shall serve for the future for the understanding and interpretation of the present article.

As proposed as a means of conciliation:

No. 4

France agrees to extend the limits of Canada to the Mississippi which shall serve as a barrier and shall be common to the two crowns: but it is stipulated that the possession of New

nouvelle Orléans demeurera à la France, et pour l'intelligence et l'explication claire de cet article, il sera annexé à chaque instrument du traité définitif une carte qui désignera invariablement les limites des deux nations dans ces parties de l'Amérique.

DUC DE CHOISEUL TO OSSUN, September 20, 1762

[A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 537:184]

Ecrite de la main de

Mr le Duc de Choiseul.

78 Copie d'une lettre particulière de Mr le Duc de Choiseul à Mr le Marquis d'Ossun.

A VERSAILLES le 20. 7bre 1762.

Nous voilà Monsieur le Marquis, arrivés au vrai nœud de la négociation. jusques là les deux cours pouvoient avoir des complaisances réciproques, laisser un champ libre à leurs complaisances, à leurs sentimens et même aux complimens; mais aujourd'hui c'est une décision précise, en forme et sans nulle tergiversation; car je vous avoue qu'il y a eu beaucoup de différence entre ce que Mr Odune nous a dit et que vous nous avez mandé, et ce que

[*Translation*]

Orleans remain to France: and for the understanding and clear explanation of this article there shall be annexed to each instrument of the definitive treaty a map which shall designate invariably the boundary of the two nations in those parts of America.

Written in M. le Duc de Choiseul's hand

Copy of a private letter from M. le Duc de Choiseul to M. le Marquis d'Ossun

VERSAILLES, September 20, 1762

Here we are, Monsieur the Marquis, arrived at the real crisis of the negotiation. Thus far the two courts have been able to indulge in mutual complaisances, in sentiment, and even in compliments. But today it is a precise decision, in form and without subterfuge that is called for. For I profess to you that there is much difference between what M. Odun told us or what you reported, and the contents of the instruction to which M. de

contenoient les instructions auxquelles Mr de Grimaldi etoit adstreint. je sais bien que l'on vous fera mille objections auxquelles vous n'aurés qu'un mot à répondre; le Roi d'Espagne veut il la guerre ou la paix? S'il veut la dernière, ainsi qu'il l'a dit, écrit, promis au roi son cousin, il faut qu'il adopte les articles: S'il veut la guerre, il faut qu'il les rejette; il ne reste plus de
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milieu; Car vous verrés par les lettres de Mr de Nivernois que l'on est pressé par le tems à Londres, et qu'avec la meilleure volonté, le Roi d'Angleterre, si son Parlement s'ouvre, ne pourra plus en imposer à la faction contraire à son autorité et à la paix. je vous previens aussi que nous ne souffririons pas que la paix soit manquée pour l'article 6. La Louïsiannie nous appartient en toute souveraineté, et le roi n'entend point que les dispositions qu'il fait relativement à son bien puissent être contrariées au point de détruire un ouvrage aussi utile à son royaume. rassemblés toutes vos forces, Monsieur le Marquis, pour le faire reussir sans causer de l'humeur entre les deux cours; renvoyés mon courier

[*Translation*]

Grimaldi was limited. I know they will make you a thousand objections, to all which you have one word to answer: Does the King of Spain want war or peace? If he wants the latter, as he has said, written, and promised to the king his cousin, he must adopt these articles. If he wants war, he must reject them. No middle course remains. You will see by the letters of M. de Nivernois that time presses at London, and that with the best will in the world, the King of England, once his Parliament has opened, can no longer keep down the faction opposed to his authority and to the peace. I further give you this warning that we will not suffer the peace to fail over article 6. Louisiana belongs to us in full sovereignty, and the king does not intend that the arrangements he makes for his own good shall be contradicted to the point of destroying an undertaking so beneficial to his kingdom. Muster all your forces, Monsieur the Marquis, to bring it to pass without causing ill humor between the two courts. Send back my courier promptly, directing him to Fontainebleau.

promptement et adressés le moi à Fontainebleau quoique certainement ce que nous desirons le plus soit la paix, cependant, après la paix, ce qui nous est le plus nécessaire, est une décision

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prompte et sans ambiguïté qui nous mette en état de rompre une négociation qui apporte des entraves *nécessaires* à nos opérations militaires. Vous dirés à Madrid que si le parti de la guerre prévaut, jamais nous ne ferons aucuns reproches, et que nous croirons que le Roi d'Espagne se détermine pour le mieux. nous n'en serons que plus affermis dans le sistème de l'alliance. Si au contraire on se décide pour celui de la paix; l'Espagne peut compter de nôtre part sur une reconnoissance éternelle. comme nous ne voulons pas user de finesse, vous ne dissimulérés pas à Mr Wall que moi en mon particulier je crois que les anglois ne prendront pas la havanne, ce qui ne m'empêche pas de desirer la paix, mais ce qui peut faire changer les sentimens du Roi d'Espagne. je crois que je n'ai rien à ajouter afin que vous soyés instruit de nôtre situation politique: C'est à vous, Monsieur le Marquis à travailler sur ce canevas. au reste je vous confie que j'abjurerois

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la politique pour ma vie si cette paix est manquée; il ne me

[Translation]

Though assuredly what we most desire is peace, next after peace what is most needful to us is a prompt and clear decision which will enable us to break off a negotiation which necessarily hampers our military operations. You will say at Madrid that if the decision is for war, we shall never reproach them, and shall believe the King of Spain decides for the best. We shall be but the more confirmed in our policy of alliance. If on the contrary they decide for peace, Spain may rely on our everlasting gratitude. Since we will not use finesse, you will not conceal from M. Wall that I for my part think the English will not take Havana, which does not hinder me from wanting peace, but which may change the King of Spain's opinion. I think I have nothing to add to inform you of our political situation. It is for you, Monsieur the Marquis, to paint the picture. Finally I will confide to you that if this peace fails, I will forswear politics the rest of my life; it

seroit pas possible de me mêler de cette besogne pour la troisième fois.

On dit qu'il y a des projets de mariage en négociation entre les cours de Madrid et de Vienne; je crois que cet avis est certain; tachés de démêler adroitement quels sont ces projets. il nous paroît convenable ici que le Roi des deux Siciles épouse une autrichienne; mais nous serions fâchés que l'on ne songeat pas à la fille de L'infé Don Philippe pour le Prince des Asturies.

je vous ai écrit si à la hâte ma lettre ministériale qu'il y aura peutêtre bien des fautes: je n'ai pas le courage de la relire; vous les corrigerez en en donnant copie à Mr Wal, ainsi que des pièces qui l'accompagnent.

j'ai l'honneur d'être &c.

[*Translation*]

will be impossible for me to meddle with this job for a third time.

They say there are marriage projects negotiating between the courts of Madrid and Vienna. I think the information is sure; try adroitly to find out what the plans are. Here it would seem proper to us that the King of the Two Sicilies should marry an Austrian; but we should be vexed if they did not think of the daughter of the Infante Don Philip for the Prince of Asturias.

I have written you my ministerial letter so hastily that there may be many mistakes in it. I have not the courage to reread it. You will correct them when you give M. Wall a copy of it as of the accompanying documents.

I have the honor to be, etc.

OSSUN TO WALL, September 27, 1762

[A E Corr. Pol. Esp., 537:189]

Copie d'un office passé par Mr le Mis d'Ossun à
Mr Wal,

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A BALSAIN le 27. 7bre 1762.

MONSIEUR,

J'ai l'honneur de remettre ci-joint à V. Exce la copie du projet de préliminaires entre les deux couronnes et l'Angleterre, qui m'a été envoyé par Mr le Duc de choiseul. j'accompagne cette pièce d'une copie de la lettre que ce ministre m'a écrite en même tems. vous verrés, Monsieur, que la France est entièrement d'accord avec l'angleterre sur les conditions de sa paix particulière, mais qu'il reste quelques difficultés à aplanir pour ajuster ce qui concerne l'Espagne. j'avoue, Monsieur, qu'après avoir mûrement examiné les pièces que j'ai l'honneur de communiquer à V. Exce je ne trouve pas de différence assès essentielle entre les propositions de l'Espagne et celles de l'angleterre pour suspendre l'effet des sentimens d'amitié et de générosité qui ont déterminé

[Translation]

Copy of an official note handed by M. le Marquis
d'Ossun to M. Wall

BALSAIN, September 27, 1762

MONSIEUR:

I have the honor of communicating herewith to Your Excellency the copy of a project of preliminary articles between the two crowns and England, which was sent me by M. le Duc de Choiseul. I accompany this document with a copy of a letter that minister wrote me at the same time. You will see, Monsieur, that France is entirely in accord with England on the conditions of her private peace, but that there remain some difficulties to be adjusted in what concerns Spain. I profess, Monsieur, that after having maturely examined the documents that I have the honor to communicate to Your Excellency, I cannot find sufficiently important differences between the proposals of Spain and those of England to suspend the effect of the sentiments of amity and generosity which have long determined

depuis long tems Sa Mté Cathe à procurer à la France la paix qu'une longue suite d'événemens malheureux lui a rendu absolu-
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ment nécessaire. L'art 6. des préliminaires, tel qu'il est proposé par Mr le Duc de Bedford, pourroit peutêtre allarmer l'Espagne sur l'objèt de la contrebande; mais cette crainte seule doit elle faire rompre la négociation, si l'on considère les dépenses immenses que la continuation de la guerre exigera, et les suites facheuses qu'elle peut avoir pour l'Espagne dans cette même partie de l'Amérique? je ne parlerai point de l'entreprise que les Anglois suivent actuellement contre la havanne; quoique elle puisse reussir, je me flatte, et Mr le Duc de choiseul présume aussi, qu'ils echoueront: mais comment les empêcher de s'emparer l'année prochaine non seulement de la Louïsianne, mais encore de la Floride? et lorsqu'ils en seront les maitres, sera-t-il possible de les en chasser, surtout dans le triste état on se trouve reduite la marine de France? ne vaut-il pas mieux, Monsieur, que Sa Mté Cathe se prête à la fixation des limites du Canada telle que nos

[*Translation*]

His Catholic Majesty to procure France the peace that a long course of unfortunate events has rendered absolutely necessary to her. Article 6 of the preliminaries as it is proposed by M. le Duc de Bedford might perhaps alarm Spain on the subject of contraband trade; but should that fear break off the negotiation, when the immense expenses the continuation of the war will require, and the unfortunate events that it may bring Spain in those very parts of America, are considered? I will not speak of the expedition that the English have actually sent against Havana; though it may succeed, I flatter myself, and M. le Duc de Choiseul also supposes, that it will fail. But how next year shall we prevent them from seizing not only Louisiana but Florida as well? And when they once are master of them, will it be possible to expel them, especially in view of the sad state to which the French navy is reduced? Would it not be better, Monsieur, for His Catholic Majesty to permit the settlement of the boundaries of Canada as our enemies demand it for a con-

ennemis la demandent comme une condition *sine quâ non* car enfin, si leur projet n'est pas d'en abuser, il n'en resultera aucun dommage pour l'Espagne, et dans le cas contraire, la France aura le tems de rétablir sa marine, de munir ses colonies, l'Espagne en usera de même de son côté, et les deux couronnes, après avoir mis à profit la durée de la paix, seront en état de réprimer ensuite avec succès l'avidité, l'ambition et le despotisme Anglois, véritablement portés à un point intolérable; mais ces considérations et toutes celles que je pourrois mettre sous les yeux de Sa Mté Cathe par l'entremise de V. Exce, sont bien foibles, si on les compare avec la véritable satisfaction qu'aura ce digne et grand monarque de pouvoir procurer la paix au roi son cousin qui la desire et qui a les motifs les plus pressans pour la desirer. c'est aussi dans les sentimens et dans les promesses de Sa Mté Cathe que le roi mon maître met sa principale confiance. C'est à Sa Mté Cathe à décider de la continuation de la guerre ou de la paix par les ordres précis et prompts qu'elle daignera adresser à Mr

[Translation]

dition *sine qua non*? For finally, if their purpose is not to abuse it, no harm will result to Spain; and in the contrary case, France will have time to reestablish her marine, and to fortify her colonies; Spain on her side will do the same, and the two crowns having put to good use the duration of the peace, will then be in a condition to repel with success the English greed, ambition, and despotism, which truly are carried to an intolerable degree.

But these considerations and all others that I can lay before the eyes of His Catholic Majesty, through Your Excellency's means, are very weak, if they be compared with the real satisfaction that great and worthy monarch will have in procuring a peace for the king his cousin, who desires it and has the most pressing motives to do so. It is moreover in the sentiments and promises of His Catholic Majesty that the king my master puts his chief reliance. It is for His Catholic Majesty to decide on the continuation of the war, or on peace by the exact and prompt orders he will deign to address to M. le Marquis de Grimaldi.

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le Mis de Grimaldi et je suis autorisé à déclarer à ce monarque, que, s'il prononce pour la guerre, la France persuadée qu'il se sera déterminé pour le mieux ne fera jamais aucuns reproches à cette occasion; mais que, s'il se détermine pour la paix, le roi mon maitre et tous ses sujets en conserveront une reconnoissance éternelle.

j'ai l'honneur d'être &c.

P. S. je joins ici, Monsieur, pour plus d'exactitude, la copie d'une lettre de Mr de Bedford à Mr de choiseul et celle d'une pièce qui l'accompagnoit, quoique le contenu en soit porté dans la copie du projèt des préliminaires.

[*Translation*]

And I am authorized to declare to that monarch that if he decides for war, France, persuaded that he decides for the best, will never make him any reproaches on it; but if he decides for peace, the king my master and all his subjects will cherish an eternal gratitude to him.

I have the honor to be, etc.

P. S. I annex here, Monsieur, for greater exactness, the copy of a letter from M. de Bedford to M. de Choiseul, and that of an accompanying document, though the content is implied in the copy of the project of preliminaries.

NIVERNOIS' MEMOIR OF September 23-24, 1762¹

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 447:139]

.....
Art: 6.

La France accorde que le Fleuve de Mississipi serve aux deux nations de limites entre la Louisiane & le Canada, de manière que la rive gauche de ce fleuve appartienne à la Grande Brétagne, jusqu'à la Rivière Iberville et les Lacs Maurepas et

139v

Pontchartrain; et pour constater les limites des deux couronnes d'une manière certaine, il sera annexé à chaque instrument des préliminaires ou du traité définitif une carte sur laquelle la ligne de demarcation sera marquée en couleur; et cette carte servira à l'avenir pour l'intelligence et l'interprétation de cet article.

A l'égard des nations sauvages qui sont entre les bords du Mississipi et les lacs du Canada, elles resteront neutres et indépendantes, et elles ne seront point gênées dans la liberté du com-

[Translation]

.....
Article 6

France accords that the Mississippi River serve as boundary for the two crowns between Louisiana and Canada, in such fashion that the left bank of the river shall belong to Great Britain as far as the river Iberville and Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain: and to state the boundaries of the two crowns in an exact way, there shall be annexed to each instrument of the preliminaries, or of the definitive treaty, a map on which the line of demarcation shall be marked in color; and this map shall serve in the future for the understanding and interpretation of the article.

With regard to the Indian tribes which are between the bank of the Mississippi and the lakes of Canada, they shall remain neutral and independent, and shall not be molested in freedom

¹ This memoir of terms Nivernois presented to the English ministry on his own responsibility. It created a bad impression, increasing the distrust felt for Nivernois' slyness. Nivernois withdrew it three days later. See *ante*, clv.

merce tel qu'elles l'ont exercé jusqu'à présent tant avec les François qu'avec les Anglois.

.....

COMTE DE CHOISEUL TO NIVERNOIS, September 25, 1762

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 447:155]

A M. le Duc de Nivernois

No 9.

par le courier Domanger

A PARIS le 25. 7bre 1762.

.....

Je m'empresse M. a vous dépêcher aujourd'hui un courier pour vous rendre compte d'une conférence très longue que j'ay eüe hier avec M. le Duc de Bedford, dans laquelle nous avons réglé tous les artes de nos préliminaires, même ceux de l'Espe sauf le consentemt de cette couronne que nous espérons de recevoir, le 6. du mois prochain. M. le Duc de choiseul étoit de cette conférence avec M. le Bailli de Solar. nous sommes absolument d'accord sur tous les points qui intéressent la france, et nous avons même arrêté ceux qui concernent l'Espe Vous trouverés cy joint ce

[Translation]

of trade as they have enjoyed it up to now, with both French and English alike.

.....

To M. le Duc de Nivernois

No. 9

By the courier Domanger

PARIS, September 25, 1762

.....

I hasten, Monsieur, to send you today a courier to give you the account of a very long conference that I had yesterday with M. le Duc de Bedford in which we arranged all the articles of our preliminaries, even those of Spain, saving the consent of that crown which we hope to receive the sixth of next month. M. le Duc de Choiseul was at the conference, along with M. le Bailli de Solar. We are absolutely in accord on all the points respecting France, and we have even decided on those which

nouveau projet de préliminaires, qui est semblable a celui que je vous ay envoyé par le der courier, à cela près des petits changemens que nous y avons faits; vous les remarquerez facilement, cependant je vais vous les indiquer sommairement pour vous épargner la peine d'en faire le dépoûillemt.

.....
155v....

Il a admis la nouvelle version sur l'arte 6., mais en y ajoutant que le fleuve de Mississipi sera commun *dans tout son cours*. Cette clause remédie à l'inconvenient prévu par l'angre que la navigation pourroit n être pas bonne par la Riviere Iberville et les lacs de mon côté j'ay ajouté à la possession de la nouvelle orleans *et de l'isle dans laquelle elle est située*. cet arte tel qu'il

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est rédigé dans cette nouvelle forme, doit satisfaire l'Angre autant pour le moins que la note secrete. M. le Duc de choiseul croit qu'il passera plus aisement à Madrid J'en doute fort, c'est ce que nous sçaurons par le retour du courier.

.....
[Translation]

concern Spain. You will find annexed this new project of preliminaries which is similar to the one I sent you by the last courier with some minor changes we have made. You will easily see which they are. However I will briefly indicate them to save you the trouble of picking them out.

.....
He had admitted a new version of article 6, adding however that the Mississippi River shall be common "for its whole course." This clause remedies the inconvenience foreseen by England that the navigation by the Iberville River and the lakes might not be good. On my side I have added to the possession of New Orleans "and of the island on which it is situated." This article as now drafted into this new form should satisfy England as well at least as the secret note. M. le Duc de Choiseul thinks it will go down more easily at Madrid. I doubt it very much; but we shall know by the return of the courier.

EGREMONT TO BEDFORD, October 26, 1762

[S P France, 253]

WHITEHALL Oct 26th 1762.

.....

Counter Project of Articles¹

.....

6. Afin de retablir la paix sur des Fondemens solides et durables, et écarter pour jamais tout sujet de dispute, par rapport aux Limites des Territoires Britanniques et François sur le Continent de l'Amerique: Il est convenu, qu'à l'avenir, les Confins entre les Etats de Sa Majesté Britannique, et ceux de sa Majesté très Chretienne, en cette partie du Monde, seront irrevocablement fixés par une Ligne, tirée au milieu du Fleuve Mississippi, depuis sa Naissance jusqu'à la Riviere Iberville, et de là par une Ligne, tirée au milieu de cette Riviere et des Lacs Maurepas et Pontchartrain, jusqu'à la mer: Et à cette fin, le

[Translation]

WHITEHALL, October 26, 1762

.....

Counter-project of articles¹

.....

6. To reëstablish peace on solid and durable foundations and remove forever all sources of dispute regarding the boundaries of British and French territory on the American Continent, it is agreed that for the future the limits between the possessions of His Britannic and of His Most Christian Majesty in that part of the world shall be irrevocably fixed by a line drawn in the middle of the Mississippi River from its source as far as the river Iberville and thence by a line drawn in the middle of that river and of Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain to the sea. And to this end the Most Christian King cedes in full propriety and

¹This is an extract from a new set of articles drawn in England and practically imposed as an ultimatum on the French court. The Louisiana article in both the preliminary and definitive treaties was practically identical with this version, adding only that all stipulations in favor of the inhabitants of Canada should apply also to those of the ceded portion of Louisiana.

Roi très Chretien cede, en toute propriété, et garantît à sa Majeste Britannique la Riviere et le Port de la Mobile, et tout ce qu'Il possède, ou a dû posséder du côté Gauche du Fleuve Mississippi, à l'exception de la ville de la Nouvelle Orleans, et de l'Isle dans laquelle Elle est située, qui demeureront à la France. Bien entendu que la Navigation du Fleuve Mississippi sera également libre, tant aux sujets de la Grande Bretagne, comme à Ceux de la France, dans tout sa largeur et toute son etendue, depuis sa source jusqu'à la Mer; et nommement cette partie qui est entre la susdite Isle de la Nouvelle Orleans et la Rive droite de ce Fleuve: aussi bien que l'entrée, et la sortie, par son Embouchure. Il est de plus stipulé, que les Batimens, appartenans aux Sujets de l'Une ou de l'Autre Nation, ne pourront être arrêtés, visités, ni assujettis au Payement d'aucun Droit quelconque.

.....
Observations
.....

Article 6. Dans l'extension de Cet Article pour approcher, autant

[*Translation*]

guarantees to His Britannic Majesty the river and port of Mobile, and all that he possesses or should possess on the left bank of the Mississippi River, with the exception of the city of New Orleans and of the island on which it is situated, which shall remain with France: It is understood that the navigation of the Mississippi River shall be equally free to the subjects of Great Britain as well as to those of France, in all its course and extent from its source to the sea, and more particularly that portion which is between the said island of New Orleans and the right bank of the river, as well as the right of entering and leaving by its mouth. It is further stipulated that vessels belonging to the subjects of one or the other power may not be stopped, searched, or subjected to payment of any dues whatever.

.....
Observations
.....

Article 6. In the enlargement of this article to approach

qu'il est possible, de la forme dans laquelle il doit paroître dans le Traité Definitif on a eu Attention de ne s'écarter rien des Idées des Ministres de Versailles. Comme la Ligne de Demarcation des Limites doit etre tirée au Milieu d'une Riviere, et des Lacs, dont la Description n'est sujette à aucune Equivoque, il paroît inutile d'annexer une Carte.

.....

[*Translation*]

so near as may be to the form in which it should appear in the definitive treaty, care has been taken to depart in nothing from the ideas of the ministers of Versailles. As the line of demarcation for the boundary should be drawn in the middle of a river and lakes whose description is subject to no mistake, it seems useless to annex a map.

.....

CHAPTER XVI

FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONTROVERSY, DECEMBER, 1762—JANUARY, 1763

EGREMONT TO BEDFORD, December 6, 1762

[S P France, 255]

WHITEHALL 6th Decr 1762

[Encloses draft of definitive articles with remarks.]¹

.....

I am to observe to Your Grace that the Omission in the 7th Article marked A of the Draught I now transmit, of the Words, *jusqu'à la riviere Iberville et de là par une ligne tirée au milieu de cette riviere et des Lacs Maurepas et Pontchartrain*, which stood in the 6th Article of the Preliminaries is merely intended to make that Article consistent, & to remove an Inaccuracy or Contradiction in the Manner, in which it was expressed in the Preliminaries, where Your Grace will observe, that the Limits, laid down in the first Part of the Article, exclude Great Britain entirely from the Left or East Side of the Mississippi below the Iberville; & of Course from its Embouchure: but, in the subsequent Part of the same Article, France renounces every Thing on the left of the Mississippi except the Island, on which New Orleans stands; & consequently the left side of the River, below the Island, belongs to Great Britain. The Omission of the above Words removes this Inconsistence, without inroaching upon any supposed Rights or Claims of his Most Christian Majesty, who desired nothing more than the Island, on which New Orleans is situated, on the left Side of the Mississippi, nor indeed is the Part, between the Island & the Sea, on the left Side of the River

¹ The English draft of the articles of the definitive treaty. Egremont argued that there was territory on the east bank of the Mississippi below New Orleans that was not part of the "island on which New Orleans is situated," and claimed it for England. This enlarged English claim occasioned dispute and prolonged the final settlement until the winter of 1763.

Mississippi, worth the Notice of France unless it is with a View to command the Mouth of the River: Your Grace knows that the French Ministers expressed no Difficulties about having the Navigation of the Mississippi free & in common to both Nations. But should it be objected, that the Subjects of France, are, by this Means, excluded from the Navigation of the River Iberville, & the Lakes Maurepas & Pontchartrain, I am commanded by his Majesty to send your Grace the Article marked *B* which admits of a free & common Navigation of the Iberville & Lakes above mentioned, & tho' it does not appear probable, that the French Minister will lay any Stress upon the Navigation in common of the Iberville and Lakes, which can be of little use to France, after their Cession of the Mobile, Yet, should it be insisted upon, it is his Majesty's Pleasure that Your Grace do admit it, as expressed in the above Article *B*.....

A

Article 7.

Les Confins entre les Etats de Sa Majesté Britannique et Ceux de Sa Majesté Très Chrétienne sur le Continent de l'Amerique, seront irrévocablement fixés par une Ligne tirée au milieu du Fleuve Mississippi depuis sa Naissance jusqu'à la Mer: Et à cette fin Le Roy Tres Chrétien cede, en toute Propriété, et garantit à Sa Majesté Britannique la Riviere et le Port de la Mobile et tout ce qu'il possède, ou a dû posséder du Côté gauche du Fleuve Mississippi, à l'exception de la Ville de la nouvelle Orleans, et de l'Isle dans laquelle elle est située qui demeureront

[Translation]

A.

Article 7

The boundaries between the possessions of His Britannic and of His Most Christian Majesty on the American Continent shall be irrevocably determined by a line drawn in the middle of the Mississippi River from its source to the sea. And to this end the Most Christian King cedes in full propriety and guarantees to His Britannic Majesty the river and port of Mobile and all that he possesses or should possess on the left bank of the Mississippi River with the exception of the city of New Orleans and of the island on which it is situated, which shall remain to France.

à la France; Bien entendu que la Navigation du Fleuve Mississipi sera également libre tant aux Sujets de la Grande Bretagne, comme a ceux de la France dans toute sa Largeur, et toute son Etendue, depuis sa Source jusqu'à la Mer et nommement cette Partie qui est entre la susdite Isle de la Nouvelle Orleans, et la Rive droite de ce Fleuve, aussi bien que l'entrée et la Sortie par ses Embouchures; Il est de plus stipulé, que les Batimens appartenans aux Sujets de l'une, ou de l'autre Nation ne pourront assujettis au Payement d'aucun Droit quelconque. Les Stipulations inserées dans l'Article 4 en faveur des Habitans du Canada, auront lieu de même pour les Habitans des Pais cédés par cet Article

B. Inserts after *demeureront à la France*. "avec la Navigation de la Riviere Iberville et des Lacs Maurepas et Pontchartrain, jusqu'à la Mer, qui sera commun aux deux Nations."

[*Translation*]

It being well understood that the navigation of the Mississippi River shall be equally free to the subjects of Great Britain as to those of France in all its course and all its extent from its source to the sea, and more particularly in that part which is between the said island of New Orleans and the right bank of the river as well as the right of entering and leaving by its mouths. It is further stipulated that ships belonging to the subjects of either nation shall be subjected to the payment of no duty whatever. The stipulations inserted in article 4 in favor of the inhabitants of Canada, shall apply also to the inhabitants of the country ceded by that article.

B. inserts after, "shall remain to France": "with the navigation of the river Iberville and of Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain as far as the sea which shall be common to the two nations."

BEDFORD TO EGREMONT, December 24, 1762

[S P France, 255]

PARIS Decbr 24th 1762

.....

I endeavoured to the utmost of my Power to bring The French Ministers to consent to the leaving out the Words *jusques à la Riviere Iberville & de là par une Ligne tirée au milieu de cette Riviere, & des Lacs Maurepas & Pontchartrain*: But This They would in no Sort consent to: And tho' I shewed them, that by the express Words of the Article They could possess, to the left or East Side of the Mississippi, nothing but the Town of New Orleans, & the Island on which it was situated, yet They persisted in refusing to come into this, as being new matter, the River Iberville & the Lakes being fixed for the Boundary betwixt the two Nations, according to the Maps which They had sent over, & which had been, as They assert, accepted by us, as a certain Guide to ascertain a fixed and un-equivocal Boundary. By this Map, They say, there is no Land below the Island on which New Orleans stands towards the Sea, which is formed by The Mississippi on one Side, the River Iberville & the Lakes on another, & by the Sea itself on the third. They even go so far as to assert, that should there be a Morsel of Land on the other Side the Iberville & the Lakes, *that* cannot belong to England, whose Boundary is absolutely fixed towards the Westward by them: And tho' I shewed Them, that the specifick Words of the 6th Article of the Preliminaries excluded France from the Possession of every Thing on the Continent of North America to the left of the Mississippi, except the Town of New Orleans and the Isle on which it is situated, They would not hear Reason on this, but persisted in maintaining their opinion by the worst Arguments imaginable, & concluded with insisting that no new matter should be introduced in this Article. It is remarkable that the Marquis de Grimaldi took a great Part in this Dispute, against me, which He has never before done on Points solely French: which, I own increases my Suspicion, that the Report, I have heard, that France intended to cede New Orleans &c to Spain, has some Foundation. As the Navigation thro' The Iberville & the Lakes was never

mentioned by Them, nor have They any Occasion for it, I thought it better to say nothing to Them about it.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE ENGLISH DRAFT OF A DEFINITIVE
TREATY¹

[S P France, 255]

Observations Sur le projet de Trte definitif envoye
par la Cour de Londres

Sur L Article 7

On a suprimé dans le projet anglois la clause qui fixe les limites "par une ligne tirée au milieu du fleuve Mississipi depuis sa naissance jusqu'à la Riviere Iberville et de là par une ligne tirée au milieu de cette Riviere et des Lacs Maurepas et Pontchartrain jusqu'à la Mer."

Cette clause est cependant necessaire pour fixer les limits des deux Couronnes et pour l'intelligence de l'article. L'isle dont il est question et dans laquelle la nouvelle orleans se trouve & située, est formée suivant toutes les Cartes tant angloises que françoises

[*Translation*]

Observations on the project of a definitive treaty
sent by the court of London

On Article 7

The English project suppresses the clause which establishes the boundaries "by a line drawn in the middle of the Mississippi River from its source to the river Iberville and thence by a line drawn in the middle of that river and of Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain to the sea."

That clause however is necessary to fix the boundaries of the two crowns, and for understanding the article. The island in question on which New Orleans is situated, is formed according to all the maps, English and French alike, by the river Iber-

¹ This represents the French protest against the English draft.

par la Riviere Iberville et les Lacs Maurepas et Pontchartrain d'un coté, par le fleuve du Mississipi de l'autre, et enfin par la Mer. C'est de ce Terrain circonscrit d'eau, soit douce, soit salée que l'on a entendu parler, quand on a dit que l'Isle, ou la nouvelle Orleans est située, demeurerait a la France. L'on ne sauroit l'entendre autrement, et c'est pour éviter toute obscurité et toute contestation sur cet article, que le Ministere de France a joint au premier projet d'articles Preliminaires, qu'il a envoyé a Londres, une Carte sur laquelle la ligne de demarcation etait marquée en couleur jaune. Cette Carte est encore a Londres, et si l'on veut y jeter un coup d'oeil la question sera décidée sur la simple inspection de cette Carte et l'on ne pourra douter que l'Isle dans laquelle la nouvelle Orleans est située ne soit formée par le mer, le fleuve de Mississipi et la Riviere Iberville passant par les Lacs Maurepas et Pontchartrain et se prolongeant jusqu'à la Mer. Il est de toute verité que cet article n'a jamais été entendu autrement pendant tout le cours de la negociation. On en appelle a la bonne foi du ministere anglois, et ce n'est que sur la fin de cette

[*Translation*]

ville, and Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain on one side, by the Mississippi River on the other, and finally by the sea. It is this territory, surrounded by water, fresh or salt, that has been meant when it has been said that the island on which New Orleans is situated should remain to France. It could not be otherwise understood; and in order to avoid all obscurity and dispute on this article, the French ministry annexed to the first project of preliminary articles sent to London, a map on which the line of demarcation was marked in yellow. That map is still at London, and if anyone cares to cast an eye on it, the question will be decided on the simple inspection of that map, and it will not be doubtful that the island on which New Orleans is situated is formed by the sea, the Mississippi River, and the Iberville River passing by Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain, and extending to the sea. It is absolutely true that that article has never been differently understood during the whole course of the negotiation. We appeal to the good faith of the English ministry; and it was

negociation que la Cour de Londres ayant représenté que la navigation ne seroit pas praticable par les Lacs Maurepas et Pontchartrain jusqu'a la mer, que la France convint que les anglois pourroient naviguer par la partie du fleuve Mississipi depuis la Riviere Iberville, jusqu'a la mer: Mais cette condition qui marquoit la deference du Roi aux representations du Roi de la Gde Brte et qui n'a rien change a la possession de l'Isle entiere par les françois, n'a pû detruire la condition essentielle de la possession totale de l'Isle; ainsi le Ministere de France ne peut se dispenser de demander qu'elle soit libellée dans l'arte 7 du projet du Traité definitif comme elle l'est dans l'arte 6 des Preliminaires: c'est a dire "qu'a l'avenir les confins entre les Etats de S. M. tres chretne et ceux de S. M. Brite en cette partie du monde seront irrevocablement fixés par une ligne tirée au milieu du fleuve Mississipi depuis sa naissance jusqu'a la Riviere Iberville et de là par une ligne tirée au milieu de cette Riviere et des Lacs Maurepas et Pontchartrain jusqu'a la Mer."

[*Translation*]

only at the end of that negotiation that, the court of London having represented that the navigation was not practicable by Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain to the sea, France accorded that the English might navigate the part of the Mississippi River from the river Iberville to the sea. But that condition which was a mark of the deference of the king to the representations of the King of Great Britain, and which has in no way changed the possession of the whole island by the French, cannot destroy the essential condition of their total possession of the island. Accordingly the ministry of France cannot dispense with demanding that it be worded in article 7 of the project of a definitive treaty as it is in article 6 of the preliminaries; that is to say, "that for the future the limits between the possessions of His Most Christian and those of His Britannic Majesty in that part of the world be finally fixed by a line drawn in the middle of the Mississippi River from its source to the river Iberville and thence by a line drawn in the middle of that river and of Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain to the sea."

Enfin l'on demande qu'à la fin de cet article, on insere la clause suivante qui est le meme qui se trouve a l'arte 19 des Preliminaires concernant la cession de la Floride par l'Espagne a l'angleterre.

"Il est de plus stipulé que Sa Mate tres chretne aura la facilite de retirer tous les effets qui peuvent lui appartenir dans toutes les parties cedées par la france pour former les limites du Territoire de la Grande Bretagne du coté du fleuve Mississipi, telles quelles sont specifiées dans le premier article, soit artillerie, Munitions de guerre ou autres.

PRASLIN TO NIVERNOIS, December 26, 1762

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 448:425]

M. le Duc de Nivernois

2e Lettre

No 37.

A VERSAILLES le 26. Xbre 1762

Je vous envoie cy joint, M. le duc, la copie du projet de traité définitif qui a été rédigé à Londres, sur lequel nous avons

[*Translation*]

Finally it is asked that at the end of that article there be inserted the following clause which is the same as that in article 19 of the preliminaries concerning the cession of Florida by Spain to England.

"It is further stipulated that His Most Christian Majesty shall be allowed to withdraw all the property which may belong to him in all the sections ceded by France to form the boundaries of the territory of Great Britain toward the Mississippi River, such as are specified in the first article, as artillery, munitions of war, etc."

M. le Duc de Nivernois

Second letter

No. 37

VERSAILLES, December 26, 1762

I send you enclosed M. the Duc, the copy of the project for a definitive treaty which was drawn at London, on which we

conféré, Mardy der avec M. le Duc de Bedford.....

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L'arte 7. a causé une contestation très vive entre M. le Duc de Bedford est moy. Je ne vous répéterai point ici, M., toutes les raisons que nous avons à alléguér pour justifier la demande que nous faisons pourqu'il soit rédigé tel qu'il est dans les préliminaires. vous les trouverés détaillées dans mes observations; et je me persuade que vous les trouverés convaincantes. vous êtes d'ailleurs très au fait de tout ce qui a rapport à cet arte qui a tenu une grande place dans nôtre négociation. c'est le fameux arte 6 sur lequel nous avons donné une note secrète et qui nous embarassoit beaucoup à cause de l'Espagne. vous devez avoir,

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M. la copie de cette note jointe à vos instructions; mais, pour plus grande sûreté, je vous en envoie un duplicata. elle est un peu différente de l'arte 6. des préliminaires; mais la différence vient des changemens et de l'addition qu'on y a faits en angre et que nous n'avons pas crû devoir rejeter, parceque nous n'y

[Translation]

conferred Tuesday last with M. le Duc de Bedford.....

Article 7 occasioned a very warm dispute between M. le Duc de Bedford and me. I will not repeat to you, here, Monsieur, all the reasons we alleged to justify the demand we made that the article be drawn as in the preliminaries. You will find them detailed in my observations; and I flatter myself you will think them conclusive. You are otherwise well acquainted with everything regarding that article, which has had an important part in our negotiation. It is the famous article 6 on which we gave a secret note and which much embarrassed us on Spain's account. You should have, Monsieur, the copy of that note annexed to your instructions; but for greater certainty I send you a duplicate. It differs a little from article 6 of the preliminaries; but that difference arises from the changes and addition made in England, which we thought we should not reject, because we

avons apperçu aucune source de discussion. mais cette note doit faire nôtre loi; elle a été adoptée en angré; et elle a été rédigée sur une pre note secrette qui avoit été remise par M. de Mackensy à M. le Cte de Viri, qui nous l'a envoyé. on nous avoit recommandé le plus grand secret, parcequ'elle pouvoit perdre Milord Bute, qui l'avoit donnée à l'insçu du conseil du R. de la G. B. nous n'avons pas trahi la confiance de ce digne ministre, pour qui nous avons la plus grande consideration et qui nous intéresse véritablement par la candeur et la probité que nous avons remarquées dans son caractère. il ne peut désavouer ces faits, et nous en apellons aujourd'hui à sa bonne foi. M. le Cte de Viri, par qui toute cette négociation a passé et qui l'a fait réussir par son zele et par son habileté, ne disconviendra pas de tout ce que

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j'avance; et pour achever de mettre cette affaire dans tout son jour, je vous envoie la carte originale qui étoit jointe à la note secrète. C'est la même que nous avons adressée à M. le Cte de Viri; elle est apostillée au revers de la main de son secrétaire; elle

[*Translation*]

could perceive no cause for discussion on it. But that note should plead our case; it was adopted in England; and it was drawn on the basis of a first secret note which had been communicated by M. de Mackenzie to M. le Comte de Viry, who sent it to us. We were enjoined the greatest secrecy on it because it might ruin My Lord Bute, who had given it without the knowledge of the council of the King of Great Britain. We have not betrayed the confidence of that worthy minister, for whom we have the greatest consideration, and who in truth interests us by the candor and probity which we have observed in his character. He cannot disavow these facts, and today we appeal to his good faith. M. le Comte de Viry, through whom this whole negotiation passed, and who by his zeal and skill insured its success, will not deny what I set forth. The better to put the matter in full daylight I send you the original map which was annexed to the secret note. It is the same which we had addressed to M. le Comte de Viry; it is indorsed in his secretary's

nous fut renvoyée parce que la ligne de démarcation marquée en jaune n'alloit pas tout à fait jusqu'à la mer, quoique ce fut nôtre intention; et le ministere anglois craignoit par là qu'il ne fût pas assés clair que la Mobile étoit comprise dans nôtre cession. Je fis donc prolonger la ligne jaune telle qu'elle est aujourd'hui, et je renvoyai un double de cette carte qui est resté à Londres.

Je crois, M., qu'après cette explication, nul homme de bonne foi ne pourra prétendre que l'isle dans laquelle la nouvelle orleans est située soit autre que le terrain renferme entre le fleuve Mississipi, la Rivière d'Iberville, passant par les Lacs Maurepas et Pontchartrain et la mer. M. de Bedford prétend que l'on a retranché en Angre la phrase qui exprime la ligne de démarcation passant par la Rivière Iberville et les Lacs Maurepas et Pontchar-

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train jusqu'à la mer parceque cette expression de limites contredit la phrase suivante où il est dit; *que la france cède tout ce qu'elle possède du côté gauche du fleuve Mississipi, à l'exception de la ville de la Nouvelle Orléans et de l'isle dans la quelle*

[Translation]

hand; it was returned to us because the line of demarcation marked in yellow did not go quite to the sea, though that was our intention, and the English ministry feared by that that it was not sufficiently clear that Mobile was included in our cession. I then had the yellow line extended as it is today, and I sent back a duplicate of the map which remained at London.

I believe, Monsieur, that after this exposition, no man of good faith can claim that the island on which New Orleans is situated is other than the territory enclosed between the Mississippi River and the river Iberville, passing by Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain to the sea. M. de Bedford claims that in England they omitted the phrase which states the line of demarcation passing by the river Iberville and Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain as far as the sea because that statement of the boundary contradicts the following phrase which says, "that France cedes all she possesses on the left bank of the Mississippi River with the exception of the city of New Orleans and of the

elle est située. Il prétend que cette isle ne comprend pas tout le terrain renfermé entre la mer, le fleuve Mississippi et la ligne de démarcation tirée au milieu de la Riviere Iberville et des Lacs Maurepas et Pontchartrain; mais que cette isle n'est qu'une partie de ce terrain formée par quelque bras du fleuve Mississippi. Je lui ai fait voir la carte; mais malgré l'évidence, il ne s'est pas rendu, et a prétendu qu'elle pouvoit n'être pas juste. En vérité, je ne me serois jamais attendu à avoir une difficulté sur un arte aussy clairement stipulé. mais je ne puis croire que le ministère Anglois se refuse à la démonstration et qu'il s'écarte de la bonne foi avec laquelle il s'est conduit jusqu'à present. Nous demandons encore qu'il soit ajouté à la fin de cet arte une clause pareille à celle qui est stipulée dans les préliminaires pour la floride. Je ne pense pas que la cour de Londres puisse s'y refuser, puisque le cas est absolument pareil et M. de Bedford n'y a fait aucune difficulté.

.....

[Translation]

island on which it is situated." He claims that that island does not include all the land enclosed between the sea, the Mississippi River, and the line of demarcation drawn through the middle of the river Iberville and of Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain; but that that island is only a part of the land formed by one branch of the Mississippi River. I have shown him the map; but despite the evidence he has not yielded to it, and has claimed it cannot be exact. In truth I would never have expected any difficulty on an article so clearly stated; but I cannot believe that the English ministry will not yield to demonstration, and that it will depart from the good faith in which it has acted until now. We further ask that a similar clause be added at the end of the article similar to that which is stipulated in the preliminaries for Florida. I do not think the court of London can refuse it since the case is absolutely similar and M. de Bedford has made no difficulty of it.

.....

NIVERNOIS TO PRASLIN, January 5, 1763¹

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 449:34]

No 75.

reçu le 9.

Repdu le 14

A LONDRES le 5. janvier 1763.

a 2. h. apres midi

MONSIEUR LE DUC

Comme j'apprends que le courier de Milord Egremont ne partira que dans quelques heures je profite de ce petit delay, pour vous mander quelques nouvelles assés interessantes qui se debitent ici.

J'ay vû M le Cte de Bute et je vais vous dire à la hâte, mais avec précision, ce sur quoy vous pouvés compter par raport aux

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trois articles de vos observations qui me paroissent les principaux. 1. l'article sur les limites; 2. l'arte 8 et les articles similaires par rapport aux vaisseaux pour les emigrans 3. l'arte 11 par raport aux Indes Orientales. Sur le premier, ce que l'on

[*Translation*]

No. 75

Received the 9th

Answered the 14th

LONDON, January 5, 1763

at two in the afternoon

MONSIEUR THE DUC:

As I learn that My Lord Egremont's courier will not set off for some hours, I profit by this small delay to give you some news that is quite interesting.

I have seen M. le Comte de Bute, and I shall tell you in haste but with exactness on what you can rely with respect to the three articles of your observations which seem to me the chief. 1. The article on boundaries; 2. Article 8 and similar articles respecting vessels for the emigrants; 3. Article 11 with respect to the East Indies.

¹ This and the following note, written at different times the same day, tell their own story.

veut icy et dont on ne démordra pas, c'est que la liberté de la navigation partout le cours du Mississipi jusqu'à la mer soit

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assurée, de manière que nous ne conservions pas les moyens de la troubler en aucun tems; c'est pour cela qu'on vouloit circonscrire notre isle de la Nouvelle Orleans de manière que l'Angre acquit la possession de l'embouchure gauche du dt fleuve et des isles ou islots qu'on dit y être adjacents. mais on se consentira de nous demander de prendre l'engagement de n'élever, conserver ni entretenir aucune fortification à la dite embouchure; et en

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obtenant cela de nous, on s'abstiendra de demander la possession territoriale et on tournera à cet egard l'article comme nous le desirons.

.....

[*Translation*]

On the first, what is desired here and what will not be given up, is the assured freedom of navigation throughout the course of the Mississippi as far as the sea, in such fashion that we shall not retain the means of hindering it at any time. It is for that that they wish to circumscribe our island of New Orleans in such fashion that England acquires the possession of the left outlet of the river and of the islands or islets said to be adjacent. But they will be content with asking us to engage ourselves not to build, keep, or maintain any fortification at the said mouth; and obtaining that of us, will refrain from asking the territorial possession; and in that aspect will word the article as we wish.

.....

NIVERNOIS TO PRASLIN, January 5, 1763

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 449:39]

No 76.

Repdu le 14.

A LONDRES le 5 Janvier 1763.
à 7 heures du soir

MONSIEUR LE DUC

Je suis obligé de coûter au roy la dépense d'un courier par un petit incident qui vous fera connoître quel métier c'est de négocier ici, par le tems qui court, et à quel homme j'ai affaire dans la personne de M. Egremont. Son courier, qui ne devoit partir qu'à sept heures, à ce que m'a dit M Bute, et qui devoit attendre les dépêches du Comte de Viri pour le Bailli de Solar, est parti furtivement à cinq. Il n'en reste pas moins vrai que je suis convenu avec M. Bute de tout ce qui est contenu dans ma dépêche chiffrée d'aujourd'hui. Je vous ajouterai ici, puisque j'en ai l'occasion, que vous devés partir de deux points qui me paroissent incontestables; L'un que M. Bute, qui a vraiment de la droiture

[*Translation*]

No. 76

Answered the 14th

LONDON, January 5, 1763
Seven in the evening

MONSIEUR THE DUC:

I am obliged to put the king to the expense of a courier by a little incident which will let you know what kind of a trade it is to negotiate here at the moment, and with what sort of a man I have to deal, in the person of M. Egremont. His courier, who, by what M. Bute told me, was not to set off till seven in the evening, and who should have waited for the Comte de Viry's dispatches for the Bailli de Solar, left secretly at five. It is none the less true that I came to an agreement with M. Bute on everything contained in my ciphered dispatch of today. I will add here since I have the opportunity, that you can act on two assumptions which seem to me indubitable. One is that M. Bute, who really is upright and well-intentioned, if all the rules of the

et de la bonne intention, si toutes les règles de la Métaposcopia ne sont pas fausses, craint comme le feu d'être compromis au Parlement par les artifices de M. Egremont sous le prétexte de s'être immiscé dans les affaires de secrétairerie d'état, et d'y avoir introduit une direction arbitraire. Je vous dirai même que je soupçonne que M. Egremont a entre les mains quelques pièces par écrit soit lettres ou billêts qui serviroient à fonder cette accusation. Il est certain que M. Bute connoit M. Egremont pour ce qu'il est et qu'il sait toutes ses liaisons et ménagemens avec le parti de l'opposition, et il est en même tems évident qu'il n'ose le contrarier en rien depuis l'assemblée du Parlement; vous attribuerés peut-être cela à pusillanimité et vous devés même, étant à Versailles, porter ce jugement, mais si vous étiez ici et que vous eussiez sous les doigts la constitution de ce païs cy vous sentiriez que M. Bute ne peut faire que ce qu'il fait, et que tout homme qui risque peut-être sa vie, et surement ses places et qui

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pis est sa réputation joue trop gros jeu pour n'être pas circonspect.

[*Translation*]

metaposcopia are not false, fears like fire being compromised in Parliament by the artifices of M. Egremont, under the pretext that he has intruded himself into the affairs of the secretary's office, and has brought in an arbitrary control. I will even say to you that I suspect that M. Egremont has in his hands some written papers, letters, or notes, which will support this accusation. It is certain that M. Bute knows M. Egremont for what he is, and that he is aware of all his alliances and intrigues with the opposition party; it is also evident that he dares cross him in nothing during the session of Parliament. You will attribute this to cowardice perhaps, and, being at Versailles you may even be satisfied that it is so; but if you were here and had the constitution of this country at your finger tips, you would perceive that M. Bute can do no other than he does, and that any man who risks perhaps his life, surely his places, and what is worse his reputation, is playing for too high stakes not to be cautious.

Le second point d'après lequel vous devés partir c'est qu'ici (M. Bute excepté) tous les gens en place sont intéressés dans le commerce, les entréprises, les avantages, les monopoles, de deux sortes de gens, les negocians de l'Amérique et la Compagnie des Indes. J'ai presque certitude que M. Egremont y est pour une part considérable, delà les difficultés insurmontables sur tous ce qui intéresse l'avidité de ces sortes de gens.

.....

PRASLIN TO NIVERNOIS, January 8, 1763

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 449:72]

M. le Duc de Nivernois

2e lettre

No 42.

VERSAILLES 8. Janvier 1763.

Je sçais, M. le Duc, toutes les difficultés qu'éprouvent les négociations qui se font à Londres. Je pense aujourd'hui, comme par le passé, qu'on peut avoir meilleur marché de M. de Bedford que des ministres Brites dans leur païs, et vous avés pû voir jusqu'a

[*Translation*]

The second point of departure for you is that here, M. Bute excepted, all the persons in office are interested in the trade, speculations, privileges, and monopolies of two kinds of people—the American, and the East Indian merchants. I am almost certain that M. Egremont is deeply concerned: hence are the insurmountable difficulties in everything that excites the greed of these two groups.

.....

M. le Duc de Nivernois

2nd letter

No. 42

VERSAILLES, January 8, 1763

I know, M. the Duc, all the difficulties which negotiations at London entail. I think now as formerly that one can have a better bargain from M. de Bedford than from the British ministers in their country. As you can see up to now I have only referred

present que je ne vous ai renvoyé les affaires que dans le cas de nécessité. mais il faut bien avoir recours à vous et à votre sçavoir faire quand l'ambr d'angre est invincible, soit par humeur, soit par la rigueur de ses instructions. Je ne crois pas que ce soit le premier motif que nous ayons eu à combattre, excepté sur l'arte de la Louisiane qu'il avoit pris à gauche et dont il estoit fort entêté; Sur tout le reste il paroissoit assés bien disposé; mais il se disoit gêné et retenu par les ordres précis de sa cour. Je me serois relaché volontiers sur l'arte de la Louisiane puisqu'elle ne nous intéresse plus. Mais par honneur et par egard pour la cour de Madrid je ne pouvois admettre une clause aussy contraire aux préliminaires.

72v

A l'occasion de la Louisiane si le ministere Anglois vous parle encore de la cession que nous en avons faite à l'Espe vous pouvés répondre qu'en effet le roy l'a offerte à S. M. C. comme une possession qui est à la convenance de l'Espe et qui nous devient plus à charge qu'utile après le démembrement qui vient d'en

[*Translation*]

matters to you from necessity: but it is essential to have recourse to you and to your savoir faire at moments when the English ambassador is unapproachable whether it be from ill humor, or from the strictness of his instructions. I do not think it is the first motive with which we have to contend, except on the article of Louisiana, which he took amiss, and on which he is very obstinate. On all the rest he appeared well enough disposed, but he said he was hampered and checked by the exact orders of his court. I would willingly have given way on the Louisiana article since it no longer concerns us. But from honor and from consideration for the court of Madrid I cannot admit a clause so contrary to the preliminaries.

On the subject of Louisiana, if the English ministry again speaks to you of our cession to Spain, you can answer that in truth the king offered it to His Catholic Majesty as a possession convenient for Spain to have, and become more chargeable than

être fait en faveur de l'angre.

.....

NIVERNOIS TO PRASLIN, January 12, 1763

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 449:91]

No 80.

Reçu le 18.

Rep du le 19.

A LONDRES le 12. Janvier 1763.

MONSIEUR LE DUC

Le courier part enfin ce soir ou demain matin pour porter à M. le Duc de Bedford la reponse définitive à vos observations et j'en profite pour vous dire encore un mot la dessus.

On m'a laissé lire hier au soir la dite reponse qui est fort longue, et vous en trouverez ci joint la substance que j'ai extraite de mémoire. dès hier matin on m'avoit communiqué et laissé par écrit l'art 11. et je le mets en entier tel qu'on me l'a donné, il est

[*Translation*]

useful to us after its dismemberment in favor of England.

.....

No. 80

Received the 18th

Answered the 19th

LONDON, January 12, 1763

MONSIEUR THE DUC,

The courier at last sets off this evening or tomorrow morning to carry to M. le Duc de Bedford the final answer to your observations, and I improve the opportunity to say a word to you on the subject.

They let me read yesterday evening the answer in question, which is very long; and you will find annexed the substance of what I gathered from the memoir. Yesterday morning they communicated it, leaving article 11 in writing, and I insert it in its entirety as it was given me. It is entirely different from what

entièrement différent de ce qu'on m'avoit annoncé. On se relâche sur les époques et on s'opiniâtre sur le reste.

M. Egremont est toujours à sa campagne, on lui a envoyé hier la dépêche à signer, on la rapportera aujourd'hui à Londres, et selon l'heure à laquelle elle arrivera le courier partira ou ce soir ou demain.

M. Halifax m'envoya hier au soir un passeport direct pour
91v

M. de Riaucourt et j'ai l'honneur de vous l'envoyer ci joint
J'ay l'honneur d'être avec le plus sincère attachement
Monsieur le Duc

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,
Le DUC DE NIVernois

P. S. [*ciphered*:]

Vous pouvez ajouter foi à l'extrait que je vous envoie. il n'a pas été fait entièrement de mémoire. Le petit Deon¹ qui est leste en a fait copier adroitement les principaux articles pendant que je

[*Translation*]

they had told me. They relax on the epochs and insist on the rest.

M. Egremont is always on his estate. Yesterday they sent him the dispatch to sign; they will bring it back to London today, and according to the hour it arrives, the courier will set off this evening or tomorrow.

M. Halifax sent me yesterday evening a passport for M. de Riaucourt, and I have the honor to send it to you annexed.

I have the honor to be with most sincere attachment,
Monsieur the Duc,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,
the DUC DE NIVernois

P. S. [*ciphered*:]

You can rely on the extract I send you. It was not made entirely from memory. Little D'Eon,¹ who is nimble, adroitly had the principal articles copied while I was dining with M.

¹ Chevalier d'Eon, the notorious adventurer who later represented himself to be a woman. He tells the story somewhat differently in his memoirs, ascribing much more of the credit to himself.

dinois avec M. Wood.¹ qui me l'avoit apporté pour m'en dire la substance, et l'avoit laissé dans ma chambre. cela a été fait par un de mes secretaires nommé Le Boucher qui sait très bien l'anglois et qui est tout plein d'intelligence. Au reste il pourroit très bien se faire que M. Wood m'eût trompé et ne m'eût pas communiqué la vraie depeche: Je ne le crois pourtant pas, mais à tout hazard je vous en fais l'observation.

EXTRACT OF ENGLISH ANSWER TAKEN BY LE BOUCHER²

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 449:88]

1763. 11 Jvier

Joint au No 80. de la depeche
de Mr le Duc de Nivernois du

12. Janvr 1763

Dans la dépêche de M. Egremont à M. le Duc de Bedford, on debute par dire que l'on pense comme les ministres de France

[Translation]

Wood,¹ who had brought them to me to tell me the gist of them, and had left them in my room. It was done by one of my secretaries named Le Boucher, who understands English very well and who is full of intelligence. Of course it may very well be that M. Wood deceived me and did not communicate the real dispatch. I do not believe so, but at all events I make the suggestion.

January 11, 1763

Annexed to No. 80 of the dispatch
of M. le Duc de Nivernois of

January 12, 1763

In the dispatch of M. Egremont to M. le Duc de Bedford, he begins by saying that he thinks, like the ministers of France, that

¹ The M. Wood is Robert Wood, undersecretary of state. He may have been supplying Nivernois with information at Bute's instance or for cash in hand.

² The nature of this document is sufficiently explained by the preceding one.

qu'il faut s'en tenir à la *lettre des articles préliminaires*. On se récrie beaucoup sur ce que les François veulent être novateurs et s'écartent bien plus du vrai sens que les Anglois auxquels ils font ce reproche.

.....
88v....

Art. 7.

Cet article est conforme à ce que le Duc de Nivernois a mandé mais les termes dans lesquels il est conçu méritent attention. La difficulté faite par le ministère de France sur les limites de la Nouvelle Orléans est trouvée très *extraordinaire*. Un refus *opiniatre* de la part de la France de consentir à ne point avoir de fortifications de l'un et l'autre côté du fleuve paroitroit annoncer un dessein de gêner et troubler la navigation Angloise. Si M. le Duc de Bedford ne peut pas obtenir sur cet article des termes

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satisfaisans par rapport aux limites territoriales il doit absolument insister sur l'entière démolition du fort *la Balise* et de tout autre fort à l'embouchure du fleuve.

Enfin la *nouvelle* demande faite par la France de la restitu-

[*Translation*]

it is necessary to hold to "the letter of the preliminary articles." He complains much that the French wish to innovate and depart much further from the true sense than the English whom they tax with doing so.

Art. 7.

.....
This article conforms to what the Duc de Nivernois indicated, but the terms in which it is couched merit attention. The difficulty made by the ministry of France on the boundary of New Orleans is found "most extraordinary." An "obstinate" refusal by France to have no fortifications on either side of the river seems to announce an intention of vexing and disturbing the English navigation. If M. le Duc de Bedford cannot obtain satisfactory terms as to the territorial boundaries, he is to insist absolutely on the entire demolition of the Fort La Balise and any other at the mouth of the river.

Finally the "new" demand made by France for the restitu-

tion de l'artillerie est (dit-on) aussi singulière qu'inattendue et on croit que M. le Duc de Bedford fera aisement sentir l'impossibilité de l'accorder.

.....

PRASLIN TO NIVERNOIS, January 14, 1763

[A E Corr. Pol. Angl., 449:108]

M. le Duc de Nivernois

1ere lettre

No 43.

Par le courier Domanger

A VERSAILLES le 14. Janvier 1763

Les deux couriers que vous m'avez successivemt dépêchés M le Duc les 3. et 8. de ce mois m'ont apportés vos cinq dépêches no 74. 75. 76. 77. et 78. avec toutes les pieces qui y etoient jointes.

.....

[*Translation*]

tion of the artillery is, they say, as singular as it is unexpected, and they think M. le Duc de Bedford will easily perceive the impossibility of according it.

.....

M. le Duc de Nivernois

First letter

No. 43

By the courier Domanger

VERSAILLES, January 14, 1763

The two couriers whom you successively sent me, M. the Duc, the third and eighth of this month have brought your five dispatches, numbers 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, with all the annexed documents.

.....

Mais si nous consentons à la condition qu'on exige sur l'arte
108v

7. que nous n'entretenions aucune fortification au dessous de la
nouvelle Orleans il faudra au moins que cette condition soit
reciproque. a l'egard du refus qu'on veut nous faire de retirer de
la Louïsiane les effets royaux. c'est une injustice d'autant plus
grande qu'on a accordé cette faculté à l'Espe et je vous avoüe que
nous aurons beaucoup de peine à endurer cette injustice.

.....

[*Translation*]

But if we consent to the condition required on article 7 that
we shall maintain no fortification below New Orleans, the condi-
tion at least must be reciprocal. With regard to the refusal they
would make you with respect to the withdrawal of the royal
property from Louisiana, it is an injustice all the greater in that
the freedom to do it has been accorded to Spain; and I profess to
you we shall with difficulty suffer this injustice.

.....

Mais si nous consentons à la condition qu'on exige sur l'arte
108v

7. que nous n'entretenions aucune fortification au dessous de la nouvelle Orleans il faudra au moins que cette condition soit reciproque. a l'egard du refus qu'on veut nous faire de retirer de la Louïsiane les effets royaux. c'est une injustice d'autant plus grande qu'on a accordé cette faculté à l'Espe et je vous avoüe que nous aurons beaucoup de peine à endurer cette injustice.

.....

[*Translation*]

But if we consent to the condition required on article 7 that we shall maintain no fortification below New Orleans, the condition at least must be reciprocal. With regard to the refusal they would make you with respect to the withdrawal of the royal property from Louisiana, it is an injustice all the greater in that the freedom to do it has been accorded to Spain; and I profess to you we shall with difficulty suffer this injustice.

.....

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